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Preface
It all began in 1975. It was my good fortune to meet Pro¬
fessor William Twining at a conference for legal philosophy
held in Lammi in Finland. I had at that time filed an appli¬
cation to the British Council for a Fellowship and sought
advice regarding which university to choose for studying le¬
gal reasoning. Professor Twining suggested to me that the
best place to study this problem was the University of Edin¬
burgh, where Professor Neil MacCormick was - and still is -
residing.
I decided to accept Professor Twining's advice which I
have never regretted. When I was called to an interview at
The British Council in Copenhagen I had then made up my mind
to study in Edinburgh. This was, I think, somewhat a surprise
for my interviewers who expected, I presume, my answer to be
either Oxford or Cambridge. But I was quite adamant that Edin¬
burgh was the place to go to, indeed, I made this a condition
for my accepting the Fellowship, if offered. I never thought
that I would succeed. I am, therefore, greatly indebted to
the British Council for having been awarded a British Council
Fellowship to study Philosophy of Law towards the Ph.D. at
the University of Edinburgh (Scot/Den/2202/17). And I wish to
convey my gratitude towards the office of the British Council
in Copenhagen which supported my application to the Head of¬
fice in London which granted me the Fellowship, and to the
office in Edinburgh, especially to Miss M.A. Loudon, who
assisted me during my stay in Edinburgh from 1976 to 1978.
My first visit to Edinburgh was in the glorious summer
of 1976, where Professor MacCormick offered me his welcome
and hospitality. Neil became my friend, and I lost my heart
to Edinburgh.
Scandinavian Legal Realism has always received particu¬
lar attention in Scotland.
The subject-matter of my thesis is the philosophy of
Axel Hagerstrom who is the founder of this school of juris¬
prudence (Vilhelm Lundstedt, Karl Olivecrona, Alf Ross). Scan¬
dinavian Legal Realism is an endeavour to describe the ulti¬
mate nature of morality and law or to say what morality and
law really is. This approach requires a preliminary investi-
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gation of the scope and validity of knowledge which is sup¬
plied by Hagerstrom's philosophy. It is Hagerstrom's claim
that morality and law need a proper epistemological founda¬
tion. He also claims that his own philosophy offers the only
proper epistemological foundation for inquiries into the
nature of law and morals. My aim in this thesis is to con¬
sider Hagerstrom's epistemology in relation to his moral
and legal philosophy. This is the reason why my thesis is
occupied with epistemological and ontological issues to a
greater extent than it is usually the case in jurisprudence.
My justification for this is that Hagerstrom is right that
there can be no adequate legal theory without an adequate
grounding in epistemology. Although I shall claim that HS-
gerstrom's epistemology is inadequate, his philosophy of law
deserves serious consideration since HSgerstr5m, like Kelsen,
attempts to build law and legal science on a proper epistemo¬
logical foundation. In this respect I shall argue that Hager¬
strom offers two theories of law which so far have been ne¬
glected .
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Neil for sti¬
mulating discussions and support during the years of my
writing this thesis as well as his introducing me to the
philosophy of Thomas Reid.
When writing my thesis I have followed the advice quoted
in Boswell's Life of Johnson: "Read over your composition,
and where ever you meet with a passage which you think is
particularly fine, strike it out". - I am grateful to Neil
for his reading and correcting my manuscript, turning bad
passages into fine passages, and for making suggestions to
improve the contents.
Of course I accept full responsibility for my thesis.
To present it invites to criticism and critical discussion
of Hagerstrom's philosophy as a means of getting nearer the
truth about knowledge, morality and the law.
Besides the British Council Fellowship, my thesis was
written under a grant from Statens Samfundsvidenskabelige
Forskningsrad (Danish Social Science Research Council, j.nr.
514-6541) which I acknowledge with thanks. I also wish to
express my thanks to "Axel H's Rejselegat", Det samfundsvi-
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denskabelige Fakultet, Aarhus Universitet, and the chairman
Professor Torben Svenne Schmidt, and the Faculty of Law,
and the chairman Professor Stig J0rgensen, for their fa¬
vourable attitude to my applications for financial aid cov¬
ering travelling costs to Edinburgh.
I am indebted to Stig J0rgensen for assistance and ad¬
vice during the years of my fellowship. I also thank my col¬
leagues Ole Fenger and Karl Georg Schmidt for their willing¬
ness to discuss many of the problems to which my thesis gave
rise.
For secretarial assistance, my thanks to Mrs. Birte Hu-
sum and especially to Mrs. Jytte M0nster. Jytte kept me
writing by pressing for material to type, and, when she fi¬
nally got it, turned my illegible handwriting into beauti¬
ful printed pages, also making valuable suggestions for the
improvement of my English. Without her assistance, this the¬
sis would never have materialized.
I dedicate my thesis to my daughters, Tine and Pernille,
who have suffered, I am afraid, from their father being too
occupied with the company of Axel HSgerstrom.
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Chapter I
Axel Hagerstrom. A Biographical Sketch
"Every philosophy is tinged with the colouring of some
secret imaginative background, which never emerges ex¬
plicitly into its train of reasoning."
Alfred North Whitehead*
1. At the Crossroads
Writing in 1896 to his fiance, the twenty three year old
Esther Nyander, Axel Hagerstrom sets forth his conviction
that he has a mission in life. The mission is to work for
the eradication of the prevailing prejudices which form
obstacles to the improvement of the human condition. Ha¬
gerstrom 's vocation for the improvement of the human con¬
dition is directed at reforming the present world, rather
than directed at salvation from the world. To accomplish
this purpose, Hagerstrom believes that a critique of pre¬
vailing philosophical views is necessary in order to arrive
at a rational method as a means to increase human know¬
ledge and human happiness. Hagerstrom, firmly believing in
the righteousness of his cause, quotes Luther's famous
phrase: "Here I stand. I can do no other. God help me.
Amen". He also realizes that "from now on my life will be
one great struggle, and nobody knows, if I ever will
achieve a secure and quiet life, but I have no choice".
Hagerstrom then confronts Esther with the choice of
following him or breaking off the engagement. Hagerstrom
is quite prepared to do so. Esther "is free if she so
wishes, and I (i.e. A.H.) shall in my heart bury all bliss
of life, for which I after all do not exist".
Hagerstrom urges Esther to make up her mind "within
the faith of the Eternal". Hagerstrom did not have to wait
long for a reply, which was concordant with his fervent
hopes. Esther decided to follow Hagerstrom, come what may.
They married in 1899 and she was his devoted wife until
his death in 1939.
Science and the Modern World, New York 1925, p. 1.
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2. Sources on Hagerstrom's Life
I have quoted this letter from the book by Hagerstrom's
daughter Margit Waller: "Axel Hagerstrom. Manniskan som fa
kande"."^ This book is an important source for the story
2)
of Hagerstrom's life, and I have used it in this sketch.
Besides Waller's book I have used the recollections of two
of Hagerstrom's students, the memoirs of John Landquist:
3)
"Axel Hagerstrom" and Anders Wedberg: "Axel Hagerstrom,
Nagra minnesbilder och intryck".^
Knowledge of Hagerstrom's personality and the circum¬
stances of his life is perhaps not relevant for the under¬
standing and evaluation of his philosophical arguments. But
it provides a background for understanding Hagerstrom's
mission and also for his influence on other people.
Hagerstrom, as the title of Waller's book suggests,
effaced his own personality and wished his philosophy to
stand alone. The book reveals Hagerstrom as a compelling
personality, who to many of his students seems to have the look
and intensity of the paradigmatic philosopher. What was
important to Hagerstrom was philosophy, and the proper way
of doing it. Doing philosophy was an existential matter
for Hagerstrom. His whole life was dedicated to the pursuit
of truth, and finding certainty. Hagerstrom had great con¬
fidence that he had found the true philosophy. His philoso¬
phical self-confidence resembles that of Spinoza. A cor¬
respondent once asked Spinoza:
"How do you know that your philosophy is the best of all
that ever have been taught in the world, are now being
1) "Axel Hagerstrom. The Person Whom Few Knew", Stockholm 1961. Herein¬
after referred to as Waller. The letter is at p. 93. I have trans¬
lated the quoted passages into English, as well as all other quoted
passages.
2) This book is also used by C.D. Broad in his "Memoir of Axel Hager¬
strom", printed in PR p. 15-29.
3) "Axel Hagerstrom" in "Som jag minns dem" (As I Remember Them),
Stockholm 1949, p. 129-138. Hereinafter referred to as Landquist.
4) "Axel Hagerstrom. Some Recollections and Impressions" in Svensk
Litteraturtidsskrift, vol. 34, 1971, p. 27-31. Hereinafter referred
to as Wedberg. See also Wedberg's bibliography in Svenskt Biogra-
fisk Lexikon (red. Erik Grill) Bd. 19. Stockholm 1971-73, p. 607-
611 with further references.
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taught, or ever shall be taught? Passing over what may be
devised in the future, have you examined all the philoso¬
phies, ancient as well as modern, which are taught here,
and in India, and everywhere throughout the whole world?
Even if you have duly examined them, how do you know that
you have chosen the best? You will say: "My philosophy is
in harmony with right reason; other philosophies are not."
But all other philosophers except your own followers dis¬
agree with you, and with equal right say of their philoso¬
phy what you say of yours, accusing you, as you do them,
of falsity and error. It is, therefore, plain that before
the truth of your philosophy can come to light, reasons
must be advanced, which are not common to other philoso¬
phies, but apply solely to your own; or else you must ad¬
mit that your philosophy is as uncertain and nugatory as
the rest."5)
To this question Spinoza replied,
This question I might with much greater right ask you, for
I do not presume that I have found the best philosophy, I
know that I understand the true philosophy. If you ask me
in what way I know it, I answer: In the same way as you
know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two
right angles: that this is sufficient, will be denied by
no one whose brain is sound, and who does not go dreaming
of evil spirits inspiring us with false ideas like the true.
For the truth is the index of itself and of what is false". '
I believe that Hagerstrom, if asked, would offer the
same reply as Spinoza. For Hagerstrom truth makes itself
manifest, once we take the true starting-point for our in¬
quiries. What matters is to get rid of "evil spirits", in
order to arrive at genuine knowledge of man and his place
in nature. There is, in Hagerstrom's life, a constant
struggle between the evil spirits of mystical experiences
and the beneficent spirit of genuine knowledge, between
passion and reason, or faith and knowledge.
3. Hagerstrom's Home and His Early Life
Axel Anders Theodor Hagerstrom was born in the rectory of
Vireda, a small village north of Jonkoping, on 6th Septem¬
ber 1868. He was the first child of the Rev. Karl Frederik
Theodor Hagerstrom by his second wife, Augusta Maria Skarin.
With his first wife, Ida Imbring he had already two sons,
5) B. Spinoza, Correspondence (transl. by R.H.M. Elwes) New York 1955,
Letter LXXIII from Albert Burgh, p. 411.
6) B. Spinoza, Correspondence, Letter LXXIV, p. 416-7.
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Reinhold, born in 1863 and Gustav, born in 1865. She died
shortly after having borne Gustav. Hagerstrom's other
brothers and sisters were Johan, born in 1871, Emilia,
born in 1873, Berta, born in 1874 and David, born in 1878.
The children were given a Christian upbringing, first in
the rectory of Vireda, later in Orberga which is beauti¬
fully situated close to Vattern.
Hagerstrom's father was a powerful preacher of the
orthodox Lutheran School. He was definitely opposed to the
"New Evangelism" which was critical of the established
church. Karl Hagerstrom looked upon the "New Evangelism"
as a threat to national unity and defended the traditio¬
nal confessional heritage of the church. In his well-pre¬
pared sermons the admonition of the word plays an impor¬
tant role, especially concerning sin and punishment after
death. He stressed good works as necessary for God's sal¬
vation in Heaven. God must require good works as the pre¬
condition of communion with him. And the Kingdom of Christ
is a realm of grace. Sin, on the other hand, is evil. The
sinner is punished for "bad works" with damnation in Hell.
All the evils of human life flow ultimately from the culp¬
able fall of man. God, in the sermons of Karl Hagerstrom,
is ruler of all things. God is almighty, and righteousness
itself, and as long as sin is exactly balanced by just
punishment, it does not upset the moral harmony in God's
world. Karl Hagerstrom never questioned the truth of the
Lutheran doctrines.
Axel went to church with his parents and listened to
his father's sermons about the sinners and unbelievers
and their fate in Hell. Waller reports that these sermons,
which depicted Hell as eternal fire, made a strong impres¬
sion on Axel's mind. "One day when Axel sat in front of
the open fire in the rectory, he put his hand into the
flames in order to sense the suffer and tortures of the
7)
damned, to whom he perhaps belonged".
At home, Karl Hagerstrom also demanded thorough dis-
7) Waller, p. 24, cf. below Ch. Ill, p. 155.
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cipline and strict order. Once Axel, asked by his mother
to collect some potatoes in the cellar and put them on the
kitchen floor, emptied the bag on the floor in front of
his mother guilelessly: "Here uney are in the place you
wanted". Hagerstrom's father strongly disapproved of Axel's
conduct, and "it was not without some fear that he (i.e.
Karl Hagerstrom) considered that his son might take a wrong
.,8)
turning .
The son, in fact, did take a wrong turning later in
his life, since Axel did not follow his parents' wish to
study theology and become a minister. I shall come back to
this. In his youth, however, Hagerstrom submitted himself
to his father's commandments, and was deeply concerned
with self-examination and sense of guilt. The result was
that Hagerstrom was too afraid of his father to express
himself frankly or spontaneously to him. Perhaps Hagerstrom
- like Mill - was also deprived of a will of his own. As
Mill wrote "I was so accustomed to expect to be told what
to do, either in the form of a direct command or of a re¬
buke for not doing it that I acquired a habit of leaving
my responsibility as a moral agent to rest on my father,
9)
my conscience never speaking to me except by his voice".
Hagerstrom's relationship to his father perhaps ex¬
plains why he in his writings and lectures is so concerned
with the idea of duty and also why he believes that "the
feeling of duty is a conative feeling, ... a feeling of
being driven to act in a certain way, devoid of valuation".
For Hagerstrom "the expression of command leads to the
thought of a commanding will". ^ Hagerstrom's attack on a
commanding will behind the imperative form of the expres¬
sion of the command may be seen as an effort to set him¬
self free from his father's influence, and stress his own
8) Waller, p. 52.
9) John Stuart Mill, Autobiography (ed. by J. Stillinger) Oxford 1971,
p. 33.
10) Hagerstrom, INLM, p. 130, cf. p. 125: the commanded person "is de¬
termined, not by values which are significant for himself, but by
the imperative form of the expression".
11) Hagerstrom, INLM, p. 159.
6
autonomy.
The strict upbringing by his father is in some ways
balanced by Hagerstrom's relationship to his mother Augu¬
sta and her mother, Axel's grandmother, Charlotte. The
latter stayed with Hagerstrom's parents and it is probably
through her influence that Hagerstrom became interested in
political and social questions. Hagerstrom's mother was
also a devoted Christian who firmly believed in the command¬
ment to love God "with all thine heart and with all thy
soul and with all thy might" followed by the commandment
"thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself". Love, for Ha¬
gerstrom's mother, is not seen as a power that destroys
man's reason, but rather, as an emotional attitude by which
discord and fear can be healed.
Hagerstrom's mother was deeply influenced by the "New
Evangelism". Her husband disapproved of the "New Evangelism"
but the difference in religious outlook did not produce any
schism between husband and wife. The explanation is probably,
12)
as Waller suggests, partly Augusta's tolerance of oppos¬
ing views, partly Karl's lack of interest in theological
questions.
The "New Evangelism", or Rosenianism after the founder
13)
of the movement C.D. Rosenius, made much of "objective
justification", appealing to sinners to "come as you are"
and confess and seek trust and salvation in Christ to take
away one's sins. Sinners are not condemned to Hell but may
be assured of his salvation, and by the power of the Holy
Spirit, man is capable of attaining "perfect love" for God
and his fellows in this life.
Augusta Hagerstrom was full of thoughts for her fami¬
ly - including Axel's elder brothers - and she was the
centre of the family and held it together with her solici¬
tude. She did also much for the sick and poor people in
the parish, and her charity was renowned.
12) Waller, p. 15.
13) Rosenius was a lay preacher strongly influenced by George Scott,
an English Methodist Evangelist.
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Waller stresses the mother's importance for Hager-
strom's life. She had a strong affection for her children,
and Axel was profoundly attached to her. Not only in the
sense that Axel could seek consolation from his mother for
his constant fear and dread. In the incident of Axel's
burned hand, mentioned above, his mother not only relieved
the physical pain but tried to soothe Axel's troubled con¬
science by calling attention to God's grace and set it at
rest. But Hagerstrom was also devoted to her in the sense
that his mother was his confidant, in her he could find
understanding and sympathy for his troubles over the menace
of Hell and the problem of an invisible, omnipotent God.
Hagerstrom's fear of Hell and of an invisible God, it
seems to me, leads to observations and questions on the
nature of reality. By relying on his mother, Hagerstrom
was able, I think, to overcome much of his fear of living
in an insecure and inferior world, and rather experience
the world as basically helpful and trustworthy. His mother's
care for him also meant, I think, that Hagerstrom learnt
to separate his own private and internal life of imagina¬
tions from the objective and external life of persons and
objects. Through her love, Hagerstrom came to believe that
both kinds of life, the internal life and the external life,
can be regarded as real. Whether reality or being belongs
fundamentally to either the internal life of feelings or
the external life of objects, including human beings, is
a basic theme in Hagerstrom's later philosophy. Hagerstrom's
occupation with this theme can, I think, psychologically be
traced back to his mother's influence.
4. Hagerstrom's Education and Choice of Study
It was the parents' wish that Axel should study theology
and become a minister thus continuing the family tradition.
Hagerstrom learnt reading before he was 5 years old and he
was educated by his father, who was a very demanding teacher,
until he entered school in 1879 in Jonkoping. Owing to his
father's education Hagerstrom went up to the third class.
8
Hagerstrom was a bright pupil who received good marks. His
favourite subject was mathematics, and from his diary it
emerges that he used to assist his class-mates with solving
mathematical problems as well as doing mathematics for
leisure, because mathematics "always gave him the highest
14)
intellectual pleasure". Otherwise, Hagerstrom relaxed
from his school-work by long walks and other out-door
activities such as skating. Owing to his extensive self-
studies, Hagerstrom was prepared to take the General Cer¬
tificate a year earlier than his class-mates. In order to
do so, an exemption was needed. On the very day Hagerstrom
was going to apply for an exemption at the principal's
office he received a letter from his elder step-brother
Reinhold, urging him to desist from his project. This
letter completely changed Hagerstrom's plan. He did not
apply for an exemption and took his General Certificate
the following year.
Why did Hagerstrom change his mind? Jonkoping, where
Hagerstrom lived, was at that time one of the centres for
the Rosenian movement. Hagerstrom had attached himself to
the movement's ideals of self-denial and meekness for God,
the true ideal being a life of love and obedience to the
will of God, and its preoccupation with self-examination
of one's sinfulness, which is overcome through revival which
leads to a new being in God. Within the congregation and
association of the regenerate, the new beings, each indivi¬
dual under the eye of his fellow Rosenians was to occupy
himself with growth in holiness, denial of worldiness, and
conformity to the indwelling Christ. Reinhold was a fellow
Rosenian and in his letter to his brother, he pointed out
that Axel's plan was a sign of self-worship and self-glori¬
fication which a true Christian must condemn. Spiritual
arrogance in one's own intellect is a sin against God.
Axel was on the point of treading the path of sin, and Rein¬
hold believed it was his brotherly duty to warn his younger
14) Waller, p. 29.
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brother of the momentous consequences of his decision to
apply for an exemption.
When Hagerstrom received his brother's letter, "his
soul was tormented by dissension, which also manifested
15)
itself, since I became deathly pale". The conflict in
Hagerstrom's mind was between his self-esteem and his am¬
bitions on the one hand and his awe or veneration for God's
message "Renounce and you will gain more" on the other.
"God be praised!" Hagerstrom writes, "the demon of ambi¬
tion retreated with shame. The angel of renouncement cap¬
tured my heart and healed gently and peacefully the deep
wounds caused by the struggle".
Hagerstrom made up his mind on moral grounds, that is
to say he abandoned his ambition and withdrew from worldly
interests in order to lead a life in peace with God. This
belief was a comfort to Hagerstrom. He could look forward
to finding salvation rather than incur damnation. Never¬
theless, from the letters to his brothers Gustav and Rein-
hold it is obvious that he had great difficulties in per¬
suading himself that it was the right decision. His brother
Gustav suggested to him that he might prepare himself for
the coming studies at the University of Uppsala. Hagerstrom
thought that this might be a good idea, and asked for in¬
formation concerning the study of philosophy rather than
the study of theology.
The letter - from 1885 - shows clearly that Hagerstrom
was in doubt whether he was "called" to become a minister
and that he needed some time to reflect on his future
career. What emerges from Hagerstrom's letters in this
period is a great sensitivity to the issue of dependence
and independence in man's relation to God, but also a cer¬
tain ambivalence which required him to give consideration
to all sides of this issue.
In 1886 Hagerstrom went to the University of Uppsala
15) Waller, p. 36. My translation from a letter from Axel to Rein-
hold (his "beloved brother"). The following quotation is from
the same letter.
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to study theology. He passed the introductory exam in 1887
which covered subjects as History, Greek, Hebrew and Philo¬
sophy. In Philosophy his teacher was Erik Olaf Burman
(1845-1929), and it was due to his influence that Hager-
strom in 1887 "decided to devote myself to philosophical
4- » 16 )studies .
In a letter to his father from May 1887 Hagerstrom
informed him of this decision. Hagerstrom's motivation
17)
was partly "his anti-theological way of thinking", part¬
ly the role of minister and his representative functions.
Hagerstrom's anti-theological way of thinking is solely
directed at the dogmatic studies of religion, not at the
Christian elements in religion. "Christianity is", Hager¬
strom writes, "from the bottom of my heart the only reli¬
gion which can satisfy an individual human being's con¬
crete spiritual requirements". His antipathy to the role
of minister is bound up with the social aspects of the
role of minister. A minister is connected with his
audience.
"He must within his congregation account for Providence not
only in his teaching but also in his life. Therefore, the
congregation has a rightful claim to scrutinize not only
his teaching but also his style of life. The social role
of the scholar is quite different. He is only concerned
with finding the truth, and his personal way of living
does not concern the public at all."
What matters to Hagerstrom is to break his way away from
these external influences, and only rely on his own intel¬
lectual powers in order to establish his own independence.
Psychologically, Hagerstrom's decision to study phi¬
losophy rather than theology may be explained as a reac¬
tion towards his whole upbringing and an effort to become
independent of this upbringing. Hagerstrom's parents,
especially his father, wanted Axel to study theology and
find his way in life as a minister. By his decision not
to enter theological study Hagerstrom expressed his
desire to become an independent and autonomous person with
16) Hagerstrom, PR p. 33.
17) Waller, p. 61-62.
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a will of his own. It is of some significance, I think,
that Hagerstrom signed his letter "Give all at home my
love from Pappa's philosophical son Axel".
Hagerstrom's announcement to quit the study of theo¬
logy caused an uproar in the family. The parents were an¬
gered by their son's disobedience, anxious of what might
happen to the abandoned son and uneasy about his earning
a living in the future. His decision, in short, could
bring disgrace on the family. A brisk exchange of letters
took place between the parents and Hagerstrom. The parents
supplicated and adjured Hagerstrom to change his mind. It
was imputed to him that he was ungrateful, selfish, un¬
loving, freakish and vagarious. Hagerstrom's father, deep¬
ly shocked and indignant at his son's anti-theological
view, threatened him with rescinding financial support
for his studies. This move, however, was vanquished by
Hagerstrom's mother, who at first also felt betrayed.
After a while she accepted his decision and tried to me¬
diate between father and her beloved and admired son. The
father's wrath was not so easily allayed, and it was not
until 1893, on Hagerstrom's twentyfifth birthday at the time
of the conferment of his doctor's degree in philosophy, that
the father was reconciled with his son's choice and satis¬
fied that this choice after all did not entail any dis¬
grace on the family but on the contrary was a credit to
the family, cf. below p. 15.
Hagerstrom, as indicated, did not give in to his pa¬
rents' entreatments and exhortations. Once, in 1885, Rein-
hold had succeeded in reviving Hagerstrom's feeling of
sin and unworthiness. By attacking his motives Reinhold's
letter had stripped Hagerstrom of his pride in his in¬
tellectual abilities and reduced him to the sinful child
in the presence of the omniscient God. Now, he had the
courage of following his own conviction. Hagerstrom had
the feeling that he had to live his own life, not his
father's life. In spite of the opposition of his family,
Hagerstrom was determined to study philosophy. This, of
12
course, was a critical period in Hagerstrom's life. He was
under great emotional strain, torn between his respect and
love for his parents and his longing for independence.
Hagerstrom's letters do not reveal anything about this
inner conflict in his mind. But it is significant that
Hagerstrom once the decision was made changed his plans
of going home and spending the holidays in the family's com¬
pany. Hagerstrom used to return to the rectory to find re¬
freshment in its garden, its lovely view, and enjoy the
presence of his beloved parents.
The problem for Hagerstrom was to break away from his
parents and establish his own independence. And this pro¬
blem needed fundamental questioning which in turn required
loneliness. So Hagerstrom went directly from Uppsala to an
inn in Bjornlunda in order to reflect upon his future life.
With Henrik Ibsen: "Really to sin you have to be serious
18)
about it" , Axel Hagerstrom was serious about it. His
letters indicate that Hagerstrom's decision was a matter
of principle for him. What the parents ask Hagerstrom to
abdicate is something which he cannot abdicate "my honour"
19)and "plight my troth". The letters also indicate that
these principles cause Hagerstrom intense mental agony.
Hagerstrom thinks that it is quite wrong of his parents
to say that he is an ungrateful and unloving son. "God is
my witness that I will not be an ungrateful and unloving
20)
son", he says in his letter. He is quite prepared to
respect and honour his father and mother in every respect
except in matters "which offend my conviction of the right
think to do. Right and duty, more than anything else, have
to do with matters of the utmost individual and sensitive
character".^
Hagerstrom was very sensitive about his honour, and
as he later wrote "one fights the better when one is stand-
18) Henrik Ibsen, Peer Gynt, 1867. Hagerstrom read and admired the
works of Ibsen.
19) Waller, p. 64.
20) Waller, p. 64. Letter from June 1887.
21) Waller, p. 65. Letter from June 1887.
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22)
ing up for one's rights". The analysis of the notions
of right and duty was to occupy Hagerstrom's mind. What
Hagerstrom writes in this letter forms the background for
his later philosophical analysis of these concepts. Hager¬
strom's attention to these concepts for philosophical ana¬
lysis was undertaken, I believe, not only because of their
philosophical and legal bearings but also with a wider pur¬
pose in mind: that of understanding his own station and
its rights and duties.
In his letters Hagerstrom also indicated that he would
visit his parents in September, but he did not do so and
returned to Uppsala to pursue his studies. He also took
up teaching in order to earn his keep. He worked very hard
and after a few years studies he passed his final exam in
1892 .
He then began preparing his thesis "Aristoteles etiska
23)
grundtanker och deres teoretiska foruttsattningar" which
was completed and defended in 1893.
Hagerstrom's life in Uppsala was ascetic and lonely.
He was by nature a recluse. Besides he did not spend the
time with his fellow-students, partly because his studies
and teaching did not give him the opportunity, partly be¬
cause he, had he the opportunity, could not afford to go
to public houses.
According to Waller, Burman gave special attention
to the young Hagerstrom. "Burman looked after Hagerstrom
like a father, and was probably the person in Uppsala who
24)
was dearest to Hagerstrom during his period of studies".
Burman and Hagerstrom formed a lifelong friendship. Other¬
wise Hagerstrom lacked intimate personal friends.
Hagerstrom mentions Aristotle's division of friend¬
ship into three kinds without mentioning the source, viz.
Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII. Hagerstrom dismisses
22) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 2.
23) Uppsala 1893 (Aristotle's Ethical Ideas and Their Theoretical
Presuppositions).
24) Waller, p. 79.
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friendship for the sake of utility and pleasure, and
stresses the perfect friendship which is based on love
for the same aim in life - the eternal life - and where
men, concerned with this common aim, address themselves to
implement it. For Hagerstrom
"the value of friendship is for the sake of intellectual
community of ideas, and this intellectual community I can
share without any physical relationship with, e.g. a writer,
dead or living. I love Kant, Fichte, Brandes, Nietzsche
and many others with equal devotion, if not with greater
devotion, than any of my friends. Perhaps the ardour of
love would vanish, if I did become personally acquainted
with them: No man is a hero to his valet". '
2 6)
Among many others, "the genius Marx" must be mentioned.
Hagerstrom's lack of personal friends may perhaps be
explained by a saying of Henrik Ibsen, "Friends are to be
feared, not so much for what they make us do as for what
they keep us from doing". His brother Reinhold is a case
in point. Hagerstrom's letters reflect that he suffered
from depression, and the only cure seems to have been
reading philosophy, seeking desparately to find the truth.
"The power of truth is great and it will survive even
without the support of a weak human being. My comfort is
that the truth will always, like beams of light through
darkness, come to the fore. I have toiled and struggled
for truth but perhaps my work was not pure, therefore it
had to be purified in order that the eternal truth may
dwell therein. The truth requires us in its service, if
we do not sacrifice ourselves for the truth, we are use¬
less tools",
.... 27)
wrote Hagerstrom to hxs parents in 1891.
It is noticeable that Hagerstrom uses religious words
to describe his position. For Hagerstrom you have to free
yourself from extraneous matters, and discipline your un¬
ruly will and affections in the pursuit of truth and know¬
ledge. If you just know the truth, you need not be scared.
Thus, Hagerstrom divides his world into the intelli¬
gible, which is logically structured and real, and the un¬
intelligible, which is chaotic and unreal. His ideal is
25) Waller, p. 128. From a letter to Esther written 1897.
26) Waller, p. 184. Hagerstrom's characterization in a lecture held
1908.
27) Waller, p. 81-82. Letter of 10th November.
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no longer God but absolute, unchangeable truth, and for
this he suffers rightly, because he is cleansed by suffer¬
ing and is thereby prepared for life in this world. Hager-
strom, when breaking away from his parents and their ideals,
has attached himself to a new ideal, i.e. that of seeking
absolute truth, on which he is building a new emotional
defence against his constant feeling of helplessness and
loneliness.
5. Hagerstrom's Relationship to His Parents
The 6th September 1893 was a great day in Hagerstrom's
life. It was his 25th birthday. It was also the date for
the conferring of his degree which took place in connection
with the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Uppsala
Mote in 1593, where the Protestant Reformation was con¬
solidated by King Gustav Vasa's adoption of the Lutheran
confession of Augsburg. It was a day with glorious sunshine,
also in a literal sense, for Hagerstrom, whose parents had
travelled to Uppsala to praise their son. His mother had
brought him the garland, made by her from flowers in the
garden, and his father's fear for his son's fate had turned
into respect. He could, after all, be well pleased with his
beloved son, who was going to be a lecturer in the University.
Thus, the parents and Hagerstrom were happily reunited.
Hagerstrom could again spend his holidays in the parents'
home. If he often did not do so, it was this time due to
hard working, mostly on philosophical subjects in Uppsala,
and not, as previously, due to differences in convictions.
Hagerstrom's father died in 1906. This is only mentioned
28)in passing in Waller's book, and there is no account of
whether this affected Hagerstrom. I do not know whether
there is any causal connection between his father's death
and Hagerstrom's opposition to idealism, subjectivism, and
metaphysics, which set in afterwards. Hagerstrom's mother
moved to Stockholm, where she died in 1933. Until her death
she took a lively interest in Hagerstrom's philosophy and
her wish was, expressed in a letter when she was about 87,
28) Waller, p. 145.
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"that philosophy must be the foundation, on which we wretch¬
ed human beings with some confidence can build our small
29)
houses".
Hagerstrom's letters to his mother are pervaded with
affection and gratitude to her. In a birthday letter to
her, he stresses the importance of
"the intimacy in the relations between parents and children.
Therefore, the unity and holiness of the family is the most
important condition for the strength of the generation to
come. For, if the past and the present only are opposed to
each other, then conviction and death are at hand. '
The intimacy, which Hagerstrom refers to in his letter, he
found in his relationship to his mother. She was, I believe,
the most important person to him throughout all his child¬
hood and youth. Her great affection and care for his wel¬
fare made him love her as a child and gave him the feeling
of safety or security, he needed, because of his father's
austere way of life. Hagerstrom's father was particularly
strict in anything that touched on religion and morality,
which in Hagerstrom's case produced an intense feeling of
sin and unworthiness. This feeling was only balanced by
his mother's care. Hagerstrom rather respected than loved
his father. Hagerstrom's basis for this relationship was
fear and reverence. In contrast to his relationship with
his mother, which was founded on adoration and affection.
At his mother's funeral, Hagerstrom, deeply moved, talked
of the sparkles in her eyes, which embraced him when he
first left home to see the world.
6. Hagerstrom's Future Career
Hagerstrom worked hard through his whole life. Having com¬
pleted his dissertation, he started working on new projects,
which were completed and published in 1895. One book was
"Undersokning av den empiristiska etikens mojlighet med
31)
sarskild hansyn till dess moderna huvudformer", followed
29) Waller, p. 16.
30) Waller, p. 66. From a letter dated 23rd October 1903.
31) (An Inquiry into the Possibility of the Empiri&ist Ethics with
Special Regard to Its Modern Representatives).
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by its sequel "Om den moraliska kanslan och driften sasom
32)
fornuftiga i den moderna rationalismens huvudformer".
Hagerstrom's intention in writing these two books was
to strengthen his candidacy for the professorship in prac¬
tical philosophy, which was vacant after the retirement of
C.Y. Sahlin. E.O. Burman, Hagerstrom's teacher in philosophy,
also applied for the post. Hagerstrom did not for one se¬
cond think that he would be appointed to the post. His only
intention in applying was to receive a formal acknowledge¬
ment of the merits of his works, a recognition of his qua¬
lifications as a philosopher, which might be useful for his
future career. His parents were worried about his future
prospects, and had admonished him to take care of his pro¬
spects for the future as a teacher.
As it was expected, Burman was appointed to the chair.
The Committee's decision was in that respect, in Hager¬
strom's opinion, absolutely right. On the other hand, the
Committee was absolutely wrong, in Hagerstrom's opinion,
to report that he was not qualified for the vacant post.
Hagerstrom was infuriated by the statements by the members
of the Committee concerning his philosophical abilities.
The Committee's testimony was, in his opinion, an heinous
act. Among other things it was said about him that
"he was perhaps somewhat one-sided but after all evident¬
ly a philosophically gifted person with great potentiali¬
ties. But still he is in a period of "Sturm und Drang"
(i.e. storm and stress), so there is no knowing what he
may do; his future development must be considered to be
quite questionable".33)
34)
This statement was made by Professor Reinhold Geijer,
whom thenceforward Hagerstrom regarded as an opponent,
treating him with the utmost contempt. It was a victory for
Hagerstrom when Geijer later recommended Hagerstrom's
appointment to the chair of philosophy in Uppsala, cf.
below p. 26.
32) (On the Moral Sense and Instinct as Rational in the Principal
Forms of Modern Rationalism).
33) Waller, p. 96-97.
34) Reinhold Geijer (1849-1922), professor in theoretical philosophy
in Uppsala.
18
Hagerstrom was asked if he would withdraw his appli¬
cation, in order to avoid publication of the Committee's
unfavourable statements - but he refused and the Committee's
report was released in March 1896. Hagerstrom had in his
outrage already planned a counterblast. In his letter to
Esther, already referred to in section 1 of this chapter,
Hagerstrom had made it quite clear that he was not pre¬
pared to give in but rather determined to fight for his
conviction. Hagerstrom got Esther's support, and in a later
letter he writes "the general opinion here in Uppsala is,
as far as I know, that the Committee's rejection depends
upon the fact that I have completely rejected the prevail-
35)
ing views of the powerful masters". At the same time he
writes to his parents stating his reasons for countering
the Committee's unfavourable testimony of his philosophi¬
cal qualifications. He writes:
"I do not overlook the risks for my own future life, but
I know for sure that I must first abide by my own ideas
and not allow these ideas to be stiffled by some spiritual
dotards, who now are the masters of affairs, next I must
strike a blow to emancipate, if possible, the philosophi¬
cal spirit, which at present in Sweden is ensnared by some
old men with impoverished minds. Besides I am immovably
convinced that I am right. Why should I then give way? To
speak my mind I feel that I am called upon to initiate my
lifework."36)
Hagerstrom published his reply "Om den empiristiska
etiken och den moraliska kanslan - svar pa kritik" in
1897.37)
7. Hagerstrom's Relationship to His Family
The only person, whom Hagerstrom missed on the glorious
day of 6th September 1893, cf. above section 5. was Esther
Nyander. She was the daughter of a minister, Nils Johan
Nyander, who lived in the neighbourhood of Hagerstrom's
home. The families of Nyander and Hagerstrom knew each
35) Waller, p. 98. From a letter written in March 1896.
36) Waller, p. 99. Letter from March 1896.
37) (On the Empiristic Ethics and the Moral Sense - Reply to Critics).
This book has not been accessible to me, and I have not had the
opportunity to read it.
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other personally and a visit at Hagerstroms' was arranged
in order that their children could come to know each other.
When Hagerstrom saw Esther, in the summer of 1892, he imme¬
diately fell in love with her, and he won her afrection.
They were formally engaged in 1896.
Hagerstrom's relationship to his fiance can be summed
up by a quotation from a letter written in 1896:
"I have now, you realize, only you, to confide in in every
respect. Only together with you do I realize myself as I
am. In company with other persons I have to harness myself
in certain rigid and stark manners which I feel almost
suffocating. Therefore, you are half of my soul, and without
you I am only a half human being."38)
Esther was to become the half of Hagerstrom's life,
the other half was philosophy. Esther did not understand
much of his philosophy, but she endorsed it and backed
him up whole-heartedly, ever since the incident of Hager¬
strom's failure to get the chair in philosophy mentioned
in the beginning of this chapter. "She had an intuitive
understanding of his aims and she loved and admired him
just as he was, although she sometimes found him to be a
39)
bit eccentric", Waller comments. She was the life force
in Hagerstrom's life in solitude, mentally and physically,
and only the thought of her devotion kept him up in his
periods of depression. Hagerstrom married Esther in 1899.
In January 1899 he thought that his financial position was
so secure that he could afford to rent a house. He informed
Esther of his decision, which meant that they had to make
preparations for getting married. The wedding was arranged
to take place the 28th June in the church of Ostra Harg,
where Esther's father was a minister. It was with a sense
of freedom from fear and anxiety that Hagerstrom and his
bride moved into their common home, which was to become
the seat and centre of family life, Hagerstrom had two
daughters - Rut and Esther -, and the focus of domestic
affections, in a quotation from Goethe, "The most fortu-
38) Waller, p. 127. Letter of September 1896.
39) Waller, p. 138.
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nate of men, be he a king or a commoner, is he whose wel¬
fare is assured in his own home". I think that Hagerstrom
was one of these most fortunate men. His wife cared for
him, and there he found everlasting abode of bliss.
Thus, Hagerstrom combined marriage and philosophy.
His wife's love was his strength both in his striving to
overcome the evil spirits in his own mind and in his philo¬
sophical work directed against the prevailing false and
pernicious ideas, which deprive men of a genuine sense of
truth and reality.
It seems, his daughter writes, that Hagerstrom did
overcome the depressive mood, which was so salient in his
youth, thanks to his own strength of character and his
wife's efforts to brighten his otherwise pessimistic views.
"Together with her he created a home infused with tender-
40)
ness, safety and thoughtfulness". Hagerstrom is described
41)
by his daughter as "kind to wife and children". However,
in his engagement in philosophical discussions Hagerstrom
often conveyed the impression of being pugnacious and
belligerent, but these traits were completely absent when
at home. "He was so harmonious, so tender and gentle that
it is true to say that the essence of his personality was
42)marked by an august serenity".
Hagerstrom had - so he reports in one of his letters -
a fiery temper, and the reason why he appeared so harmo¬
nious at home may be due to the fact that he was never
faced there with any criticism of his views, neither from
his wife, nor from his friends, who all seem to have sub¬
mitted themselves to his serene mind.
His only passions were strong coffee and smoking his
long-pipe. He never travelled outside Sweden but often
talked about visiting one place in particular, that
is Konigsberg, where Kant had lived and worked. He also
dreamt of going to Rome to experience the Roman Forum,
40) Waller, p. 190.
41) Waller, p. 190.
42) Waller, p. 190.
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but this dream never materialized. Although he was in¬
vited to attend a conference in Rome in 1933, he was "for
several reasons obliged to decline the invitation", Waller
43)
writes. But she does not specify Hagerstrom's reasons.
I venture to guess that one of Hagerstrom's reasons was
that he was afraid of going abroad, leaving his wife and
children behind him. When his wife and children once - in
1905 - went to see her parents, leaving Hagerstrom alone
in Uppsala, he was out of his mind. "If the postman keeps
me waiting for a few minutes I can hardly endure the
suspense, and when he finally arrives with your letter,
I'm in such a hurry to read it that I tear both envelope
44)and letter into pieces", Hagerstrom writes to his wife.
I take it that Hagerstrom still - in 1933 - could not bear
the thought of leaving his wife and his home where he felt
secure.
8. Hagerstrom's Mission and His Final Victory: Professor
Hagerstrom's lifework as a philosopher was to substitute
philosophy for religion as the true foundation for know¬
ledge of man's existence in society. Hagerstrom sets out
with a short essay "Om filosofiens betydelse for manniskan"45)
in which he presents his opposition to the prevailing views
in Uppsala. In his essay Hagerstrom presents two principal
trends of thought in the history of mankind. One is an ex¬
trovert trend of thought, where knowledge is based upon
what is accessible to the senses. The other trend is intro¬
vert, where knowledge is based upon feeling and intuition.
The extroverts stress analysis and reflection, and are
critical of received opinions and common ideas. The intro¬
verts, on the other hand, tend to be uncritical, accepting
without any questioning the inherited opinions which are
adhered to as dogmas. What matters is to find a philosophi¬
cal justification for human opinions and establish valid
43) Waller, p. 199.
44) Waller, p. 180.
45) (On the Importance of Philosophy for Mankind) Uppsala 1898.
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principles for the unity of mankind.
The key questions are, Hagerstrom says, what is the
nature of a philosophical understanding concerning the
basic foundation for man's knowledge, and what is the na¬
ture of a philosophical understanding concerning the final
goal of man's life. The first question concerning knowledge
is answered by Hagerstrom on idealist lines. If there is
to be a fundamental account of knowledge of what there is,
it must start from the intellect. Intellect, Hagerstrom
argues, is the key to understanding of the world. Like
Berkeley, Hagerstrom claims that sensible things have no
existence without the mind. When I perceive a tree, Hager¬
strom writes, I cannot be sure that there is a tree. The
only thing I know for sure is that I have a sense-experience
of a tree. The ground for what is real and what is apparent
depends upon some sort of intellectual necessity. This ne¬
cessity is found in a universal and impersonal mind, which
to a greater or lesser extent is present in one's personal
mind. It is not possible, Hagerstrom argues, to conceive
of reality in terms of the experience of individual minds.
Nor is it possible to resort to the mind of God. Rather,
we must conceive of reality in terms of a common and uni¬
versal mind, exemplified in philosophy. The task of philo¬
sophy is to provide the logical principles for testing
the soundness of human claims to possess knowledge. These
principles cannot be found in experience. Since they are
used to justify experience they must be independent of ex¬
perience and must accordingly find their basis in reason.
As for the second question concerning man's goal, Hager¬
strom' s answer is that the moral rightness and wrongness
of actions do not consist in outward obedience to commands,
but in the imitation of the universal unwritten law in man's
inward life. The ultimate goal of man is peace and mental
and material security and happiness.
In carrying out his important task Hagerstrom thinks
that it is vital to purify oneself from extraneous matters
such as gaining personal benefits or rewards in the shape
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of money. Submitting his essay to the public he writes to
his parents
"Well, now my essay has been published. I don't care at
all about the general accepted view of the public nor
whether any attention is paid to my book, although I had
the wish that somebody might learn something by reading
it or, in fact, get their vision widened. Thus, I hold
that I am totally indifferent to any outward evaluation
of my essay and my only hope is that it will bring about
something good."46)
I do not know how Hagerstrom's essay was received by
the public, but I know that Hagerstrom after all was not
"totally indifferent to any outward evaluation". Having
written his book about Kant, "Kants Ethik im Verhaltnis
47)
zu seinem erkenntnistheoretischen Grundgedanken", he
conveys in a letter to his parents his satisfaction, even
pride, to learn that he is now known in Gottingen, "one
48)
of Germany's most distinguished universities".
This can be contrasted with what Landquist reports
about the reception of Hagerstrom's book in Uppsala. The
rector of the University made the complaint that it was a
scandal that the Professor in philosophy, Kurre Geijer,
had not read the book of the illustrious lecturer in phi-
49)
losphy. Hagerstrom's own attitude towards Geijer is
shown by the following incident, taking place in Geijer's
home, where Landquist and Hagerstrom were present. Geijer
started a conversation about Kant. Whereupon Hagerstrom
grabbed a big directory from a shelf and concentrated upon
reading it, until Geijer had finished his talk.
It must be stressed that the true philosopher for
Hagerstrom is the man who passionately and sincerely stri¬
ves for truth.
"The philosopher, the true philosopher, is distinguished
from other men, not by getting closer to the truth, but
by the fact that the love of truth is glowing in his soul
in contrast to the coolness in other people. These people
are content with bits of truth, the philosopher by contrast
46) Waller, p. 122. From a letter written April 1898. Hagerstrom's
emphasis (my translation).
47) Uppsala 1902.
48) Waller, p. 176.
49) Landquist, p. 131.
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is not satisfied with bits of truth but wants the whole
truth, he spreads his wings in search of the whole truth
in its eternal radiance^0)
Hagerstrom never changed his view of philosophy. For
him - as for Plato - the genuine philosopher is the person
whose passion it is to "strive after the whole of truth".
The philosopher with his passion for wisdom or the whole
of truth has "a taste for every sort of knowledge and throws
51)
himself into acquiring it with an insatiable curiosity".
When a man knows, then there must be something that he knows.
Only what is real, as opposed to what is unreal, can be
known. The object of knowledge then is the real, the world
as it is, as opposed to the world of imagination and feel¬
ing, or to a transcendent world of ideas as postulated by
Plato by his theory of forms. In this respect Hagerstrom
departs from Plato. Hagerstrom rejects the Platonic notion
of a world of separate forms or universals and adheres to
the Aristotelian notion that universals are inherent in
particular things. Basically the aim is to present a total
view of the world and man's place in this Universe.
As for the role of the philosopher, Locke had written
that
"'tis Ambition enough to be employed as an Under-Labourer
in clearing Ground a little, and removing some of the
Rubbish, that lies in the way to Knowledge; which certain¬
ly had been very much more advanced in the World, if the
Endeavours of ingenious and industrious Men had not been
much cumbred with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth,
affected, or unintelligible Terms, introduced into the
Sciences, and there made an Art of, to that Degree, that
Philosophy, which is nothing but the true Knowledge of
Things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to be brought into
well-bred Company, and polite Conversation. Vague and in¬
significant Forms of Speech, and Abuse of Language, have
so long passed for Mysteries of Science; And hard or mis-
apply'd Words, with little or no Meaning, have by Prescrip¬
tion, such a Right to be mistaken for deep Learning, and
Height of Speculation, that it will not be easie to per¬
suade, either those who speak, or those who hear them,
that they are but the Covers of Ignorance, and Hindrance
of true Knowledge. To break in upon the Sanctuary of Vanity
50) Waller, p. 175. From a letter to Esther, December 1898.
51) Cf. Plato, The Republic (translated by F.M.Cornford) Oxford 1966,
p. 187 (V 485) , and p. 178 (V. 475).
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and Ignorance, will be, I suppose, some Service to Humane
Understanding."52)
Hagerstrom would agree with Locke, but he never con¬
ceived the function of the true philosopher to be solely
an under-labourer. His function is also to be a lay-
preacher, leading people towards the truth. In this Hager¬
strom resembles his father. But the gospel which Hager¬
strom preaches is different. It is essentially the possi¬
bility of salvation not in virtue of a saviour but through
the improvement of human understanding. Man can be free
by understanding the true order of nature and by the use
of reason man is able to detach himself from superstition
and ignorance and from the blind hatred, which supersti¬
tion and ignorance engender, thus attaining happiness and
dignity. Like Spinoza, HagerStrom's purpose is to teach
people to think realistically and rationally about social
and moral problems, and to discard moral and religious
prejudices.
Since 1904, owing to Professor Burman's illness, Hager¬
strom held for long periods his post and gave lectures on
burning issues such as Socialism. In a letter to his pa¬
rents he writes,
"I now lecture on Socialism, and the theatre is mostly
crammed with people, including many Socialist students.
Yet the crux of the matter is not to judge whether Socia¬
lism is right or wrong, the point is really to investigate
what kind of ideas are involved in modern Socialism, to
return to the pot in human nature, where the Socialist
food is cooked, in a single phrase: to understand Socia¬
lism. Thus, you do not have to fear that I shall end up
as a Socialist. For a philosopher, as a matter of fact,
practical affairs as such are unimportant. He rather de¬
votes himself to his studies and strives only for under¬
standing the truth of the matter, and grasp the inner
coherence in what happens."53)
Hagerstrom was deeply interested in political and
social problems but his attitude was that of the keen
observer not that of the active participant. His comment
on the general strike and lockout in Sweden 1909 is re-
52) John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (edt. P.H.
Nidditch) Oxford 1975, The Epistle to the Reader, o. 10.
53) Waller, p. 177. From a letter written November 1904. Hagerstrom's
emphasis.
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vealing in that respect. In a letter to his mother he
writes,
"The general strike, however, is a valuable lesson for
the workers, they are taught that it is by no means an
easy task to overthrow a society, which is based upon an
ancient legal order. Let this be the lesson to the workers
that it is of no avail to proceed in thoughtless actions,
if they wish to conquer something. Bearing this in mind
the general strike may be of great significance for the
whole society by bringing about a more peaceful labour
market."54)
Hagerstrom in his lectures tried to supply his liste¬
ners with the information necessary for successful actions.
Having acted as a substitute for Professor Burman for many
years, he was finally - in 1911 - elected to the post as a
professor of practical philosophy. Hagerstrom received the
good news when taking a walk in Uppsala. His only thought
was to inform his wife, so he rushed home, rang excitedly
the bell, and when his wife opened the door, he just pro¬
claimed "called". ^
The fact that Hagerstrom was nominated a professor
without his applying for the post is rather significant.
Once Hagerstrom applied for this chair but was rejected.
In 1906 his application for a chair in Lund was also turned
down, although this time his qualifications were duly ac¬
knowledged. Now, on the advice of Professor Geijep, his
former opponent, he was elected, because he fulfilled the
condition "to be deservedly considered to be appointed in
preference to any other Swedish man who can be thought of
56)
fulfilling the professorship". Waller reports that her
father was very cheerful and lighthearted on receiving
the news, especially since it was by no means obvious that
he would be nominated. There were other candidates for the
post and Hagerstrom was well known for holding radical
views which might prevent his nomination.
So, small wonder that Hagerstrom, once an apostate,
now a resurgent felt that he was rehabilitated. His suffer-
54) Waller, p. 185. From a letter of 23rd August 1909.
55) Waller, p. 187.
56) Waller, p. 186. Cf. above p. 21.
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ing had not been in vain, and his calling was proof of his
salvation. Now was the time to do things in the service of
mankind.
Hagerstrom's inaugural lecture was held on 18th March
1911 and later published as "Om moraliska forestallningars
sanning". I shall deal with the substance of his lecture
later. In concluding this chapter I shall offer some views
concerning Hagerstrom's style of lecturing as reported by
some of his former pupils.
9. Hagerstrom's Style and Impact
Hagerstrom's method of lecturing - as a young lecturer
57)
around 1900 - was most remarkable, Landquist reports.
Hagerstrom was a very shy person, and he tried to evade
standing face to face with his students. Thus, Hagerstrom
would sit in his chair, with his back to the audience,
reading aloud from his well-prepared lecture-notes covered
in a black oilcloth wrapper, and never glancing at the
students. His lectures, however, made a deep impression.
His voice was distinct, sharp and sensuous, and certain
sentences were stressed passionately and very energetical¬
ly. And he had always something shocking to tell. Thus,
in his character sketch of St. Paul he would say that St.
Paul was a homosexual, and this was the reason why St.
Paul talked of a thorn in the flesh.
When students sat for their examination, which took
place in Hagerstrom's house, he would let them sit in one
room, while Hagerstrom himself occupied his adjacent study,
asking them questions. Hagerstrom himself never appeared,
except once, it is reported, when a student, answering a
question about the philosophy of Plato, explained that
Plato was a materialist, Hagerstrom then became visible
in the doorway and scrutinized with a piercing look the
57) Landquist attended Hagerstrom's lectures on philosophy of reli¬
gion in 1902, and he also took private lessons with Hagerstrom
in order to pass his exam in philosophy. Landquist's doctoral
thesis submitted to the University of Uppsala was rejected. When
Landquist in 1930 applied for a professorship in Lund, he was
declared unqualified by the committee, where Hagerstrom was a
member.
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candidate. Hagerstrom would face-to-face judge the kind
of human being who could say such a thing.
Thus, Hagerstrom was considered to be a peculiar man,
surrounding himself with an atmosphere of mystery and
magic. This, perhaps, was instrumental for creating "the
Myth of Hagerstrom" as exemplifying the true philosopher:
indifferent to the world around him, intensely occupied
with reading books on philosophy. He was renowned for his
logical acumen. His penetrating mind would penetrate the
darkened superstitions and prejudices of other thinkers
with the most striking outcomes. The implications of his
own views were sometimes left somewhat obscure, except
for his admirers. Hagerstrom was a powerful persuasive
and domineering man, and the intensity of his own presenta¬
tion and the compelling force of his own views communicated
themselves to his followers and made demands on them to
adjust their views to him. His personality was characte¬
rized by a stern and serene kindness which sometimes
turned out to be more benignant and charitable, particu¬
larly in relation to persons he approved of. But he could
also be very malicious and frantic. Especially he showed
immense hostility towards persons whose opinions he dis¬
approved of. When Hagerstrom acted as a critic at the
public defences of doctoral theses, he would give his
opponents a withering look, and approach their work with
violent animus. In such he could behave as "Jupiter
„ 58)tonans .
As a professor, Hagerstrom's lectures were also of
a peculiar nature. The lecture room faced the Cathedral.
It was fitted with tiers of rising seats facing the lec¬
turer's table, and the entrance to the room was in a cor¬
ner, where the seats were at their highest which had the
effect that the lecturer was not visible until he advanced
to the middle of the room. Anders Wedberg reports that
the audience was made up of a small, but loyal group of
58) Landquist, p. 131.
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eight to ten people, mostly older residents in Uppsala who
were on friendly terms with Hagerstrom, and two or three
59)
students. While waiting for the lecturer to begin the
students were sitting talking to each other or looking at
the doves flapping around the Cathedral. Suddenly a low
voice was heard from the lecturer's table. There he was
sitting, with the grizzled hair combed back and the pincenez
wedged to his nose, reading aloud from a thick bunddle of
lecture-notes. The lecturer would start without any cere¬
monies. Hagerstrom never greeted his audience and would
hardly look at them. If he ever raised his eyes from his
notes, he would only glance at the doves, and not have an
eye for the audience.
As a teacher Hagerstrom was certainly different, an¬
other of his pupils, Folke Schmidt reports. Hagerstrom
"was a small thin man with a big head of hair like that of
some of the young men of today, and that was something very
unusual in those days. He was not grey although at that
time he was close to 65. As in addition he had a high-pitched
voice, he made a feminine impression. When reading his lec¬
tures he sat with his head bowed deep over his manuscript,
never looking up. His audience was no ordinary one, at least
not to a person used to the large classes at the faculty of
law. There were usually about twelve persons present and of
these only two or three seemed to be students attending as
part of their professional training or for the purpose of
passing their examinations. The rest were people of mature
age who appeared to have followed Hagerstrom's teaching
from year to year.
In contrast to his extreme shyness was the fervour
and conviction of his presentation. Olivecrona says that
Hagerstrom
"captured the attention of the listeners by the intensity
of his delivery; and he led them with convincing clarity^,
through the most intricate of philosophical labyrinths."
One can compare this report with that of Folke Schmidt who
writes that
"Hagerstrom's lectures were not easy to follow, at least
not for me, whose knowledge of Kant and the other great
59) Wedberg entered the University of Uppsala in 1931 to study law,
and attended Hagerstrom's lectures in 1931-32 and 1932-33.
60) Folke Schmidt, The Uppsala School of Legal Thinking, in Scan¬
dinavian Studies in Law, vol.22, 1978, p. 151 ff., at p. 152.
61) Karl Olivecrona, In Hagerstrom, INLM p. XXXVI.
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philosophers of the 18th and 19th centuries came mostly
from second-hand sources."62)
Wedberg also reports that he
"cannot recollect that Hagerstrom ever gave the impression
of entertaining any doubts about the correctness of what he
was saying, or that Hagerstrom would indicate that he was
talking about subjects, which he was not familiar with, or
that Hagerstrom would call attention to possible objections
to his own views, objections which he did not know how to
counter. He preached a gospel, its truth and perfection
were for him unshakable and obvious, and it was his firm
belief that this view had great consequences for our way
of thinking as well as for our whole life."63)
The lecture would finish on the dot, Hagerstom would
leave the lecture-table still talking and finish - in the
invisible doorway - with some striking remark which would
puzzle his audience.
It would be inconceivable to interrupt Hagerstrom
during the delivery of his lectures. But it happened that
Hagerstrom went for a walk or had a cup of coffee at a con¬
fectioner' s, surrounded by a band of loyal disciples. After
a while Wedberg belonged to this group, where it was possible
to put questions to Hagerstrom. Wedberg writes that he
"cannot recollect that Hagerstrom ever entered into a dis¬
cussion with the group. When asked a question, Hagerstrom
would answer by giving a short lecture. The Socratic method
of discussion was completely alien to Hagerstrom's tempe¬
rament."64)
Hagerstrom's seminars were conducted in a similar way,
Wedberg reports. Each term a book or two were chosen for
discussion. Wedberg mentions Bergson's "Les deux sources
de la morale et de la religion", and his most vivid im¬
pression of these seminars is that
"Hagerstrom thought that the authors in almost every re¬
spect were completely at fault. In his seminars he showed
himself to be tainted with a, for most academics, not un¬
common trait: he had a liking for having his own views
echoed by his pupils."66)
Wedberg's account may be compared with Olivecrona,
who writes that
"in his seminars, however, he was perhaps at his best as
62) Folke Schmidt, ibid. p. 153.
63) Wedberg, p. 27-28.
64) Wedberg, p..28.
65) Wedberg, p. 28.
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a teacher. Usually a recent book was to be discussed (e.g.
Pound's Introduction to the Philosophy of Law or Kelsen's
Allgemeine Staatslehre). Hagerstrom would often pick up a
thread somewhere at a point that might seem to be of se¬
condary importance; he would put a question that seemed
to be innocuous; but the answer occasioned a further
question, and in a few steps he was at the core of the
problem, having approached it from an unexpected angle."
But, of course, Olivecrona was a true pupil of Hager-
strom, while Wedberg's relationship to Hagerstrom became
problematic. Wedberg came to the conclusion that Hager-
strom's views were wrong, and he openly said so in a re¬
joinder to Lundstedt, another devoted disciple. Lundstedt1s
attitude is very revealing. He writes
"In 1934, I was impudently attacked in a paper by two brash
youngsters, graduate students of philosophy (now both of
them professors of philosophy), who reproached me, among
other things, with misinterpreting Hagerstrom's thoughts
on law. I did not feel that these two cocky boys rated an
answer; but when Axel Hagerstrom suggested he would answer
in my stead I agreed of course."66)
Wedberg - like Ingemar Hedenius who was also a dissenter -
6 7)
was met with hostility and polemics.
What was important to Hagerstrom was philosophy, and
the proper way of doing it. The proper way of doing philo¬
sophy was only Hagerstrom's way of doing it, this was a
moral matter for him and he demanded that others shared
his way and standards of doing philosophy. In this respect
he was uncompromising. It is claimed that it was a charac¬
teristic trait of Hagerstrom that he was committed to a
relentless self-criticism of the presuppositions of his own
philosophy.^^ This may very well be true, when Hagerstrom
was not engaged in disputes. In this case he was perhaps
capable of seeing the difficulties of his subject-matter
and capable of pointing out the vast background of ignorance
against which Hagerstrom's contribution to philosophy must
be measured. However, when engaged in dispute, or faced
with opposition, it is my opinion that Hagerstrom was ada-
66) A.V. Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised, Stockholm 1956, p. 7.
67) See Axel Hagerstrom, "Ein Stein, Ihr Herren, ist ein schlechtes
Argument", in Fonstret, 1934, p. 3.
68) E.g. by Konrad Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hagerstroms Filoso-
fi, Falkoping 1968, p. 17.
32
mant that his claims were the correct claims which must be
unswervingly adhered to.
Hagerstrom resigned from the chair in 1933. Immediate¬
ly after the delivery of his valedictory lecture "Natural
Law in Legal Science", he left the crammed lecture-hall,
so he was not present for the tribute to him to be pre¬
sented by the Rector of the University. The Rector had to
give his speech later. Having resigned did not entail that
Hagerstrom stopped working. He still carried on his stu¬
dies in Roman law until his death on 7th July 1939 of a
heart attack. When he was taken semi-conscious to the ho-
69)
spital he whispered "I wonder how my work will get on now".
In the following chapters I shall present and examine
Hagerstrom's work and way of doing philosophy.
69) Waller, p. 213.
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Chapter II
Axel Hagerstrom. His Works and Philosophical Development
"Endless volumes, larger, fatter
prove man's intellectual climb
but in essence it's a matter
just of having lots of time."*
1. Introduction
Hagerstrom spent his life reading and writing. Preparing
his book "Der romische Obligationsbegriff" he read practi¬
cally "the whole body of Classical literature in the ori¬
ginal language".^ In his lectures
"he moved freely and easily from the philosophical classics
- which he seemed to know by heart - to the history of mo¬
ral, religious, and legal phenomena, to the abstractions
of "Begriffsjurisprudenz" (i.e. Conceptual Jurisprudence),
to the theories of value propounded in economics, and the
theory of knowledge in physical science . In every direc¬
tion he found evidential support or illustration for his
own doctrine."2)
Thus Hagerstrom is committed to the requirement of an
inductive method, that is the task of a philosopher is to
be an ardent collector of raw materials from other writers,
and his duty is to determine, whether this material can be
put into a coherent intellectual framework in contact with
reality. As I see it, Hagerstrom's inductive method is to
be taken in a procedural fashion in the sense that the
gathering of data should precede the formulation of the
theory. The data for the philosopher are concepts and
judgements as expressed in words and sentences. For Hager¬
strom the historical dimension of concepts used in judge¬
ments is quite decisive. It is important to refer to the
historical development of the thoughts behind words and
sentences. The starting point is meanings of words, as
* Editorial, The London Times Literary Supplement, 28th December
1967. Quoted from The International Thesaurus of Quotations (com¬
piled by R.T. Tripp), Harmondsworth 1970, Sec. 91, No. 61.
1) Waller, p. 29.
2) Wedberg, p. 28.
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reflected in everyday or scientific use, and the aim is to
determine whether there are thoughts behind this practice
of using words or not. Words, for Hagerstrom, are empty
sounds, when they do not signify the thoughts of the
3)
speaker. Philosophy then is a scientific discipline,
which proceeds from concepts and judgements expressed in
words and sentences to a detailed description of whether
there are any thoughts behind words and sentences. The
method to achieve this purpose is to analyse words and
sentences in order to find out, what we really mean by the
words in common or scientific (i.e. wissenschaftlich) lan-
4)
guage. For Hagerstrom, this work of clarification or ana¬
lysis is essential for the advancement of knowledge or
science, because the concepts expressed by such words as
e.g. "right", "duty", "knowledge", and "reality" may be
riddled with contradictions. And concepts which are self-
contradictory are useless concepts, since they apply to
nothing. For Hagerstrom, such concepts as "right and duty"
are riddled with contradictions, and strictly speaking
devoid of cognitive meaning. In this way Hagerstrom's in¬
ductive method can also, I think, be taken in a logical
fashion, that is to say, any sound philosophical theory
should be supported by the data. And the data are human
thoughts and feelings manifested in empirically given ex¬
pressions such as words and sentences. The wealth of histo¬
rical data supplied by Hagerstrom from his extensive studies
of other writers is used to corroborate his own theory that
the prevailing theories of knowledge, morality and law have
no merits whatsoever. The traditional philosophy has nothing
to offer and Hagerstrom conceives his mission to expose
their errors, and offer the only true view concerning the
structure of the world. There is a distinction between the
3) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 56.
4) It is to be noted that Hagerstrom uses the word "science" in the
German sense of "Wissenschaft", which is broader in scope than the
English "science", covering natural science as well as the human
studies, e.g. religion, ethics, and law. "Science" then covers any
kind of disciplined research that aims at knowledge and it suggests
gaining information about the real nature of things.
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way the world is and what we say about it, and Hagerstrom's
claim is that what he says about it is true. Hagerstrom,
like Bacon, takes all knowledge to be within his province
and claims to present the only tenable view concerning
knowledge and reality. But this is to anticipate. What I
wish to do in this chapter is to present Hagerstrom's
writings published during his life-time, in section 2.
Section 3 is about his writings published posthumously.
In section 4 I shall mention some commentaries on Hager¬
strom's work. Finally, in section 5, I shall indicate the
scope and plan for my approach to Hagerstrom's philosophy.
2. Hagerstrom's Writings Published during His Life
Hagerstrom's literary career began in 1893, when he pub¬
lished his doctoral thesis on Aristotle, "Aristoteles
etiska grundtanker och deras teoretiska forutsatningar".^^
The personal crisis Hagerstrom underwent brought about
that he lost his former faith in God's grace as the only
means to reach virtue and truth. Hagerstrom's choice to
study philosophy rather than theology meant that he formal¬
ly disavowed his former error that man without God is vi¬
cious and blind. Instead Hagerstrom turned into being an
avowed atheist for the rest of his life. Hagerstrom thus
opposed Lutheran orthodoxy and its theological subleties.
Although Hagerstrom now insisted on his independence from
Christian thought, he was still close to Lutheran and
Pietist thought on one basic point, viz. that practical
philosophy is a central matter for serious reflection, since
it is concerned with instructions for man's life in society.
Hagerstrom's concern with practical philosophy thus reflects
his religious upbringing.
What is the foundation of morality? For Lutheranism
and Pietism the answer is that the foundation can only be
found in the Bible. For Luther the only true moral rules
5) Cf. Bacon, "I have taken all knowledge to be my province", from
a letter to Lord Burleigh. Quoted from the Concise Oxford Dictio¬
nary of Quotations, Oxford 1975, p. 15.
6) (Aristotle's Ethical Ideas and Their Theoretical Presuppositions)
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are divine commandments, and these moral rules have no
further justification than as being the commands of God.
What is good and what is right are defined in terms of what
God commands, and to question his commands of what is good
and what is right is sinful. To be before God in fear and
trembling as a justified sinner is what matters. Human rea¬
son and will are enslaved by sin, and cannot function as a
foundation for morality. What can function as a foundation
is only faith in God, who is both infinitely powerful and
infinitely good, and human beings are only saved by God's
grace bestowed upon the faithful. The true believer is at
all times at once a sinner and justified. His sins are
never abrogated, but his faith ensures that they cease to
count against him. This is Luther's doctrine of justifica¬
tion by faith alone, which was preached by Hagerstrom's
father. Luther's mission was a protest against philosophy,
which is an excellent thing in its own place, but a very
harmful thing when its categories are transferred into the
different realms of divine things. Philosophy is tied to
the empirical world; theology is tied to the non-empirical
world, the Heavenly Kingdom. And only confusion can arise
if the boundaries of these two realms are blurred.
Concerning the fundamental questions about proper
conduct in social and political life Luther treats the New
Testament as the final authority. He also claims
"that the political stance which is actually prescribed in
the New Testament is one of complete Christian submission
to the secular authorities, the range of whose powers he
crucially extends, grounding them in such a way that their
rule can never in any circumstances be legitimately resisted.
The articulation of these principles involved no appeal to
the scholastic concept of a universe ruled by law, and
scarcely any appeal even to the concept of an intuited law
of nature: Luther's final word is always based on the World
of God." '
Luther's approach is exemplified by Hagerstrom's father.
His mother represents the pietist approach, which also
stresses that the nature of human understanding determines
7) Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought , vol.
2. The Age of Reformation, Cambridge 1978, p. 19.
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what we can think and what we cannot think. There are limits
to human understanding, and in the last resort truth can
only be found in the Bible as made clear by divine illumi¬
nation. Pietism stresses the affective and conative elements
of human nature as essential to true faith at the expense
of the cognitive elements. For pietism practical philosophy
is central and what is stressed is that will is independent
of intellect. What matters is that Christianity is a practi¬
cal faith rather than an intellectual belief, and that this
faith expresses itself in love. This again implies that the
aim is not so much intellectual conviction but rather the
aim is to win the allegiance of the whole man and his perso¬
nal participation in activities inside and outside the church.
The true faithful believer is committed to the dignity of
his profession, and what is emphasized is the standards of
life and conduct in accordance with the commandments of the
Bible rather than purely academic achievements. Due to the
influence of E.O. Burman, Hagerstrom was apposed to this
doctrine and his new conversion, stressing the intellectual
powers of man, made it imperative to look for another founda¬
tion of morality.
Hagerstrom turned to Aristotle as "the philosopher" or
8)
"the father of atheists and fanatics". Perhaps the reason
is that Aristotle had no conception of an authoritative theo¬
logy to justify God's ways to man and could perhaps be
counted as an ally in the fight against pietist thought.
Aristotle stresses that moral virtue is due to man's
rational control of his desires. The highest virtue for man
is, according to Aristotle, theoretical wisdom, that is an
activity of which man is capable because of something di¬
vine in his nature. Man's highest function is thought about
objects, which cannot be other than what they are and so
never change. I think that this is a reason for Hagerstrom's
choice to write his thesis about Aristotle's ethical think¬
ing or practical wisdom and its relation to theoretical
8) See Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to
Spinoza, rev. ed., London 1979, p. 29 for this label attributed
to Aristotle.
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thinking or wisdom. It is a common theme in Hagerstrom's
philosophy. Another reason is perhaps the new interest
in Aristotelian realism by philosophers such as Adolf Tren¬
delenburg and Franz Brentano.
In his preface to his thesis Hagerstrom claims that
Aristotle's ethical theory must be seen as a reaction to¬
wards Plato. Aristotle's aim is partly to advance a concept
of matter, through which a teleological explanation of the
world becomes possible^ partly to base his ethics on indivi¬
dual self-determination.
Hagerstrom's inquiry into Aristotle concerns the pro¬
blem of knowledge and the problem of ethics. Hagerstrom
accepts Aristotle's solution concerning the problem of
knowledge, that is knowledge is knowledge of the universal
and the real as they exist in concepts. But Hagerstrom does
not accept Aristotle's ethical theory. Ethics is, according
to Hagerstrom, the science, which determines human conduct,
through which the human good for the individual is acquired.
The ethical problem is to explain the possibility of such
conduct aiming at the good for man. So far Hagerstrom follows
Aristotle. But Hagerstrom thinks that Aristotle's failure is
his lack of sense for the essence of individuality, the cha-
9)
racteristics of which is the universal-will.
Hagerstrom rejects Aristotle's ethical theory, because
9) Cf. Hagerstrom, Aristoteles etiska grundtanker, p. 158 and 190. -
I am not quite sure what Hagerstrom has in mind by "the universal
will", whether he is thinking of an individual's rational will (his
principles and aspirations in so far as they form a coherent sy¬
stem) or whether he is thinking of the will of all individuals as
such (the laws and conventions of the individual's community).
There is perhaps a close connection between the individual's ra¬
tional will and the social order within which he acquires that
will, so Hagerstrom's claim is perhaps that man's rational will
is the universal will manifested in him. So conceived Hagerstrom's
claim is, I think, that a man is good, when he is moral and he is
moral, when his actions are conformed to and embody a good will,
that is a universal will, where the end is an end for all of us,
cf. F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd ed., Oxford 1927, p. 144.
(The 1st edition of that work was published in 1876, Hagerstrom's
thesis in 1893, so Hagerstrom might have read it. The common
source is, of course, Hegel).
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Hagerstrom charges it with circularity. Aristotle defines
the virtuous man as the man whose reason determines his
bodily feelings or desires. On the other hand man's feel¬
ings and desires determine his reason.^'
According to Hagerstrom's understanding of Aristotle,
there cannot be a conflict between man's reason and man's
feelings or desires. There is, however, such a conflict.
This is another basic theme in Hagerstrom's writings. Since
Aristotle's theory is silent on this aspect, it must be
discarded. Aristotle tries to unite a rationalistic and
empirical approach to ethical problems. In the end he fails.
The merit of Aristotle's theory is, however, to stress the
objective point of view, which is tied to reality.
In his next books, "Undersokning av den empiristiska eti-
kens mojlighet med sarskild hansyn till dess moderna huvud-
former" and "Om den moraliska kanslan och driften sli-
12)
som fornuftiga", both published in 1895, deal with the
same themes. These two books form a unity and are based on
the same methodological principle, viz. the critical exami¬
nation of historically given philosophical claims in the
light of considerations implicitly contained in these claims
with a view to developing a rational response to them. The
task of the philosopher, as conceived by Hagerstrom, is to
follow the philosophical claims to their conclusions, in
order to determine whether these conclusions reveal inade¬
quacies or contradictions. In order to accomplish this task
the philosopher must not put forward his own conception as
a measuring-rod for criticism. Instead it is necessary that
the critical philosopher is familiar with or absorbs the
basic thoughts of the philosopher to be scrutinized, in
order to establish their internal relationship.
"No philosopher tears himself away with impunity from the
chain which connects the first and the latest stage in the
10) Whether this is a justified critique of Aristotle's theory, I
leave aside.
11) (An Inquiry into the Possibility of the Empiricist Ethics with
Special Regard to its Modern Representatives), Uppsala 1895.
12) (On the Moral Sense and Instinct as Rational Phenomena in the
Principal Forms of Modern Rationalism), Uppsala 1895.
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13)
progressive development of mankind's philosophical thought."
The advancement of philosophical knowledge only makes pro¬
gress through criticism, either by the philosopher's own
self-criticism of his thoughts or by the criticism of these
thoughts by another philosopher. In this way the philosopher
is concerned with progress towards a more perfect system
of concepts. To believe in progress is to believe that
there is or can be movement in a desirable direction. And
the desirable direction is, according to Hagerstrom, the
improvement of man's ability to think for himself.
Hagerstrom's inquiry into practical philosophy in the
books mentioned is to state a definition of the key terms
of empiricist philosophy and rational philosophy and their
relationship to the essence of goodness. According to Hager¬
strom' s definitions, an empiricist philosophy is characte¬
rized by its conception of the given reality as a sensuous
reality without any necessary unity. It is subdivided into
a dogmatic empiricism, the philosophers mentioned are Locke
and Berkeley, and a critical empiricism, the example is
Kant. Opposed to this philosophy is the rationalistic phi¬
losophy, characterized by its conception of reality as rea¬
sonable reality, which has an immanent neccesary unity. This
philosophy is again subdivided into a dogmatic version, the
examples mentioned are Plato (his dialogues the Sophist and
Parmenides), Spinoza, and Leibniz, and a critical version,
the examples are Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, Schleiermacher, He¬
gel, and Bostrom. In the ethical sphere, the essence of
goodness is conceived by empiricism as something entirely
relative or sensuous, determined by the sensuous nature of
man. In contrast to this, rationalism conceives the essence
of goodness as a determinate good as such, i.e. a rational
good, independent of and determining the conduct of men in
the sensible reality. The essence of the good for man is
13) Hagerstrom, Undersokning av den empiristiska etikens mojlighet,
Forord, "Ingen tankare lossliter sig ostraffadt fran den kedja,
som sammenbinder det forsta med det sista i mensklighetens fi-
losofiska frematskridande". (My translation).
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defined by Hagerstrom as man's independence and complete
self-determination.
Having defined the concepts, Hagerstrom goes on to
present and criticize some empiricist philosophers and
their views concerning the moral principle, which deter¬
mines men's actions. The philosophers discussed are Jeremy
Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Leslie Stephen, Herbert Spencer,
and the Danish philosopher Harald Hoffding. Their principle
of utility might be useful as a legal principle but it must
be rejected as a proper moral principle on the ground that
it is only concerned with the outward or external rela¬
tionship between individuals, whereas a proper moral prin¬
ciple proceeds from mankind as a unity of individuals in a
permanent inward or internal relationship.
Hagerstrom next proceeds to consider the German philo¬
sopher W. Wundt, whose perspective is higher than the phi¬
losophers previously mentioned. However, Wundt's conception
of morality and the moral principle must be rejected as
self-contradictory.
In the end Hagerstrom's claim is that empiricist
ethics is an impossible undertaking. The reason why this
is so lies in the nature of empiricist philosophy. It is
the conception of the given reality as a sensible reality,
which it is impossible to determine completely, because the
character of sensible reality is contradictory and hapha¬
zard. On this foundation it is impossible to ground the
moral principle to guide man's practical life. For an em¬
piricist philosopher, moral rules can, at best, only be
probable rules, whereas the true nature of moral rules is
that they are necessary rules. The moral principle must
have a foundation in another reality, which is elevated
above the sensible reality. This reality is in contrast
characterized by being a systematic, necessary and complete¬
ly determined reality.
Hagerstrom's argument is, if I understand him correct¬
ly, that the possibility of moral knowledge presupposes an¬
other reality or another aspect of reality than the merely
sensory given reality. The foundation for establishing the
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moral principle must be a reality, which is non-contradic¬
tory, non-changing and possessing a complete determinate
character. This is the subject-matter for Hagerstrom's se¬
cond book, dealing with the rationalist philosophers.
What is common to these philosophers is that they all
proceed from a given reality, which is conceived as a unity
determined by reason. The only way to establish knowledge
of whether e.g. an action is a duty or not is to appeal
to reason as opposed to faith. Reason refers to man's in¬
tellectual or cognitive faculty, in contrast to the facul¬
ties of will and desire. To appeal to reason, rather than
faith, is to oppose the religious view, which holds that
access to grace or faith is the only true foundation for
practical philosophy concerning itself with reshaping so¬
ciety in the direction of a more just situation for mankind.
Hagerstrom shares this concern but for him the founda¬
tion must be philosophy, not theology. Hagerstrom is not
satisfied with the solutions offered by the philosophers
from Kant to Hegel and Bostrom. It is extremely difficult
to follow Hagerstrom's presentation of their views and his
critical remarks. Hagerstrom claims that it is rather easy
to see their faults. It is by no means easy, I think, and I
shall make no attempt to summarize Hagerstrom's criticisms,
14)which are expressed in the Hegelian style of prose.
Hagerstrom's basic criticism is that these philosophers
profess to be critical rationalists. The truth of the matter
is that they belong to the dogmatics. - Moreover, it is of
importance to notice that Hagerstrom accepts that it is
quite legitimate to ask questions concerning the foundation
of morality. It makes sense to inquire into the ultimate
nature of the good, which ought to determine men's conduct.
Although the answers provided by previous rationalist phi¬
losophers are not fully satisfactory, they are not irrele¬
vant answers as is the case with empiricist philosophers.
At this stage, as far as I understand him, Hagerstrom
does not consider the possibility that the question "what
14) See Hagerstrom's own summary in PR, p. 34.
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is the good" is an improper question. The question in this
form implies that there is such a thing as the good, and
this, in turn, implies that there is one and only one thing
that is good. The good, then, is that which clears all misery
away, that which can give all men a happy life, that is an
15)"unobstructed life ... of quietness and peace".
This is the message of Hagerstrom's next publication,
where he proclaimed his own view in the essay "Om filoso-
16)
fiens betydelse for manniskan", published 1898. Hager-
strom argues that philosophy, rather than religion, is the
foundation for understanding man's place in nature, and phi¬
losophy is the only way to help man to get rid of fear and
spiritual bondage, which dominate man's thinking.
In this essay Hagerstrom presents his theory of know¬
ledge and his theory of morality. According to Hagerstrom
mind and values are fundamental in the world as a whole.
Thus, Hagerstrom adheres to idealism. For Hagerstrom know¬
ledge, if it is to be genuine knowledge, must be expressed
in judgements, which are necessary and universally valid.
Knowledge can have these characteristics only if they are
found also in the objects known. This follows from the
principle of causality, according to which any property
residing in the effect must also have been present in the
cause. The objects of knowledge must therefore be deter¬
minate, real and unchanging. This is guaranteed by the uni¬
versal human mind, which is present in the minds of indi¬
viduals and thus turns their experiences into knowledge. The
same holds with respect to moral rules. They must be neces¬
sary and universally valid. The right way of conduct is not
to obey external commands, but to follow the unwritten law
in the inner life of man, that is individuals must follow
the universal will, which is present in them. This univer¬
sal will manifests itself in a system of philosophical
principles. These philosophical principles are the founda-
15) The quotations are from a lecture Hagerstrom held in 1923, see
PR, p. 213.
16) (On the Importance of Philosophy for Mankind)
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tion for empirical experience as well as moral experience,
since these principles, e.g. the principle of causality,
express the necessary conditions of any possible empirical
experience and moral experience.
Hagerstrom next with untiring energy wrote a weighty
book, running to 828 pages, closely printed, on Kant's
ethics, "Kants Ethik im Verhaltnis zu seinem erkenntnis-
theoretischen Grundgedanken systematisch dargestellt",
which was published in 1902.
Hagerstrom had worked on writing this book for several
years. Waller reports that when Hagerstrom visited his
fiance Esther on 5th June 1899 to plan their wedding taking
place on 28th June, Esther shortly afterwards wrote to a
friend of hers, "if I could only find a good hiding place
for his favourite philosopher Kant's old folios, I'll hide
17 \
them, at least for the duration of our honeymoon". It
is not reported whether she had any success. But the fact
that Hagerstrom spent many years writing this book may ex¬
plain the great length to which it finally extended.
It is difficult to summarize the contents of the book.
I shall only draw attention to Hagerstrom's aim of under¬
standing the relationship between Kant's epistemology and
his moral philosophy. Hagerstrom "wished, without critici¬
zing him (i.e. Kant) in the least, to set forth my view of
18)
what he (i.e. Kant) had really meant".
Hagerstrom's own view is based upon the methodological
principle that Kant meant what he said. The task for Hager¬
strom is then to discover and describe the true meaning of
Kant's thoughts based upon another methodological principle
that we must fully absorb ourselves in Kant's thoughts.
The only way to show that we understand what Kant really
means is to study his concepts and judgements expressed in
words and sentences in the context of the whole structure
19)
of Kant's doctrines.
17) Waller, p. 161.
18) Hagerstrom, PR p. 35.
19) Cf. Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. IV, "Nun liegen die Verhaltnisse
>
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In order to accomplish the task of understanding what
Kant really means we must
"mit aller Kraft danach streben, jede Wertschatzung der
leitenden Gedanken des behandelten Denkers von den histo-
rischen Betrachuung fernzuhalten." °'
Hagerstrom's point is, if I understand him correctly,
that to understand Kant's doctrines is one thing, to under¬
stand the age, in which Kant wrote his books, is quite an¬
other thing. There is no doubt, Hagerstrom writes, that
every individual is a child of his time, and so is a philo-
21)
sopher. Every thinker, then,is influenced consciously
or unconsciously by the social, political and cultural con¬
ditions of his day. What matters, however, when we wish to
arrive at a better understanding af Kant's doctrines is
not so much to relate it to the cultural background but
rather to pay attention to Kant's doctrines on their own
account and examine them critically by considering their
basic or guiding thought. The task for the critical philo¬
sopher is to know the end of Kant's doctrines, that is
Kant's ultimate guiding thought, and when this thought is
grasped there is a clear programme for considering the spe¬
cific claims which Kant makes. Carrying out this programme
we must do our thinking for ourselves. In Hagerstrom's own
words
"Es ist fur eine solche Erkenntnis (d.h. von der Gedanken-
19) (continued) indessen so, dass bei Kant, wie bei jedem tiefgehen-
deren Denker, die einzelne Ausserung, besonders wenn sie von tie-
ferer Bedeutung fur das System im Ganzen ist, eben durch den Zu-
sammenhang, in dem sie vorkommt, bestimmt ist. Wird der Zusammen-
hang fortgelassen, so bleibt der einzelne Satz in einem Gedanken-
system in Wirklichkeit hinsichtlich seiner Bedeutung unbestimmt,
so dass in ihn ganz anderes hineingelegt werden kann, als was
gemeint ist. Dabei ist das Unvermogen der Sprache, sich vollig
einem Denken anzuschmiegen, das sich nicht bloss mit dem sinn-
lich Darstellbaren beschaftigt, von grosser Bedeutung. Dieses
Unvermogen muss eben durch die nahere Bestimmtheit ersetzt werden,
die Ausdriicke und Satze durch ihren Zusammenhang erhalten."
20) Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. IV.
21) Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. VII, "Weiter ist zu beachten, dass,
wie man sagt, jedermann Kind seiner Zeit ist". The phrase "wie
man sagt" refers, I think, to Hegel, cf. Hegel's Philosophy of
Right (translated, with notes by T.M. Knox) Oxford 1952,
p. 11.
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welt eines Philosophen) notwendig, dass man selbstandig
den leitenden Gedanken in dem eigenen Bewusstsein auf-
spriessen lasst."22)
According to Hagerstrom the task is to uncover the
guiding thought behind Kant's doctrines in order to in¬
crease our knowledge of the internal unity of Kant's doc¬
trines and his specific claims. We must examine Kant's
claims in the light of his basic thought in order to estab¬
lish whether the claims are consistent or inconsistent with
his basic thought. This is the criterion for the truth of
the claims put forward. In Hagerstrom's own words,
"man muss fordern, dass wirklich ein einheitlicher Gedanke
derart nachgewiesen wird, dass Kants eigene Darstellung,
wie sie Punkt fur Punkt verlauft, sich durch denselben als
ein zusammenhangendes Ganzes begreifen lasst."23)
For this purpose Hagerstrom thinks that the method
used in natural science is inadequate. There is, Hagerstrom
says,
"eine iibertriebene Tendenz, die naturwissenschaf tliche Me-
thode auf alle moglichen Gebiete anzuwenden. Wenn ich auch
durch Analyse eine chemische Zusammensetzung kennen lernen
kann, wenn auch das physische Leben auf analytischem Wege
auf Grund der chemisch-physikalischen Prozesse, auf die es
zuriickzufuhren ist, erkannt werden kann, so ist es nicht ge-
sagt, dass man in die Gedankenwelt eines Philosophen durch
ein Zerpfliicken und Zusammenstellen seiner Ausserungen Ein-
blick gewinnen kann. Dort ist doch etwas vorhanden, das von
dem Gebiet naturwissenschaftlicher Forschung verschieden
ist, und das ist die innere Einheit des Gedankens."24)
The method to be used in understanding the thoughts
of a philosopher is to start from the given concepts and
judgements and proceed to unravel their implications by a
consideration of "was in den eigenen Worten des behandelten
25)
Denkers unmittelbar ausgedriickt liegt".
In order to understand a philosopher's words we must
also, according to Hagerstrom, understand his basic thought.
Hagerstrom is aware, I think, that this method of under¬
standing involves a circle since to understand, e.g. Kant's
words, we must also understand Kant's basic thought, yet
22) Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. IX.
23) Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. V.
24) Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. VIII-IX.
25) Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. VIII.
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to understand Kant's basic thought, we must have come to
understand what Kant really means by his use of words that
constitute his basic thought. The question is whether Kant
in fact has a given basic thought, which it is then possible
to look for, or whether we rather invent a basic thought
and then attribute this to Kant by reading it into Kant's
words.
Hagerstrom's belief is that it is necessary that there
be an ultimate thought, otherwise one has no foundation for
2 6)
one's explorations. His way out of the difficulty pre¬
sented by the question above is, in his own words,
"Die Sache ist die, dass man unwillkiirlich einen Gedanken
aus dem, was man liest, herausholen will, und wenn man
durch das Studium nicht direkt zu einem solchen kommen
kann, greift man zu Gedanken mit denen man selbst vertraut
ist und erklart das Ganze daraus."27)
Hagerstrom's exposition of Kant's doctrines proceeds
on the basis that Kant has in fact a given ultimate thought,
which can be found if only one takes the trouble to read Kant
and proceeds without any preconceived ideas of one's own.
The mistake, then, is to attribute thoughts to Kant, which
he does not hold.
This is the case with philosophers, like Cohen and
Riehl, who studying Kant read their thoughts into Kant's
28)
doctrines. The result, which follows from such a proce¬
dure, is that Kant is presented as adhering to psychologism,
that is the validity of human knowledge is found in their
psychological causes and in the laws of association. This
is quite illegitimate according to Hagerstrom. The truth
26) Cf. Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. X, "Es ist klar, dass eine Ent-
wickelung uberhaupt nicht ihre gehdrige Beleuchtung erhalten
kann, sofern nicht ihr Endpunkt bereits bekannt ist."
27) Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. IX.
28) Cf. Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. 827, "So ist die ganze psycho-
logische Auffassung von Kant eine gewaltsame Konstruktion, auf
dem eigenen Unvermogen des Konstruierenden beruhend, in seinem
Gedanken sich iiber eine psychologische Auffassung sei es der
theoretischen oder der praktischen Erkenntnis zu erheben.
Die Folge ist, dass Kants ganze Philosophie dargestellt wird,
als hatte sie ihren Ursprung nicht in einem grossen Denker,
sondern in vielen - kleinen."
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is that the validity of human knowledge lies in its logi¬
cal character, its universality and necessity, and this is
29)
also what Kant really means. Thus, the ultimate episte-
mological principle is the unity of pure self-consciousness
as identity of subject and object.
Regarding morality, the fundamental concept for Kant
is the concept of duty. Considering this concept, the
question to be asked is not the psychological question,
"What is the feeling of duty?", which must be left to the
psychologist to answer on the basis of introspection
("innere Erfahrung"). The question, which the philosopher
asks, is the question, "What is duty?", or in Hagerstrom's
own German,
"Wir fragen also, wenn wir die Pflicht behandeln, nicht
wie die Psychologen: wie stellt sich uns das Pflichtbe-
wusstsein dar, betrachtet durch die Brille der inneren
Erfahrung, sondern: was ist der Gegenstand derselben, was
ist Pflicht, wessen sind wir uns bewusst? M.a.W. wir ver-
setzen uns in die praktische Reflexion, reflektieren tiber
die Pflicht genau wie bei unserm Handeln, obschon in gros-
serer Allgemeinheit. So kommen wir in die Lage, die Giiltig-
keit des Pflichtbewusstseins aus immanenten Gesichtspunkten
zu beurteilen. Dies geschieht, indem wir untersuchen, ob
zum Pflichtbewusstsein ein reiner Begriff gehort, welcher
ihm Objektivitat verleiht in analoger Weise, wie die Ver-
standeskategorie die Objektivitat der Erfahrung konstitu-
iert. Wir fragen also: was ist, verpflichtet zu sein, nicht,
sich verpflichtet zu fiihlen? " 30)
Hagerstrom's answer to this question is that the reality
of duty is a moral feeling, which has a certain regular
character, in man's consciousness independent of arbitrary
31)
feelings. Hagerstrom's claim is that the concept of duty
29) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 35.
30) Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. 253, cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 133.
31) Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. 254, "Die Realitat der Pflicht be-
deutet gleichfalls eine gewisse urspriingliche Gesetzmassigkeit
im Bewusstsein, freilich nicht, wie man denken mochte, in dem
wirklichen Verhaltnis zwischen den Momenten der zum Begehrungs-
vermogen gehorenden Sinnlichkeit oder den Neigungen unterein-
ander, sondern eine im eigentlichsten Sinne praktische Gesetz¬
massigkeit, d.h. eine notwendige Beschaffenheit des Willens als
Willens, die darin besteht, dass er ein gewisses Prinzip unbe-
dingt zu seinem Bestimmungsgrunde macht ohne Riicksicht auf ihn
zufallig affizierende Lustgefiihle. Diese Gesetzmassigkeit wird
auch, wenn wir die Verpflichtung als eine Realitat auffassen,
als unabhangig von den zufalligen Affektionen des Willens giltig
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is equivalent to "the right thing to do". And it is obvious
for Hagerstrom that it is possible to have a science, the
subject-matter of which is what in fact is the right thing
32)
to do for individuals living in a society.
Ethics, as a scientific discipline, is based upon the
principle of the ultimate value of autonomy or duty. Duty
is expressed in categorical imperatives, and their reality
and ground must be located, not in the sensual nature of
man nor in the external circumstances of the world in which
individuals are placed, but solely in a practical regularity
in man's rational will. What one's obligation is follows
immediately from one's rational will, that is from pure
consciousness of duty as such. This constitutes the basic
principle for one's actions.
To the extent that an individual is moved by impulses
and feelings, that individual has only an arbitrary will
or consciousness of duty. Only in so far as an individual be¬
comes autonomous and has acquired values can the individual
rationally prefer some impulses and feelings to others.
When an individual has acquired a rational will and lives
according to the dictates of pure consciousness of duty,
then that individual is free in the sense that he accepts
the moral rules inwardly, desiring the moral order for its
own sake. When we say that an action is right, we are not,
if I understand Hagerstrom correctly, expressing or giving
vent to our feelings about it. We may do that, but what is
of much more importance is that we are putting forward a
31) (continued) aufgefasst. Andernfalls wurde sie nicht als urspriing-
liche Gesetzmassigkeit aufgefasst werden, was notwendig ist, damit
wir uns als wirklich verpflichtet, nicht als zufallig zu gewissen
Handlungen getrieben auffassen."
32) Cf. Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. 257, "Der Philosoph hat das
Recht, sich in die praktische Reflexion bei dem Handeln selbst
zu versetzen und die Realitat des Guten und der Pflicht von
ihrem Gesichtspunkt aus zu beurteilen. Es ist klar, dass damit
die Ethik selbst als eine Wissenschaft von der Pflicht gerecht-
fertigt ist. Ware man nicht berechtigt, den Menschen als tat-
sachlich verpflichtet, sondern nur als sich verpflichtet fuhlend
zu betrachten, so wurde die Ethik ihres Gegenstandes ermangeln.
Sie wurde durch eine psychologische Untersuchung der Entstehung
des Pflichtbewusstseins ersetzt werden."
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rule of action, which we think is valid for anyone, who
finds himself in the situation, to which the rule applies.
It follows that we are putting forward a moral judge¬
ment stating a rule of action. This judgement can be true
or false. Hence it is possible to argue in a rational way
about the truth of moral judgements. Ethics, as a scienti¬
fic discipline, is precisely concerned with a systematic
account of what to do, founded on a rational basis, not on
faith in God's will.
It was Hagerstrom's teacher in philosophy, E.O. Burman,
who introduced Hagerstrom to Kant. Around 1901 Burman gave
33)lectures on Hegel's philosophy of law. I do not know
whether Hagerstrom attended Burman's lectures nor whether
Burman also introduced Hagerstrom to Hegel. But Burman's
interest in Hegel may have prompted Hagerstrom to write an¬
other book, this time on the concept of law (Recht)r"Stat
och ratt. En rattsfilosofisk undersokning I", which was
34)
published 1904. Hagerstrom wanted to present a philoso¬
phical discussion of principles of rights and duties as
distinct from the ordinary science of positive law (Rechts-
wissenschaft). The latter only considers positive law, but
does not show or prove that particular legal rules are ra¬
tional. This is the task of the philosophical science of
the state, which is an immanent and logical inquiry into
the concepts of duty and right. The guiding thread of this
inquiry is its method, where one speaks in philosophical
terms about the nature of the state and comprehends the
state and its laws as something to be known as rational.
The basis for this method is the possession of an episte-
mological principle, and this principle Hagerstrom takes
over from his book on Kant's ethics. Hagerstrom's episte-
mological principle is the unity of subject and object in
pure self-consciousness as the only logical requirement
33) Later published from a student's, Ernst Andersson Akmar, short¬
hand records as:Hegels Rattsfilosofi. Offentliga Forelasningar
vid Uppsala Universitet. Uppsala 1939. (Hegel's Philosophy of
Law. Public Lectures held in the University of Uppsala).
34) (State and Law (Recht). A Philosophical Inquiry I), Uppsala 1904.
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for knowledge of rights and duties.
Genuine understanding of his new book involves, Hager-
strom declares, a penetration of his former book on Kant
and a mastery of Hagerstrom's contentions in that book.
Thus, Hagerstrom takes it for granted that he has in his
book "Kants Ethik" demonstrated the truth of his epistemo-
logical principle. His argument is that Hagerstrom "never
has come across any critique of the Kantian epistemologi-
35)
cal principle as it is stated in the book in question".
Accordingly Hagerstrom proceeds on this foundation,
according to which any claim of knowledge is expressed in
judgements, and these judgements have as such the character
of a synthesis of opposites. Complete knowledge is knowledge
of judgements in the coherent system, where the judgements
involved are logically related to each other and are ulti¬
mately traceable to the epistemological principle of unity
between subject and object.
Thus, Hagerstrom subscribes to the Hegelian doctrine
that knowledge and its object are essentially one, meaning,
I think, not that knowledge and its object cannot be distin¬
guished, this is acknowledged by Hegel as well as by Hager¬
strom, but rather meaning that knowledge and its object are
inseparable aspects of a single experience, that is self-
consciousness as a logical - not psychological - unity. This
is the Hegelian theory of the Absolute Idea, which alone is
completely self-consistent. For Hegel only spirit (Geist)
realizes the Absolute Idea, hence it follows that reality
must be spiritual. At this stage of his career Hagerstrom
accepts this idealism, although he later was to abandon
idealism in favour of materialism. What is important to
35) Hagerstrom, Stat och Ratt, Preface p. Ill, "aldrig antraffat nagon
kritik af den Kantiska kunskapsteoriens princip, sadan den ur skrif-
ten i fraga framgar". My translation. - I have not read any reviews
of Hagerstrom's book, but if Hagerstrom's argument is that his epi¬
stemological theory is true until it is proved to be false, then
his argument is fallacious. Hagerstrom lapses into the psychologism
he otherwise so strongly criticizes, since Hagerstrom confounds the
truth of his theory with its acceptance, and disproof of the
theory with its rejection.
VitW
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notice is that Hagerstrom firmly believes that problems
concerning knowledge of reality and problems concerning
concepts such as right and duty, which we necessarily use
when we discuss legal and moral questions, can be resolved
only if we think of reality in a certain way. For Hager¬
strom we must think of reality as mind rising progressive¬
ly to a full knowledge of itself.
Hagerstrom's epistemological foundation for his in¬
quiry into law (Recht) is that whatever is real is both
thought and its object. It follows that a philosophical in¬
quiry into law must consider in which sense, if any, law
can be thought as real. Hagerstrom's objective, that is to
say, is to provide a real definition of the essence of law.
The essence of law is an unconditional "ought" or "duty".
Whatever the state claims in the form of legal rules, it
claims in the form of legal duties, which must be obeyed
because they are duties, and not on account of any physical
force behind the rules.
Hagerstrom's conclusion is that will and not force is
the basis of the state. Law can correctly be characterized,
as Hegel said, as the universal will, provided that the
universal will is regarded not as the arbitrary will of
individuals but as the rational will which is based upon
the common interest. I shall comment on this aspect of Ha¬
gerstrom's thought in a later chapter, when I discuss his
later investigation of whether positive law can be correct¬
ly characterized as an expression of will.
The title of Hagerstrom's book "Stat och Ratt. En
rattsfilosofisk undersokning I" suggests an accompanying
volume. In fact Hagerstrom also promised another volume,
dealing with Hegel and the nature of constitutionalism.
This volume never, as far as I know, materialized.
This is a rather serious matter, since Hagerstrom
36) Cf. Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. IX "das Hauptgewicht (muss) immer
auf eigenes freies Nachdenken gelegt werden" ... "das selbstan-
dige Durcharbeiten des als leitend eingesehenen Gedankens (muss)
von wesentlicher Bedeutung fur die Erkenntnis der historischen
Wahrheit sein."
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claims that the volume to come is vital for the correct
understanding of the published volume "Stat och Ratt". If
we follow Hagerstrom's own claim - and why should we not
do this? - then a reader of "Stat och Ratt" cannot (in the
logical sense) fully understand "Stat och Ratt". This is
perhaps the reason why Hagerstrom's "Stat och Ratt" has
37)
fallen into oblivion. Another reason is perhaps more
important. Hagerstrom rejected, in his later writings, the
will-theory as the foundation of legal rules. And this
theory is prominent in "Stat och Ratt".
I do not know why Hagerstrom did not publish the pro¬
mised volume. The answer is perhaps that Hagerstrom thinks
that there is an intimate link between epistemological
questions and ontological questions. It is epistemological
considerations, which determine what is real. Hence there
is a vital need for proper epistemological considerations
concerning the foundations of knowledge. If the choice of
our starting-point for inquiries into the nature of law
and morality depends upon epistemological considerations,
then we must beware not to fall into error at the very
start by choosing the wrong starting-point. Therefore we
need to be on constant guard concerning the examination
of the principles of knowledge on which we build the system
of knowledge of what is real. Therefore one must be engaged
in self-criticism of one's epistemology and try to improve
it, if possible. Hagerstrom was engaged in self-criticism
searching for the true and basic principle of knowledge.
His effort was crowned, he believed, by the publication of
- in his own words - his "most important book", expressing
38)
his "new view", concerning the foundation of knowledge,
"Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft. Eine logisch-erkenntnis-
39)
theoretische Untersuchung I. Die Realitat" in 1908. In
this book Hagerstrom rejected empiricism, because its
37) Hagerstrom himself, however, refers to the book in a later article,
see below p. 58. It is also referred to in his book on the will-
theory, see Hagerstrom, INLM p. 27.
38) Hagerstrom, PR p. 37.
39) Skrifter utgivna af Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Samfundet,
Uppsala, Band XII-3, Uppsala 1908.
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starting-point for acquiring knowledge is bare sense-per¬
ceptions. But sense-perceptions depend upon concepts or
principles for deciding whether the reported perceptions
are correct. Reason, rather than experience, is the proper
starting-point. Hagerstrom's thesis is that the concept
of reality is a logical requirement for every piece of
knowledge. The way of truth is thought, and whatever is
thought of exists. The criterion of truth is that reality
is identical with itself, that is the relation between
cognition and its objects are identical in absolute know¬
ledge .
Hagerstrom thought that his book was a Copernican re¬
volution in the theory of knowledge. I shall comment on
that in chapter III. Suffice it here to notice that Hager¬
strom's projected second volume to "Das Prinzip der Wissen-
4 0)
schaft" was never published. What Hagerstrom did was to
present his epistemological views concerning the principle
of knowledge in a short dialogue in Swedish, "Botanisten
och Filosofen", in 1910.
In this dialogue between a philosopher (i.e. Hager¬
strom) and a scientist, the philosopher is presented as
the person who seeks to arrive at the truth by criticizing
the received opinions of scientists. According to Hager¬
strom scientific research rests upon inarticulate assump¬
tions which scientists do not recognize or pay attention
to. It is the task of the philosopher to bring these assump¬
tions into the open and examine them critically. Philosophy
is the highest form of knowledge or science, because it
alone involves no presuppositions. On the contrary philo¬
sophy is concerned with the most general principles of
scientific knowledge and their justification. This justi¬
fication is, in turn, based upon the principle of knowledge
40) The question is whether the sequel is vital for understanding
the published volume, cf. above. If so, no wonder that the pub¬
lished volume has been characterized as a most difficult book,
cf. Ernst Cassirer, Axel Hagerstrom, Goteborg 1939, p. 6.
41) (The Botanist and the Philosopher). Reprinted in Hagerstrom, Fi-
losofi och Vetenskap (utg. Martin Fries) Stockholm 1957, p. 15-110.
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itself, where knowledge and the object of knowledge are but
two sides of a single entity, the absolute knowledge. Philo¬
sophy in short shows itself to be the theory of knowledge
and the methodology of the various sciences, because philo¬
sophy is logically presupposed by every distinct science.
Hagerstrom presented the fundamental tenets of "Das
Prinzip der Wissenschaft" in his "Selbstdarstellung" of his
4 2)
own philosophical views. These tenets are the refutation
of epistemological idealism and epistemological realism*
the assertion of the completely logical character of sen¬
sible reality, and the impossibility of metaphysics as a
scientific doctrine of reality. In his "Selbstdarstellung"
he also summarized his views on morality and law, to which
I shall return in a later chapter. He gave another brief
summary of his philosophical views for a Swedish dictionary
of philosophy in 1925.^"^
Hagerstrom's later work on epistemology is concerned
with Einstein's theory of relativity. In a paper "Ober die
Gleichungen der speziellen Relativitatstheorie", published
44 )
in 1937, Hagerstrom argues that Einstein is a metaphysi¬
cian using words without thoughts. According to Hagerstrom,
if we are using words without thoughts, then we cannot have
a four-dimensional space-time, but only a three-dimensional
space-time, involving spatial distance, time interval, and
mass. Hagerstrom's paper was later published, in an ex¬
panded version, as "Erkenntnistheoretische Voraussetzungen
45)
der speziellen Relativitatstheorie Einsteins".
Hagerstrom always believes that there is a relation¬
ship between epistemology and ethics. Hagerstrom's writings
concerning ethics are "I moralpsykologiska Fragor" (On
42) Axel Hagerstrom, Selbstdarstellung, in Raymund Schmidt, Die Philo-
sophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, Bd. VII, Leipzig 1929,
p. 111-159. Translated into English by Robert T. Sandin and printed
in Hagerstrom, PR p. 33 ff. and p. 309 ff. A Swedish version is
printed in Hagerstrom, Filosofi och Vetenskap, p. 112-180.
43) See Hagerstrom, PR p. 313 f.
44) In "Adolf Phalen in Memoriam", Uppsala 1937.
45) In Theoria, vol. XII, 1946, p. 1-68. A Swedish version is printed
in Hagerstrom, Filosofi och Vetenskap, p. 190-242 , cf. below Ch.
Ill, p. 109.
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Questions of Moral-Psychology), a review of a book by the
Norwegian Kristian Birch-Reichenwald Aars: "Gut und Bose.
46)
Zur Psychologie der Moralgefiihle" . In this review Hager-
strom maintains that there is an important distinction be¬
tween moral psychology and scientific ethics. Moral psycho¬
logy is an empirical discipline which has for its subject-
matter the nature of moral consciousness. The method to be
applied is the method of induction in order to establish
the facts. Scientific ethics, on the other hand, is a phi¬
losophical discipline, which has for its subject-matter
the reality of values. This discipline is concerned with
the question what is the real nature of what is morally
good or bad, and what is the real nature of the morally
right or wrong action. The method to be applied is the me¬
thod of conceptual analysis providing definitions of moral
concepts used in moral judgements. Scientific ethics is
based upon the presupposition that it is possible to speak
of moral judgements as true or false. In a criticism of
4 7)Edward Westermarck, Hagerstrom argues that Westermarck
confounds the philosophical question of what must be the
real moral value with the altogether different psychologi¬
cal question of what is the content of our moral judgements.
It may be that the answer to the first question is that the
real moral value ultimately refers to pleasure or non-
pleasure. If it is so, it does not follow, however, that
the answer to the second question is that the content of
our moral judgements expresses tendencies to produce plea¬
sure or pain.
When we put forward our moral judgements Hagerstrom
raises the question whether it might not be the case that
we mean something else than the mere expression of feelings
as is Westermarck's opinion. What, then, is this "something
else"? Hagerstrom mentions moral judgements concerning
46) Printed in the journal Psyke (Edt. Sydney Alrutz), vol. 2, 1908,
p. 273-287, vol. 3, 1908, p. 85-99.
47) Hagerstrom refers to the German edition: Ursprung und Entwicklung
der Moralbegriffe. English edition: The Origin and Development of
the Moral Ideas, London 1906.
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duties which do not express feelings, although it must be
granted that feelings of pain and pleasure are associated
with moral judgements concerning our duties. The essential
feature of these judgements is, however, the expression of
impersonal duties according to rules above the will of in¬
dividual human beings. The essential question is to investi¬
gate what we think when we utter moral judgements concerning
duties. Hagerstrom's review is a plea for a conceptual ana¬
lysis of moral concepts where the aim is to win clarity by
fixation of the concepts concerning the reality of duty.
It is the passage from having the concept of duty to having
a clear and distinct concept of duty. This concept functions
like an anchor for our investigations into the reality of
moral phenomena.
It is interesting to notice that in this article Hager-
strom still believes that moral judgements based upon the
immediate pure consciousness of duty can be true or false.
Also that he does not use the word "metaphysics" in any
derogatory sense. On the contrary Hagerstrom takes Aars to
task for his use of the word to denote faith in contrast to
knowledge. Knowledge cannot be confined to objects, which
we can touch, see or feel but comprises also non-sensory
objects beyond all sensory experience, where knowledge is
obtained by a process of reasoning.
Hagerstrom's position is, at this time, that what is
needed is an investigation of the relationship between con¬
sciousness and reality. In doing this, the philosopher must
realize that from the standpoint of epistemology, reality is
accessible to an individual only as a correlate of conscious
acts, and therefore careful attention must be paid to what
occurs in these subjective acts and the stating of objective
judgements. Philosophical analysis and clarification of the
various forms of judgements must follow from the basic modes
of consciousness, viz. knowing, feeling, and willing. Thus,
philosophy, for Hagerstrom, remains close to psychology.
But there is a vital difference between psychology dealing
with consciousness as an empirical discipline, which is
based upon induction, and a philosophical analysis of judge-
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ments relating to acts of consciousness, when these acts
are grasped in immediate selfgivenness and the aim is to
understand and describe their essence.
48)
In an article "Kritiska punkter i varde psykologien"
from 1910, written to honour his teacher and friend E.O.
Burman, Hagerstrom sets out to analyse the relationship
between consciousness and objects of value. The point of
departure of Hagerstrom's analysis is the theory, put for¬
ward by Meinong, that consciousness of value is a subjective
experience of objects.
The question for Meinong is how to determine this sub¬
jective state of mind and its relation to objects. According
to Meinong this subjective state of mind is that of value-
feeling, which is related to objects. For Hagerstrom the cri¬
tical point to be discussed is first, whether it is true to
say that value-feelings, like judgements, may be said to be
true or false. Hagerstrom's objection is that it is true
that there can be no thinking without an object thought,
no judging without an object judged about, but it is not
true that there can be no feeling without an object felt.
The peculiarity of feeling is that there is nothing but
what is a subjective state without objectification.
Hence, it follows that the basis for moral judgements
concerning what is valuable or good or moral judgements con¬
cerning duties cannot be value-feelings. The reason why is
that value-feelings lack logical content, whereas judgements
concerning evaluations of objects as good or bad, and judge¬
ments concerning duties do possess logical content, since
they are directed towards objects. Concerning legal duty,
Hagerstrom maintains, with reference to his book "Stat och
Ratt", that the concept of legal duty cannot be reduced to
the command of a social authority sanctioned with force,
but that the concept of legal duty always implies a moral
element, viz. the maintenance of what is right. What is
right, Hagerstrom contends, is what is in the common interest
of all individuals in a society.
48) (Critical Points in the Psychology of Value), in Festskrift till-
agnad E.O. Burman, 7. oktober 1910, Uppsala 1910, p. 16-75.
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In Meinong's theory of value, the basic concept is that
of value-feeling. A second critical point is that the in¬
vestigation of value-feeling can only be an investigation,
which concentrates on the value-feeling itself, which
is given in immanent experience, and its aim is to discover,
whether there are any objective entities that get constitu¬
ted in the value-feeling. This philosophical approach must
be kept strictly apart from psychological or physiological
investigations of feelings as causal phenomena.
If, in discussing the nature of feeling, one proceeds
from these empirical investigations, then there is a risk
of putting forward theories which have no support whatso¬
ever, since they are not founded on the immediate experience
of feeling itself.
A philosophical investigation, on the other hand, takes
as its departure the immediate given experience of feeling
itself, which is unique as being infallible, and the inve¬
stigation is then directed at giving an accurate descrip¬
tion of the essence of this experience of feeling and its
relation to other mental phenomena.
What Hagerstrom presents in his article, then, is a
philosophical analysis, as distinct from an empirical in¬
vestigation, of consciousness and its relation to objects
of value. When we investigate what actually confronts us
in the consciousness of values, Hagerstrom's conclusion is
that the experience of values is neither a subjective state
of mind, nor a presentation (Vorstellung) of the object
valued but a peculiar relationship between a subjective
attitude towards the object and a presentation of the ob¬
ject .
Unfortunately, Hagerstrom does not describe this pecu¬
liar relationship any further in his article. What he wants
to stress is, however, that consciousness of what is is
distinct from consciousness of what ought to be. Knowledge
of what ought to be cannot be reduced to what is, or natu¬
ral objects, which can be touched or seen or felt, but still
Hagerstrom believes in the possibility of knowledge con¬
cerning our moral duties.
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Hagerstrom's inaugural lecture "Om Moraliska Forestall-
ningars Sanning" was held on 18th March 1911, and published
49)
later the same year. In this lecture Hagerstrom changed
his view.
"Science has only to indicate what is true, while it is
nonsense to regard the idea of obligation as true.
He concluded his lecture by saying that
"moral philosophy as a science is purely and simply a
science of actual moral evaluations in their historical
development, based on a psychological analysis and con¬
ducted by a critical philosophical investigation of the
ideas which are operative therein. ... Moral science may
not be a teaching in morals, but only a teaching about
morality."51)
Perhaps the reason why Hagerstrom did change his view
around 1909-1910 was his occupation with the theories of
Marx and Engels. Engels taught that there are at bottom
only two main philosophical positions, idealism and mate¬
rialism. And for Engels materialism is the true view. Hager-
strom, I believe, followed suit and rejected his former
idealism in favour of materialism. This fitted very well
with Hagerstrom's belief in the importance of the law of
contradiction as a fundamental law of reality. In this re¬
spect Hagerstrom parted company with the dialectics of Marx
and Engels. In a series of lectures, published in 1909 as
52)"Social Teleologi i Marxismen", Hagerstrom argued that
in his analysis of society Marx confounds the idea of the psy¬
chological necessity whereby human beings form societies and
economic systems with the quite different idea of necessity,
which operates independently of human volitions, feelings,
and purposes in society and causes advantageous or harmful
situations for the individuals. Marx is quite right, Hager¬
strom says, to say that man is an animal which can develop
49) This lecture is reissued in Hagerstrom, Socialfilosofiska Uppsat-
ser, (Edt. Martin Fries), 1st ed., Stockholm 1939, 2nd ed. , Stock¬
holm 1966. It has been translated into English by Robert T. Sandin
as "On the Truth of Moral Propositions" and printed in PR p. 77-96.
Hagerstrom uses the word "Forestallning" as equivalent to the Ger¬
man "Vorstellung". - Perhaps "idea" is a better way of translation
50) Hagerstrom, PR p. 95.
51) Hagerstrom, PR p. 96.
52) (Social Teleology in Marxism), in Uppsala Universitets Arsskrift,
vol. 1909, Uppsala 1909, p. 1-72.
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into an individual only in society. The important thing is
man's individuality and freedom. But this individuality and
freedom cannot be described in teleological terms because
there is no purpose either in nature or in society. Man's
individuality and his freedom consist in his understanding
of necessity of the latter kind, by discovering the laws
which govern nature and society independently of human will.
The notion of will looms large in Hagerstrom's later
writings, as does the notion of natural rights. Hagerstrom's
philosophy was conceived as providing the foundations for the
existing legal and moral sciences by providing clear expli¬
cations of the concepts which the scientists use, but do
not themselves explicate. Hagerstrom's position in his
"Selbstdarstellung" was that in these sciences "metaphysics
53)does not enter in, but rather everything is metaphysics".
For instance, the definition of law as the expression of
will, is considered to need such clarification, which Hager-
strom was concerned with in his article "Ar Gallande Ratt
54)
Uttryck av Vilja?", published in 1916, where it is argued
that law is not an expression of will but rather of interests,
and his book from 1917 "Till Fragan om den Objektiva Rattens
55)
Begrepp. I. Viljeteorien", where the idea of duty and
its relationship with will is discussed.
In his book Hagerstrom argues that the present state
of legal science and its theories of law and legal obliga¬
tion is dominated by contradictory concepts. Thus, Hager¬
strom draws the conclusion that without observation of non-
contradictory concepts there could be no coherent legal
thinking.
Natural law theories and their influence on theories
of punishment was criticized in an article "Naturratt i
53) Hagerstrom, PR p. 68.
54) (Is Positive Law an Expression of Will?), published in Festskrift
tillagnad Vitalis Norstrom, Goteborg 1916, p. 171-210, translated
into English by C.D. Broad and printed in I, Ch. II, p. 17-54.
55) (On the Question of the Notion of Law. I. The Will Theory), pub¬
lished in Skrifter utg. af Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Samfundet
i Uppsala, vol. 19:2, Uppsala 1917, translated into English by
C.D. Broad and printed in I, Ch. Ill, p. 56-256. Part of this
translation is reprinted in Hagerstrom, PR p. 97-172.
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56)
Straffrattsvetenskapen" from 1920. Hagerstrom returned
to this theme in his article "En Straffrattslig Princip-
57)
undersokning", published shortly before his death.
Kelsen's theory of law was rejected as absurd in Hager-
58)
Strom's review of Kelsen's Allgemeine Staatslehre in 1928.
59)
- In a review "Till Fragan om Begreppet Gallande Ratt"
from 1931 of Ross' Theorie der Rechtsquellen, Hagerstrom
maintains that Ross has set himself an impossible task,
viz. that of combining facts and values, or reality and ought.
For Hagerstrom the idea of valid law in the sense of obliga¬
tory rules is a magical idea, and the concept of valid law
must be analysed in terms of social-psychological facts.
This is precisely what is wrong with Kelsen's theory. Kelsen
does not allow legal science to have anything to do with ac¬
tual social existence, and Ross is criticized for following
Kelsen. Although Ross tries to come to grips with the actual
living reality he fails in the end.
It was Hagerstrom's contention that the modern concepts
of law and duty have their roots in traditional ideas of my¬
stical forces and bonds. Hagerstrom set out to trace these
roots which he found in Roman law. This view was presented
in his book "Der romische Obligationsbegriff im Lichte der
allgemeinen romischen Rechtsanschauung I", published in
1927.^^ The projected second volume "Uber die Verbalobli-
61)
gation" was published in 1941. Also must be mentioned
56) (Natural Law in Criminal Science), published in Svensk Jurist-
tidning, vol. 5, 1920, p. 321-341.
57) (On Fundamental Problems of Law), published in Svensk Juristtidning,
vol. 24, 1939, p. 209-225, translated into English by C.D. Broad
and printed in I, Ch. VI, p. 348-366.
58) (Kelsen's Theory of Law and the State), a review published in
litteris, vol. 5, 1928, p. 20-40, p. 81-99, translated into Eng¬
lish by C.D. Broad and printed in I, Ch. IV, p. 257-298.
59) (On the Question Concerning the Concept Valid Law), published in
Tidsskrift for Rattsvetenskap, vol. 44, 1931, p. 48-91.
60) Published in Skrifter utg. av Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Sam-
fundet i Uppsala, Band 23, Uppsala 1927. The preface to this
book has been translated into English by C.D. Broad and printed
in I, Ch. I, p. 1-16.
61) Published in Skrifter utg. av Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Sam-
fundet i Uppsala, Band 35, Uppsala 1941, II.1. - This volume only
deals with the Roman ideas concerning "Verbalobligation". Hager¬
strom had in mind to publish a volume on the idea of "Konsensual-
obligation" but this second part never materialized.
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his book "Das magistratische ius in seinem Zusammenhang
6 2)
mit dem romischen Sakralrechte" from 1929.
What is the reason for the binding force of a promise?
Hagerstrom discussed that question in relation to a Swedish
63)
writer Nehrman-Ehrenstrale in an article from 1934. This
was also the subject-matter of an article from 1935 "Be-
6 4)
greppet Viljeforklaring pa Privatrattens Omrade". Hager¬
strom's conclusion is that to consider a promise as an ex¬
pression of will is an absurd view, originating in the equally
absurd theory of natural law which dominates the modern
account of contracts.
Magic is also conspicuous in the notion of ownership,
so Hagerstrom maintains. The notion of ownership is thought
as a relation between the natural world of perceptible phe¬
nomena and the super-natural world of spiritual forces.
"Dass ein solcher Zusammenhang magischer Natur ist, und dass
wir also, soweit uns die populare Auffassung vom Eigentums-
recht beherrscht, Magie iiben, wenn wir z.B. Fische auf dem
Markt kaufen, kann nicht bezweifelt werden"
6 5)
is Hagerstrom's conclusion in an article from 1933.
And Hagerstrom's main aim is to eradicate the evils
of magic and make people come to themselves and realize
that magical notions are the fruit of their own confused
imagination.
Hagerstrom's other articles written for rather obscure
journals were collected and published shortly after his
death as "Socialfilosofiska Uppsatser".^^
62) Published in Uppsala Universitets Arsskrift, vol. 1929, Uppsala 1929.
63) (Nehrman-Ehrenstrale's Conception of the Reason for the Binding
Force of a Promise, in the Light of the Conceptions of Roman and
Natural Law), published in Minnesskrift agnad 1734 Ars Lag, Bd. II,
Stockholm 1934, p. 571-630. - Translated into German as "Recht,
Pflicht und bindende Kraft des Vertrages" and published in Skrifter
utg. av Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Samfundet i Uppsala, vol.
44:3, Uppsala 1965, with an introduction by Karl Olivecrona.
64) (The Concept of a Declaration of Intention in the Sphere of Private
Law), published in Theoria, vol. 1, 1935, p. 32-57, p. 121-138. -
Translated into English by C.D. Broad and printed in I, Ch. V, p.
299-347.
65) Vergleichungen zwischen den Kraftvorstellungen der primitiven und
der modernen Kulturvolker, published in Festskrift tillagnad Arvi
Grotenfelt, Helsingfors 1933, p. 63-84.
66) (Social-Philosophical Papers) (Edt. Martin Fries), 1st ed. Stock¬
holm 1939, 2nd ed. Stockholm 1966.
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The guiding thread in these articles is that man is
dominated by mystical ideas which paralyse men's ability
to live together in concord, for these mystical ideas di¬
vert men's energy to pursue the supernatural and imaginary,
encourage egoism, and thus destroy the feelings of solida¬
rity, which make social equality and harmony possible. To
overthrow these magical ideas will give place for salva¬
tion on earth rather than in heaven, since men will be able
to form genuinely humanistic societies.
3. Hagerstrom's Writings Published Posthumously
Hagerstrom left behind him his hand-written lecture notes,
which run to about 50,000 pages. After Hagerstrom's death,
the manuscripts were deposited in the University of Uppsa¬
la and Martin Fries dated and catalogued the manuscripts,
and even typed them. The manuscripts are now accessible in
6 7)
the University Library of Uppsala, and some of the manu¬
scripts have already been published by Fries. Since Hager¬
strom's manuscripts were not intended for publication,
Fries did some editing of Hagerstrom's texts. The manu¬
scripts published by Fries are "De socialistiska Ideernas
Historie",^^ a series of lectures held in 1908-1909, on
Socialist ideas from Plato to Lassalle and Marx. Next comes
6 9)
the book "Religionsfilosofi" covering Hagerstrom's lec¬
tures on religion. Hagerstrom gave a brief account of his
view on religion in his "Selbstdarstellung" but never pub¬
lished any book on this subject although he intended to do
so after completing his book on Roman law and his work on
Einstein's theory of relativity. But his death put an end
to this plan. Hagerstrom's lectures date from 1923 to 1929
and show his pre-occupation with the relation between the
67) A catalogue is printed in Konrad Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel
Hagerstroms Filosofi, p. 209.
68) (The History of the Socialist Ideas), Stockholm 1946.
69) (Philosophy of Religion), Stockholm 1949. Some parts of these
lectures have been translated and published by Robert T. Sandin
in PR p. 175 ff.; see also Axel Hagerstrom, Lectures on so-called
Spiritual Religion, Theoria, vol. XIV, 1948, p. 28-67.
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spiritual reality, that is God, and the material reality
of feelings. His lectures deal with the schism between
knowledge (science) and theology, which was a burning
issue in the first two decades of the twentieth century.
To Hagerstrom this schism had to be rationally harmonized
in some manner. Hagerstrom did that by claiming that it
is meaningless to ask if spirit actually exists. The volume
70)
"Moralpsykologi" is a series of lectures held in the
years 1917, 1921, and 1930 on the ideas of value and duty,
on the meaning of moral judgements, and a discussion of
different moral points of view, and the meaning of a real
autonomous morality. These lectures deal with two other
schisms, viz. the schism between reason and feeling and
the schism between knowledge and value. Hagerstrom's posi¬
tion is that these schisms, too, had to be harmonized. The
question is how this can be done. "Only by paying attention
to what is real"is Hagerstrom's answer.
Hagerstrom does not teach morality, he is only inter¬
ested in presenting an analysis of what there is, and inform¬
ing people of the psychological connections between people
living in a society. A real autonomous morality - or the
essence of morality for an individual - Hagerstrom says,
cannot consist in the individual's will being determined
solely by duty. If this is the case the individual is
nothing but a servant of spirit. Further if the individual's
will is determined by duty, conceived as an inherent pro¬
perty of actions, then the individual's will cannot be
freely aimed at social goals, because the will in this
case is determined by the fear of sanctions. A truly moral
will is the will, which is determined by the love of the
whole. What this amounts to, is, I believe, the Hegelian
view that an individual is free only as a member of a
society, whose laws and conventions he can conscientious¬
ly accept. An autonomous morality for an individual con¬
sists, not in habitual obedience to law, but in a critical
acceptance of law in the common interest.
70) (Psychology of Morality), Stockholm 1952.
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The last book covering Hagerstrom's lectures is "Rat-
71)
ten och Staten", which reproduces Hagerstrom's lectures
on the growth of legal ideas held 1917, on state and forms
of state held 1921, and the relation between state and law
from 1924.
The editor of the lectures, Martin Fries, has done a
service by bringing out these lectures, but unfortunately
he has in his editing left out passages, which are either
unclear or presented elsewhere in Hagerstrom's writings,
so one has, after all, to turn to the original manuscripts
in order to have the full version of Hagerstrom's thought.
This is a pity because the lectures deal with questions re¬
lating to Hagerstrom's book "On the Question of the Notion
of Law. The Will Theory I", from 1917. This title indicates
a projected second volume which, however, never appeared in
print. Perhaps these lectures form the material for that
book. In his lectures Hagerstrom attacks the metaphysical
background of legal science and its reliance on notions of
law as an expression of will, and natural rights. Having,
to his own satisfaction, demolished the doctrinal study of
law, of legal science, as metaphysics because its object
is considered to be something spiritual rather than some¬
thing natural, Hagerstrom unfortunately ends his lectures
by saying that what the subject-matter is for a true le¬
gal science is a question to be considered on another
occasion.
I take it that a legal science, in order to be a
scientific study according to Hagerstrom's epistemological
view, has for its subject-matter nothing but actual legal
valuations in their historical development, based on a
psychological analysis of ideas such as right or duty. Le¬
gal science, then, cannot be a teaching in law, but only
a teaching about law as a social-psychological phenomenon.
4. Commentaries on Hagerstrom's Philosophy
A great philosopher has, it has been said, a polarizing
71) (The Law and the State), Stockholm 1963.
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effect on the intellectual world. The great philosopher
forces others to become critics, or epigones, or creative
explorers of the new horizons he has seen. In this sense,
Hagerstrom is a great philosopher. Hagerstrom has his cri¬
tics, who attack his philosophy with the objection that
it, too, is a version of subjectivism.
72)
To name only some important critics, John Cullberg,
73) 74)
Hjalmar Lindroth, and Konrad Marc-Wogau, pursue this
line of criticism of Hagerstrom's philosophy, which, after
all, put forward the claim to have refuted subjectivism.
These critics reject Hagerstrom's philosophy precisely be¬
cause of the alleged inherent subjectivism which Hagerstrom
has not refuted.
There are, however, also the faithful disciples of
Hagerstrom who try to make Hagerstrom's difficult writings
and teachings more widely known and intelligible. Axel
75)
Hagerstrom is, together with his colleague Adolf Phalen,
founder of the so-called Uppsala-Philosophy, which flou¬
rished during the second to the fourth decade of this cen-
76)
tury.
The Uppsala-Philosophy is characterized by its concep¬
tion of philosophy as the analysis and clarification of
concepts used in scientific (wissenschaftlich) as well as
in ordinary discourse by its rejection of metaphysics and
by its adherence to "value-nihilism", that is the theory
that moral judgements, properly speaking, cannot be judge-
72) Religion och Vetenskap. Till fragan om den systematiske teologiens
vetenskapliga grundlaggning. (Religion and Science. On the Question
of the Scientific Foundation of Systematic Theology). Stockholm 1930.
73) Tron och Vetandets Grans. Kritiska synspunkter pa den moderna Upsala-
filosofien. (The Frontier of Faith and Knowledge. Critical Remarks
on the Modern Upsala-Philosophy). Uppsala 1933.
74) Studier till Axel Hagerstroms filosofi (Inquiries into the Philoso¬
phy of Axel Hagerstrom). Falkoping 1968. A Collection of articles
printed previously in various journals.
75) See his own summary of his philosophy in Die Philosophie der Gegen-
wart in Selbstdarstellungen (Hrsg. R. Schmidt) Band 5, Leipzig 1924,
p. 165-204.
76) For an account of the movement see Robert T. Sandin, The Founding
of the Uppsala School, in Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 23,
1962, p. 496-511. - Also Anders Wedberg's article on philosophy in
Sweden, in Handbook of World Philosophy, Contemporary Developments
since 1945, (edt. John R. Burr) London 1980, p. 173-191 with refe¬
rences .
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ments but must be seen as expressions of interests or feel¬
ings. In epistemology, the Uppsala-Philosophy rejects subjec¬
tivism or idealism. Subjectivism rests upon the assumption
that knowledge of objects involves an object in the mind
(an idea (Vorstellung)), which implies that the object of
knowledge is part of the mind. At the same time the object
of knowledge must necessarily be something different and
distinct from the knowing mind. Knowledge of an object in¬
volves a relation between the mind and the independent ob¬
ject known, at the same time the object known is regarded
as something which is part of the mind. Phalen regards this
subjectivist view as one of the main sources of the problem
concerning the foundation of knowledge. The problem con¬
cerning the foundation of knowledge can only be solved by
an analysis of our common concepts. It is Phalen's conten¬
tion that our common concepts are dialectical, i.e. they
involve contradictions, and if this is the case they are
devoid of any cognitive or scientific value. Hence our
common concepts need a thoroughgoing revision which it is
the philosopher's task to carry out by a conceptual analy¬
sis. The starting-point for this conceptual analysis is our
concepts, and the means for determining the contents of our
concepts are the history of the concepts which provides us
with an independent source for verification. Thus, only by
way of considering the history of our common concepts can
we become aware of the fact that our concepts are self-con¬
tradictory. In this way we gradually come to know the
essence of the concepts, and thus improve our concepts by
purification of foreign elements in order to arrive at con¬
cepts which are self-consistent and faithful to reality.
A key question has been whether it is Hagerstrom or
Phalen who was the first philosopher in Sweden to reject
subjectivism. To answer this question is one objective
which Martin Fries is concerned with in his massive book
7 7 \
"Verklighetsbegreppet enligt Hagerstrom". '
77) (The Concept of Reality According to Hagerstrom). Uppsala Univer-
sitets Arsskrift 1944:3, Uppsala 1944, p. I-XXXVI + p. 1-539.
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It is Fries' contention that the priority is due to
Hagerstrom, since Hagerstrom refutes subjectivism already
in 1904 by his book "Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft". Since
then Hagerstrom consistently argues against subjectivism
and justly summarizes his epistemological views in his
"Selbstdarstellung" published 1929. It follows, too, that
Fries thinks that the critics of Hagerstrom, accusing him
of being a subjectivist, simply do not understand Hager¬
strom's philosophy.
Marc-Wogau has disputed Fries' contention, and argues
that the rejection of subjectivism, a cornerstone in the
Uppsala-Philosophy, is due to Phalen. Marc-Wogau has been
followed by other critics of Hagerstrom, e.g. Ingemar Hede-
78)
mus .
Fries has another objective in his book, that is to
present a positive and systematic account of Hagerstrom's
basic thoughts in Hagerstrom's philosophical doctrine con¬
cerning reality. Fries sets out to solve this task by ad¬
hering to Hagerstrom's methodology, put forward in Hager-
79)strom's book on "Kants Ethik", and by paying attention
to Hagerstrom's published writings as well as his unpub¬
lished manuscripts.
Fries' book makes extremely hard reading, since he
never tries to present Hagerstrom's difficult writings by
offering translations in more familiar terms. Fries' expla¬
nation consists only in repeating Hagerstrom's own words.
Fries' style of writing is as abstract and concentrated
as is Hagerstrom's. According to Fries' book, Hagerstrom
emerges as the most profound philosopher and his philoso¬
phy cannot possibly be classified in any of the schemes
ordinarily used. In Fries' own words,
"Hagerstrom's philosophy as epistemology cannot be charac¬
terized as empiricism, rationalism or criticism; it does
not involve any systematic philosophy of life or view of
life proceeding from a metaphysical principle of the nature
of materialism or idealism; it cannot be ranged under any
of the common set of labels as monism, pluralism, pantheism,
78) Om Ratt och Moral (On Law and Morality), Stockholm 1941, cf. below
Ch. Ill, p. 132.
79) See above p. 44 f.
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naturalism, sensationalism, naive realism, nominalism, phe¬
nomenalism, probabilism, solipsism and scepticism - just to
mention the most well-known phrases used to denote the ba¬
sic problems in theoretical philosophy"
Obviously, Hagerstrom's philosophy is a philosophy sui
generis which defies any ordinary classification. This may
also explain why Hagerstrom seldom puts any label on his
own philosophy. But it is, after all, a version of subjec-
81)
tivism, as Hagerstrom himself acknowledges. But it is
quite true that it is difficult to nail Hagerstrom down,
because of Hagerstrom's ambiguous language, and because
Hagerstrom asserts his position with confidence, and then
goes on to qualify it afterwards.
The fact that Hagerstrom's philosophy is sui generis,
and the fact that his style of writing is extremely diffi¬
cult to follow explain, according to Fries, the extraordi¬
nary difficulty in understanding Hagerstrom's philosophy.
But I have not found Fries' book particularly helpful in
understanding Hagerstrom's epistemological view, since
Fries makes no effort to render Hagerstrom's writings more
intelligible by substituting other concepts than those used
by Hagerstrom.
There is another book on Hagerstrom's philosophy by
82)
Ernst Logren, "Huvuddragen av Hagerstrom's Filosofi".
I have not found this book helpful either. It offers an
80) Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, p. XXI, "Hagerstroms filosofi kan som
kunskapslara icke karakteriseras vare sig som empirism, rationa¬
lism eller kriticism; den innebar heller icke nagon systematisk
varlds- och livsaskadning med utgangspunkt i en metafysisk prin-
cip av materialistisk eller spiritualistisk natur; den kan icke
inrangeras under vissa gangse klicheer som monism, pluralism, pan-
teism, naturalism, sensualism, naiv realism, nominalism, fenome-
nalism, probabilism, solipsism och skepticism - for att endast nam-
na de mest kanda, betecknande grundlaggande problemstallningar inom
den teoretiska filosofien," - cf. below Ch. Ill, p. 115.
81) See his own characterization of his epistemology as "subjectivism"
in the sense that "we cannot approach or speak in a meaningful
way about any other reality except the reality which we conceive."
From a letter to Arnold Solven, dated 4th January 1931 and pub¬
lished in the Swedish journal Tiden, 1940, Heft 2, p. 83 ff., quo¬
tation from p. 89. - My translation. Compare Hagerstrom, PR p. 50,
"Reality means ... what is apprehended".
82) (The Main Elements of Hagerstrom's Philosophy), Uppsala 1944.
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account of the development of Hagerstrom's thought, begin¬
ning with Hagerstrom's "Undersokning av den empiristiska
Etikens Mojlighet" and ending with Hagerstrom's "Socialfi-
losofiska Uppsatser". But Logren mainly offers long quo¬
tations from Hagerstrom's writings, and then sometimes in¬
serts his own short commentaries. So Logren makes no
attempt either to try to reconstruct Hagerstrom's thought
ortoexpress this in a more intelligible language.
Besides being a founder of the Uppsala-Philosophy,
Hagerstrom's philosophy is also important for the rise of
the school of jurisprudence known as "Scandinavian Realism".
This school of jurisprudence has become quite well-
known in the Anglo-American legal world as is witnessed by
the chapters devoted to the movement in various text-books.
Hagerstrom's writings on morality, where he advances
the theory called "value-nihilism", that is the theory that
knowledge of value is impossible, is examined by Bo Peters-
O C \
son in his dissertation "Axel Hagerstroms vardeteori".
Petersson's objective in his book is to examine the develop¬
ment of Hagerstrom's theory by taking into account his pub¬
lished as well as his unpublished writings. Petersson's
interpretation of Hagerstrom relies heavily on Hagerstrom's
unpublished lectures, which, however, are only summarily
reproduced. This makes it difficult to assess Petersson's
thesis. According to Petersson, Hagerstrom puts forward two
versions of his theory of value. One version can be dated
to the years between 1907 and 1912 when Hagerstrom's thesis
is that no value-judgement is true or false. The other ver¬
sion dates from 1912 when Hagerstrom holds the view that
some value-judgements are neither true nor false, and that
some value-judgements are always false. Petersson's claim
83) For an overview, see my book Skandinavischer Realismus. Hagerstrom
Lundstedt, Olivecrona, Ross, Kolleg Rechtstheorie, Bd. 111,1,
Freiburg 1978.
84) See e.g. R.W.M. Dias, Jurisprudence, 4th ed., London 1976, Ch. 20,
p. 639 ff., and his A Bibliography of Jurisprudence 3rd ed., Lon¬
don 1978, p. 333 ff., and see also the Bibliographical Index, Sub
Hagerstrom, A.
85) (Axel Hagerstrom's Theory of Value), Uppsala 1973. With a summary
in English.
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is that the emotive theory, i.e. the theory that some value-
judgements are neither true nor false, is true, but Hager-
strom's arguments fail in the end to establish this.
Hagerstrom's philosophy and its importance for theology
is discussed in Jarl Hemberg, "Religion och Metafysik. Axel
Hagerstroms och Anders Nygrens Religionsteorier och dessas
86)
Inflytande i svensk Religionsdebatt".
A general exposition of Hagerstrom's philosophy is
offered by Ernst Cassirer in his, "Axel Hagerstrom. Eine
8 7)
Studie zur schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart". This
is a valuable study of Hagerstrom's epistemology and his
moral and legal theory. Cassirer relates Hagerstrom's phi¬
losophy to other writers, in epistemology, for example, he
refers especially to Husserl's criticism of subjectivism
as being quite similar to Hagerstrom's criticism.
Hagerstrom's general claim is that
"all that is called Geisteswissenschaft - whether it con¬
cerns the I, society, the state, morality or religion - is
only an intellectual play with expressions of feeling, as
if something real were designated thereby."88)
Cassirer's rejoinder to this thesis is that if Hager¬
strom's thesis is true, then Hagerstrom's own philosophy
can only be considered to be an intellectual play with ex¬
pressions of feeling. This is, indeed, as Cassirer remarks,
89)
a paradox. Cassirer thinks that Hagerstrom's philosophy
in the end is inconsistent, and therefore must be rejected.
I think that Hagerstrom's way out of the paradox is
to insist that he - in contrast to other philosophers - has
freed himself from playing with expressions of feeling and
unconscious assumptions. Hagerstrom's own sustained self-
criticism frees him from any assumptions and thereby Hager¬
strom starts without any preconceived opinions. Therefore
86) (Religion and Metaphysics. The Religious Theories of Axel Hager¬
strom and Anders Nygren and their Influence on Religious Discus¬
sion in Sweden), Stockholm 1966. With a summary in English.
87) Goteborgs Hogskolas Arsskrift, vol. XLV, 1939, 1., Goteborg 1939,
p. 1-120.
88) Hagerstrom, PR p. 74.
89) Cassirer, Hagerstrom p. 111.
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he above all is able to designate what is real and thereby
attain absolute knowledge. In this way Hagerstrom's philo¬
sophy for himself and his acolytes, e.g. Fries, Lundstedt,
and Olivecrona, represents the correct and only view, which
leads to the view that he who is not with Hagerstrom is
against him. Those who are against him, e.g. Cassirer and
Marc-Wogau, are in the end of the day dismissed by Fries,
because they have not worked hard enough to understand Ha¬
gerstrom's thought. And by "hard enough" Fries means, I
think, "hard enough to suit me with respect to understand¬
ing Hagerstrom". If I am right, then Fries has the enor¬
mous advantage of talking as if he is saying something im¬
portant, viz. that is possible for others to understand
Hagerstrom, whereas what Fries is in fact saying is that
only Fries understands what Hagerstrom's philosophy is
about. Thus, Fries' objective is only to set forth his view
of what Hagerstrom really means without criticizing Hager-
90)Strom's thought in the least.
I have, in any case, worked hard to understand Hager¬
strom's philosophy. What I wish is to present my under¬
standing of Hagerstrom's inquiries into epistemology, mo¬
rality and law, and to criticize Hagerstrom's thought as
well. After all Hagerstrom presents his tenets as truths
established by a reasoned argument, not merely as tenets
above and beyond reason to be accepted on faith. Ultimate¬
ly Hagerstrom's fundamental tenets cannot be accepted on
faith, a contention which amounts to the announcement "I
believe in what Hagerstrom says, because it is something
91)
revolutionary". This is tantamount to saying "credo
92)
quia absurdum", rejected by Hagerstrom. Hagerstrom's
tenets must be supported or justified by reference to ra¬
tional and impersonal standards. And in this case Hager¬
strom is not necessarily the best and only judge, although
he perhaps is inclined to think so. But this would be a
90) Cf. Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, p. XXXV.
91) To mention but one example, cf. Folke Schmidt, The Uppsala School
of Legal Thinking, Scandinavian Studies in Law, vol. 22, 1978,
p. 151 ff. at p. 152 and p. 159.
92) Hagerstrom, PR p. 262 f.
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mistake. The person who makes a claim cannot also set the
standard for assessment of the validity of his argument and
the truth of his tenets. My claim is that Hagerstrom's te¬
nets do not pass the standard of non-contradiction. And
this claim I wish to substantiate in this book.
5. Plan for the Book
My book does not aim at giving a full account of Hagerstrom's
writings. Hagerstrom's unpublished manuscripts are, un¬
doubtedly, of great value in order to trace Hagerstrom's
philosophical development and interests, but since I have
not personally had any access to these manuscripts, I shall
disregard them (hoping, however, that I in the future may
have the opportunity to consult them. Or, even better, that
the manuscripts eventually will be published and so made
accessible to the public). Considering the claim made both
by his disciples and his critics that Hagerstrom is Sweden's
most important philosopher it is to be regretted that these
manuscripts have not been published, and also that there is
93)
no adequate scholarly edition of Hagerstrom's work.
My book has, then, a more modest aim, that of present¬
ing Hagerstrom's epistemology and its importance for under¬
standing Hagerstrom's inquiries into the nature of law and
morals. My thesis is that there is an intimate link between
Hagerstrom's inquiry into the nature of knowledge and rea¬
lity on the one hand, and his inquiry into the nature of
morality and his inquiry into the nature of law on the other
hand.
My claim is that Hagerstrom approaches ontology or rea¬
lity from an epistemological point of view. Hagerstrom's
questions are: "What conditions must any scientific inquiry
satisfy?" and "What must things be like if they are to be
known?" Hagerstrom's answer to these questions is that what
can be spoken of and thought of must be. Thus, Hagerstrom
initiates his epistemology by appealing not to empirical
93) What I have in mind with "scholarly edition" is an edition in the
line of the editions of the collected works of John Stuart Mill or
Jeremy Bentham.
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data or sense-experiences but rather to fundamental laws
of thinking. The fundamental laws of thinking are the prin¬
ciple of identity and the principle of non-contradiction,
which are ultimate principles of <^11 knowledge and reality.
Since it is self-evident that any thinking is being and
any being is thinking,it is Hagerstrom's claim that the
world is a rational world governed by laws. The task of
science is to discover the inherent rationality in the
world by using scientific methods. Ordinary language is
not rational, since it is infused with feelings or emotions,
and it is the task of the philosopher to rationalize it in
the sense that the philosopher must show that we are only
dealing with words, behind which there are no thoughts. It
is rational to claim what is real, but it is neither think¬
able nor sayable to claim what is not real. The language of
non-being is, cognitively speaking, a language, in which
we can only talk nonsense. Using this language people are
literally saying nothing but naming unreal things. But they
constantly confuse themselves into believing that they are
actually talking sense. When people are talking about moral
and legal issues, they use the words "right" and "wrong",
or "duty" or some other synonymous terms. It is of impor¬
tance for the rationality of social life to inquire into
what is meant by these terms used in ordinary or scientific
discourses in order to decide whether these discourses are
meaningful or not. The demand is that the philosopher must
submit moral and legal discourse to reason in order to dis¬
cover whether there is any inherent rationality in these
types of discourse. It is Hagerstrom's claim that these
types of discourse are fundamentally irrational, since they
depend upon men's feelings and volitions.
Moral and legal language with the notions of "right"
and "duty" exercise a tyranny over thought, and thought is
always struggling against it, but so far in vain. Hagerstrom's
claim, however, is that his thought and philosophy finally
see through the mist of metaphysics and establish the
scientific foundation for disciplines dealing with morality
and law as their subject-matter. The task of a scientific
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ethics and a scientific legal discipline is to investigate
men's feelings and volitions by using scientific methods.
Thus, my departure is the works of Hagerstrom trans¬
lated into English. As I said above my aim is to understand
as well as to criticize Hagerstrom's thought. It is Hager¬
strom's belief that
"no philosopher tears himself away with impunity from the
chain which connects the first and the latest stage in the
progressive development of mankind's philosophical thought."
Hagerstrom is, in that respect, no exception. In his "Selbst-
darstellung" Hagerstrom acknowledges his debt to Kant, but
otherwise he remains silent about the influence from past
95)
philosophers. As for contemporary philosophers, only
Phalen is mentioned, and besides him Hagerstrom's general
claim is that "I have not been significantly influenced by
contemporary philosophy".^^
Thus, Hagerstrom proclaims his uniqueness in the pro¬
gressive development of philosophical thought, which re¬
minds one of a similar claim made by Hegel. There is no
doubt in my mind that Hagerstrom is deeply influenced by
Hegel, and in general by German philosophers, e.g. Ludwig
Feuerbach, who reacted against Hegel. The fact that Hager¬
strom so loudly proclaims that he has a mission and that his
philosophical views are unique is, I think, a reminder of
another fact, viz. that Hagerstrom is most likely to have
derived his basic philosophical views from philosophers,
whom he consciously or unconsciously rejects. It is, however,
difficult to establish whether or not Hagerstrom is in¬
fluenced by other authors, since this requires (1) that
there is a genuine similarity between the views of these
authors and Hagerstrom's own view, (2) that Hagerstrom
could not have found the relevant view in any other authors,
and (3) that Hagerstrom as a matter of fact has read these
authors. Since Hagerstrom does not explicitly discuss the
94) Cf. above note 13.
95) The philosophers mentioned by Hagerstrom in his "Selbstdarstellung"
are Burman, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Descartes, and Hume, and
only the view of Descartes is discussed in some detail.
96) Hagerstrom, PR p. 38.
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97)
views of Feuerbach, at least not in the published writings,
it is extremely difficult to establish whether the condi¬
tions (1), (2), (3), mentioned above, hold or not. To estab¬
lish whether the conditions hold or not it is necessary to
have access to Hagerstrom's unpublished manuscripts, which
perhaps will give us a clue. This is, again, to stress the
need for publication of his material. Since I have not had
access to the unpublished material I shall resist the temp¬
tation to write about authors who might have influenced
Hagerstrom. But I shall, occasionally, point to a similari¬
ty between HagerStrom's views and the views of other authors.
I shall, then, concentrate my efforts on Hagerstrom's text
as the object of my inquiry, hoping to arrive at an under¬
standing of it.
I start with the assumption that Hagerstrom is not
likely to be always contradicting himself. After all, the
corner stone of Hagerstrom's philosophy is the law of con-
98)
tradiction, so I assume that Hagerstrom is a consistent
writer. From this assumption it follows that I assume that
Hagerstrom is a systematic thinker, which, I think, is also
99)
Hagerstrom's own opinion of his efforts.
Now, Hagerstrom's systematic efforts can be orienta¬
ted either toward the precise formulation of a problem for
empirical scientific inquiry or toward an encyclopedic syn¬
thesis of basic tenets. The first systematic effort aims
at the advancement of inquiry, the latter has a different
aim in mind, that of conservation and transmission of truth.
I think it makes a difference which aim one has in mind.
Hagerstrom's systematic efforts may fail, because they in¬
volve internal contradictions. If Hagerstrom involves him¬
self in contradictions then we cannot accept what he writes
97) Feuerbach is mentioned in passing in Hagerstrom's lectures on
the History of Socialist Ideas, see De Socialistiska Ideernas
Historie (Edt. M. Fries), Stockholm 1946, p. 245. - Feuerbach
is not mentioned at all by Fries in his "Verklighetsbegreppet
enligt Hagerstrom".
98) Hagerstrom, PR p. 42.
99) Cf. Hagerstrom's own admission, PR p. 313, "I have maintained
the following basic ideas although I have not carried them through".
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without interpreting it. But this interpretation depends
upon whether Hagerstrom's intention is to present the
appropriate method for inquiry or whether his intention is
to present a claim of knowledge. Hagerstrom may, of course,
have both these aims in mind. If Hagerstrom's intention is
to present the appropriate method for inquiry, then he can
be justly criticized if this is not the case. Hagerstrom
then fails, because he has chosen the wrong method for
arriving at true answers. If Hagerstrom's intention is to
present a claim of knowledge, then he can be justly criti¬
cized if he is mistaken. Hagerstrom then fails, not because
he has chosen the wrong method, but because he has not used
the right method in the right way for arriving at true an¬
swers .
In my criticism of Hagerstrom's theory I follow Popper's
point that
"any attack, any criticism of any theory whatsoever, must
be based on the method of pointing out some sort of contra¬
diction, either within the theory itself or between the
theory and some facts."100)
In short, contradictions do matter. In fact, Hagerstrom's
own weapon in his battle against metaphysics and subjecti¬
vism is the accusation of self-contradiction."^"^ I shall
apply the same weapon in my battle with Hagerstrom's text.
In the preface to Hagerstrom's "Inquiries into the
Nature of Laws and Morals" Karl Olivecrona writes that
"Hagerstrom's contentions usually have a startling effect
on jurists."
And he continues that Hagerstrom's
"criticism concerns, however, the ultimate assumptions of
legal science. If it is fundamentally correct, it is bound
profoundly to affect our view on law and society. It should
therefore be most carefully discussed without any precon¬
ceptions ."102)
I believe that Olivecrona's claim can be generalized
to cover Hagerstrom's philosophy as a whole. I agree with
100) Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 5th ed., London 1974,
p. 327, cf. his The Open Society and its Enemies, 5th ed., London
1966, vol. 2, p. 215.
101) This is similar to F.H. Bradley. See John Passmore, A Hundred
Years of Philosophy, Penguin ed. 1968, p. 61.
102) Olivecrona, in Hagerstrom, INLM p. XXIII.
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Olivecrona that Hagerstrom's philosophy "should be most
carefully discussed". But I do disagree that this can be
done "without any preconceptions". The implication of Olive¬
crona 1 s view is that only in philosophy there are no pre¬
conceived ideas or unjustified assumptions. How could any
intellectual activity be free of assumptions? Even Olive¬
crona proceeds on the assumption that you must have no
assumptions. This is clearly incoherent, as is his other
assumption that it is possible to start without any assump¬
tion and then still hope to obtain knowledge concerning,
in Olivecrona's words, "the substance of Hagerstrom's con-
, .. „ 103)tentions .
Olivecrona follows Hagerstrom. Hagerstrom, in turn,
is, perhaps, influenced by Husserl, who advanced the simi¬
lar claim that any philosophical investigation must be free
from all presuppositions, and investigate what actually
confronts us.^^' The philosopher, for Hagerstrom, has di¬
rect access to what is real as distinct from the ordinary
man and his confused ideas of what is real. Since the phi¬
losopher has direct access to what is real, he can proceed
"without any preconceptions", to use Olivecrona's phrase.
Thus, the philosopher stands in contrast to other writers
who proceed on inarticulate assumptions. And the philoso¬
pher's task is precisely to bring inarticulate assumptions
of other writers in the open and put them to a critical
examination. The philosopher is particularly fitted for
this task, since he after all can offer his criticism in
the light of his knowledge which is based, not upon any
preconceptions, but only upon what there is. But this claim
made by Hagerstrom and Olivecrona fails in the end. It is
a mistaken conception to think that it is possible to pro¬
ceed without any assumptions, and that philosophy is, in
this respect, an exception. The claim that we must proceed
"without any preconceptions" is in itself a preconception,
so the claim is self-refuting.1^5^ So the position of
103) Olivecrona, ibid.
104) See John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 189.
105) Cf. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol.2, p.230, cf. p.309.
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Olivecrona and Hagerstrom is an incoherent position.
Thus, my approach to Hagerstrom depends upon the
assumption that contradictions need to be avoided, and
that Hagerstrom's arguments must be taken seriously. What
I wish to do is to examine Hagerstrom's arguments using
his weapon, the accusation of self-contradiction, against
him.
Hagerstrom once put forward the claim that his episte-
mology was a turning event in the history of philosophy.
It was a Copernican Revolution. I shall consider this claim
in Chapter III. In Chapter IV I shall present Hagerstrom's
epistemology. In Chapter V I shall present his views con¬
cerning morality. I shall present Hagerstrom's account of
law in Chapter VI. In this chapter I shall not discuss his
theory of Roman law as being imbued with magical and mysti¬
cal notions.
If Hagerstrom
"had wished to arouse an Englishman's worst suspicions, he
could not have done better than he did by his use of the
word "mystical106)
A discussion of Hagerstrom's theory of Roman law as rooted
in "traditional ideas of mystical forces and bonds""^^ re¬
quires a familiarity with Roman law beyond my competence,
and this is one reason for disregarding his theory in this
book. Another reason is that Hagerstrom's theory has, in¬
deed, aroused suspicion in Great Britain, and has been suf¬
ficiently demolished by the writings of Geoffrey MacCormack
So I shall concentrate my chapter on Hagerstrom's
other writings, especially his criticism put forward in
the book "Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals".
Hagerstrom's purpose, as a philosopher, is to destroy
106) The quotation is from E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Theories of Primi¬
tive Religion, Oxford 1965, p. 83. The reference there is to the
French writer Levy-Bruhl, but the remark is, in my opinion,
applicable to Hagerstrom.
107) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 16.
108) See his articles: Hagerstrom's Magical Interpretation of Roman
Law, The Irish Jurist, 1969, p. 153 ff.; Formalism, Symbolism
and Magic in Early Roman Law. Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiede-
nis, vol. 37, 1969, p. 439 ff.; Hagerstrom On Rights and Duties,
Juridical Review, 1971, p. 59 ff.
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the prevailing metaphysical views, and in doing so estab¬
lish the secure path for scientific thinking about nature
and man's place in nature and society. But Hagerstrdm's
own thinking is a piece of metaphysics, or so I shall claim,
using "metaphysics" in accordance with Hagerstrom's defini¬
tion as "the view which makes something real out of reality
itself".109)
If this is true, then it seems to follow that Hager¬
strom's writings can be put aside as meaningless and use¬
less. This conclusion should be resisted, I suggest in my
final chapter.
Hagerstrom's prejudice is that all genuine knowledge
must be of one single form, viz. that of logical demonstra¬
tion. On this basis Hagerstrdm lies down a criterion of
the intelligible use of language. The intelligible use of
language is the rational one, where one talks about what
is real, in contrast to the non-intelligible use of lan¬
guage, which is irrational, since one talks about what is
not, that is to say one says nothing, not in the sense of
being silent but in the sense of talking nonsense, i.e.
uttering what does not correspond with reality. Hagerstrom's
own philosophical claim is that he of course uses the former
language, whereas his opponents use the latter. Objections
put forward against Hagerstrom's philosophical views can
then be dismissed as irrational, and nothing but the expres¬
sion of logical confusions. No wonder, therefore,that Hager-
strom gets angry at or impatient with those who do not
agree with his "way of truth".
The question is, however, whether Hagerstrdm in fact
did find the way of truth. It seems to me that Hagerstrdm
cannot lay down, once and for all, the limits of intelli¬
gible discourse, in such a way as to exclude the asking of
questions that are not scientific, but are metaphysical.
For example, rather than dogmatically accepting Hagerstrdm's
claim that it is absurd to speak of individuals having
rights with no corresponding duties, I should like to see
109) Hagerstrom, PR p. 60.
HSgerstrSm's sweeping generalization as a reminder and as
an instruction to reconsider the epistemological basis for
moral and legal claims.
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Chapter III
Axel Hagerstrom's Philosophical Message: The Copernican
Revolution in Epistemology
"For (magna est Veritas et praevalebit)
great is truth, and shall prevail."
Thomas Brooks*
1. Introduction
Hagerstrom grew up in a religious atmosphere, and felt
early the demand that life should be an arena for devotion.
Hence it is no coincidence that Hagerstrom's philosophical
contribution is marked by an intensely serious, quasi-
religious, and dedicated character. When Hagerstrom became
aware of the uniqueness of his vocation, which he felt
within himself was philosophy, he had to defy his father's
wish that he study theology. Hagerstrom did not, like Ludwig
Feuerbach, obtain his father's consent to switch faculties
from theology to philosophy. He did so in spite of his
father, and then Hagerstrom, like Feuerbach, became a full-
time student of philosophy."*"* Here Hagerstrom was intro¬
duced by E.O. Burman to the writings of Kant, and Hager¬
strom with all his heart adapted himself to Kant's philo¬
sophical vocabulary.
I shall comment on Hagerstrom's style in Section 2.
In Section 3 I shall deal with the background for Hager¬
strom's Copernican Revolution in epistemology. In Section
4 I shall consider it as a version of idealism and in Sec¬
tion 5 as a version of materialism. Hagerstrom's claim is to
* The Crown and Glory of Christianity, 1662, p. 407. Quoted from
The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, Oxford 1975, p. 42. -
Cf. "Magna est Veritas et praevalet" (Great is Truth and Mighty
above all Things), 3 Esdras, IV, 41 (Vulgate). Quoted from Oxford
Dictionary, p. 29.
1) For Ludwig Feuerbach1s development, see Frederick Gregory, Scienti¬
fic Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany, Dordrecht 1977, Ch.
1. It is interesting to notice the common background between
Feuerbach and Hagerstrom.
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present the final solution concerning the foundation of know¬
ledge. I shall argue that he fails, and that his revolution
should be met with a counter-revolution. In Section 6 I shall
present Hagerstrom's metaphysics and argue that he is a meta¬
physician according to his own definition of "metaphysics".
Finally, in Section 7, I shall consider Hagerstrom's philoso¬
phical method used to dispel the confusions which beset the
ordinary consciousness. In these sections I shall incorporate
my exposition of what Hagerstrom says with my criticism, since
what Hagerstrom says leads immediately to criticism. I shall
try to make the dividing line between exposition and criti¬
cism clear, and only hope that I shall succeed.
2. Hagerstrom's Style of Writing
It is a commonplace that Hagerstrom writes in a very diffi¬
cult style. Even his most devoted disciples agree and com¬
plain about "die langen und verwickelten Satze" and say
that Hagerstrom's "Ausdrucksweise nicht immer vollig klar
ist".2)
C.D. Broad, who translated some of Hagerstrom's writings
into English, writes that Hagerstrom
"had steeped himself in the works of German philosophers
and philosophical jurists, and his professional prose-
style both in German and in Swedish had been infected by^vthem so that it resembles glue thickened with saw-dust."
I fully endorse what Broad writes. Hagerstrom was influenced
by the great German idealists like J.E. Fichte, F.W.J.
Schelling, and G.W.F. Hegel, whose fathers also happened
to be Protestant pastors, and who themselves had studied
theology. Hagerstrom studied these philosophers and their
style of writing and this reinforced, I think, the dedicated
2) Martin Fries, in his introduction to Hagerstrom, EE p. 1.
3) C.D. Broad, Hagerstrom's Account of Sense of Duty and Certain
Allied Experiences, Philosophy, vol. XXVI, 1951, p. 99. Cf. a
similar remark by Broad that "the writings of too many eminent
Absolutists seem to start from no discoverable premises; to pro¬
ceed by means of puns, metaphors, and ambiguities; and to re¬
semble in their literary style glue thickened with saw-dust".
Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Cambridge 1933, vol. 1,
p. lii. Quoted from A.C. Ewing, Idealism, 3rd ed., London 1961,
p. 9.
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nature of Hagerstrom's philosophical style. His choice of
technical terminology reflects his conscious opposition to
romanticism and feelings as expressed in his letters. Phi¬
losophy is a serious undertaking, where the philosopher has
to rely on a terminology, which must be made philosophical¬
ly respectable by elimination of subjective ideals or perso¬
nal preferences of style. Thus, Hagerstrom's approach to
philosophy is based upon the inherited terminology of Ger¬
man transcendental philosophy. In this respect Hagerstrom
is by no means an innovator or revolutionary. Hagerstrom
uses, however, the pre-existing terminology to present some¬
thing quite new, or so Hagerstrom claims. Hagerstrom writes
"it was natural, in order to make myself understandable,
that I should make use of the terminology belonging to
these points of view. Nevertheless this dependence on these
philosophical views (even if it was only of a negative cha¬
racter) led to the result that I was not entirely aware
that my use of this terminology could produce misunder¬
standing . "4)
But, to comment, this is unconvincing. If you use, as does
Hagerstrom, the terminology belonging to subjectivism when
you want to refute it, then you must make it clear in what
sense you use the terms. Otherwise you must expect that
people are going to misunderstand you, since their mental
sets depend upon the expectation that the terminology is
used in the traditional way.~^
If you are going to use the existing technical termi¬
nology to criticize the traditional philosophical views
couched in a very similar terminology you run the risk of
confusing not only the readers but also yourself. The readers,
e.g. the philosophers, who are criticized, do not recognize
6)
that their views are discarded. And Hagerstrom himself is
liable to get confused. That this is not just my idle spe¬
culation is confirmed by Hagerstrom. He writes
"I had to make use, at the beginning, of familiar but really
misleading definitions, which were, however, already refuted
4) Hagerstrom, PR p. 50-1.
5) For the phrase "mental set" I am indebted to E.H. Gombrich, Art and
Illusion, 5th ed. , London 1977, p. 53.
6) Cf. Cassirer, Axel Hagerstrom, p. 15.
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7)
by the treatise itself."
The treatise referred to is "Das Prinzip der Wissen-
schaft", and it is revealing to read Hagerstrom's own ex¬
position in his "Selbstdarstellung" of that treatise. Ha¬
gerstrom writes
"I pass over certain statements in the treatise, the ob¬
scurity of which I soon perceived for myself."8)
Since Hagerstrom gets involved in confusing himself
by using a familiar vocabulary, what, then, about Hager¬
strom's readers? Do they also perceive the obscurity as
easily as Hagerstrom does? Hagerstrom obviously must think
so, since he is not prepared to inform the readers of his
"Selbstdarstellung" about the dividing line between obscure
and non-obscure statements in "Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft".
It is rather curious why Hagerstrom keeps this as a dark
secret. I should have thought it proper that potential
9)
readers of this "most important book" were informed of
which statements they can safely ignore, and which they
have to pay attention to.
Perhaps the reason is that Hagerstrom writes equivo¬
cally. This statement needs to be defended, because Hager¬
strom's own prescription is that it is vital to discard
thinking in fluid notions in favour of thinking in fixed
or rigid concepts.^' My claim is that Hagerstrom in his
epistemological doctrine cannot afford to be clear about
his "fundamental propositions". The reason why is that
Hagerstrom's method is to take the familiar technical ter¬
minology for granted and then try to show that thinking in
these terms is inconsistent, since the terms do not coin¬
cide in some essential points with objective reality. To
establish this, it is necessary for Hagerstrom to put a
new meaning into the given terminology and incorporate
this into a new consistent theory."*""^
7) Hagerstrom, PR p. 37.
8) Hagerstrom, PR p. 38.
9) This is Hagerstrom's own description of "Das Prinzip der Wissen-
schaft", see PR p. 37.
10) Cf. above Ch. II, p. 54 f., 57 f.? 68, 75 f.
11) There is also the possibility for Hagerstrom either to use the
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The purpose of Hagerstrom's theory is to deny precise¬
ly what the traditional epistemological doctrines of idea¬
lism (subjectivism) and realism (empiricism) assert. Hager¬
strom's method is then subversive. It uses the given termi¬
nology of the old doctrine to destroy its spirit, and to
that extent Hagerstrom's use of its terms is of necessity
ambiguous. This ambiguity explains why some of his dis¬
ciples see in Hagerstrom an ardent critic of the prevailing
philosophical views - and this is also how Hagerstrom sees
12)himself - while others see in him a defender of idealism.
Hagerstrom's theory is based upon the given termino¬
logy, which he both accepts and tries to overcome and make
fit for expressing his own methods of understanding the na-
13)
ture of man's place in nature and society.
As I see it, Hagerstrom's claim is that not until we
have achieved this knowledge can we master nature and so¬
ciety. Before we have achieved this knowledge and mastery,
man is a stranger in a social world of mystery and magic,
though he does not know it. Hagerstrom, of course, is the
exception, since he has gained his knowledge, and there¬
fore is able to master the world. This, I take it, is the
core of Hagerstrom's philosophy, which is, indeed, expres¬
sed in a rather obscure terminology, which leaves the reader
in the dark and in despair of ever understanding either the
terms of Hagerstrom's fundamental propositions or the na¬
ture of his fundamental claims. As a last resource in the
face of this deplorable condition,
11) (continued) the ordinary vocabulary or create a new terminology.
I shall return to why Hagerstrom does not use these possibilities
in Section 7.
12) Cf. the discussion between Martin Fries and Konrad Marc-Wogau,
see the article by Fries "Zur Interpretation einiger Gedanken in
der Philosophie Hagerstroms", in Festskrift tillagnad Einar Tegen,
Lund 1951.
13) The very point of Hagerstrom's efforts is similar to the efforts
of the artist. The artist, too, needs a vocabulary, and the given
vocabulary rules even where the artist wishes to reproduce nature
faithfully. The only way out is to create a new vocabulary. Cf.
the distinction between finding and making a modium of expression
in Gombrich, Art and Illusion.
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"most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incap¬
able of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices
to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melan¬
choly and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind,
or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses,
which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game
of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends;
and when after three or four hour's amusement, I wou1d
return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and
strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart
to enter into them any farther."14)
I have much sympathy with Hume's way out of the trouble.
Certainly there is more fun in dining with friends than
reading Hagerstrom. But then there is Hagerstrom's warning:
15)"One can eat and drink to one's own destruction". I find
myself - with Hume - "absolutely and necessarily determined
to live" and complete my book on Hagerstrom. His writings
have, after all, a magical influence, a power of fascina¬
tion that comes to dominate one. His writings cannot be
dismissed as nonsense, or not worth taking the trouble to
read. But I refuse to succumb to Hagerstrom's lure. "If a
man pretend to be an ambassador from heaven", Reid writes,
"we must judge of his credentials"."'"^' Hagerstrom's claims
cannot deprive us of this right, and I wish to exercise
that right.
I think it is here of some importance to notice that
Hagerstrom's writings are addressed not to the common man
in the street, but to skilled and scholarly philoso¬
phers and jurists, who should be able to understand that
Hagerstrom is not writing nonsense but proclaiming the
truth. Hagerstrom's audience then is the philosophers,
jurists and theologians, rather than the public at large.
This goes for his oral lectures as well. These lectures
14) David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Edt. L.A. Selby-Bigge,
2nd rev. ed. by P.H. Nidditch) Oxford 1978, Book I, Part IV, Sec.
VII, p. 269. The quotation later in the text is also from Hume,
to be found at the same page.
15) Hagerstrom, PR p. 246. - Perhaps this reflects Hagerstrom's asce¬
tic way of life as well as his scheme of salvation to turn away
from a life of luxury to a simpler life that man can become god¬
like. - Cf. the dictum by Feuerbach, "Der Mensch ist was er isst"
(Man is what he eats). See Gregory, Scientific Materialism, p. 92.
16) Reid, Thomas, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Edt. Baruch
A. Brody) London 1969, p. 693.
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are primarily addressed to scholars and students who aspire
to become scholars or philosophers, rather than to the pub¬
lic or, what Hagerstrom calls, "the ordinary consciousness".
A person of "ordinary consciousness" may - of course - be
a listener, but he has no right to judge the veracity of
Hagerstrom's doctrines, because his vision is clouded by
ignorance and prejudice."'"'^
What Hagerstrom implies is that there is a distinction
between "the ordinary consciousness" and "the non-ordinary
consciousness". The former is not reliable and therefore
Hagerstrom does not use ordinary language to express
his views. The latter is equivalent to the "philosophical
consciousness", that is Hagerstrom's consciousness, and this,
in turn, must use a philosophical terminology. What Hager¬
strom implies is that he who is not a philosopher according
18)
to my principles cannot understand me. Thus, it seems
that Hagerstrom is quite confident that philosophers will
accept his theory of knowledge and his theory of morality,
that theologians will accept his theory of religion as an
illusion, and that lawyers will accept his theory of Roman
law as a piece of magic. His confidence is similar to that
of Copernicus, who wrote,
"Nor do I doubt that skilled and scholarly mathematicians
will agree with me if, what philosophy requires from the
beginning, they will examine and judge, not casually but
deeply, what I have gathered together in this book to prove
these things."^)
Copernicus' revolution was successful. One can question,
however, whether Hagerstrom's philosophy is a revolution.
17) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR e.g. p. 38, 60, and p. 210.
18) Cf. the dictum by Leonardo da Vinci: "He who is not a mathemati¬
cian according to my principles must not read me". Quoted from
E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical
Science (2nd rev. ed.) London 1932, p. 30. And compare for a si¬
milar point the remark made by John Constable: "The art of seeing
nature is a thing almost as much to be acquired as the art of
reading the Egyptian hieroglyphs". Quoted from Gombrich, Art and
Illusion, p. 12. - This fits with Hagerstrom's attitude towards
other philosophers, see above Ch. II, p. 76.
19) in a letter to Pope Paul III. Quoted from E.A. Burtt, The Meta¬
physical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, p. 39.
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I shall return to that in Section 5.
For Hagerstrom's acolytes Hagerstrom's philosophy must
20)
be deeply examined, judged, and accepted. The obscurity
of its presentation is a mark of the profoundity and intel¬
lectual depth of Hagerstrom's way of thinking, which they
21)
claim they understand and others misunderstand. "The
others" refers to the critics who think that Hagerstrom's
obscurity is a rather sure sign that there is no distinct¬
ness in Hagerstrom's conceptions, without which
"there can be neither propriety in our words, nor in the
structure of our sentences, nor in our methods".22)
This is incidentally also Hagerstrom's claim. He reproaches
other writers for using vague and fluid notions rather than
fixed and rigid concepts.
In what follows I shall try to find out whether Hager¬
strom does prove his philosophical views or whether his
philosophy rather is
"a metaphysical play with words, behind which no thought
stands".23)
Just as important as Hagerstrom's writings are Hager¬
strom's oral lectures. Perhaps Hagerstrom's influence is
due more to his lectures than to his writings. To a certain
extent Hagerstrom avoids using technical terminology in his
lectures, which makes them easier to follow. Using ordinary
language must, however, present a problem for Hagerstrom,
since his assumption is that ordinary language is, by its
very nature, imbued with the false philosophy of idealism
and the meaninglessness of metaphysics. So Hagerstrom ob¬
viously faces the problem of making himself understood in
his achieving his goal, the clarification of concepts and
the teaching of the true philosophy.
In this predicament Hagerstrom was favourably placed
as a professor with an audience of colleagues and students
who attended his lectures with patience and willingness.
20) Cf. e.g. Olivecrona, in Hagerstrom, INLM p. XVI and p. XXIII.
21) Cf. above Ch. II, p. 69 f.
22) Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 399.
23) The quotation is from Hagerstrom, PR p. 56.
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His listeners were faced with a powerful personality and
listened to a voice of bewitching persuasiveness. I think
that some of them have had difficulties in distinguishing
between what they had gained from listening to Hagerstrom's
philosophical elucidations of concepts on the one hand from
what "his compelling personality made them feel they had
gained" on the other.24^
Again the style is of importance. Nobody can start
from scratch but he can criticize his forerunners. And
this is exactly what Hagerstrom does, and his attack is
couched in quasi-religious language. It goes like this:
"Ye have heard that it is said by other philosophers that
consciousness itself is the foundation of knowledge. But
I (Hagerstrom) say unto you that this is false."
Or again:
"Ye have heard that it is said by other philosophers that
reality is spiritual in nature. But I say unto you that
this is meaningless."
In the area of values:
"Ye have heard that it is said that there is knowledge of
value. But I say unto you that knowledge of value is im¬
possible. "
And to mention the area of law:
"Ye have heard that law is an expression of will. But I
say unto you that there is no will behind the law."
Thus, Hagerstrom preaches the Gospel: "The Truth shall
25)
make you free". What Hagerstrom means by his gospel is,
among other things, revealed in one of his lectures, where
Hagerstrom avers
"In truth one can say to mankind: If the darkness in the
world causes you to suffer, this is simply due to the fact
that you have not ignited the torch which alone can make
the world light. You are waiting for the light to come from
without, presenting itself to you. But such a light can
only be an illusion. Ignite the light yourself, and it will
burn with an undiminished flame."2°)
24) The quoted sentence is from Alice Ambrose, in her remarks about
Wittgenstein, in "Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Portrait", in Ludwig
Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Language (Edt. A. Ambrose and M.
Lazerowitz) London 1972, p. 13. Ambrose writes that "Doing philo¬
sophy was a moral matter for Wittgenstein". This remark applies
to Hagerstrom as well. Cf. below p. 94.
25) Cf. The Bible, John, 8:32.
26) Hagerstrom, PR p. 304-05, from lectures delivered in 1920 and 1929,
cf. Fries, Religionsfilosofi, p. 11.
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The first thing I wish to draw attention to is the re-
27)
ligious tone of Hagerstrom's proclamation. Besides the
religious tone, the next thing to notice is Hagerstrom's
comparison of knowledge with light. There is an echo of
Plato's famous description, in the Republic, of the common
man as being in the state of a cave-dweller who sees only
the shadows of things. The philosopher has liberated him¬
self from the chains binding him to the cave, i.e. from
the senses. He has seen the light, thus attaining a clear
vision of the ideas which are the true essences of things.
There is further the appeal to rationalism, e.g. Descartes
and his appeal to man's light, or Locke's similar claim to
irresistible light of self-evidence as the foundation of
knowledge and truth.
Despite his religious language, what Hagerstrom is
saying is that knowledge and truth do not come by God's
grace, nor are obtainable only in the light of Christian
faith. On the contrary, genuine knowledge requires li¬
beration from the chains binding man to religion. It re¬
quires, on the positive side the possession of a high de¬
gree of sophisticated intelligence. So genuine knowledge
is only obtainable in the light of an intellectual endea¬
vour, where philosophical thought is fundamental. This phi¬
losophical thought is the pillar of the world. Thus, Hager¬
strom is an exponent of rationalism, and perhaps idealism
m 28)as well.
For Hagerstrom, thought, as opposed to feeling, is
fundamental, and thought necessarily teaches us that there
is an independent reality confronting us. It also shows
that any man has the capacity of discerning the truth about
27) Cf. e.g. "I shall light a candle of understanding in thine heart,
which shall not be put out", 2, Esdras XIV, 25, and "Ye are the
light of the world". "Let your light so shine before men, that
they may see your good works", St. Matthew, V, 14-16. - Cf. gene¬
rally the notion of "the candle of the Lord set up by himself in
men's minds", John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding
(Edt. P.H. Nidditch) Oxford 1975, Book IV, Ch. Ill, § 20, p. 552.
28) Cf. e.g. Feuerbach, "The senses illume the world to us, but their
light is not their own, rather, it comes from the central sun of
the mind". Quoted from Gregory, Scientific Materialism, p. 20.
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this reality without the help of revelation. Every man,
however, needs the help of the philosopher to destroy the
29)
illusions fostered by "the nature of the human soul-life".
The light for Hagerstrom is, of course, his own philosophi¬
cal view according to which knowledge is indubitable and
infallible, because it is in accordance with the very prin¬
ciple of knowledge itself.
Hagerstrom invites us to think of him as one who has
come to destroy man's metaphysics and to fulfil man's hope
for a complete understanding of life in nature and society.
Thus, Hagerstrom thinks of himself as initiating a Coper-
nican Revolution, that is a new age founded on a solid
foundation of knowledge, in which it is for the first time
understood that there is but one world, a single harmonious
whole, and that this world can be known only by the use of
science, expressed in a system of self-consistent judgements.
The traditional religion of Christianity has to be re¬
placed by the new religion of science. Hence the reference
to light, in the above quotation, which also carries the
implication of being a symbol of science, i.e. electricity,
which expels the forces of darkness in a quite literal sense.
Thus, "light" points to another strand in Hagerstrom's think¬
ing, that is his naturalism, where mind has emerged from
material processes. The only way to understand these pro¬
cesses is the scientific or cognitive view. In whichever way
one interprets Hagerstrom's metaphor of light, it is through
science in the sense of thinking that men are related to
the world of nature and society in a meaningful way. Thus,
Secular, not Christian, perfection by knowledge is the hope¬
ful note which Hagerstrom sounds as his counterblast to
Christian dramas of salvation by means of faith, feelings
or volitions.
Certainly for his disciples Hagerstrom ignites the
light, or rather Hagerstrom is the light. The fact that
this light comes from without is by no means to be considered
to be an illusion.
29) The expression is Hagerstrom's, see PR p. 210. Cf. below p. 219.
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There is a dilemma here for Hagerstrom, which I believe
is important for understanding his writings. On the one
hand Hagerstrom proclaims his awareness of his own impor¬
tance as having a mission, which is actualized in and
through his philosophical writings. On the other hand,
Hagerstrom needs to be recognized by others in order to
maintain his sense of importance and uniqueness. Basically,
Hagerstrom's longing was always to be important and signi¬
ficant to someone else. He found this importance and signi¬
ficance by being recognized by his students as an object in
the real world. An application of the Berkeleian principle:
to be is to be perceived, in the case of Hagerstrom:
30)
to be is to be recognized by someone else.
Thus, there is a mutual dependence between Hagerstrom
and his devoted pupils. Hagerstrom is the light, and they
reflect it. He who is not with Hagerstrom is eo ipso against
him. This explains, I think, Hagerstrom's wrath against dis¬
senters, his "polemical acerbity" in his writings, which,
31)
however, "are strictly scientific". Hagerstrom is only
what other people regard him as being. And his acolytes re-
32)
gard him as a God. For these acolytes Hagerstrom is the
torch of knowledge, and it is their mission to hand it over,
that is to preserve Hagerstrom's existence as well as his
fundamental propositions.
Thus, Hagerstrom sent out a stream of dedicated pupils,
30) Cf. Hagerstrom, "In the abstract one needs an object in order to
be conscious which exists independently of me or outside of me"
PR p. 187.
31) The quotations are taken from Olivecrona's preface, see Hagerstrom
INLM p. XVI and p. XXI. The word "scientific" is used, I take it,
as meaning "conforming to Hagerstrom's guiding principles".
32) Cf. Folke Schmidt, "There existed between Hagerstrom and Lundstedt
what can only be described as a God-to-Prophet Relationship", The
Uppsala School of Legal Thinking, Scandinavian Studies in Law,
vol. 22, 1978, at p. 160.
33) For a list see Festskrift tillagnad Axel Hagerstrom, 6. September
1928, Uppsala 1928.- Attention is drawn to the fact that one pro¬
minent pupil of Hagerstrom was the former General-Secretary of the
United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold. - Dag Hammarskjold wrote in a
letter to Hagerstrom's daughter: "Let me in this connection tell
you that meeting Axel Hagerstrom - as man and scholar - not only
was one of the greatest experiences in my student days but ever
since has kept its importance for me through the years". Quoted
from Waller p. 207. (My translation).
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who carried with them the conviction that the philosophy
they had learnt by listening to Hagerstrom, the philosopher
and their spiritual mentor, is an important thing, since
its claim is to have established the essential truth about
the whole human life on a scientific basis. Hagerstrom has
pioneered a new area of scientific study with deep implica¬
tions for mankind. Hagerstrom's disciples spread his message
to the general educated public, where it had a tremendous
effect on current social, political, and moral issues, and
made a centre of discussion in the columns of the leading
34)
newspapers.
I shall, in this book, refer to his messengers, A.V.
Lundstedt and Karl Olivecrona, among jurists, and their
clinging to the conviction that Hagerstrom's philosophy is
very important indeed, whatever the precise rational grounds
35)for that philosophy may be. Olivecrona writes that Ha¬
gerstrom ' s
"results - if they contain an essential element of truth -
are very far-reaching; they obviously cannot be adequately
appreciated until the validity of his criticism has been
thoroughly tested; and even then, the consequences will
appear only gradually."36)
The last sentence is mystifying, since it presupposes that
the validity of Hagerstrom's criticism is established.
If it turns out to be the case that it can be shown that
Hagerstrom's criticism is invalid, does Olivecrona then
suggest that the consequence of this will only appear gra¬
dually in the sense that Olivecrona, say, still goes on to
believe, rather than disbelieve, in the validity of Hager¬
strom's criticism? If so, he is not rational. "In every
34) Cf. Lars Gustafsson, The Public Dialogue in Sweden, Stockholm
1964.
35) Cf. Lundstedt, in Legal Thinking Revised, p. 11, who quotes a fa¬
vourable review of his "Superstition or Rationality" by a Swiss
jurist Albert Heider, in which Lundstedt is "compared with an
Einstein". It is quite clear that Lundstedt is very flattered
by this remark. But he should not be so, bearing in mind that
Hagerstrom considers Einstein to be an arch metaphysician, see
Hagerstrom, EE p. 9. For Olivecrona, see Law as Fact, (1st ed.,
London 1939, reprinted with notes) London 1962, Preface. And see
above at note 21.
36) Olivecrona, in Hagerstrom INLM p. XXIII-XXIV, cf. below p. 140.
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37)
case, the assent ought to be proportioned to the evidence".
If Hagerstrom's criticism has been shown to be invalid,
then one should disbelieve it; if it has been shown to be
valid, one should believe it, and if it has not been shown
to be either, which Olivecrona suggests by his remark about
testing, one should not believe it nor disbelieve it, but
rather try to establish whether the criticism is valid or
not. - This is what I shall try to do. I believe that Hager-
strom's criticism does not pass the test. The following
sections are devoted to establishing that.
3. The Background for Hagerstrom's Copernican Revolution
In "Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft" Hagerstrom makes the am¬
bitious claim that he has solved the problem of the founda¬
tion of knowledge. Hagerstrom offers a diagnosis of the
failures of previous epistemological theories and presents
his own prescription,
"namlich als Begriff der Realitat als absolut notwendig
mit sich selbst identisch."38)
That is to say, knowledge (science in the German sense of
Wissenschaft) must have one, and only one basic principle.
This basic principle is the only real foundation and firm
standpoint of any claim of knowledge. The basic principle
is the principle of identity of the concept of reality with
itself, which is indemonstrable and self-evidently true.
The acme is the concept of reality as the only solid founda¬
tion for discovering what is true. This is what Hagerstrom
proudly announces as "die kopernikanische Umwalzung in der
Erkenntnistheorie", the Copernican Revolution in the theory
of knowledge.
It is interesting to compare Hagerstrom's remark with
the remark made by Feuerbach, who wrote,
"The Copernican system is the most glorious victory idea¬
lism and reason have achieved over empiricism and the
senses."39)
37) Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 43.
38) Hagerstrom, Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft, p. 76, cf. above Ch. II, p.53.
39) Feuerbach, Werke, Bd. II, p. 136. Quoted from Gregory, Scientific
Materialism, p. 21, cf. p. 234, note 57.
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Hagerstrom's intention is, however, to refute idea¬
lism, but uphold reason. His use of the phrase "Copernican
Revolution" alludes to Kant, and is meant to combat Kant's
solution of the problem of knowledge. - Hagerstrom is not
the only philosopher to arrive at the idea of a revolution
in philosophy. In order to understand Hagerstrom's revolu¬
tion I think it is appropriate to consider what Kant says
about his Copernican Revolution, and also what the Coper¬
nican Revolution is about.
Kant's Copernican Revolution in epistemology is rather
anti-Copernican. The revolution in astronomy advanced by
Copernicus' theory consists in the thesis that the earth
is a planet revolving on its axis and circling around the
4 0)
sun, while the fixed stars remain at rest. This helio¬
centric theory involves the assertion that the correct
point of reference in astronomy cannot be considered to
be the earth, as had been taken for granted by the adherents
of the Ptolemaic geocentric theory, but must be the fixed
stars and the sun. Copernicus' theory presents a challenge
to the geocentric theory, which could be supported by a
literal interpretation of the Bible as well as the testimo¬
ny of the senses. The latter is important. As Burtt writes,
"contemporary empiricists, had they lived in the sixteenth
century, would have been first to scoff out of court the
new philosophy of the universe."^'
This new philosophy was accepted primarily because of its
simplicity, and secondly because of the revival of mathe¬
matical studies, which suggests a Platonic-Pythagorean
42)
orientation as the scientific way of viewing the universe.
A scientist who has this orientation believes and
looks for regularities present in the structure of the uni¬
verse, which is fundamentally mathematical in character.
Copernicus "sought mathematical harmony in phenomena, be-
40) For what follows on Copernicus I am indebted to E.A. Burtt, The
Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science.
41) Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 25.
42) See,besides the book by Burtt referred to, John Losee, A Histori¬
cal Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Oxford 1972, p. 17.
The next quotation is to be found at p. 44.
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cause he believed that they were "really there"". The im¬
plications of the new philosophy of the universe are that
genuine knowledge is mathematical knowledge, and that the
real world is mathematical. According to the Copernican
theory, the sun, not the earth, is the fundamental point
of reference. .An important implication of this theory was
that man had lost his privileged position in the universe.
Man was not a subject suited to mathematical study, and man
was reduced to being a discoverer of the external world of
resting and moving objects. The external world is the pri¬
mary world, the secondary world is man's world of colours
and sounds, pleasures and passions.
"It was inevitable that in these circumstances man should
now appear to be outside of the real world; man is hardly
more than a bundle of secondary qualities." '
Man's position is then no longer to be exalted above nature.
Descartes' dualism between man's mind and man's body
sets the stage for a development, where
"man begins to appear for the first time in the history of
thought as an irrelevant spectator and insignificant effect
of the great mathematical system, which is the substance of
reality."
The only thing in common between man and the real world of
bodies is man's ability to discover this world. But how is
this possible? Descartes set out to answer this question
in order to combat the prevalent scepticism, which doubts
man's capability of gaining reliable knowledge. And Des¬
cartes succeeded - at least to his own satisfaction - by
employing the method of complete and systematic doubt as
a critical test coupled with the methodological principle
of clear, distinct, and non-contradictory ideas, ending in
the famous Cogito, as constituting the foundation for all
knowledge.
"The great revolution, which Descartes produced in philoso¬
phy, was the effect of a superiority of genius aided by
the circumstances of the times",
Reid writes.^4)
43) Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 80, referring to Galileo,
and to Descartes for the following quotation.
44) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 135, cf. p. 150 and
p. 674 on Descartes' "remarkable revolution in philosophy".
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The great revolution in philosophy consists in the
overthrow of the authority and infallibility of Aristotle,
which hinders man from using his intellect. The revolution
also consists in drawing a distinct line between the material
and the intellectual world. And the obvious consequence of
this distinction is that - in Reid's words -
"accurate reflection on the operation of our own mind, is
the only way to make any progress in the knowledge of it."45)
46)
This is the background for Kant's Copernican Revolution.
My claim, made above, is that the Kantian Revolution
is an anti-Copernican Revolution. My reason for this claim
is that Kant puts the perceiving and thinking mind into the
centre of the universe. The point of reference is not the
sun, but the human mind. The human mind is not merely a
passive mirror of nature, but plays an active part in im¬
posing the mathematical harmony upon the material presented
by the senses.
About his revolution Kant writes,
"Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must
conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our know¬
ledge of objects by establishing something in regard to
them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assump¬
tion, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether
we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics,
if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge."
In Kant's view, the objectivity and possibility of knowledge
is secure, because, in his own formulation,
"the understanding does not draw its laws (a priori) from
nature, but prescribes them to nature."48)
Kant takes it for granted that there is knowledge.
He does not question that knowledge exists, but rather
45) Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 141.
46) I do not wish to imply that Kant is influenced by Reid. According
to A.D. Woozley, "it is fairly clear that he (i.e. Kant) had never
read him (i.e. Reid)". Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual
Powers of Man (Edt. A.D. Woozley), London 1941, p. XIII.
47) Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (translated by Norman Kemp
Smith) London 1976, p. B XVI (p. 22). - I am indebted to W.H.
Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, Edinburgh 1975,for my
understanding of Kant.
48) Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that Will be able to
Present Itself as a Science (translated by P. Gray Lucas), Man¬
chester 1978, § 36 (p. 82).
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accepts mathematics and the Newtonian picture of the uni¬
verse. For Kant the problem presented is: How is scienti¬
fic knowledge possible? His answer is the theory of pure
a priori intuitions of space and time, which provide the
form of all human experience. What is given in this way
must, however, be subsumed under categories, if knowledge
is to result.
According to Karl Popper's summary of the Kantian
epistemology, Kant makes man the lawgiver of nature. The
implication of this is that
"we must give up the view that we are passive observers,
waiting for nature to impress its regularity upon us. In¬
stead we must adopt the view that in digesting our sense-
data we actively impress the order and the laws of our in¬
tellect. Our cosmos bears the imprint of our minds."49)
Another implication of Kant's epistemology is that
man must recognize that there are limits to knowledge.
"We must never go beyond the limits of reason and experience.
If we do so, then we are liable to get involved in illusions,
and are groping at random instead of following the secure
path of science. It is the first and most important task
of philosophy to deprive metaphysics, once and for all,
of its injurious influence, by attacking its errors at the
very source."50)
The very source of metaphysical errors is to foster a
general scepticism, e.g. the scepticism advanced by David
Hume's philosophy, which threatens to undermine the relia¬
bility of mathematics and natural science. This scepticism
further undermines morals, religion, and law by suggesting
that proofs of the existence of God and proofs of human
responsibility are unfounded, and hence must be discarded.
Thus, Kant sets out "to deny knowledge in order to
make room for faith". There is, indeed, knowledge,
since general scepticism is unfounded. The sceptic can
only formulate his position by assuming what he attempts
to deny, that is the declaration that there is no rational
basis for our beliefs about the world. But there is a ra¬
tional basis for our beliefs about the world, Kant argues.
49) Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 180-1, cf. p. 95 and 191.
50) Kant, Critique, p. B XXXI (p. 30). Cf. below p. 104.
51) Kant, Critique, p. B XXX (p. 29).
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Investigation of the empirical world is governed by the
intuitions of space and time as categories, both of which
are indispensable for arriving at knowledge about pheno¬
mena in the world. The intuitions of space and time and
the categories, e.g. the category of causality, are neces¬
sary conditions for perceptual experiences of phenomena
in the world of nature. All events in this world are ne¬
cessarily connected with other events according to the
category of causality. It is a question of empirical in¬
vestigation to discover the regularities, which actually
hold between events. It is not legitimate to apply the
category of causality beyond the empirical realm of spatio-
temporal things, processes and events. Hence claims, made
by the traditional metaphysicians to arrive at knowledge
of God, the soul, and the world as a whole, are not legi¬
timate claims. They are not legitimate, because the meta¬
physicians commit the fallacy of transcending the limits
of our experience. They make claims about the realm of the
supersensible, but this realm must forever remain unknown.
Though Kant has a tremendous respect for natural
science and mathematics, he does not think of those dis¬
ciplines as containing everything that can be said signi¬
ficantly. Kant does not adhere to the doctrine of natura¬
lism and positivism, which claims the omnicompetence of
science. There are also disciplines dealing with God, mo¬
rality and law, and statements in these disciplines are
meaningful, even if the meaning of these statements is
established in ways, which differ from those in which
scientific or everyday empirical statements are established.
The merit of Kant's philosophy, as he sees it himself, is
"that it vindicated the claims of science without sacrifi¬
cing the rights of morality,, a result achieved by distin¬
guishing sharply between the phenomenal and noumenal orders
and associating science with the first, morals with the se¬
cond. Given this analysis no scientific discovery could
threaten human freedom or challenge the validity of the
other postulates of practical reason: whatever the state
of human knowledge, morals remain autonomous."^'
52) Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 5.
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In his philosophy Kant introduces the concept of thing-
in-itself as a limiting concept to "curb the pretensions of
53)
sensibility". Kant's claim is that this concept is "no
arbitrary invention" of his. The concept has a necessary
function for upholding the distinction between appearance
and reality, between what is un-knowable and what is know-
able, or between freedom and necessity.
Kant's successors, e.g. F.H. Jacobi, J.G. Fichte, F.W.J.
Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel accept the claims of the Kantian
Copernican Revolution that man is free, and that it is man's
mind which structures the world. What they cannot accept is
the Kantian notion of thing-in-itself, because this implies
that man cannot grasp the ultimate reality. This is a dogma¬
tic claim, which must be opposed. The notion of thing-in-
itself is an arbitrary invention of Kant, and can safely be
eliminated as a factor in the explanation of human experience
of reality. If it is the case that man's ideas of an external
reality are accompanied by a feeling of necessity, or accom¬
panied by the feeling of being imposed upon or affected by
an object existing independently of mind or thought, then
the Kantian concept of thing-in-itself is useless. The pro¬
blem is to give an account of what is logically presupposed
by man's experience of the world.
As Fichte says, the philosopher is faced with a choice
between two - and only two-systems, when he wants to explain
54)human experience. The two systems are idealism and dog¬
matism. The fundamental concept for dogmatism is the concept
of thing-in-itself. Dogmatism explains human experience as
passive. Human experience is conceived as the effect of ob¬
jects imposed upon consciousness. The implication is that
the proper way for investigation is to begin with objects,
and expect this investigation to yield knowledge of the fun¬
damental structure of reality. The fundamental concept for
idealism is the concept of intelligence-in-itself, in Fichte's
terminology the absolute ego. Idealism explains human ex-
53) Kant, Critique, B 311, (p. 272).
54) Cf. J.G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, 1794,
in Werke (Hrsg. I.H. Fichte) Bd. 1, Berlin 1971, p. 426.
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perience as creative. Intelligence or the absolute ego is
the cause of objects in the world. The implication is that
the proper way for investigation is to begin with the acti¬
vity of thinking, and in this way give an account of the
fundamental structure of reality. For Fichte the choice be¬
tween dogmatism and idealism depends upon what sort of man
you are, that is in the end your interests.
"Der letzte Grund der Verschiedenheit des Idealisten und
des Dogmatikers ist sonach die Verschiedenheit ihres Inter-
esses. " 55)
For Fichte, dogmatic philosophers cannot give a consistent
account of consciousness or the activity of thinking. Con¬
sciousness is ultimately reduced to something material
which is inert. Since consciousness by its very nature is
active, dogmatism must be rejected in favour of idealism.
In contrast to the static Kantian world view, idealism is
a dynamic world-view, stressing the idea of a process,
through which man manifests himself, and thus makes room
for the emergence of a state of affairs, in which both
man's existence and freedom are a reality. For idealism
the basic fact is the self as the activating principle of
the world. In the beginning is the act of consciousness
which is its own evidence, or in other words the act is
self-certifying.
Idealism is the philosophy of progress in contrast to
dogmatism, which upholds the prevailing conditions.
"Ein von Natur schlaffter oder durch Geistesknechtschaft ...
erschlaffter odi ekriimmter Charakter wird nie zum Idea-
The philosophy, which makes for progress, is to be pre¬
ferred to the philosophy, which does not. Since idealism
makes for progress, Fichte opts for idealism. The task of
idealism as a way of philosophizing is the clarification
of the activity of consciousness. The highest form of con¬
sciousness is the active, reflective, rational self-con¬
sciousness achieved by the philosopher, because he alone
among other people recognizes Mind or Spirit as the basic
lismus erheben.
55) Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre, p. 434.
56) Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre, p. 434.
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principle of knowledge and reality.
The culmination of idealism is the Hegelian theory of
absolute idealism, where reason is the unity of on the one
hand consciousness of sensible external objects and on the
other self-consciousness ending up with an identity between
objectivity and subjectivity. The result is that reason is
constitutive of the world, not as Kant holds a mere form
which the human mind imposes upon the world. The nature of
reality is rational, so it can be completely grasped by phi¬
losophical thought. There is no need at all for making the
concession that there is room for faith to yield an adequate
representation of reality. Philosophical thought is able to
attain genuine knowledge of the essence of reality.
Hence Hegel's dictum "Was verniinftig ist, das ist wirk-
lich; und was wirklich ist, das ist verniinftig" (What is
57)
rational is actual and what is actual is rational). And
world history shows the progress of the consciousness of
freedom. "The absolute end and aim of the world (is) free-
, . . ,,,58)dom realized .
Hegel's philosophy is - to use Popper's characteriza¬
tion -
"undoubtedly an attempt to re-establish rationalism on a
new basis. It permitted the philosopher to construct a theory
of the world out of pure reasoning and to maintain that this
must be a true theory of the real world. Thus it allowed
exactly what Kant had said to be impossible. Hegel, there¬
fore, was bound to try to refute Kant's arguments against
metaphysics. He did this with the help of his dialectic."^)
Hegel's philosophy does have a revolutionary character,
6 0)
Friedrich Engels asserts. The revolutionary character
consists in the insight in the nature of truth. Truth is
never a body of dogmatic propositions but rather truth is
developed in the process of knowing itself. Hegel's crucial
point is that truth is not static but undergoes a dialecti-
57) G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (transl. with notes by T.M. Knox)
Oxford 1952, Preface p. 10. Cf. Knox' note p. 302.
58) Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 129, p. 86.
59) Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 326.
60) Cf. Fr. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen
deutschen Philosophie. Reprinted in Karl Marx - Friedrich Engels,
Werke, Bd. 21, Berlin 1973, p. 267.
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cal development in time. Reason is historical, but Hegel
is wrong in thinking that reality is spiritual and that
his philosophy is the culmination of the development of the
world-spirit.
Engels and Marx accept Hegel's notion of the dialecti-
61)
cal process but they give it a materialistic twist. Rea¬
lity has the character of being material, not spiritual.
Further, Engels, like Fichte, claims that there are at
bottom only two main philosophical systems. Whereas the
v
Fichtean dichotomy is idealism and dogmatism, Engels draws
the dividing line between idealism and materialism.
The basis for Engels' dichotomy between idealism and
materialism is to be found in different theological concep¬
tions, which in turn entail different epistemological con¬
sequences. Idealism asserts the creation of the world by
God. Thus, it entails the primacy of spirit or mind to na¬
ture or matter, and makes human consciousness the starting-
point for inquiries about nature. By contrast materialism
denies that the world is created by God. The world has been
there from eternity. Thus, materialism entails the primacy
of matter or nature to mind or spirit, and makes the objects
of man's consciousness the starting-point for inquiries.
Man, according to materialism, is nothing without an object:
it is only in objectivity that he recognizes himself. By con
trast, idealism asserts that it is only in subjectivity that
man can recognize himself.
Engels addresses himself to the question,
"Has God created the world, or is the world there from
eternity (Ewigkeit)?"
"Je nachdem diese Frage so oder so beantwortet wurde, spal-
teten sich die Philosophen in zwei grosse Lager. Diejenigen,
die die Urspriinglichkeit des Geistes gegeniiber der Natur
behaupteten, also in letzter Instanz eine Weltschopfung
irgendeiner Art annahmen - und diese Schopfung ist oft bei
den Philosophen, z.B. bei Hegel, noch weit verzwickter und
unmoglicher als im Christentum -, bildeten das Lager des
Idealismus. Die andern, die die Natur als das Urspriingliche
ansahen, gehoren zu den verschiednen Schulen des Materia-
lismus."62'
61) Cf. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 331 ff., cf. below
62) Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 275.
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Another important question concerns the relation be¬
tween man's thinking and reality, or as Engels puts it
"Wie verhalten sich unsere Gedanken iiber die uns umgebende
Welt zu dieser Welt selbst?"
Engels' question is
"1st unser Denken imstande, die wirkliche Welt zu erkennen,
vermogen wir in unsern Vorstellungen und Begriffen von der
wirklichen Welt ein richtiges Spiegelbild der Wirklichkeit
zu erzeugen?". '
Engels1 answer to this question is that both idealism and
materialism maintain that we are able to "produce a correct
reflection of reality".
"Alles, was einen Menschen bewegt, den Durchgang durch
seinen Kopf machen muss - sogar Essen und Trinken, das
infolge von vermittelst des Kopfs empfundnem Hunger und
Durst begonnen und infolge von ebenfalls vermittelst des
Kopfs empfundner Sattigung beendigt wird. Die Einwirkungen
der Aussenwelt auf den Menschen driicken sich in seinem Kopf
aus, spiegeln sich di ' ab als Geftihle, Gedanken, Triebe,
The vital difference between materialism and idealism
is that idealism regards the real things as images or
"ideale Stromungen" and "ideale Machte", whereas materia¬
lism comprehends concepts as images of real things.
Concerning the question whether knowledge of the world
is possible Engels' claim is that this is indeed possible.
The sceptical views of Hume and Kant are refuted in practice.
As Engels writes,
"Das Entscheidende zur Widerlegung dieser Ansicht ist be-
reits von Hegel gesagt, soweit dies vom idealistischen
Standpunkt moglich war; was Feuerbach Materialistisches
hinzugefiigt, ist mehr geistreich als tief. Die schlagendste
Widerlegung dieser wie aller andern philosophischen Schu-
len ist die Praxis, namlich das Experiment und die Industrie.
Wenn wir die Richtigkeit unsrer Auffassung eines Naturvor-
gangs beweisen konnen,indem wir ihn selbst machen, ihn
aus seinen Bedingungen erzeugen, ihn obendrein unsern
Zwecken dienstbar werden lassen, so ist es mit dem Kant-
schen unfassbaren "Ding an sich" zu Ende."65)
As one example of how practice can assure us that we
have genuine knowledge of a real and independent world
Engels mentions that the truth of the Copernican system
Willensbestimmungen.
63) Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 275.
64) Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 2.81-2.
65) Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 276.
107
was proved when, the position of a hitherto unknown planet
having been calculated in terms of the Copernican hypothe¬
sis, the planet was actually found to be there.
Clearly, for Engels as well as for Marx, the choice
between idealism and materialism depends upon one's inter¬
ests. In contrast to Fichte, however, Engels and Marx opt
for materialism rather than idealism as the true philoso¬
phy. Idealism presupposes theism and entails epistemologi-
cal idealism. Materialism presupposes atheism and entails
epistemological realism.
Hence Marx claims, in his second thesis on Feuerbach,
"it is in practice that man must prove the truth, i.e. the
reality and power, the 'this-sidedness' of his thinking.
The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking
which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic
question".66)
For the person who is interested in progress and truth
as opposed to bondage and mystifications the choice is easy.
He opts for materialism as the only basis for his thought
and action.
Philosophers can be divided into materialists and idea¬
lists. The fundamental distinction between them is the fact
that for materialists nature is primary and spirit seconda¬
ry, while for idealists the reverse is the case. Materia¬
lists claim that it is possible to know the world complete¬
ly, that is the doctrine of the omnicompetence of science.
Idealists, on the other hand, deny the possibility of fully
knowing the world.
Lenin accepts Engels1 fundamental division of philoso¬
phical systems. Interpreting Marx and Engels Lenin writes
that the various philosophical utterances by Marx have but
one
"invariable basic motif: insistence upon materialism and
contemptuous derision of all obscurity, of all confusion
and all deviations towards idealism. All Marx's philoso¬
phical utterances revolve within these two fundamental
opposites, and from the standpoint of professorial philo¬
sophy, their defect lies in this "narrowness" and "one-
66) Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach. Quoted from K. Marx and F. Engels,
Selected Works, vol. II, Moscow 1958, p. 403.
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sidedness". In reality, this refusal to recognise the hy¬
brid projects for reconciling materialism and idealism
constitutes the great merit of Marx, who moved forward
along a sharply-defined philosophical road.
Entirely in the spirit of Marx, and in close collaboration
with him, Engels in all his philosophical works briefly
and clearly contrasts the materialist and idealist lines
in regard to all questions, without ... taking seriously
the endless attempts to "transcend" the "one-sidedness"
of materialism and idealism, to proclaim a new trend -
some kind of "positivism", "realism", or other professorial
charlatanism."67)
On the basis of materialism as the fundamental prin¬
ciple for thought and action it is possible to criticize
the existing society and thus create a better society by
revolutionary action. - As Marx writes,
"the philosophers have only interpreted the world in va¬
rious ways, the point, however, is to change it".68)
What I have tried to do in this section is to present
some of the revolutions in philosophy, which form the
background for HagerStrom's Copernican Revolution, which
took place in 1908 with the publication of "Das Prinzip der
Wissenschaft". It is worth noticing, I think, that what
Hagerstrom calls his revolution takes place in the decade
of other revolutions within physics, especially Einstein's
famous paper from 1905 on the theory of relativity, which
becomes the leading theory among physicists and mathemati¬
cians. According to this theory, the basis of the descrip¬
tion of nature is the principle of relativity, which in
turn leads to revision of Newtonian mechanical and physical
principles. Einstein's important discovery opens new pro¬
spects for scientists to a world-view modelled by scien¬
tists .
Hagerstrom's Copernican Revolution can, I suggest, be
seen as a reaction against this new scientific world-view
from a philosophical perspective. Philosophy fears science,
because science does not fear philosophy. And Hagerstrom,
besides his fear of the religious world-view, fears also
the new scientific world-view of relativity, which threatens
67) V. Lenin, Materialism and Empiro-Criticism. Quoted from Collected
Works, vol. 14, Moscow 1962, p. 337-8.
68) Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, No. XI.
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Hagerstrom's view of the existence of a real, unchangeable
and independent world. This is the context for Hagerstrom's
claim that scientists do not properly understand what they
are doing. As Hagerstrom writes,
"Das naturwissenschaftliche Denken wird dadurch in die Irre
gefiihrt, dass es nicht weiss, was es selbst voraussetzt.
Und damit ist das Tor fiir alle moglichen mystischen Aus-
drucksweisen geoffnet, wie etwa, dass der Raum vierdimen-
sional sei und etwas existieren konne, ohne dass Korper
vorausgesetzt werden."69)
Scientists interpret the world by the theory of rela¬
tivity, theologians interpret the world in their various
ways. They both do so, if we follow Hagerstrom, without
having a proper foundation for their interpretations. Hager¬
strom sets out to provide that foundation. What he wants is
philosophy and science in general "to enter on the sure path
70)of knowledge" based upon a single, basic principle.
In the following two sections I shall offer two ver¬
sions of Hagerstrom's Copernican Revolution. One claim is
that it is a version of idealism, and that there is nothing
revolutionary in Hagerstrom's epistemology. My other claim
is that it is a version of materialism, and that there is
nothing revolutionary either to be found here.
4. Hagerstrom's Revolution: Idealism
Hagerstrom's revolution takes its departure from Kant's
Copernican Revolution. When Hagerstrom was introduced to
Kant's philosophy, his attitude was one of unquestioning
awe towards the Kantian principles. Hagerstrom rejects the
Bible as the criterion of true knowledge and substitutes
Kant's philosophy as providing the fundamental basis for
defending one's claims to possess knowledge, cf. Ch.I p.10, Ch.II p.44.
Hagerstrom's life becomes a life concerned with in¬
tellectual problems, but his submission to the Kantian
philosophy does not last. Hagerstrom begins to question the
reliability of Kant's philosophy, which is, according to
69) Hagerstrom, EE p. 8, cf. above Ch. II, p. 55.
70) The quoted phrase alludes to Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.
B IX (p. 18) .
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Hagerstrom, a version of idealism, making
"the unity of self-consciousness the ultimate ground of
the objectivity of knowledge".
In a letter to his mother, written immediately after
his having been considered unqualified for the professor¬
ship in Uppsala, Hagerstrom writes,
"if someone in his one hand holds the offer of all the
happiness, riches, glory, tranquillity of mind and so on
but absence of every pursuit of my vocation in life, and
in his other hand every possible form of unhappiness,
poverty, disgrace, and agonies of the soul but in addi¬
tion a life filled with striving after my vocation in life, ^)
I should without any doubt whatsoever pick the latter hand."
Thus, Hagerstrom's restless mind carries him beyond
his parents' religious beliefs, through the commonplace
Kantian philosophy of his contemporaries in Uppsala, to
his own way of finding the truth, in search for a principle,
by which the truth will be so manifest, so well recognized
by all that no force in the universe can ever make the al¬
ternative possible. Hagerstrom did find such a principle,
viz. the principle of reality, as the logical condition for
every particular form of knowledge. This is the Copernican
Revolution in epistemology as well as in Hagerstrom's own
personal life. The criterion for the religious consciousness
is tradition or the revealed word of God in the Bible. The
criterion for the ordinary consciousness is sense-experiences.
For Hagerstrom to follow these ways of arriving at knowledge
amounts to following the ways of superstition and magic. The
right way to follow is to follow the way of truth, and this
is tantamount to following the way of the philosopher's
judgement and thinking.
Hagerstrom's preoccupation with Kant's philosophy in
particular, and the idealist movement in general, led him
73)
to "nihilism". Nihilism denotes the sceptical position
71) Hagerstrom, PR p. 33.
72) Waller, p. 123. There is no information concerning the date of the
letter, but it must have been around March 1896, cf. above Ch. I, p. 16 f.
My tranlation of Hagerstrom's letter, the text of which reminds
one of G.E. Lessing's famous dictum, cf. John Passmore, The Perfec¬
tibility of Man, London 1970, p. 48. - And see Hagerstrom,
PR p. 257.
73) Hagerstrom, PR p. 35. Hagerstrom probably takes over the notion
^
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which involves the total rejection of the possibility of
knowledge and the denial of existence of external objects.
What "nihilism" amounts to is, then the epistemological
thesis that there is reason for accepting the existence
of only one mind and its attributes as well as the onto-
logical thesis that only a mind and its attributes exist.
This position is also known as solipsism, and Hagerstrom
74)
falls into the trap.
I am not quite sure whether Hagerstrom makes the dis¬
tinction between solipsism (nihilism) as an ontological
claim and as an epistemological claim. Anyway the way out
of the trap of solipsism, in the ontological version, is
easy, since it is not a defensible position at all. Even
Hagerstrom has to acknowledge that he is not the only per¬
son in the world. If he was, this would condemn him to com¬
plete and permanent silence. What could be a worse fate
for Hagerstrom? His huge literary production is a suffi-
75)
cient proof that ontological solipsism is untenable.
Another question is, of course, whether Hagerstrom's writings
consist of words and sentences expressing judgements, that
is knowledge, or something else, that is expressions of
feelings.
When Hagerstrom seeks "with all my might to work my
way out of nihilism", to use his own words, he has
probably nihilism in the epistemological version in mind.
This is tantamount to the question whether knowledge is
possible at all, which is to return to the position of
Descartes. Unlike Descartes, Kant does not question that
knowledge exists, but this is precisely Descartes' predi¬
cament. And Descartes' way out is to use scepticism as a
73) (continued) from the German philosopher F.H. Jacobi who introdu¬
ces "nihilism" in a philosophical context, see The Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary, sub "nihilism", vol. 2, p. 1404. - It might be
added what Berkeley writes, around 1707-1708, about the mathemati¬
cians: "I see no wit in any of them but Newton, the rest are mere
triflers, mere Nihilarians", Philosophical Commentaries (Edt. A.A.
Luce) Edinburgh 1944, Entry 372.
74) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 35.
75) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 288.
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means to achieve certainty, not as a means to doubt only
76)
for the sake of doubting.
Descartes' doubt does not consist in the giving up of
all opinions, as a sceptic's doubt might. This is the case
with the sceptic, who "foolishly wishes to close his eyes
77)
to all light". Descartes' doubt amounts to an active
attempt to think the contrary of what we usually believe.
As Popkin writes,
"The cogito functions not, as some of the critics claimed,
as the conclusion of a syllogism, ... but as the conclusion
of doubt. Just by pushing scepticism to its limit, one is
confronted with a truth that one cannot doubt in any con¬
ceivable manner. The process of doubting compels one to
recognize the awareness of oneself, compels one to see that
one is doubting or thinking, and that one is here, in exis¬
tence. This discovery of true knowledge is not miraculous,
not a special act of Divine Grace. Instead the method of
doubt is the cause rather than the occasion of the acquisi¬
tion of knowledge."
Descartes resorts to the discovery of one absolutely
certain truth, the cogito, to overthrow the sceptical posi¬
tion that everything is uncertain. - The Cartesian method
of doubt is a basis for rational discourse, which makes it
possible to recognize other truths.
Descartes is primarily interested in the question:
"What can I know?" rather than the question: "What can men
know?". Descartes' experience of the cogito turns on his
inner light, so that he can now see what other propositions
are true. The illumination produced by this inner light re¬
veals the only proper standard or criterion of truth, that
is the criteria of clarity, distinctness and absence of con¬
tradiction as the ultimate test of the meaningfulness and
truth of ideas. Descartes' assumption is that all science
must be founded on a principle of absolute certainty. This
principle cannot be man's sensations, but must be man's
self-consciousness, the cogito, which makes the nature of
man to be intimately connected with the notion of thinking.
76) Cf. Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism, Ch. IX. Descar¬
tes, Conqueror of Scepticism.
77) Popkin, The History of Scepticism, p. 182. Quoting an eighteen-
century Cartesian. The following passage in the text occurs at
p. 183-4.
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For Descartes, man's thinking is vastly superior to man's
senses, and only man's reason can ultimately decide the
final question of what constitutes truth in science.
Thus, Descartes' cogito ergo sum is
"the first of all truths, the foundation stone upon which
the whole fabric of human knowledge is built, and on which
it must rest. And as Archimedes thought, that if he had one
fixed point to rest his engines upon, he could move the
earth; so Descartes, charmed with the discovery of one cer¬
tain principle, by which he emerged from the state of uni¬
versal doubt, believed that this principle alone would be
a sufficient foundation, on which he might build the whole
system of science."78)
My reason for concentrating on the Cartesian approach
is that Hagerstrom's problem is similar to Descartes' pro¬
blem, that is to refute scepticism and to establish a new
scientific outlook on a solid foundation, without metaphy¬
sics, and for all practical purposes verifiable and useful
as a key to what is real in nature and society. And Hager-
strom adopts the same procedure as does Descartes.
Hagerstrom asks the same question as does Descartes, i.e.
"What can I know?". He proceeds to answer this by overcoming
his epistemological nihilism, which has brought about a
despair in Hagerstrom's mind with regard to the problem of
79)"the possibility of any objectivity in knowledge".
The problem of objectivity in knowledge is the problem
whether objects of knowledge have a real and independent
existence apart from any reference to a knowing mind, which
furnishes the criterion of truth.
For Hagerstrom, epistemological nihilism
"directed to the whole compass of phenomenal consciousness
makes mind for the first time qualified to test what truth
is" ,
8 0)
to use a phrase from Hegel. Hagerstrom's starting-point
is nihilism, resulting in the discovery of one and only one
absolutely certain truth as the foundation of knowledge.
78) Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, p. 137, cf. p. 595.
79) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 35.
80) G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (transl. by J.B. Bailie).
Quoted from Frederick G. Weiss, Hegel, The Essential Writings,
London 1974, p. 48. - Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 61.
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The Copernican Revolution is that the validity of knowledge
of objects is based upon "the only thing which is immediate-
81)
ly given", that is "reality as self-identity".
Hagerstrom's diagnosis is similar to Descartes' diag-
nogis. If one is to avoid error one must, Descartes holds,
clarify one's ideas and only accept ideas that are clear
and distinct. Hagerstrom's method is the method of "intro-
8 2)
spective reflection". And he locates the errors concern¬
ing the foundation of knowledge within the human mind, where
it is buried or hidden under the debris of prejudices, which
can, however, be removed by a philosophical exertion of
thinking philosophically, penetrating and transcending the
myths propagated by all other philosophers and revealing the
only proper foundation of man's knowledge:
"the intuitively given reality of the object which trans¬
forms apprehension into cognition" . ^3)
The word "error" means, actually, "the action of wander¬
ing" suggesting a devious or winding course. Wandering, Ha¬
gerstrom implies, must be a deviation from the straight and
constant, and having persuaded himself that he has found
the course, his mission is to set people on the only right
course. This is, I take it, why Hagerstrom also uses the ex¬
pression "Copernican Revolution", since it implies turning
man's mind over from confused ideas of sensations and feelings
to adequate ideas of thinking, and thus restoring man to his
proper place in the unchanging world of nature and society.
From Hagerstrom's point of view there is only one
thing, which it is absolutely impossible to doubt: one can¬
not doubt that the concept of reality is identical with the
concept of reality, that is to say, the concept of absolute
knowledge is identical with the concept of reality. Or to
let Hagerstrom speak for himself in German:
"Eines allein ist, objektiv gesehen, direkt unmoglich als
nicht existierend zu denken, und dass ist die Realitat als
ihrem Begriffe nach unmittelbar mit sich selbst identisch,
d.h. das absolute Wissen. Dies ist die Kopernikanische Um-
81) Hagerstrom, PR p. 50, and p. 51.
82) Hagerstrom, PR p. 275. Cf. Stat och Ratt, p. IV.




Hagerstrom's discovery of this fundamental truth that
knowledge is equivalent to reality provides the logical
foundation, which makes it possible to recognize valid
claims of knowledge, since the concept of reality reveals
the criterion of truth. Again I let Hagerstrom speak for
himself in German:
"Das einzige Kriterium veri ist nach dem hier vorliegenden
Standpunkte die Realitat als mit sich selbst identisch. Was
die Realitat widerspruchslos bestimmt, ist eo ipso real.
Hagerstrom's criterion of truth is the principle of
identity, that is to say that truth is its own standard.
"Even as light displays both itself and darkness, so is
truth a standard both of itself and of falsity", to speak
... e • 86)with Spinoza.
Hagerstrom's revolution provides not only the answer
to Hagerstrom's initial question: "What can I know?", but
also the answer to the question: "What can men know?".
There is a common, solid foundation of departure for know¬
ing the world. When man's mind is purified from prejudices
and preconceived opinions, it is capable of knowing the
world.
Hagerstrom's epistemology leads him to the ontologi-
cal view that there is but one world and this world is a
rational or harmonious whole. Objects and events in nature
and society come about by necessity, not by the will of
God nor by man's sensations. Necessity is orderly and bound
by laws, and the human mind is capable of comprehending
these laws by using the faculty of reason as opposed to the
faculties of feeling and volition. Hagerstrom's claim is
to have established a secure foundation for truth without
the intrusion of human bias. - And his true disciples,
having heard this message, proceed to portray it as the
turning point in the history of philosophy, a unique event
8 7)
of profound importance.
84) Hagerstrom, PW p. 77, cf. PR p. 51.
85) Hagerstrom, PW p. 60, cf. PR p. 42.
86) Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Prop. XLIII, Note (p. 115).
87) See e.g. Fries' Introduction to Hagerstrom, Filosofi och Vetenskap,
Stockholm 1939, p. 7, cf. above Ch. II, p. 69 f.
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My claim is that Hagerstrom's philosophy may be a
unique event in his own life, a revolt against assumptions
embedded in his own mind. But it is hardly a turning point
in the history of philosophy. - Hagerstrom is not the first
philosopher in the world, who claims to have found the
only proper foundation of knowledge. Besides Hagerstrom
proceeds on the assumption that there must be one and only
one principle, which functions as the only proper starting-
point. This assumption may very well be mistaken. There
may be more than one principle,as for example Reid argues,
distinguishing between principles of necessary truths and
88)
principles of contingent truths.
For Hagerstrom there are only principles of necessary
truths, which in the end leads to his view that all judge¬
ments are analytical judgements. If this is the case, then
the judgements are true in virtue of the terms employed in
judgements. I shall return to Hagerstrom's conception of
judgements in the next chapter. What I wish to say here is
that Hagerstrom's conception of judgement leads to the ra¬
tionalist model of geometry as the ideal form of knowledge.
This is important for understanding Hagerstrom's philosophy.
Hagerstrom's assumption is that knowledge, to be ge¬
nuine knowledge, must be both necessary (i.e. it cannot be
conceived as otherwise) and universal (i.e. it admits of no
exceptions). Reason, as opposed to faith as well as sense-
experience, is the ultimate appeal in judging what is real
and what is unreal.
As a philosopher he carries on the tradition of ratio¬
nalism, and he is profoundly at war with irrationalism and
voluntarism. Hagerstrom's philosophy becomes comprehensible
if it is seen in its relation to the problem-situation of
his day. Hagerstrom's philosophy is directed at a philoso¬
pher like Arthur Schopenhauer, who argues that the world
is my idea, and who also holds that the concept of will is
88) Reid, Essays on the Intellecutal Powers of Man, Essay VI. Cf.
also Allen Vannerus, Hagerstromstudier (Studies of Hagerstrom),
Stockholm 1930, who makes this valid point against Hagerstrom in
an otherwise erratic book.
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crucial for the understanding of law, ethics, and human
behaviour generally, and even the key to the understanding
of reality itself. Hagerstrom's rationalism, however, is
not "the rationalism of Socrates" but rather "the intellec-
89)
tual intuitionism of Plato". The former is characte¬
rized by the awareness of one's limitations and that we must
not expect too much from reason. The latter is "the immo¬
dest belief in one's superior intellectual gifts, the claim
to be initiated, to know with certainty, and with authority."
Based upon his model of knowledge Hagerstrom conceives it
his task as a philosopher to use the faculty of reason to
bring to light the broad and deep gulf, which divides know¬
ledge from magic, reality from illusion, truth from falsity,
and necessity from chance. On this basis the task is to
render the universe as a whole intelligible as one deter¬
minate causal continuum and to explain man's place within
this universe as the only place and one governed by inexorable
laws of causality, which determine what occurs. From neces¬
sity every event has a cause. There is no freedom for man
except in the rational recognition of the necessity of all
things, and in the power, which reason, by this recognition,
may exert over the faculties of feeling and volition.
If this is true, then Hagerstrom's own philosophical
discovery cannot be described as a unique event, since this
discovery is bound to happen within the framework of causes
and effects, which operate with necessity. If all events in
the world are governed by necessary laws, then the event of
Hagerstrom's philosophy is likewise governed and bound to
take place.
As a philosopher Hagerstrom is committed to follow an
argument to its logical conclusion. As a rationalist philo¬
sopher he cannot just shrink from an unpleasant conclusion.
The unpleasant conclusion, which Hagerstrom must accept, is
that he succumbed to the very mistake of confusing thinking
with feeling. From a purely objective point of view Hager-
89) I owe the quoted phrases to Popper, Open Society and its Enemies,
vol. II, p. 227, where also the quotation in the text comes from.
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Strom's Copernican Revolution can be shown to be deduc-
ible from a law of nature, and thus exhibited as the ef¬
fect of a cause. Thus, Hagerstrom cannot have acted other¬
wise, there is no alternative possible for him hut his
Copernican Revolution. This is to be consistent. But it is
inconsistent to claim that it is a unique event and a turn¬
ing point in the history of philosophy. The ordinary course
of nature, the chain of causes and effects of which Hager¬
strom is only an insignificant part, cannot logically be
overruled by the interposition of Hagerstrom's efforts.
There can be no miracles or unique events, and to suppose
so is either to assume the existence of a divine power, or
to give vent to one's feelings.
Whatever the alternative , if we follow Hagerstrom,
we cannot accept either of them as a correct point of de¬
parture for inquiries into what reality is. Thus, Hager¬
strom is inconsistent.
"He who remains with a self-contradiction only combines
words without meaning, although he expects there will be
meaning there",
90)
writes Hagerstrom. This is an apt description of his own
"Copernican Revolution". And the consequence? Again I let
Hagerstrom provide the answer: "Now the way is open for un-
91)
controlled fantasy".
Supposing that Hagerstrom has not entered the realm
of fantasy but remains within the realm of thinking, then
he is not the first and only philosopher in the world to
put forward the claim that it is the task of the philoso¬
pher to render the universe as a whole intelligible. I
have already suggested that Hagerstrom's philosophy can be
compared with the philosophy of Spinoza. Spinoza advances
9 2)
his philosophy in order to make exactly the same claim.
This is interesting. It is also interesting to notice what
Hagerstrom writes about Spinoza. Lecturing on Spinoza's
philosophy, Hagerstrom says that "Spinoza's ethics, however,
90) Hagerstrom, PR p. 262, cf. below p. 150.
91) Hagerstrom, PR p. 212.
92) Cf. Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza, Harmondsworth 1976, p. 11 with
references.
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subverts the entire thought-structure" by the fundamental
ii 9 3)principle "summum bonum est cognoscere deum". Hagerstrom
cannot follow Spinoza's subversive thought, because the re¬
ference to God for Hagerstrom denotes something purely spi¬
ritual, viz. a feeling of blessedness, which cannot be con¬
ceived as something real.
Hagerstrom dissociates himself from Spinoza, because
Spinoza, according to Hagerstrom's interpretation, makes
the fundamental principle of knowledge and reality a prin¬
ciple of feeling. By contrast the fundamental principle of
knowledge and reality for Hagerstrom is reason. But as Hamp¬
shire points out,
"the only instrument, which he (i.e. Spinoza) allowed him¬
self, or thought necessary to his purpose, was his own
power of logical reasoning; at no point does he appeal to
authority or revelation or common consent; nor does he any¬
where rely on literary artifice or try to reinforce ratio¬
nal arguments by indirect appeals to emotion."94)
So Hagerstrom's understanding of Spinoza is not the
only one, and it is at least an open question whether Hager¬
strom does not misunderstand Spinoza. For Spinoza there is
only one single intelligible universe, viz. God or nature.
As Hampshire writes,
"If one remembers that 'nature' is, here as elsewhere in
Spinoza's philosophy, substitutable for 'God', one sees
'intellectual love of Nature' as a phrase with altogehter
different, and no less familiar associations.
Rather than suggesting something purely spiritual,
other-worldly contemplation and detachment of interest from
the actual material world, Spinoza's suggestion is quite
the reverse, that is the passionate curiousity and delight
in the infinite complexities of nature. And nature for
Spinoza denotes a single intelligible causal system.
Hagerstrom concentrates on the notion of God, forgets
everything about Spinoza's substitution, and then Hagerstrom
is able to present Spinoza as a mystical pantheist, who
93) Hagerstrom, PR p. 185 (my italics). From a series of lectures de¬
livered in 1923. There is no reference, but Hagerstrom has probab¬
ly Spinoza's Ethics, Part V, Prop. XXXII (p. 263) in mind.
94) Hampshire, Spinoza, p. 11.
95) Hampshire, Spinoza, p. 169.
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overlooks that there is but one world, the actual material
world as a causal system.
Hagerstrom's intention, too, is to "subvert the entire
thought-structure" by emancipating his fellow-citizens from
superstition and ignorance, and from the blind hatred,
which superstition engenders. This is also Spinoza's in¬
tention and in this respect there is no difference between
them. Hagerstrom's Copernican Revolution in epistemology is
in the tradition of rationalism. And it must be noticed
that Copernicus' claim - the original Copernican hypothesis
which leads to a revolution - is made on rational, not ex¬
perimental, grounds. Hagerstrom's philosophical claims are
made on rational considerations. To support this contention,
I wish to draw attention to what Hagerstrom writes imme¬
diately after introducing his discovery of the Copernican
Revolution in epistemology. Again I let Hagerstrom speak
for himself,
"Dass die Welt nur bei dem denkenden Menschen existiert,
ist ein Gedanke,der ebenso unmoglich ist wie der, dass
die Erde auf dem Riicken eines Elephanten ruht. Denn der
denkende Mensch ist nur ein Glied in einem umfassenden
Zeitinhalt. Dass aber die Welt - der Mensch darin einge-
schlossen - nur ein Moment in dem absoluten Wissen ist,
dies und nicht anders,dass das absolute Wissen die Exis-
tenz selbst ist, dass ist an sich notwendig."96)
What Hagerstrom is saying is that it is absurd to put
forward the hypothesis that we - as human thinking beings -
have no evidence of the existence of an external world.
This is just as absurd as the hypothesis of a huge ele¬
phant invented to account for the support of the earth.
Hagerstrom does not refer to Locke, but it brings to mind
Locke's account of "the poor Indian philosopher who ima-
97)
gined that the Earth also wanted something to bear it up".
This poor Indian philosopher "saying that the world was
supported by a great elephant, was asked, what the Elephant
rested on, to which his answer was, a great tortoise. But
being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-
96) Hagerstrom, PR p. 77 (my italics).
97) Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. XIII,
§ 19 (p. 175).
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98)
back'd Tortoise, replied, something he knew not what".
Locke's point, in telling the story, is that we use words
without having clear and distinct ideas. Had the poor phi¬
losopher just "thought of this word substance, he needed
not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to sup¬
port it (i.e. the earth), and a tortoise to support his Ele-
99)
phant: the word substance would have done it effectually".
But then Locke leaves his reader in mystery, since for Locke
the word substance is "only an uncertain supposition of we
know not what (i.e. of something whereof we have no parti¬
cular distinct positive Idea); which we take to be the sub¬
stratum, or support, of those Ideas we do know.
There are similarities between Locke's and Hagerstrom's
theory of meaning, to which I shall return in Chapter IV.
Hagerstrom's point is Locke's point: we must not use words
without having clear and distinct ideas. In this connec¬
tion, dealing with the problem concerning the foundation of
knowledge, it is important to notice that Hagerstrom also
believes that the hypothesis of the "poor Indian philoso¬
pher" is ridiculous and absurd. Hagerstrom also believes
that if we cannot proceed ad infinitum, there must be an
end, or ultimate principle of knowledge. If there is no such
ultimate principle, then there cannot (logically) be any
such thing as knowledge. Knowledge, to be possible, must
101) . , .
have one ultimate basis. We must discover this ultimate
principle in the present material world, not look beyond for
it in an ideal world. Hagerstrom's investigation of disco¬
vering the ultimate basis for knowledge is based upon an
inquiry into the structure of knowledge itself, and not upon
an inquiry into the nature of the world as it exists apart
from the human mind.
Hagerstrom thus proceeds on the Cartesian distinction
98) Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. XXIII,
§ 3 (p. 297).
99) Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. XIII,
§ 19 (p. 175).
100) Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book I, Ch. IV, § 18
(p. 95), cf. Book II, Ch. XIII, § 19 (p. 175) and Ch. XXIII, § 2, (p.296).
101) Cf. Hagerstrom, PW p. 59.
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between mind and matter, where knowledge in the end is based
upon the contents of mind, which makes it plausible for Ha¬
gerstrom to conclude that an inquiry into mind must precede
the inquiry into matter. The result of Hagerstrom's investi¬
gation is that the structure of knowledge itself contains
the ultimate basis within itself, that is the principle of
reality is identical with the principle of knowledge. This
principle is manifested in individual human thinking beings
who are moments of knowledge itself or moments of the abso¬
lute knowledge.
By supposing the absolute knowledge to contain the fun¬
damental basis of its order within itself, Hagerstrom really
asserts it to be God. Only God or absolute knowledge is real,
ordinary human beings are but imperfect appearances of God
or the absolute knowledge. Mind is only a particular modi¬
fication of God or Nature's infinite power of thought, "the
human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God".^
What Hagerstrom is saying is that the individual is just a
part of the absolute knowledge. This is tantamount to objec¬
tive idealism, both Hagerstrom and the object of his know¬
ledge are equally real and equal manifestations of the ab¬
solute knowledge. My conclusion is that Hagerstrom's "Das Prin-
zip der Wissenschaft" is a version of objective idealism.
Hagerstrom's philosophy may then be compared with He¬
gel's philosophy. According to Hegel
"thought and thought alone has eyes for the essence, sub- gg3)
stance, universal power, and ultimate design of the world".
For Hegel
"we conceive the world to ourselves as a great totality
which is created by God, and so created that in it God has
manifested Himself to us".103)
For Hegel "God" is equivalent to "truth" and
"the truth is only realized in the form of system, is
expressed^j^i the idea which represents the Absolute asSp 1 r 11 .
102) Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Prop. XI, Corollary (p. 91)
103) Hegel, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (transl. by
W. Wallace). Quoted from Weiss, Hegel p. 161.
104) Hegel, Encyclopaedia. Quoted from Weiss, Hegel p. 171.
105) Hegel, Phenomenology. Quoted from Weiss, Hegel p. 13.
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For Hegel God is manifest in the world. For Hagerstrom the
notion of God is repugnant, so he speaks instead of the
absolute knowledge. But what Hagerstrom says is essentially
what Hegel also says, that the truth or the essential na¬
ture of reality is a system of concepts, which can be
grasped only through the mode of thought appropriate to it,
that is through conceptual, rational thought. The subject
matter proper for philosophy, Hegel says, is "the actual
knowledge of what truly is".^ Hagerstrom is in complete
agreement, "all knowledge is a determination of what is
real"."'"^' Again Hegel says that
"there is a fundamental delusion in all scientific empiri¬
cism. It employs metaphysical categories of matter, force,
those of one, many generality, infinity, etc. ... And all
the while it is unaware that it contains metaphysics - in
wielding which, it makes use of those categories and their
combinations in a style utterly thoughtless and uncriti¬
cal. "108)
Listen to what Hagerstrom says
"Metaphysics dominates not only in philosophy, but in
science generally. But it is nothing but a series of com¬
binations of words, concerning whose character the meta¬
physician knows nothing."1^9)
Again Hegel conceives his task as that of
"conducting the individual mind from its unscientific
standpoint to that of science". '
And this is precisely also the way, in which Hagerstrom
conceives his task.
Thus Hagerstrom's discovery is no discovery at all.
It turns out to be the return to the idealist movement,
which he claims to have abandoned. What is real is still to be
explained and conceived in terms of consciousness or mind.
This is idealism. To be sure, Hagerstrom claims that the
basis of knowledge is not to be identified with self-con¬
sciousness or mind."'"^ This is the case for Hagerstrom's
rejection of the idealism of Descartes, which according
106) Hegel, Phenomenology. Quoted from Weiss, Hegel p. 44.
107) Hagerstrom, PR p. 315.
108) Hegel, Encyclopaedia. Quoted from Weiss, Hegel p. 142.
109) Hagerstrom, PR p. 60.
110) Hegel, Phenomenology. Quoted from Weiss, Hegel p. 40.
111) Hagerstrom, PR p. 51.
124
to Hagerstrom makes consciousness the fundamental basis for
knowledge. On the basis of Descartes' position one is in¬
evitably led to maintain that we know nothing but our own
mental states. Hagerstrom rejects subjectivism, but the
position he adopts is the position of the objective idea-
112)
lism of Hegel or Bradley. What Hagerstrom falls back
on is the idealist argument that it is impossible to think
of anything without thinking of it as being experienced,
and therefore it cannot be without being experienced. This
is an untruism. ^ An untruism is an ambiguous sentence,
which taken in one sense states a dull truism - an analy¬
tical or a platitudinous truth - and taken in another sense
makes a statement that is interesting, but either certainly
or probably false or at least of uncertain truth-value.
Hagerstrom's argument is, in one sense, a truism,
since it is true that if Hagerstrom is thinking of his book,
then he is thinking of his book. In another sense it is a
manifest untruth that if Hagerstrom is thinking of his
book, then it follows necessarily that the book does ac¬
tually exist. Writing this thesis I wish it were the case,
but it is not that easy.
HagerstrSm's claim is that knowledge implies a knowing
114)mind. If this is so, then Hagerstrom's discovery amounts
to the claim that the fundamental basis, on which every¬
thing turns round, is - Hagerstrom.
But this cannot be a Copernican Revolution, or if it
is then Kant certainly has the priority. Now, it is diffi¬
cult to establish whether Hagerstrom adheres to the Kantian
position concerning space and time. In one place Hagerstrom
writes that
"whatever falls within our experience, everything with which
we can occupy ourselves in thought as that which is real,
is bound by the shackles of space and time, by which God
cannot be bound".H '
112) Cf. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, Ch. 3, Towards the
Absolute, especially p. 69 on Bradley's Absolute.
113) For this notion I am indebted to Jonathan Barnes and Richard
Robinson, Untruisms, Metaphilosophy, vol. 3, 1972, p. 189 ff.
114) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 62.
115) Hagerstrom, PR p. 213.
125
This may be interpreted as an adherence to Kant, for he
holds too that "we are doomed to perceive within a frame¬
work of space and time".^^ But this interpretation does
not square with Hagerstrom's contention that "something of
117)
the character of space is imposed on reality itself".
Indeed, Hagerstrom's claim is that there is "a confusion in
human thought", and this confusion is "the tendency of human
thought to burden reality itself with the space and time, in
118)
which an individual reality exists". Hagerstrom's con¬
tention is that "reality itself cannot have its determinate-
119)
ness through space and time".
This amounts to a denial of Kant's doctrine that space
and time are subjective, a priori forms of cognition. Per¬
haps Hagerstrom's doctrine is that space and time are empi¬
rical properties of objects, on a par with any other empiri¬
cal property of objects. This is no discovery either, since
Berkeley and Hume hold this view as well. And the consequence
is that space and time are relative to the perceiving person.
This position, again, is not consistent with Hagerstrom's
contention that in perception an already objective world is
presupposed, where space and time are "the only conceivable
continuum for the real". ^
This amounts to the claim that space and time are auto¬
nomous and independent of human beings and physical bodies.
This is Newton's doctrine, and Hagerstrom has made no dis¬
covery. Since Newton's doctrine accepts empty space, and
time where nothing happens, this is in conflict with Hager¬
strom's claim that the notion of empty space "is a metaphy-
121)
sical play with words behind which no thought stands".
It is difficult to establish whether there are any
thoughts behind Hagerstrom's use of the words space and
time. Thus it is hard to establish whether Hagerstrom in
116) Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 29.
117) Hagerstrom, PR p. 211.
118) Hagerstrom, PR p. 215.
119) Hagerstrom, PR p. 211.
120) Hagerstrom, PR p. 54 and p. 288, cf. his EE where Hagerstrom ar¬
gues that Einstein's theory is a piece of metaphysics.
121) Hagerstrom, PR p. 56.
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fact succeeds in refuting Kant. Hagerstrom has forgotten his
own point about not using words without having clear and
distinct ideas in mind.
I do not think it is worth while trying to unravel
what Hagerstrom's opinion of space and time amounts to, so
I do not intend to discuss the question any further. Suffice
it to say - with Reid -
"when we are required to put out the old light altogether,
that we may follow the new, we have reason to be on our
guard" . 12 2")
I think we have reason to be on our guard, when Hager¬
strom revolts against the foundations of knowledge, and sub¬
stitutes another foundation, on which his whole philosophy
rests. The foundation ought to be very solid and well-estab¬
lished, yet Hagerstrom says nothing more for his foundation
than that it is evident. Indeed, his claim is that "nur der
Philosoph schernt auf diese Weise eines Wissens machtig zu
123)sein". The word "scheint" (i.e. appear or seem), which
Hagerstrom uses, suggests that he is offering a tentative
empirical conjecture. If this is the case the related ques¬
tion is: what would count as evidence against the conjecture?
There must be some form of procedure to test the philo¬
sopher ' s claim to possess knowledge. And the procedure,
which Hagerstrom offers is, as far as I can see, the appeal
124)
to his own mind, that is to his introspective reflection.
But the vital objection to this is offered by Hagerstrom
125)
himself as confusing psychology with logic.
If the phrase quoted is not to be interpreted as an
empirical conjecture, then the phrase perhaps suggests that
it stands to reason that the philosopher does possess ge¬
nuine knowledge. Hagerstrom's claim amounts to philosophers
being, as a matter of fact, the only persons capable of
knowing the truth. This, in turn, implies the idealist the¬
sis that there are degrees of reality and degrees of truth
within a system of absolute knowledge. This is in conflict
122) Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 14.
123) Hagerstrom, PW p. 132 (my italics).
124) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 275.
125) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 35.
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with Hagerstrom1s claim to have refuted idealism, but I
shall return to this in Ch. IV. Again one may ask for a
procedure to test Hagerstrom's claim, and what Hagerstrom
has to offer is, I suppose, the fact that he is a philoso¬
pher. To offer this procedure as a test is to offer an un-
truism. It is true, as a matter fact, that Hagerstrom is
by profession a philosopher. But it does not follow that
to be a philosopher is equivalent to being the one and only
mouthpiece of the truth. This is to elevate the philosopher
to being omniscient. This attribute is normally ascribed only
to God, since it is impossible for any ordinary human being
to know everything. We are - of course - reminded by his
true disciples that Hagerstrom is an extra-ordinary human
being, that is to say a god. This implies, if we follow
Hagerstrom's own message, that we are dealing not with
thought but with something spiritual. And these true dis¬
ciples "fail to draw the only reasonable conclusion that
can be drawn, viz. that it is therefore meaningless to ask
if the outlook is true or false, since as a content of feel¬
ing or a content of will as such, nothing else can be pre¬
sent except a determinate form of (their) own feeling and
126)
will", to use Hagerstrom's own words.
As for Hagerstrom himself, my conclusion is that his
Copernican Revolution, aiming at solving "the problem of
knowledge through a psychological investigation of the na¬
ture of human consciousness (is) based on an incredible
127)
confusion of thought", again to use Hagerstrom's own words.
So much for my general contention that Hagerstrom's
revolution, at least as it is presented in "Das Prinzip der
Wissenschaft", is not a revolution at all, but a version of
idealism. This is not - on my part - a revolutionary conten¬
tion, since it has been put forward by other critics of Ha-
128)
gerstrom. But I think this is important for understand¬
ing Hagerstrom's reaction against idealism, explicitly
126) Hagerstrom, PR p. 274. The translation offered by Sandin has "own",
where I have substituted "their".
127) Hagerstrom, PR p. 35. Hagerstrom writes "seemed to me", which I
have rendered with "is".
128) See above Ch. II, p. 67 f.
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put forward in his "Selbstdarstellung", a reaction only
the stronger, because Hagerstrom has been a follower of
idealism at least until 1910.
5. Hagerstrom's Revolution: Materialism
In a lecture, held in 1920, Hagerstrom comments on "the
real religious problem of our time", that is to say "when
materialism presses to the fore are not the roots of reli-
129)
giosity severed?". The "real religious problem" is, I
believe, equivalent to the real epistemological problem,
that is to say, when materialism presses to the fore are
not the roots of idealism severed? This is confirmed by the
sequel where Hagerstrom says:
"For it is to be noticed that if, from the point of view
of the understanding, materialism is actually the only
possible world-view, then no power in the world can in
the long run prevent its victorious progress".130)
The first question to settle is whether Hagerstrom,
in putting forward this contention, relies on the techni¬
cal Kantian distinction between reason and understanding
as different faculties with different logical operations.
Understanding as the faculty of dealing with categories,
and reason as the faculty of regulating the operations of
131)
understanding by means of regulative ideas. Reason, on
the Kantian account, is not a source of knowledge on its
own account, its function is regulative, not constitutive
of what there is, and the effect of the logical operation
of reason is that whatever we know be cast in a systematic
form. What is peculiarly distinctive of the idea of reason
is that this idea postulates, in Kant's own words,
"a complete unity in the knowledge obtained by the under¬
standing, by which this knowledge is to be not a mere con¬
tingent aggregate, but a system connected according to
necessary laws".132)
129) Hagerstrom, PR p. 299. According to Fries, Hagerstrom's manuscript
is "undoubtedly written in 1920", see his introduction to Hager¬
strom, Religionsfilosofi, p. 11.
130) Hagerstrom, PR p. 299.
131) See Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 241 f. with references.
132) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. B 673 (p. 534). - Cf. for law
Hans Kelsen's idea of the Basic Norm, by which norms are not a mere
contingent aggregate but a system of inter-connected norms.
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As far as I can see Hagerstrom does not apply this
distinction. For Hagerstrom there is no logical difference
between the operation of understanding and the operation
of reason. Thus, Hagerstrom does not separate reason from
understanding.
The next question is whether materialism is as a matter
of fact the only possible world-view from the point of view
133)
of reason or understanding, "which judges objectively".
My contention is that HagerStrom's answer is yes, when the
doctrine of materialism is properly understood. Thus, Hager-
strom's Copernican Revolution can be seen as a version of
materialism, more fully presented in his "Selbstaarstellung"
from 1929.
To be true, Hagerstrom does not now use the phrase
"Copernican Revolution", but he says that he regards "Das
Prinzip der Wissenschaft" as his "most important book and
until now I have found no cause to abandon the fundamental
134)
propositions which I have affirmed in it". Surely a
Copernican Revolution must belong to the class of fundamen¬
tal propositions. This, in turn, raises the question whether
the revolution of "Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft" is just
repeated again in Hagerstrom's "Selbstdarstellung". Now,
I have argued that Hagerstrom's approach in his former book
can be seen as an idealistic approach. This approach Hager¬
strom now abandons in favour of his materialistic approach.
It has been discussed whether Hagerstrom has or has not
changed his mind. Fries argues that Hagerstrom's thought
is constant, therefore there cannot be a change of mind.
Fries may rely on Hagerstrom's own testimony. Recollecting
his preoccupation - around 1888 - with the problem of under¬
standing the world and grasping the relation of himself to
the world, Hagerstrom recalls - in an interview to a jour¬
nal in 1939 - that he found himself in a tortured relation
both with the world and with his own nature. He also found
himself in one of the incomparable valleys of Sodermanland
133) Hagerstrom, PR p. 300.
134) Hagerstrom, PR p. 37.
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(for an English reader the Lake District may convey the
beauty of the landscape). This valley "offered an ecstatic
incitement" to Hagerstrom. He was emotionally overwhelmed
by the beauty of the scenery of the valley. It suddenly
occured to him that
"it is impossible to present the external world as a mere
content of our consciousness. Everything was surely very
unclear; but I had in any case a strong emotion of being
a new intellectual human being. ... However that may be,
I have always had the feeling that any later view adopted
was just a. continuous development of this seminal expe¬
rience . "135)
If we trust Hagerstrom's memory, then it is not cor¬
rect to say that Hagerstrom has changed his mind. His mind
is rather to be compared to an active intellectual prin-
136)
ciple, and his knowledge rather to "growledge".
Hagerstrom's starting point is his emotional experience
which he gradually transforms and expresses more clearly in
judgements culminating in the fundamental judgement stating
the principle of reality: "reality as self-identity is the
very validity of all knowledge and is in this sense the
137)
immediately given". What this shows, however, is that the
expression and evocation of Hagerstrom's feeling can be in¬
terpreted as characterizing Hagerstrom as a truly religious
person, relying on nothing but his own feelings. If this is
the foundation of Hagerstrom's philosophy, then it is a
piece of metaphysics. Hagerstrom emphatically denies this
interpretation, writing "if reality is defined as knowledge
itself, there is not the least thought of self-conscious-
138)
ness". On the contrary Hagerstrom's claim is that "the
objectivity of knowledge must lie in the very nature of
139)
what is apprehended, in the very nature of the object".
What Hagerstrom wants to say is that his enjoyment (or suffer¬
ing) of such emotional experiences is one thing, but quite an¬
other thing is a claim of knowledge, expressed in a judgement.
135) Waller, p. 171 (my translation).
136) I owe this word to Basil Willey.
137) Hagerstrom, PR p. 51.
138) Hagerstrom, PR p. 51.
139) Hagerstrom, PR p. 36.
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For Hagerstrom, following Kant, "feeling is not a faculty
whereby we represent things, but lies outside our whole
faculty of knowledge". ^
The same applies to volition, according to Hagerstrom.
Indeed, the basic distinction for him is between thinking
or reason which objectify and represent things as they are,
and feeling and volition which do not objectify anything.
For Hagerstrom knowledge is incompatible with feeling and
volition. This is what I think Hagerstrom wants to say.
But what he actually says virtually amounts to idealism or
subjectivism since "object" may denote an idea in one's
mind. Hence Hagerstrom's contention that "reality means
what is apprehended" or "the truth of the existence of the
thing means nothing other than it exists as we apprehend
it".141)
If so, then it is true that Hagerstrom has not changed
his mind, but then his "new view" is still an idealist view.
This is still metaphysics, according to Hagerstrom's own
definition, and it is rather tempting to dismiss his philo¬
sophy without a hearing. I shall resist this temptation.
But then it must be acknowledged that Hagerstrom has changed
his mind around the years 1909-1910. If this is granted,
then the only way of explaining his change of mind is to
assert that this is only the working-out of an inward prin¬
ciple of development, which was there inherent from the very
beginning, and dimly realized in 1888 and fully presented
both in his books "Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft" and "Selbst-
darstellung".
This is, I take it, Fries' line of argument in his
massive book on Hagerstrom's philosophy. This view has been
contested by Mare-Wogau,referring to the surprise among the
philosophers in Uppsala, when Hagerstrom's "Selbstdarstel-
lung" appeared in 1929.
Hagerstrom's basic claim has been that for genuine
knowledge to occur, there must be an unconditional principle.
140) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. B 829 note (p. 633 note).
141) Hagerstrom, PR p. 50, and p. 211 respectively.
142) Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hagerstrom's filosofi, p. 54.
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This principle cannot be an object or natural thing, be¬
cause each thing is what it is in consequence of some other
thing. This principle cannot be mind or consciousness as
such, because mind exists only in contrast to nature. The
principle must then be found in a synthesis of mind and
nature, and this is then the principle of reality. Hager-
strom's point is now that mind in the sense of thinking is
always intentional. It is always consciousness of something,
that is an object, and an object is a material reality.
Hence the foundation of knowledge is a material reality
rather than a spiritual reality. The latter is the founda¬
tion for idealism or subjectivism, the former the foundation
for Hagerstrom's version of materialism.
By relying on the intentionality of consciousness for
his rejection of idealism Hagerstrom cannot uphold his
claim to have initiated a Copernican Revolution of world¬
wide significance, as Fries claims. The distinction has
been used by other philosophers before Hagerstrom to refute
idealism. I shall return to this. The claim of revolution
by Hagerstrom and Fries only shows that their minds are
deceived by the "Idols of the Den", to use Francis Bacon's
classification, where "the Den" refers to Uppsala. At best
Hagerstrom has made a revolution among philosophers in
Uppsala, and even that has been disputed.
It is Hagerstrom's colleague, Adolf Phalen, who has
the priority in Uppsala. I do not wish to enter into a
reasoned discussion in this dispute between Fries and Lund-
stedt, defending Hagerstrom, and their critics, defending
Phalen. This is an internal Swedish affair, but my bet is, if
pressed, that it is Phalen, cf. above Ch.II p.69, below p.148.
To understand Hagerstrom's philosophical revolution
it is, I believe, important to stress that Hagerstrom is
convinced that there must be a proper foundation for know¬
ledge, and this proper foundation must be "an unconditional
principle, which functions as one sure anchorage,without
which our organic life is but a stage of somnambulism",
to borrow a phrase from Samuel Coleridge. Hagerstrom re¬
lies on this anchor in his revolution in order to establish
133
the sure and secure foundation of knowledge in a world of
change and uncertainty.
Hagerstrom's problem is - in the twenties - the same
problem as in 1888, that is to understand the world and
his relationship to this world. And the world around him
is in turmoil. There are the social and political changes
of World War I and the Russian Revolution. There are
counterparts in science with Albert Einstein's theory of
relativity upsetting the Newtonian picture of the world
and in philosophy the view of Ernst Mach that concepts are
nothing but human constructions referring only to sensa¬
tions in the course of the individual's sense-experiences,
rather than referring to existing things in the world.
This scientific and philosophical approach is for Hager¬
strom tantamount to either scepticism or idealism, which
in turn implies a revolt against reason and the fancies of
uncontrolled emotional imaginations in the minds of ordi¬
nary people. The best safeguard against the subjectivist's
folly and fantasy and the voluntarist's excess of the will
to power is science based upon reason. Hagerstrom's aim is
to build a system of knowledge on a firm foundation with
no concessions made either to scepticism or idealism. And
this foundation must be materialism, as Hagerstrom inter¬
prets materialism.
Hagerstrom's Copernican Revolution, in his version of
materialism, is still based upon the Hegelian formula of
identity between reason and reality. Thus, Hagerstrom's
philosophy presents, I believe, an illustration of Popper's
claim that the idealist claim of the identity between rea¬
son and reality "can easily be turned round so as to become
, . , _ . ... 143)
a kind of materialism.
What I wish to do in this section is to try to find
out what kind of materialism Hagerstrom adheres to. I rea¬
lize that this is a dangerous task, at least if we follow
Fries, since this implies that it is - perhaps - possible
to classify Hagerstrom's philosophy. According to Fries,
143) Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 331, cf. above, p. 105.
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Hagerstrom's philosophy is unique in the sense that it can¬
not be classified. What Fries' claim amounts to is the
claim that Hagerstrom's philosophy is Hagerstrom's philo¬
sophy. This is a true and rather uninformative tautology.
But what is worse for Fries is that he does not realize
that for Hagerstrom a tautology is absolutely meaningless
in the sense that it is a mere combination of words with
144)
no thoughts behind. This is a rather odd view of a tau¬
tology, but never mind that for the moment. If we follow
Hagerstrom's thought, and why shouldn't we, since he is
the master, then what Fries' claim amounts to is that Ha¬
gerstrom's philosophy is a tautology, in the accepted sense,
as well as a mere combination of words with no thoughts be¬
hind .
This is, indeed, surprising. The philosopher Hager-
strom is in a position very similar to the position of the
emperor in the fairy tales of Hans Christian Andersen: the
emperor wears no clothes, Hagerstrom has no thoughts. Of
course, if Hagerstrom's materialism is the doctrine that
really there are no mental events: no thoughts, no feelings,
no volitions, no states of consciousness at all, then this
is a consistent view. But it is a preposterous view. Hager¬
strom, at least, thinks that his doctrine is true, indeed
it is presented as the truth. So there is at least one
thought, and Hagerstrom has involved himself in contradic¬
tion from which he can extricate himself only by denying
that he knows anything - which is an absurd alternative
from Hagerstrom's own point of view. Hence Hagerstrom must
either contradict himself or lapse into absurdity. In fact,
his great Copernican Revolution is all fagade with very
little thought behind it. The genius of Hagerstrom is the
genius of a magnificent magician. - A magnificent magician
knows of course what he is practising. He bewitches and
fools his audience, not himself, with his magic tricks.
What intrigues me, the more I read Hagerstrom, is whether
Hagerstrom as a magician actually deludes himself or whether
144) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 62.
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he rather skillfully manipulates his audience by using his
magic formulas. I am not quite sure of the answer to that
question. But it fascinates me, and I hope I am able to
convey some of this fascination to my readers.
My own view is that Hagerstrom is a sincere utterer
of untruisms, when he propounds his statements. He supposes
himself to be making true and interesting statements. What
he is in fact doing is hovering between true and trifling
statements and false and informative statements. Thus, Ha¬
gerstrom's philosophy is founded upon an untruism. This is
my thesis, which I hope I am able to substantiate in what
follows.
Presenting his own philosophical views Hagerstrom
writes that
"I (i.e. A.H.) have not been significantly influenced by
contemporary philosophy, on account of what is, in my
opinion, its uncritical point of departure".145)
What this shows is Hagerstrom's sense of his own superiori¬
ty and scorn for contemporary philosophers. It is the proud
claim of the absolutist rationalist who possesses infallible
knowledge on account of his own intellect, who does not
tolerate opposition. ^ It is arrogance and a sign of Hager¬
strom' s self-assertiveness in spirit and outward show. It
exemplifies Bacon's dictum "there is no such flatterer as
14 7)
is a man's self". Bacon also suggests the remedy against
such flattery, that is the liberty of a friend. If I were
a friend of Hagerstrom, I would remind Axel of his own words
in his inaugural lecture from 1911: "everything is only a
moment in an endless natural context, in which nothing is
in itself higher or lower" You say "everything", Axel,
and surely this must also include you. You admit this in
your "Selbstdarstellung" writing that the individual is "only
149)
an insignificant part of the world". Don't forget that.
If you do, then you are "not at all any kind of object, which
145) Hagerstrom, PR p. 38.
146) Cf. above Sec. 5, p. 117.
147) Francis Bacon, Essays (Edt. M.J. Hawkins), London 1972, p. 84.
148) Hagerstrom, PR p. 95.
149) Hagerstrom, PR p. 63.
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could be assigned a place in a material and temporal rea¬
lity". ^-*0) The consequence of that, you know, is that you
are something spiritual. And you maintain, Axel, that this
is absurd from the logical point of view. Don't be absurd,
Axel. That would be my counsel as Axel's friend to try to
keep his mind in health.
Hagerstrom had friends, but these friends were ad¬
mirers and flatterers rather than critics. Lundstedt, his
closest friend, always makes a virtue of not being a phi¬
losopher, to mention one example. Fries, on the other hand,
makes the claim that he is a philosopher, but then he does
not criticize but succumbs to Hagerstrom's philosophy. Cri¬
tics of Hagerstrom's philosophy are regarded, not as friends,
but as enemies to be eradicated. To put it generally, Ha¬
gerstrom' s true followers turn out to be henchmen, who are
prepared to pay obeisance to Hagerstrom and his writings,
although they also generally concede that his "extraordinary
method of composition" and his "complicated exposition and
language" make it difficult, if not impossible to under¬
stand."'"^'''' This says something about the state of mind of
his admirers, e.g. Folke Schmidt, who confesses that he
does not comprehend what Hagerstrom says, nevertheless takes
him to be a genius who has "in fact something important
152)
to say". This is to confuse what is unintelligible with
what is profound.
To revert to Hagerstrom's proclamation of his indepen¬
dence of contemporary philosophy, a more charitable inter¬
pretation is possible, I suggest. According to this inter¬
pretation Hagerstrom is committed to an individualistic
conception of philosophizing, believing that everyone should
think creatively for himself. This is, indeed, laudable. It
is a sign of the true individualist who can think for him¬
self and make judgements on the basis of his own thinking.
150) Hagerstrom, PR p. 235.
151) The quoted phrases are from Olivecrona's Preface to Hagerstrdm,
INLM p. XV and p. XIV.
152) Folke Schmidt, The Uppsala School of Legal Thinking, Scandina¬
vian Studies in Law, vol. 22, 1978, p. 151 ff. at p. 152.
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But why ignore what other philosophers have thought? Even
if Hagerstrom ends up with a principle concerning the foun¬
dation of knowledge, which happens to be in agreement with
those of his contemporaries, the principle is Hagerstrom's
as long as he can show why he thinks it is the basic prin¬
ciple for the foundation of knowledge. Then he is still an
individualist. I do not think that this is Hagerstrom's
attitude. His attitude is rather that one can only be an
individualist if one propounds a principle, which no one
before has ever thought of.
This seems to me to be wrong. But it may explain why
Hagerstrom rejects the views of other philosophers. This
brings back Hagerstrom's sense of self-assertiveness, his
sense of having a unique mission, i.e. being the leader of a
movement, the aim of which is to arrest the flux and the
instability of the present time, caused by human folly and
fancy. The mind of modern man is scandalized by myths
and superstitions, which threaten the stability of the world.
It is man's soul, not nature, which is corrupt. Man's soul
must be severed from its magical and religious roots, since
these roots contain within themselves self-destructive ten¬
dencies. Only by remembering his place in the world, a sub¬
ject of necessary laws, in nature as well as in society,
can man play his part in the natural order without disaster.
Knowledge of the world and knowledge of its laws is not
folly and futile, but absolutely vital for the survival of
man in a time of turmoil.
To purify man's soul and his depraved judgements by
the light of reason and truth, and to turn man's mind away
from the path of feeling and willing upon the path of think¬
ing and truth is what Hagerstrom's Copernican Revolution
aims at. The fruit of this pursuit is unity and peace among
human beings, since "it belongs to the notion of truth to
be one" This is Hagerstrom's gospel: he embodies the
truth. Soundly and plainly expounded it amounts to: he who
is not with us is against us, and again, he who is not
153) Hagerstrom, PR p. 231.
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against us is with us. That is the fundamental point of
Hagerstrom's critical philosophy, I think (see above p.107)
that in the end there are only two philosophies that count,
idealism and materialism, and for Hagerstrom the choice is
materialism, in his version of that doctrine.
Hagerstrom, to be sure, is a critic of the prevailing
philosophical doctrines. But his criticism is not friendly,
but openly hostile. It is imbued with an authoritarian spi¬
rit, since every criticism of Hagerstrom's system of thought
is tantamount to challenging Hagerstrom himself as the only
authoritative interpreter of his system.
In this battle against views opposing his own doctrine
Hagerstrom's weapons are charges that these views are self-
contradictory or meaningless. These charges presuppose,
however, that Hagerstrom does know what these opposing views
mean and does know the logical structure of their arguments.
But does he know? Hagerstrom is well-known for being a
voracious reader. It is noticeable that in his "Selbstdar-
stellung" he does not care to refer to any contemporary
philosopher, except his Swedish colleagues Burman and Pha-
len, and yet he dismisses contemporary philosophers on
account of their uncritical approach. And they are dismissed
without even displaying the logical structure of their ar¬
guments. Apparently Hagerstrom despises other contemporary
philosophers, and this may explain why they are dismissed
without a fair hearing. If you do possess the truth, as
Hagerstrom claims he does, then you need not bother about
contemporary philosophers in the sense of reading them in
order to learn something from their arguments. This is, to
my mind, to adopt a highly uncritical approach. Or if you
do bother to read them, then the purpose is only to show
that they are inconsistent. But it is difficult to test
whether this charge made by Hagerstrom is true, since, as
I said, he does not care to mention his target and put his
reader into the position to judge for himself if Hagerstrom's
criticism is correct, that is whether Hagerstrom has grasped
the meaning of the view he so violently dismisses.
A critical reader of Hagerstrom, then cannot be sure
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whether Hagerstrom deals with a make-believe world of phi¬
losophers of his own invention or a real world of living
philosophers. To use the notion of self-contradiction as
a weapon presupposes some kind of system, as George Berke-
154)
ley has pointed out. Berkeley has his system of
immaterialism and Hagerstrom has his system of materialism.
But why is Hagerstrom's system the only fully intelligible
system comprising all reality?
If Hagerstrom's answer is that this is so, because it
can be proved to be so, then he is inconsistent. He is in¬
consistent, because he admits elsewhere that he cannot prove
v, • • I 155)that hxs own view is true.
What is the decisive test between opposing views is
practice "where only objective reality has meaning". ^
This "objective reality" is equivalent to "material reali¬
ty", that is to say Hagerstrom's "psycho-physical organism
in its conscious life (which) stands in relation to the ex-
157)
ternal order" of his audience and delivers his lectures.
His lectures embody an imperative (an independent impera¬
tive to use Olivecrona's notion): crede ut intelligas! Do
as Hagerstrom if you would know of his system. Try it out
and trust Hagerstrom, then his system proves to be true.
If the minds of people are reformed in accordance with in¬
dependent imperatives, they cannot fail to follow reason
and abandon confusion and dogma. Small wonder that his true
henchmen were somewhat bewildered, when Hagerstrom died
in 1939. "He left, indeed, a vacuum behind him", says
158)
Olivecrona. Not only in the physical sense, of course,
but also more significantly in the spiritual sense, if I
am allowed to use this provocative expression, considering
the hostility of Hagerstrom towards the use of such an ex¬
pression, because there are no thoughts behind. There is,
however, "authority behind the words" used by Hager-
154) Cf. George Berkeley, Principles hi § 79, Selections p. 87.
155) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 58.
156) Hagerstrom, PR p. 54.
157) For the quoted phrase see Hagerstrom, PR p. 292.
158) Karl Olivecrona, The Theories of Hagerstrom and Lundstedt, Scan¬
dinavian Studies in Law, vol. 3, 1959, p. 127 ff., at p. 136.
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159)
strom. His henchmen are now alone and left to them¬
selves. In order to stay alive they started "to pay atten¬
tion to the communicator's utterances in order that the
corresponding ideas may be evoked", as Hagerstrom writes
in another context.16^ That is to say they pay attention
to Hagerstrom's utterances in his writings and "dedicate
months, or years, to the study of his work, as is necessary
if it is to be really penetrated and digested".But
what they never do is to question the reliability of Hager¬
strom's writings. Why not, since Olivecrona admits that
they present a challenge? If Hagerstrom's system "contains
an essential element of truth" then "the consequences are
162)
very far reaching", Olivecrona writes. Obviously, as
Olivecrona notices, this presupposes that the validity and
truth of Hagerstrom's system has been thoroughly tested.
It is remarkable that neither Lundstedt nor Olivecrona did
put Hagerstrom's views to any serious test. They simply
accepted and trusted Hagerstrom's insight by paying obe¬
dience to his imperative: crede ut intelligas. I think the
reason why they do not raise any objections to Hagerstrom
is that they have absorbed his teaching, evading "the dan¬
gerous question whether the conviction is true or not" to
163)
use an expression from Hagerstrom. Why is this so dan¬
gerous? Because it is only possible to preserve true auto¬
nomy by unquestioning obedience. I shall return to this
aspect of Hagerstrom's way of thinking.
Obviously a firm conviction is dangerous to truth,
especially if one proceeds like Hagerstrom, who believes
that his approach is not based upon any convictions. Then
the consequence may be that one is led astray and the re¬
joinder to Hagerstrom's line of reasoning is that merely
thinking or merely believing in a coherent system does not
alone establish that this system is the only true system
of the world. It is pointless to examine the predictive
159) For the quoted phrase, see Hagerstrom, INLM p. 312.
160) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 140.
161) Olivecrona, in Hagerstrom INLM p. XVI, cf. above p.95 and below p.169.
162) Olivecrona, in Hagerstrom INLM p. XXIII.
163) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 167.
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and explanatory force of Hagerstrom's system, until it has
been established whether it is, in fact, a coherent and
consistent system. If Hagerstrom's system is logically in¬
consistent, then it is compatible with any and all events,
and then quite uninformative. What I shall do is to accept
the challenge presented by Olivecrona and try to examine
Hagerstrom's credentials for his system of thought.
If we follow Hagerstrom and accept his contention that
he is not "significantly influenced by contemporary philo¬
sophy", then he is, I suggest, significantly influenced by
the problem-situation of his day, referred to earlier in
this section. That is to say the background for Hagerstrom's
philosophy is the flux and turmoil of events taking place
in philosophy, science and politics. Hagerstrom's philoso¬
phy so tries to solve certain problems presented in con¬
nection with this background by offering a comprehensible
and rational theory about the world and man's place in this
world. Hagerstrom is faced with a changing world, and this
is a terrifying experience for him, needing a remedy. A
remedy must be found to put an end to the philosophical,
social and political disturbances of his day causing un¬
rest and chaos. Thus, Hagerstrom revolts in order to estab¬
lish a secure foundation for knowledge.
For Hagerstrom there cannot be any knowledge of things
and events in flux. Knowledge, if it is to be genuine know¬
ledge, must be clear, certain and not subject to change.
These characteristics can only be attained if they are found
in man's knowledge as well as in the objects known. Objects
of knowledge must then be definite, real, and unchanging.
This is very much akin to Plato's view. Hagerstrom, however,
rejects the Platonic world of ideas independently existing
apart from the sensible world. There is only one world, the
sensible world. And Hagerstrom claims that this sensible
world is not a chaos, but a cosmos with an inherent logical
and material structure, where things and events come about
by necessity, not by will. Necessity is orderly and bound
by laws. The doctrine which Hagerstrom introduces is that
there is a stable structure in the world, and scientific
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judgements state necessary truths about the structure of
the sensible world, which cannot be other than it is. It
must be realized that scientific judgements state necessary
truths; this is Hagerstrom's position, which he shares with
Aristotle. If Hagerstrom is not "significantly influenced
by contemporary philosophy", then he is significantly in¬
fluenced by ancient Greek philosophy. Hagerstrom's position
is that once it is realized that genuine knowledge is know¬
ledge by means of causes, that causes are necessary rela¬
tions between objects in space and time, that man is an ob¬
ject in the link of necessary causes, then it is possible
to restore man to his senses. The greatness of one's being is
to harmonize man with the order of things. Man must then
recognize his historically created place in the natural and
social order, in which he lives governed by laws, which are
independent of man's feelings and volitions. If we recog¬
nize this, we achieve peace in our minds, and peace in so¬
ciety. Laws are fitted to man's thinking, and it is man's
thinking, his "clear and distinct" judgements concerning
"an already determined objective world", rather than his
confused sensations, which is important. ^
Hagerstrom is committed to rationalism, writing that
"it is utterly impossible to understand why only percep¬
tions should be granted access to reality". He is also
committed to the view that there is no distinction between
contingent laws and necessary laws. Laws of nature and laws
of society arise simply and necessarily out of matter left
to itself. All events, without exception, are subject to
laws.
To sum up, the motto of Hagerstrom's philosophy may
be said to be: "Everything is at rest, and nothing is in
flux". In his revolt Hagerstrom takes side, and he sides
with Parnemides rather than with Heraclitus. It is the prin¬
ciple of non-contradiction which is fundamental rather than
164) For the phrases quoted, see Hagerstrom, INLM p. 112 and PR p. 57
respectively.
165) Hagerstrom, PR p. 41.
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the dialectical logic of Hegel and his followers. Hager-
strom will have nothing to do with the latter logic. Rea¬
lity is without contradiction. That is to say, reality is
of such a kind that the true world view is a harmonious
system of mutually consistent and intrinsically non-con¬
tradictory concepts and judgements. Sense-experiences do
not present us with such a world view. It belongs to philo¬
sophy to present this view by clarifying, modifying and
rendering consistent the concepts derived from experience
and used in scientific and everyday discourse*
As Hagerstrom says
"when we remove the presupposition that reality is some¬
thing constant, which cannot be in more than one mode, we
cut the life-nerve of thought". ^6)
This assumption presents Hagerstrom with the task of offer¬
ing an explanation which accounts for the instability of
things and events in the world. Hagerstrom hovers between
reality being as a matter of fact without contradiction and
reality having to be without any contradiction. - For Hager¬
strom the explanation consists in referring to man's feel¬
ings and volitions. I shall return to this in Section 7.
It also presents him with the task of offering the
only foundation for knowledge, by which we can distinguish
dialectical fancies and religious superstitions from truth.
It is this aspect of Hagerstrom's system, which I wish to
consider.
Hagerstrom's assumption is that if man's knowledge is
vital for his survival and mastery of the world, then this
knowledge must have a proper foundation. - Hence the choice
of starting-point is very important. We must beware of fall¬
ing into error at the very beginning of our inquiries into
the nature of reality, the nature of law and the nature of
morality. The starting-point, then, must be a scientific
starting-point based upon thinking. If we do so, then we
realize, Hagerstrom maintains, the union between the indi¬
vidual and his environment in any account of reality. It
166) Hagerstrom, PR p. 288.
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follows from this that we also realize that there cannot
be a sharp break in continuity between mind and matter.
Mind has been developed out of matter, and can be explained
by matter. The worid is not created by man's mind, nor by
God's will, but exists independently of our minds, governed
by laws, which constrain us.
For Hagerstrom, then, the correct and critical point
of departure is "the intellectual standpoint" or "the mate¬
rialistic point of view". Where man as "the psycho-physical
organism in its conscious life stands in relation to the
16 7)
external order and perceives it". The uncritical and
incorrect points of departure by contrast are subjectivism
or "epistemological idealism" and "epistemological realism"
168)
or the ordinary consciousness. They are both concerned
with the genuine problem of providing a proper foundation
of knowledge, but they both fail to provide an adequate
solution. Their solutions are inadequate, because the con¬
ceptual schemes they present are inadequate. The scheme
offered by epistemological idealism is based upon the prin¬
ciple of self-consciousness. Its starting-point is mind,
its doctrine says that judgements are fundamental for the
expression of claims of knowledge. Then judgements are,
however, about the workings of the human mind. This leads
to the view that reality is mind or spirit.
The scheme offered by epistemological realism is based
upon the principle of an unknown reality. Its starting-
point is the individual's sense-experiences of an external
world, its doctrine says that our sense-experiences are
fundamental for knowledge of objects in the world. What we
immediately perceive is not the objects in the world, but
only ideas of them in our minds. This leads to the view
that reality as it is remains unknown and unintelligible. ^
For Hagerstrom, the solution to the problem of the
foundation of knowledge can only be found by transcending
epistemological idealism and epistemological realism and
167) Hagerstrom, PR p. 292.
168) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 38.
169) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 38 f.
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their inadequate conceptual schemes which must be replaced
by a higher principle as the ground for an adequate concep¬
tual scheme. The higher principle, and this is equivalent
to the only foundation of knowledge, is the realization
that the objectivity of knowledge "must lie in the very
nature of what is apprehended, in the very nature of the
object".1^0^ The very nature of the object, in turn, is
"a determinate object of thought", that "is something con-
171).
stant, which cannot be in more than one mode". This
object is "immediately given" or "intuitively given" in a
judgement expressing knowledge . ^
Hagerstrom's principle is that "reality as self-identity
is the very validity of all knowledge and in this sense
173)
the immediately given". This is Hagerstrom's key to
174)
the solution of "the riddle of the Universe". There is
no riddle of the universe, since everything in the world
obeys necessary causal laws. The problem is only to discover
them, once the true foundation of knowledge has been firm¬
ly established. To provide this foundation is precisely what
Hagerstrom has done by overcoming epistemological idealism
and epistemological realism, cf. above p. 104.
Thus, Hagerstrom endorses, as far as I can see, Hegel's
claim that only the philosopher is capable of understanding
reality as it is. Since Hagerstrom is the latest philoso¬
pher to arrive in the world his understanding is superior
to and profounder than any of his predecessors. He alone
is able to see what is true and what is false in the pre¬
vailing views. Hagerstrom offers his philosophical treat¬
ment in a Hegelian fashion as "the highest peak" of world
wisdom, where philosophy is not only truth in and for it¬
self, but also truth as exhibited in worldly matters, where
everything is rationally comprehended. Hagerstrom's theory
170) Hagerstrom, PR p. 36.
171) Hagerstrom, PR p. 43 and p. 288.
172) Hagerstrom, PR p. 50, p. 51.
173) Hagerstrom, PR p. 51.
174) The allusion is to Ernst Haeckel1s book of the same title, see
Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 42.
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of truth comes to light as a very convenient theory. Truth
is the same as reason, and everything that appeals to rea¬
son in its final and latest stage must be true for that
stage. In other words, everything that seems self-evident
to those,whose reason is up to date, must be true. What is
self-evident to Hagerstrom is the same as truth. Provided
you are up to date, all you need is to believe in Hager-
strom's theory. History is the judge, and the adherence
to his theory provides its truth. Hence the claim of Hager-
strom's greatness and uniqueness as the creator of a com¬
pletely new way of thinking. I wish to evaluate Hagerstrom'
greatness as a philosopher. I do not think that it matters
whether Lundstedt, Olivecrona or Fries find his theory of
philosophy or theory of law inspiring for their studies.
What matters is rather whether there is some truth in Hager
Strom's claim to have provided the only proper epistemolo-
gical foundation by overcoming epistemological idealism
and epistemological realism. My contention is that this is
not the case, and I now proceed to substantiate this by
examining his refutations of these theories.
What Hagerstrom maintains, if I understand him correct
ly, is that epistemological idealism is true in so far as
it stressed that knowledge is expressed in judgements. It
goes wrong, however, giving rise to falsity, by claim¬
ing that these judgements are only concerned with the con¬
tents of our consciousness. This is the basis for Hager-
strom's contention:
"the proposition which is regarded as self-evident in the
history of philosophy as well as -in general, viz. that con¬
sciousness itself is the only immediately given, is false".
This is a basic point for Hagerstrom's claim to have ini¬
tiated a Copernican Revolution. Of course this contention
is true, since this proposition is not regarded as self-
evident "in general", if by this is meant the view of the
common man in the street. But then Hagerstrom has a pecu¬
liar conception of his consciousness, to which I shall re-
175) Hagerstrom, PR p. 36 (my italics).
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turn below. Next, if the meaning of Hagerstrom's conten¬
tion is that this proposition has been regarded self-evi¬
dent by all previous philosophers, then it is false. To
mention but one example, Thomas Reid writes that
"all the arguments urged by Berkeley and Hume against the
existence of a material world are grounded upon this prin¬
ciple, that we do not perceive external objects themselves,
but certain images or ideas in our own minds. But this is
no dictate of common sense, but directly contrary to the^g.
sense of all who have not been taught it by philosophy."
It is a first principle of contingent truths, says Reid,
that those things do really exist, which we distinctly per¬
ceive by our senses and are what we perceive them to be.
So Hagerstrom's refutation of epistemological idealism can¬
not be considered to be a Copernican Revolution as estab¬
lishing a new way of thinking, except perhaps among philo¬
sophers in Uppsala. But Hagerstrom evidently thinks so,
writing
"subjectivism I refuted by showing that in no conscious¬
ness can the consciousness itself be given. That which is
apprehended is always something other than the apprehen¬
sion ."177)
But Hagerstrom is not entitled to claim that he is the
first modern philosopher who refutes idealism by relying
on the distinction between an act of consciousness and the
object of that act.
The thesis of the intentionality of consciousness has
been formulated by A. Meinong and F. Brentano, and Hager¬
strom is familiar with their writings. So what it shows is
Hagerstrom's self-sufficiency and lack of appreciation of
the efforts of other philosophers. It also shows the perils
of ignoring contemporary philosophy, since the distinction
between consciousness and object is the foundation for
G.E. Moore's paper "The Refutation of Idealism" in the
journal "Mind" in 1903.
Marc-Wogau has investigated whether Hagerstrom was
familiar with this article, and his conclusion is that this
is not likely, since the copy of Mind containing the ar-
176) Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 627.
177) Hagerstrom, PR p. 38 (my italics).
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ticle was borrowed by one of Hagerstrom's colleagues, Pro-
178)
fessor B. Hammar, from 1904-1906. Whether Hagerstrom
has discussed philosophical questions with Hammar does not
emerge from what Marc-Wogau writes. Anyway, this is a minor
point.
Hagerstrom cannot claim to be the first in the world
to have refuted idealism, and even in Sweden it is a moot
question whether Phalen is not to be credited rather than
Hagerstrom, but I shall not try to settle this historical
question, cf. above p. 132.
What is more important is that Hagerstrom's criticism
of subjectivism or idealism has a broader aspect than the
criticism made by Moore. - Moore's criticism is directed
at the idealist thesis: "to be is to be perceived", leaving
the other idealist thesis "to be real is to be spiritual"
or "reality is spiritual" out of account. Hagerstrom's cri¬
ticism is concerned with both the former and the latter
thesis. What he thinks he has accomplished is that if the
thesis "to be is to be perceived" can be shown to be false,
then it follows that the other thesis "to be real is to be
spiritual" or "reality is spiritual" is also false. Hager¬
strom's claim is that "a spiritual reality is a contradic-
■ . „ 179)tio in adjecto .
It follows that the true view is that "to be real is
to be material" or "reality is material". This is Hager¬
strom's materialism as an ontological theory, which in¬
volves him in extraordinary difficulties both for himself
and for his readers. I shall try to present his difficul¬
ties.
Hagerstrom accepts the Hegelian formula of identity
between reason and reality and gives it a materialistic
twist, implying that consciousness is also a material or
physical phenomenon. How does this square with Hagerstrom's
conception of the concept of man as the concept of "a psy-
, , . . „ 180)
cho-physical reality".
178) Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hagerstroms filosofi, p. 19 f.
179) Hagerstrom, PR p. 55.
180) Hagerstrom, PR p. 35.
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The nature of this psycho-physical organism is "a con¬
tinuous series of ideas, feelings and acts of choice . . .
181)
intimately connected with bodily existence". In this
sense consciousness is an objective reality, a quality of
body or "a material reality". It follows that man's think¬
ing, feeling and willing by nature is a material reality
in contrast to consciousness as something spiritual, e.g.
the consciousness of activity, which is "absurd from the
182)
logical point of view", or as Hagerstrom says, con¬
sciousness of "feeling and impulse which by their very na¬
ture are essentially passive". ^
If this is so, then Hagerstrom is faced with the pro¬
blem of explaining why feeling, which by its very nature is
passive, can influence man's thinking. Hagerstrom is con¬
vinced that man's failure to understand reality is due to
emotional thinking, that is that feelings infect or con¬
taminate genuine thinking. The human mind is confused, be¬
cause feelings and volitions interfere with thinking. If
the latter are by nature passive this must be absurd from
the logical point of view, since it presents Hagerstrom with
the difficulty of explaining why something passive can be con¬
sidered to be a cause. How can feelings and volitions pro¬
duce confusion in man's thinking, if they are, as Hager¬
strom claims, by nature passive? They cannot is the answer.
And the result is that Hagerstrom's system tumbles into
ruins. Then it is thinking, which is to blame, because think¬
ing is active. But if thinking is active, then it becomes
something spiritual, and this does not exist, if we follow
Hagerstrom. So thinking does not exist either, which is ab¬
surd from Hagerstrom's own point of view.
Hagerstrom tries to get out of his difficulties writing
that consciousness "is itself a specific quality of organic
matter, which itself does not have the character of matter,
although it exists in matter.'''^'
181) Hagerstrom, PR p. 235.
182) Hagerstrom, PR p. 235.
183) Hagerstrom, PR p. 35.
184) Hagerstrom, PR p. 235.
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But this is tantamount to admitting that there is
after all something spiritual or immaterial, since our
mental states of thinking, feeling and willing do not have
any material character. Then it is possible to explain why
feelings and volitions may interfere with thinking, since
feelings and volitions then become active, while thinking
on the other hand becomes something passive and constant.
If this is so then Hagerstrom involves himself in a self-
contradiction. This is, if we follow Hagerstrom, to in¬
dulge in metaphysics, that is to say a combination of words
without meaning, cf. above p. 118.
I conclude that Hagerstrom has not succeeded in re¬
futing the idealist thesis that reality is spiritual.
Hagerstrom swallows the contradiction and proceeds to
consider epistemological realism which he claims belongs to
the ordinary consciousness. It is worth noticing that Hager-
strom's attack on epistemological - and ontological - idea¬
lism is not based upon considerations of ordinary uses of
language. This is the foundation of Reid's criticism and
of Moore's criticism. It cannot be the foundation for Ha¬
gerstrom' s criticism, since he claims that the ordinary
consciousness - and by implication the ordinary uses of lan¬
guage - is radically confused.
For Hagerstrom the ordinary consciousness, i.e. episte¬
mological realism, is right in so far as it stresses that
there is an external world distinct from and confronting
human consciousness. It travels on the wrong way by claim¬
ing that consciousness in this confrontation is only aware
of sensations in the form of ideas in consciousness, rather
than the external objects themselves. It is quite clear
that Hagerstrom is concerned with a theory concerning per¬
ceptions of objects. It is not so clear who, according to
Hagerstrom, actually holds such a theory. I side with Reid,
when he writes that
"it is evidently a philosophical opinion; for the vulgar
undoubtedly believe that it is the external object which
we immediately perceive, and not a representative image of
it only. It is for this reason that they look upon it as
a perfect lunacy to call in question the existence of ex-
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ternal objects . ^
Hagerstrom, however, claims that the vulgar, to use
Reid's phrase, suffer from this lunacy. Why? The answer
is, I think, that this is the only way, in which Hagerstrom
can elevate himself as the philosopher above ordinary men.
Hagerstrom thus endorses Hegel's opinion that the ordinary
consciousness of men or "public opinion as it exists is
... a standing self-contradiction, knowledge as appearance,
1 ^
the essential just as directly present as the inessential".
Public opinion is unorganized and must be organized by a
philosopher: his business as a philosopher is to present
the truth, and to be a great man expressing the essence of
his time. This is only another way of endorsing Hegel's
claim that only philosophers are capable of understanding
reality as it is.
The vital difference between Hegel and Hagerstrom is
that for Hegel contradictions are important as the means,
by which society and nature progress, whereas for Hager¬
strom contradictions are important in the sense that they
are not permissible and must be eliminated, since once ad¬
mitted society and nature collapse.
When Hagerstrom discusses epistemological realism, he
has the theory of representative realism in mind. This theory
holds that in the knowing process our ideas are representa¬
tions of the real and external objects. This is quite clear
from Hagerstrom's example:
"If I apprehend this table as real, it appears to me if
I had gone out beyond the table which I apprehended and
which was thus an image in me, and as if I have arrived at
something else - at the real table. The real table, indeed,
has the same properties as the table which I apprehend,
while yet not being identical with it. The table in my
apprehension - the table-image - is not identical with the
real table."18V)
Hagerstrom is concerned with the perception of objects.
What he says in his example is that the epistemological rea¬
list, perhaps he has Locke in mind, holds that it is only
185) Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 151.
186) Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 316, p. 204.
187) Hagerstrom, PR p. 39.
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an idea, i.e. a representative image in the mind, of the
external object that we perceive, and not the object itself.
The object itself, say the table, exists, however, for
Locke independently of my perception of it. It is the ex¬
ternal object which produces in my mind an idea of the ob¬
ject. Hagerstrom continues to write that the object itself
is "the completely unintelligible, the "thing in itself",
which nevertheless is regarded, inconsistently, as accessible
188)
to the apprehension". This is not correct, if Hagerstrom
has Locke in mind. Locke does not hold that the table itself
is accessible to the mind. For Locke
"'tis evident, the mind knows not things immediately, but
only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our
knowledge therefore is real, only so far as there is a con¬
formity between our ideas and the reality of things."189)
And knowledge for Locke is
"nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement,
or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this
alone it consists".-'-^'
The objection to Locke is, of course, how to compare
an idea of an object with the object itself? For Hagerstrom
"the image resembles the thing in itself, the completely un-
191)
intelligible". This is also Berkeley's rejoinder, "an
192)idea can be like nothing but an idea".
Now Berkeley claims that his principles are faithful
to common-sense. This, perhaps, is another reason why Hager¬
strom believes that the basis for epistemological realism
"is obviously to be sought, above all, in the subjectivism
, , . „ 193)of ordinary consciousness .
Thus, Hagerstrom invites us to believe that according
to the ordinary consciousness, we do not see a table direct¬
ly, but are only immediately aware of an image of a table,
"an image, that is the apprehension, in which it is given
188) Hagerstrom, PR p. 39.
189) John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Ch. IV
§ 3, p. 563.
190) Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Ch. I § 1,
p. 525.
191) Hagerstrom, PR p. 39.
192) Berkeley, Rationale of the Principles II, § 8, Selections p. 38.
193) Hagerstrom, PR p. 39.
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194)
to me, belongs to it as a property". - What Hagerstrom
means is, I think, that the table, besides other properties
like size, shape, weight and colour, also has the property
of being a possible sense-experience.
Hagerstrom's criticism is then aimed at phenomenalism,
195)
which claims that to be is to be perceivable. This xs
the doctrine of John Stuart Mill, who puts it that "matter
is the permament possibility of sensation". According to
phenomenalism, a physical object, say a table, is nothing
but a group of sense-experiences (or sense-data) which are
obtained by or can be obtained by perceiving the table. But
surely Hagerstrom objects,, we know that objects exist and
continue to exist whether they are perceivable or not. The
phenomenalist and his talk about the translation of state¬
ments about physical objects into statements about phenomena,
i.e. what is immediately present to consciousness, is in
. , , 196)
prxncxple meaningless.
If I understand Hagerstrom, the same criticism applies
to the followers of Ernst Mach's theory of sensationalism,
and to the adherents of the Vienna School theory of logi-
197)
cal positivism. According to these theories the world
consists only of our sensations, and these sensations are
the only sound basis for communication about the external
world. The external world we encounter in observation is
a complex and unorganized flux, and its elements are known
to us only through sense-experience. The world, in short,
depends entirely upon our senses.
This theory is radically defective according to Hager¬
strom. His objection is that sense-experiences of sight and
touch as the only foundation for knowledge-claims presuppose
real existing external objects. These real existing objects
cannot be identified with sense-experiences. To do so is to
confuse the distinction between acts of consciousness, e.g.
touch and sight, with objects touched or seen.
194) Hagerstrom, PR p. 39.
195) Cf. Hagerstrom, EE p. 1 ff.
196) Cf. Hagerstrom, EE p. 8.
197) Cf. Hagerstrom, EE p. 33.
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The world does not depend for its existence on our
senses, it is rather the other way round, the world pre¬
sents itself to our senses of touch and sight. This is the
core of Hagerstrom's objection - in his own words -
"Hume, Kant, John Stuart Mill, Oseen und die Vertreter der
Wiener Schule haben offenbar solche Empfindungen gehabt,
da sie ja so felsenfest von ihrer Existenz uberzeugt sind.
Aber ich habe niemals derartige Empfindungen gehabt, und
ich fordere alle auf, deren Vorstellungsweise nicht durch
sensualistische Gedankengange beeinflusst worden ist, die
Frage zu beantworten, ob sie jemals derartige Empfindungen
gehabt haben."198)
For Hagerstrom to base the world upon these sense-ex¬
periences (Empfindungen) is a psychological impossibility,
and, he thinks, for everyone else too. It is in vain to
dispute with the sensationalists, like Hume, or John Stuart
Mill, and therefore Hagerstrom is confident that they can
easily be disposed of by pointing out that they are incon¬
sistent .
Hagerstrom's objection is grounded in his own psycho¬
logical introspection that he has had no such sense-ex¬
periences. This is odd, indeed, for Hagerstrom must know
what it is like to have a sense-experience, in order to
look for, and fail to find, a sense-experience, if he re¬
ports, as he does, that he has looked and failed to find
it. He must know the meaning of the doctrines he objects
to, otherwise he cannot rationally consider whether or not
to believe them. Although Hagerstrom expects no challenge,
this is forthcoming all the same. Since Hagerstrom's cri¬
ticism is directed at theories of perception, then natural¬
ly the question is whether Hagerstrom offers a better theory
to account for the perception of objects. Hagerstrom never,
to my knowledge, presents an argued theory. The starting-
point of his theory begins with reflection upon his own
experiences as an awareness of the external world, of a ma¬
terial reality consisting of physical objects in general,
animals, plants, and human beings, in so far as they are
perceptible, that is to say their bodies.
198) Hagerstrom, EE p. 33.
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The main characteristic of perception or mental appre¬
hension is that it is a passive direct confrontation with
the object in touch or by sight. Like Berkeley, Hagerstrom
stresses that touch is more important than sight. Touch
gives an immediate and obvious test of the existence of
objects, leaving no room for processes of doubt or reason¬
ing about the character of the object. We only have to think
of Hagerstrom's own experience, referred to above in Chapter
I, p.4 f., of putting his hand into the fire,to realize the
foundation for Hagerstrom's view. Touch undoubtedly gives
us knowledge directly and with certainty. This is also
Locke's and Berkeley's view, using, incidentally, fire as
an example . ^
It is for Hagerstrom impossible to misidentify what we
touch. From this analysis Hagerstrom proceeds to offer his
own view of perception or mental apprehension as "an appre¬
hension which is associated with a unique (indescribable)
feeling of constraintThus, Hagerstrom's approach to
his theory of perceiving is not characterized by any con¬
ceptual analysis of the ordinary meaning or use of expres¬
sions concerning perception. His approach is based upon his
own awareness of objects. It is inconsistent to criticize
other writers for basing their theories on the same footing.
Hagerstrom's objection to other theories of perception is
that they are grounded in feelings, which Hagerstrom does
not experience. His own theory is grounded in his own feel¬
ings of inner constraint. The critic's reply to Hagerstrom's
theory is, of course, that he does not have this experience
of constraint. The discussion then easily degenerates into
mere assertion and counter-assertion. There is,at this level,
no way of settling the dispute except Hagerstrom's trick,
persuasion rather than argument, that is: constrain the un¬
believer by using words as if there are thoughts behind
the use.
For Hagerstrom perceiving is a passive state of affairs
199) Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Ch. XI § 7,
p. 633. - Berkeley, Objections to the Principles, § 41, Selections
p. 61.
200) Hagerstrom, PR p. 57.
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where the perceiving person is coerced by external objects.
These external objects exist independently of us, and have
an objective character and structure, which impress itself
upon our consciousness whether we like it or not. Hager-
strom actually defines object or matter as that which, act¬
ing upon our sense-organs, necessarily produces sensations.
This applies to Berkeley's view as well, substituting ob¬
ject or matter with God.^"^ For Berkeley, his ideas of
sense are caused by an act of will of some being other than
himself. For Hagerstrom, his sensations are caused by ob¬
jects which exist independently of him, resulting in a feel¬
ing of constraint, which is, Hagerstrom says, indescribable.
Just as Berkeley holds that the author of nature con¬
strains us by producing ideas, which have "steadiness,
order, and coherence", Hagerstrom holds that the external
objects constrain us by causing strong, orderly and coherent
202)
feelings. For Berkeley as well as for Hagerstrom human
beings are passive receptors. The senses, when passive, do
not err in the information they give us of the objects
without the mind. When Hagerstrom opens his eyes in broad
daylight it is not in his power to determine what particu¬
lar objects shall present themselves to his view, e.g. with
beauty if he opens his eyes in daylight in the landscape
of Sodermanland, or with repugnance if he opens his eyes
and witnesses the confusions of the ordinary consciousness
leading to tumults and upheavals. Or if Hagerstrom puts his
hand in a fire it is not in his power to choose whether
his hand is burnt or not. But surely Hagerstrom is not
forced to put his hand in a fire, one may object. He is
not coerced into having this experience. It is something
which Hagerstrom has chosen himself. But this objection
does not impress Hagerstrom, since he denies the activity
of the will.
Hagerstrom's theory is that the ordinary consciousness
is coerced by objects into having sense-experiences. To be
201) See Berkeley, Rationale of the Principles, §§ 29, 30, Selections
p. 54.
202) Berkeley, Rationale of the Principles, § 30, Selections p. 54.
157
coerced by external objects is for Hagerstrom equivalent to
being constrained, compelled or forced by objects, and in
this sense people do not behave freely. They behave freely
if they realize the constraint of objects, since then they
no longer act from an inner compulsion. Freedom is in other
words consciousness of necessity.
Hagerstrom offers a causal analysis of perception,
where perception is a passivity of a mind, not, as for
example Marxists hold, the activity of the perceiving per¬
son in the world. Apparently Hagerstrom is able to avoid
being coerced, since he claims
"that the object is by no means something which limits the
independence of consciousness, and as a consequence some¬
thing external to consciousness, which, as such, cannot be
immediately apprehended in its reality as idealists and
realists alike have taken it."203)
Again Hagerstrom has involved himself in a self-con¬
tradiction, since he now seems to hold that the perceiving
person is active, rather than passive. If it is the case that
the object is immediately apprehended in its reality, then
what is apprehended in this way is something internal, not
the external objects. This is precisely what idealists and
realists also claim, and Hagerstrom's criticism is unfounded.
If it is the case that the object exists externally, then
it limits the independence of consciousness. This is Hager¬
strom's theory, but then he is faced with offering an ex¬
planation why he alone is exempt from this limitation.
Surely he must take account of the actual features of his
own physical environment, or else be eliminated from it or
try to transcend it. If he does the latter then he enters
into another spiritual world of fantasies and dreams. If
he does the former, then he just vanishes. Both options
cannot be consistent with Hagerstrom's conviction of his
mission as a philosopher, whose business is to
inform the ordinary consciousness of human individuals of
the correct view concerning their place in nature and so¬
ciety as links in a causal chain. Hagerstrom's own view is,
203) Hagerstrom, PR p. 37 (my italics).
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however, badly confused. What would it be like for the
physical environment not to force itself upon a human in¬
dividual? This is the question to put to Hagerstrom. Hager-
strom's reply is to build an indescribable feeling of con¬
straint into the very concept of perception. He may do so,
of course, but it is an extremely odd concept of percep¬
tion, perhaps governed in the end by some theological de¬
mands. Hagerstrom is perhaps aware of this and reacts by
offering another view of the concept of perception as not
involving any constraint, which then is left without any
analysis at all. My conclusion is that Hagerstrom has not
succeeded in refuting epistemological realism either.
Evidently Hagerstrom thinks he has. As usually he swallows
the contradictions involved and presents his own theory
as far superior to any other philosophical theory. His own
philosophical theory - in a Hegelian way of synthesis -
combines the truths of idealism and realism and avoids their
errors. The result is that
"thought itself presupposes for its own possibility an al¬
ready given world of experience in space and time as the
continuum, besides which none other appears as conceivable".
The result of Hagerstrom's inquiries into the proper
foundation of knowledge is the theory known as "naive rea¬
lism" or "direct realism". To be sure Hagerstrom does not
use this label for his own doctrine. The reason why is
that Hagerstrom generally holds realism to be an untenable
doctrine. Nevertheless, perceiving is equivalent to judging.
Judging is the same thing as thinking of a determinate ob¬
ject, thinking of a determinate object is equivalent to
thinking of a real material reality, and to think of a
real material reality is reasonable or rational. Reality
is by nature determinate, i.e. constant, and what is con¬
stant is rational. Hagerstrom proceeds on the basis that
contradictions are to be avoided. As I have tried to show,
Hagerstrom does contradict himself, and this implies that
his own theory collapses. If Hagerstrom tries to eliminate
204) Hagerstrom, PR p. 58.
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these contradictions the result is either a tautology such as
"if Hagerstrom perceives or judges then he perceives or
judges", or a false judgement such as "if Hagerstrom judges
then there is a real material reality".
Whatever Fries thinks of the impossibility of classi¬
fying Hagerstrom's theory, it may be classified as a ver¬
sion of "naive realism", holding that objects exist as
material objects independently of our cognition, and that
cognition is a straightforward confrontation or contact
with external objects. Hagerstrom claims that this
theory is a Copernican Revolution and constitutes the only
critical point of departure. Thus, Hagerstrom is regarded
as "the founder of modern philosophy^ But this is not
the case. Other contemporary philosophers make the very
same point of departure.
Already in 1896 Charles Sanders Pierce writes that
"we have direct experience of things in themselves. No¬
thing can be more completely false than that we can ex¬
perience only our own ideas. That is indeed without ex¬
aggeration the very epitome of all falsity."206)
Or to mention another example, G.F. Stout in Cambridge
writes, in 1905, that
"there are features of our immediate experience, which per¬
petually point beyond themselves to actual existence, other
than our own or any immediate experiences of ours".
And in Oxford, John Cook Wilson, at the same time,
claims that
"even for the extremist idealistic view, there is an ob¬
ject to be distinguished always from our apprehension of
it" .
Or take Lenin who claims that naive realism is in per¬
fect accordance with materialism. He writes
""Naive realism" is the instinctive, unconscious materia¬
listic standpoint adopted by humanity, which regards the
external world as existing independently of our minds".
Lenin also says,
"The "naive realism" of any healthy person who has not
been an inmate of a lunatic asylum, or a pupil of the
205) See N.E. Simmonds, The Legal Philosophy of Axel Hagerstrom,
The Juridical Review, 1976, p. 210 ff., at p. 210.
206) Quoted from John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p.
260, where the next quotations are found on p. 196 and p. 245.
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idealist philosophers, consists in the view that things,
the environment, the world exist independently of our sen¬
sation, of our consciousness, of our self, and of man in
general. ... Materialism deliberately makes the "naive"
belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of know¬
ledge. "207)
This is a very apt rendering of Hagerstrom's Coperni-
can Revolution in its materialistic version. And as is the
case with the former idealistic version, the latter mate¬
rialist version is no discovery on Hagerstrom's part either.
If he is not familiar with this tendency, then this only
shows the danger of ignoring what is going on in the real
world outside Hagerstrom's study in Uppsala.
Why does Hagerstrom think that all other philosophi¬
cal approaches are wrong? The answer to this question is,
I believe, that Hagerstrom is intent on establishing a clear
cut issue between his own doctrine, which is a mixture of
direct realism and materialism on the one hand, and idea¬
lism and realism on the other hand.
According to Hagerstrom's doctrine reality is material,
whereas idealism and (representative) realism make reality
spiritual. At bottom idealism and (representative) realism
attempt to "base a knowledge of reality on the foundation
of spiritual experience - ultimately one's own self-con-
„ 208)
sciousness .
This is a confusion of thought, and "absurd from the
20 9)
logical point of view". The doctrine is absurd because
it makes consciousness into a substantive entity, whereas
consciousness is in fact only an attribute of man, not a
separate form of being. In the end self-consciousness is
nothing but feelings, but it is "impossible to think by
means of feelings, because the feeling has precisely the
singular characteristic that in itself it is not a conscious¬
ness of something objective".^
If one adopts either idealism or representative rea-
207) Lenin, Materialism and Empiro-Criticism, p. 61 and p. 69. This
book was published - in Russian - in 1909.
208) Hagerstrom, PR p. 296.
209) Hagerstrom, PR p. 234.
210) Hagerstrom, PR p. 234.
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lism this is bound to open the door to arbitrary and wild
conceptions about man and the world, which, in turn, will
obstruct and delay social progress toward "the happiness
211)
and culture of the race".
To adopt Hagerstrom's view on the other hand is not
absurd, or so Hagerstrom implies. On the contrary it is the
only sound and sane view in a world of confusion. This is
seen by the various phrases used by Hagerstrom to designate
his view, where he invites us to adopt "a logical point of
view", an objective point of view, "the materialistic point
of view", "a scientific view of reality", "the theoretical
consciousness", "the consciousness of judgement experience",
"a unitary state of consciousness", or the view of "a single
consciousness" expressing itself in thinking resulting in
true judgements, "in which something is characterized as
212)
being such and such".
If one adopts Hagerstrom's point of view, what one
apprehends is "the objective, the non-spiritual ... reality
213)
which by its very nature is constant". If one does not
adopt Hagerstrom's point of view, and this is the case with
the ordinary consciousness and with the scientific conscious¬
ness of Mach and Einstein and the philosophical conscious¬
ness of realists, idealists, and dialectical materialists,
then what these individuals apprehend is "the external ob¬
ject which presents itself at the same time in feeling and
„ 214)
conception .
Now, the key-point for Hagerstrom is to keep concep¬
tion or thinking apart from feeling and volition. Concep¬
tion is "clear and distinct" and not subject to change and
its objects also are clear and distinct or determinate real and
215)
unchanging. By contrast feelings and volitxons are con¬
fused and changing and their objects do not exist apart from
211) Hagerstrom, PR p. 304.
212) See Hagerstrom, PR p. 234, 270, 302, 282, and INLM p. 17, 116,
141, 142, 107, 109 respectively for the phrases.
213) Hagerstrom, PR p. 296.
214) Hagerstrom, PR p. 264.
215) For the phrase "clear and distinct" see Hagerstrom, INLM p. 112.
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the individual having these experiences, and properly speak-
216)
ing feelings and volitions do not exist.
The important thing is conceptions based upon "thought
217)
in the proper sense". This implies that "one and only
218)
one continuum is presupposed ... (and) is the real".
This continuum is the material reality in space and time,
which "is something constant, which cannot be in more than
219)
one mode". It follows that "a conception of ... reality
220)
is unchangeable". By contrast, feelings, including
sense-experiences, and volitions are changing. The question
about reality "necessarily demands an answer which will
hold for all time".^"^
Hence, if we adopt Hagerstrom's point of view, it is
"clear that the truth of the judgement must be verified
logically, and that it will not do (as regards the truth
of the judgement) to take refuge in the supposed experience
as the ground of knowledge when it turns out that the judge¬
ments are logically absurd".222)
What is decisive is rather "a reflective apprehension of
reality", which "judges objectively", that is to say, where
the "objective truth" is equivalent to the fact that "some¬
thing is in reality or in itself such as one apprehends it
223)
to be". Again we have an echo of Hegel's philosophy of
identity, which Hagerstrom uses to combat the dialectical
method of Hegel's idealism and of Marx' materialism by his
unique philosophical thought. It is when thinking in the
proper sense is so infected or contaminated with feelings and
volitions that the world runs mad. Therefore thinking must
be kept distinct and purified from its foreign elements.
What the human mind needs is a philosopher to cure and
purify it from foreign elements. Philosophy is to be iden¬
tified with mental hygiene, ethics and law with social
216) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 188.
217) Hagerstrom, PR p. 54.
218) Hagerstrom, PR p. 54.
219) Hagerstrom, PR p. 288.
220) Hagerstrom, PR p. 290.
221) Hagerstrom, PR p. 290.
222) Hagerstrom, PR p. 262.
223) Hagerstrom, PR p. 300, cf. p. 274.
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224)
hygiene. What are the pure and foreign elements in the
human soul? The pure element is the faculty of thinking,
this is the essence of the soul. Thinking or reason is some¬
thing universal and constant elevated above all imperfec¬
tion, because it is not derived but original, not partial
but complete, not subject to qualification, because unli¬
mited, and not dependent on anything else, because it is
self-sufficient. In short, the pure element is Hagerstrom's
principle of knowledge and reality. By contrast the foreign
elements in the human soul are the faculties of feeling and
volition.
Hagerstrom has healed himself of the pernicious disease
of feeling and volition, which infects thinking and has re¬
stored his soundness by arriving at his new philosophy, or
so he claims. - My comment is that Hagerstrom has not, how¬
ever, extricated himself from the spirit of Hegel. Hager¬
strom accepts the Hegelian formula of the identity between
reason and reality, giving it a materialistic twist.
Hagerstrom accepts the Hegelian formula of freedom as
the knowledge of necessity, which for Hagerstrom implies
that his mission in life is to cure the human soul from its
religious and magical imaginations and restore the ordinary
consciousness to its original basis of soundness. From the
world of romantic escapism and fancy to the world of think¬
ing of objects, where human beings must accept condi¬
tions as they are, constrained in nature by laws, and con¬
strained in society by laws, where men are "interested only
225)
in fulfilling their duty, just because it is their duty".
On this basis there is nothing revolutionary about Ha¬
gerstrom's philosophy in the sense of overthrowing the
existing social conditions. Social and political instabili¬
ty interfere with the independence and detachment which
Hagerstrom requires for his pursuit of knowledge. For Hager¬
strom, as I see it, his basic assumption is that the best
224) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 186 f. and PR p. 280.
225) Hagerstrom, PR p. 276. This is akin to F.H. Bradley's "My Sta¬
tion and its Duties", see his Ethical Studies, Essay V.
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people are the spectators of life in nature and society.
The life of a philosopher is the activity, not so much in
the practical sphere of daily affairs, as in the contempla¬
tive sphere of the study, seeking purification and perfec¬
tion by means of knowledge, where thinking identifies it¬
self with the inherent order in nature. What matters to
Hagerstrom is the idea of order and harmony.
Hagerstrom, by nature also a timorous person, has
every interest in upholding the necessary conventions of
2 26)
a rather peaceful society like Sweden. This is also
what the rational person does, since he sees things as they
are in contrast to the irrational person who breaks the
laws. Legal activities are indispensable for the existence
of society. Or as Hagerstrom says, "the law is undeniably
a condition of culture itself. Without it, as the Sophist
Protagoras already claimed, we should never have been able
227)
to win the lordship over other species." Where the
Marxists attempt to destroy the law, precisely because the
law is the lordship of the Capitalist class over the work¬
ing class, Hagerstrom arrives at the opposite conclusion:
Law must be upheld but purified from foreign elements of
a will behind the law. Thus, Hagerstrom's Copernican Revo¬
lution is by no means a social revolution in the Marxists'
sense. In this respect there is an important difference be¬
tween Hagerstrom's version of materialism and what is known
as dialectical materialism. In fact Hagerstrom dismisses
Marx as an Utopian thinker, who reads his own wishes into
the necessary causal structure of the world. To understand
the nature of anything is for Hagerstrom, as for Spinoza,
to fit it into the system of necessary causes and effects,
of which it is a part. Hagerstrom's objection to Marx is
that Marx allows his own feelings to interfere with his
thinking. His philosophy is no more than an arbitrary pro-
226) It is interesting to compare Hagerstrom with Hobbes in this re¬
spect. Both men are timid souls, both end up with absolutism as
the only possible logical outcome of consistent concern for in¬
dividual interests.
227) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 262.
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jection of his own feelings and volitions into the necessary-
scheme of things. Thus, Hagerstrom dismisses Marx's materia-
2 28)
lism as "metaphysical materialism". By contrast, I sup¬
pose, that Hagerstrom's materialism is scientific materia¬
lism. In his case, Hagerstrom "can definitely observe a de¬
velopment towards universality in moral ideas. That is that
mode of action is good which is demanded by the well-being
229)
of the whole race". I take it that this is not Hager¬
strom's projection of his own feelings, but a scientific
judgement. And the well-being of the whole race demands
peace rather than social revolution.
Hagerstrom's own philosophy is indeed based on the the¬
sis of Marx or Lenin that left to themselves people will
never get rid of their confused notions. Unless the idea of
truth and reality is put into their brains from the outside
by philosophers or intellectuals, people will indulge in
religion or magic. But then, I suppose, the Marxists are
putting confused ideas into people's hearts, rather than
their brains. Accepting the Marxists' division of people
into two opposing classes, Hagerstrom also believes that
it is vital to diminish this division. But it must be done
by persuasion rather than by force. Minds are not conquered
by force but by "the insight that everything is only a mo¬
ment in an endless natural context, in which nothing is in
230)
itself higher or lower". Rather than the Marxists' dic¬
tum that material force can only be overcome by a stronger
material force, Hagerstrom's point is, I suggest, that
people's emotions and volitions can only be overcome or re¬
moved by an emotion or a volition contrary to itself, and
231)
possessing more power in restraining emotion. Thus, we
have legal rules "emphasizing the imperative form as such,
232)
which will break down the opposition of the will".
If my suggestion is correct, then Hagerstrom's philo-
228) Cf. Hagerstrom's criticism of Marx in "Social Teleology". Quota¬
tion from p. 69.
229) Hagerstrom, PR p. 303.
230) Hagerstrom, PR p. 95.
231) Cf. Spinoza, Ethics Part IV, Prop. LXIX (p. 233).
232) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 122. - I return to this in Chapter VI.
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sophy is rooted in feeling rather than thinking. It follows,
if we use Hagerstrom's own definition of metaphysics, that
he is engaged in a piece of metaphysics as well. His "scien¬
tific point of view" turns out to be another metaphysical
view. "Reality as such is an empty word", Hagerstrom writes,
and continues, "then does the sage see only a word before
i • 0„ 233)him?".
I do not know about the sage, but I would like to put
the same question to Hagerstrom. His answer is revealing
"the word "reality" is basically nothing but the expression
234)
of the feeling of certainty".
But there is a world of difference between a judgement
which is true and a "feeling of certainty" which refers to
a psychological state, whose existence in no way guarantees
that what Hagerstrom feels certain about is in fact true.
Hagerstrom's philosophy rests upon confusing
1. p is true, where p denotes a proposition or
judgement, and
2. Hagerstrom believes, or has a feeling of cer¬
tainty, that p is true.
Obviously Hagerstrom may believe that his judgement or pro¬
position is true even though it is not true, and his judge¬
ment may be true though neither he nor anyone else believes
it or has a feeling of certainty. To take an example. The
judgement "the primitive man is surrounded by invisible
235)
will powers" is "of course, a universally recognized fact".
That is to say Hagerstrom believes that this is a true judge¬
ment although the judgement is probably false. To be true
judgement, Hagerstrom's beliefs must accord with the way the
world is for the primitive man, the way the world is for the
primitive man does not accommodate itself to Hagerstrom's
beliefs.
The point may seem obvious, but Hagerstrom's writings
show that he has confused the fundamental distinction be¬
tween 1. and 2.
233) Hagerstrom, PR p. 209.
234) Hagerstrom, PR p. 59.
235) Hagerstrom, PR p. 233 and p. 243.
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On the basis of Hagerstrom's epistemological theory
there is an external world consisting of independent and
external objects, which are fitted to the intellectual mind,
exactly as they are. What is important is to purify the hu¬
man mind from confused notions. The only way of obtaining
knowledge of man's confused ideas is to study their history.
Only by a study of the origin of our ideas, conceptions and
judgements is it possible to know anything about the essence
of man's confused situation. It is the origin, not the va¬
lidity of judgements which is important. Or to put it in an¬
other way, Hagerstrom returns to Francis Bacon's conviction
that knowledge gives a rather accurate picture of nature
if only we take care in avoiding prejudices. The same applies
to knowledge of society. I shall return, in a later section,
to Hagerstrom's treatment of how to avoid "the idols of the
mind". Thus, for Hagerstrom, the validity and truth of judge¬
ments depend upon the pure thought of a detached intellectual
mind. An example is, of course, Hagerstrom's mind. If this
is so, then there can be no epistemological problems left
for the intellectual mind. And it is noticeable that Hager¬
strom seldom enters into analyzing the methods by which
judgements are tested, verified and falsified. The justi¬
fication of the objective truth of judgements is for Hager¬
strom his own reflective apprehension of reality. For this
reflective apprehension facts present themselves as they
are, they are there to be recognized by man's intellect,
not to be made by man's mind. Consequently, intellectuals
with a purified reflective apprehension can safely go ahead
and explore the world, safely ignoring epistemological pro¬
blems, for there are none.
Hagerstrom has provided the solid foundation for know¬
ledge of objects. If Hagerstrom's epistemological theory is
correct, then it is a mystery how error or confusion can
arise. If we are directly confronted with an objective and
material reality exactly fitted as it is to the intellec¬
tual human mind, then what is the basis for the fact of hu¬
man error and ignorance? It takes a philosopher of Hager¬
strom's calibre to unravel this mystery. This is the second
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task facing Hagerstrom, and I shall return to that in Sec¬
tion 6 .
His first task is to provide a secure foundation for
knowledge. Hagerstrom has persuaded himself that he has
established this foundation, by initiating a Copernican Re¬
volution in epistemology, that is the sovereignty of reason
and rationality in nature and society as opposed to unrea¬
son and irrationality. The question to be asked is if this
revolution has been successful, and if so, what this amounts
to. - This is the question which I shall try to answer.
What does Hagerstrom mean by using the word "revolu¬
tion"? This word is ordinarily used, according to the Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary, to denote "a complete overthrow
of the established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it". If we apply this
world to the state of affairs in the philosophical world,
then it implies a complete overthrow of the established
philosophy in any country by Hagerstrom, who was previously
subject to the views of epistemological idealism and episte-
mological realism.
If this is what Hagerstrom means by using the word,
then this is misleading. As I have tried to show it is by
no means the case that Hagerstrom's philosophy is a complete
overthrow of the established philosophical views.
Hagerstrom knows, of course, that there is an immense
body of philosophical doctrines. He rejects all doctrines
put forward by his contemporaries, because they are uncri¬
tical, that is to say they differ from Hagerstrom's doctrine.
He also claims that his doctrine is far superior in wisdom
to any of the doctrines put forward by his predecessors.
However, even Hagerstrom's own thoughts are, largely, the
product of his intellectual inheritance, and it seems to me
to be the height of folly, if Hagerstrom ignores this fact
and believes that he can overthrow other doctrines without
being fully acquainted with their conceptual foundation.
Hagerstrdm forgets his own view of man as a link in a chain
of causes and effects, and this applies equally to Hager¬
strom as a philosopher. As I have tried to make clear his
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own doctrine does not provide a new foundation for know¬
ledge. Hagerstrom thinks that he is an exception, a genius
or great man outside the chain of events. He is a great
man not only in the sense of being the man of greatest un¬
derstanding and wisdom, but also the man of greatest pas¬
sion with a mission in life, that is directing the course
of the chain of events. He then ends up as a philosophical
imperialist in analytical disguise, with philosophical and
historical success as the sole judge in matters relating to
inquiries into the nature of law. If this is the standard
to be adopted for the evaluation of Hagerstrom's revolution,
then it has failed. This can easily be shown, and the evi¬
dence is, ironically, supplied by his closest followers,
Lundstedt and Olivecrona.
Lundstedt, reviewing Hagerstrom's "Das romische Obli-
gationsbegrif f" , in 1929 predicted that this book would be a
turning point concerning inquiries into Roman law and bound
to influence any subsequent research, since it is the only
236)
solid basis for knowledge of Roman law. Indeed, anybody
doing research in Roman law is forced to adopt Hagerstrom's
approach, "die gesamte rom-tsch-rechtH-che Forsahung durch
seine Methoden in neue Bahnen gezwungen wivd", as Lundstedt
writes.
Olivecrona supplies tersely the evidence for the failure
of Hagerstrom's revolutionary approach by writing "it sank
237)
like a big stone silently dropped into the sea".
For his henchmen, however, this does not affect the
status of Hagerstrom's philosophy. Hagerstrom's philosophy
has acquired an almost unchallengeable status with his true
henchmen who teach it with relish. These henchmen and
Hagerstrom himself regard his philosophy as a revolt against
established views and impose it on others thereby trying to
make it true, since history still is the sole judge of the
truth or falsity of a theory, cf. above p.140 and p.146.
236) Lundstedt in Kritische Vierteljahresschrift fur Gesetzgebung und
Rechtswissenschaft, Band 23, 1929, p. 75-116. The quotation in
the text is at p. 86 (my italics).
237) Olivecrona, in Hagerstrom INLM p. XV.
170
Thus, Hagerstrom's revolution is rather to be con¬
sidered a revolt. Hagerstrom's revolt aims at creating or¬
der and harmony in nature as well as in society. His method
of achieving this aim is to offer a firm foundation for
knowledge, his principle of reality, around which every¬
thing in the world revolves. This is one sense of his use
of the word "revolution". Another sense of the word is
that it implies a turning away from previous philosophical
views concerning the foundation of knowledge towards Hager¬
strom's view. In this sense it refers to Hagerstrom's con¬
cern to alter the situation by diverting people's minds
from unfounded and confused ideas to thinking of the natural
and straight order of things. This aims at returning ordi¬
nary people to their senses.
Has Hagerstrom's revolution, in these senses of the
word, been successful? The answer to this question is yes,
and the reason why this is so is bound up with his method of
teaching, referred to above in Chapter I, sec. 9, II, sec. 2.
It is important to observe, I think, that Hagerstrom
appeals to the strength of reasoned arguments to support
his claim to have established a firm foundation, or so it
seems. Hagerstrom confronts his audience of pupils with the
choice between two boxes, one box containing a treasure of
knowledge, a sort of Pandora's box or a philosopher's stone,
to be called A, the other box empty/ containing nothing
238)
but confusion and words without thoughts, to be called B.
The pupil has, I take it, a preference for box A. The pupil
lacks but one item of information, how he can identify box
A from box B. The crucial question for the pupil is to find
a clue to box A rather than box B. If we follow Hagerstrom,
then the pupil has no item of information at his disposal
concerning which box is A or B. It follows that the infor¬
mation available to the pupil is completely symmetrical
concerning the boxes A and B. What the pupil wants is box
A, and if he is reasonable he must make his selection in a
238) I am indebted to Nicholas Rescher for the example and the argu¬
ment.
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manner that does not favour box A over box B. What is the
reasonable manner? There are, as I see it, three ways:
1. Make the choice in some manner which favours
box A rather than box B.
2. Make the choice in some manner which favours
box B rather than box A.
3. Make the choice in an impartial manner between
A and B, that is make his selection in a ran¬
dom manner.
If we assume that the pupil is faced with complete symme¬
trical knowledge concerning box A and box B, that is he
does not know which box is A, then he must choose the third
way, if he is to be reasonable. Hagerstrom as a teacher is
convinced that to choose the third way is unreasonable, and
this holds for the second way as well. What Hagerstr6m says
in his lectures is equivalent to box A, and therefore the
way for the pupil is the first way.
If the pupil follows the first way, then box A exists
for him, as well as for Hagerstrom, independently of their beliefs.
The pupil's willingness to listen to Hagerstrom's lectures,
to test whether Hagerstrom is in fact in possession of box
A may help to make Hagerstrom trustworthy, but it is irre¬
levant for answering the question whether Hagerstrom is
box A or not. What matters in this respect is argument. The
fact that Hagerstrom is convinced of being box A is one
thing, this is a genuine phenomenon, but has as such no¬
thing to do with the quite different thing whether Hager¬
strom's conviction is true. It is, in other words, one
thing to think that one is the voice of reason, another
thing to be the voice of reason. Hagerstrom thinks that he
is the voice of reason, if so, then he acts rationally if
he presents his pupil with available information to choose
in a rational way between box A or box B. This involves re¬
spect for the principle of rationality that it is right to
believe or disbelieve, or doubt in accordance with the ba¬
lance of reasons available, and wrong to doubt or disbe¬
lieve or believe in disregard of the reasons available.
It is my contention that Hagerstrom does not respect
this principle. His attitude towards any judgement is not
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that you can believe it, you can disbelieve it, or you can
remain in doubt whether to believe or disbelieve it. On the
contrary Hagerstrom's attitude is a secular version of the
New Testament's attitude towards any judgement, that is you
can believe a judgement or you can disbelieve a judgement.
Hagerstrom's principle is that it is right to believe and
wrong not to believe a judgement. The latter conceals the
difference between disbelief and suspension of judgement.
Hagerstrom's principle implies that it is wicked not to be¬
lieve, and more specifically, that it is wicked not to be¬
lieve in Hagerstrom's theory. Thus, we have Hagerstrom's
concern as a teacher which is to draw his pupils into the
direct awareness of his theory being the only true one, to
the exclusion of all other theories, rather than to make
his students aware of the vital question of making a rea¬
soned choice on the basis of the principle of rationality.
The effect of the principle of rationality is that he who
learns the truth from argument may lose it again from argu¬
ment. This should be Hagerstrom's position, since he appeals
to argument in support of his position.
What I suggest is that this is not Hagerstrom's posi¬
tion. He is afraid of losing an argument. Therefore he makes
his theory safe from failures. The devices to secure this
are threefold. One device is to make the theory immune from
being falsified, that is Hagerstrom does not allow any con¬
ceivable evidence to count against his theory. The second
device is to insist that only Hagerstrom's philosophy counts and
that Hagerstrom's outlook is the scientific outlook. Thus,
it follows that it is out of the question to acknowledge any
debt to other philosophers and scientists, since this in¬
volves the danger that these views may be linked with other
views, which reflect another picture of the world, and this
in turn may weaken the devotion of the disciples to Hager¬
strom's outlook. Closely related to this device is the third
device of attacking a critic's motives, when he dares to
question the reliability of Hagerstrom's philosophy. - For
the illustration of the three devices I refer to the writings
of Lundstedt, cf. below p. 184.
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The effect of Hagerstrom's principle is the position
that he who learns the truth by obedience can only lose it
by disobedience. Hence, we have Hagerstrom's presentation
of his philosophy as an injunction or imperative: crede ut
intelligas! Legal rules, we learn from Hagerstrom and Olive-
crona, are independent imperatives, that is without any
commanding persons. Thus, we have imperatives without a
commanding authority, but with obedient subjects. The con¬
sequence of this theory is to hold that the objectivity of
legal knowledge resides in the fact that it is concerned
with legal rules as social rules. Is there a similar case
to be made for claims to know, that is, is there knowledge
without a knower? If so we have knowledge-claims without
239)
a commanding person but with knowing subjects. The con¬
sequence of this view is to hold that the objectivity of
knowledge in general resides in its being a social construc¬
tion, not owing its origin to any particular individual but
created co-operatively and communally.
This view is rejected by Hagerstrom. It is the origin
of knowledge, which is the important thing, there can be
no knowledge without a knower, and the knower is, not sur¬
prisingly, Hagerstrom. The crucial point for Hagerstrom is
that man frees himself from epistemological realism and
epistemological idealism, "the two fundamental forms of
metaphysics", by acquiring knowledge. And knowledge,
for Hagerstrom, consists in the apprehension of "laws of
what occurs or sequences of concepts which determine what
241)
occurs". This apprehension "itself loses all significance
if one does not actually have ideas associated with the feel-
242)
ing of certainty or the feeling of evidence". What Hager¬
strom says obviously rests upon the assumption that the hu¬
man being becomes like what he knows, and what he knows de¬
pends ultimately on feelings. These feelings in turn must
become constant and changeless, since reality is by nature
239) Cf. Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge, Oxford 1975, esp. Ch. 3.
240) Hagerstrom, PR p. 67.
241) Hagerstrom, PR p. 57.
242) Hagerstrom, PR p. 60.
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something constant.
Hagerstrom's way of thinking is similar to Plato's way
24 3)
of thinking. For Plato the human soul frees itself
from disorder by recognizing the orderly relationship be¬
tween ideal forms in a world which is independent of the
sensible world. For Plato the human being becomes like what
he contemplates, and becomes orderly if he relies on and re¬
mains in contact with objects (i.e. ideas) which are constant
and changeless. Hagerstrom accepts that with the important
proviso that Plato's world of ideas for Hagerstrom is the
present, sensible world of facts. But one might object that
there is no reason why "the human soul-life" should become
disorderly merely as a result of contemplating the disorder¬
ly, or "the human soul-life" should become orderly merely
244)
as a result of contemplating the orderly. Plato thought
otherwise, and his modern follower Hagerstrom follows suit.
As noticed above, the foundation of Hagerstrom's "scien-
245)tific world-picture" is a complex of feelings and ideas.
Hence, if we follow Hagerstrom it "must be determined as
void for one constructs meaningless combinations of words
and yet believes that the words have a meaning". No parti¬
cular form of metaphysics, says Hagerstrom, can ever become
anything other than a more or less ingenious play with
, 246)words.
Hagerstrom as a metaphysical philosopher uses his play
with words in an ingenious way. People's volitions and feelings
are unruly and this creates an unstable world. They must
therefore be controlled in order to create a stable world.
The only way to do this is to use the imperative form of
injunctions or imperatives in order to "break down the oppo-
247)
sition of the will", thus "paralyzing all genuine willing".
243) I am indebted to John Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man, Lon¬
don 1970, and his exposition of Plato, see especially p. 41 with
references.
244) For the phrase quoted, see Hagerstrom, PR p. 210.
245) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 56 for the quoted phrase, and the following
quotation in the text.
246) Hagerstrom, PR p. 67.
247) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 122.
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Hence, likewise the pupils learn the truth by paying obe¬
isance to the master. If one is obedient to laws, the world
becomes safe and stable, if one is obedient to the master,
his authority and infallibility is unchallenged. If one is
disobedient, the consequence is that the world becomes un¬
safe and unstable. What happens if one is disobedient is,
if we follow Hagerstrom, that one is deemed to be irratio¬
nal. As Hagerstrom writes,
"considering our common social goals, a person who is not
subject to the compulsive ideas fostered by the social
life is a mentally disorderly person. He is abnormal in
so far as he is lacking the capacity to be susceptible to
social suggestion, which is the characteristic of the
human being as a social animal."248)
Thus in philosophy one is considered to be abnormal if one
lacks the capacity to be susceptible to Hagerstrom's sug¬
gestions of ideas. This is perhaps harmless, but if this is
to be considered a revolution I suggest it is a step back¬
ward rather than a step forward.
It is more serious, when Hagerstrom's view is applied
in social and political life. Here it presupposes that
"our common social goals" are fixed and determined. They
are for Hagerstrom, since he hates social uproar. To be
sure, there can be no doubt of Hagerstrom's humanitarian im¬
pulse,* he had, like Marx, a desire to help the oppressed.
But his help consisted in freeing their minds from senti¬
mental and visionary ideas, and turning them to accepting
Hagerstrom's philosophy using the scientific method of ana¬
lysing the cause and effect of processes in nature and so¬
ciety. Public opinion is confused and must be despised.
It is not people but rather the Hagerstromian scientists
who are faced with "the responsibility of legal science
249)
for the fate of man and nations" to use Lundstedt's phrase.
Thus Hagerstrom's henchmen have chosen Hagerstrom's
philosophy as the Pandora's box of knowledge. Whether this
248) Hagerstrom, Socialfilosofiska Uppsatser, p. 63. From an article
written 1934 (my translation).
249) See his article with this title in New York University Law Re¬
view, vol. X, 1932-33, p. 326 ff.
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box contains all the blessings of the world or rather all
human ills is not in question. It contains all the bless¬
ings, and these blessings do not disappear when the box is
opened. On the contrary, his hencmnen, like Lundstedt,
advocate the method of social welfare, turning Sweden,
among all countries in the world, into the Kingdom of Heaven
on Earth. It also explains why some leading contemporary
Swedes consider themselves to be missionaries and quite ca¬
pable of directing the course of future life of mankind.
To mention one or two examples, you have the former Swedish
statsminister Olof Palme, like Lundstedt of course a member
of Socialdemokratiet, or the well-known economist Gunnar
Myrdal, both making claims to be capable of solving the di¬
lemmas of the world, be it in the United States, Asia, or
wherever.
In this respect, then, one must grant that Hagerstrom
has been rather successful. At the bottom of the Pandora's
box, it must be remembered, hope is left. And it is my hope
that people will realize, that the logical conclusion of Ha-
gerstrom's philosophy is that human beings are treated as
instruments by the Hagerstromian men of understanding and
wisdom. This is their cunning of reason, that it sets the
volitions and feelings of human beings to work for their
thoughts. This is the aim of Hagerstrom's revolt to give a
counter-impulse to other revolutionary ideas by taming and
transforming people's volitions and feelings into a well-
disciplined and well-functioning society of law and order,
where the only right of man is the right to be wisely go¬
verned by philosopher kings, with a corresponding duty to
obey. If successful this amounts to a revolution. This is
Hagerstrom's challenge, and it ought to be resisted.
In the philosophical sphere, Hagerstrom's revolt can
be seen as a taking of steps to bring a "categorical revo¬
lution" into existence.^ ^ What is meant by this phrase
250) For the phrase quoted see C.A. Mace, Some Trends in the Philo¬
sophy of Mind, in British Philosophy in the Mid-Century (Edt.
C.A. Mace) London 1957, p. 99 ff., at p. 104.
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is not so much that philosophical outlooks differ from one
another in terms of what is observed in the world. These
philosophical outlooks differ rather from one another in
the way in which philosophers revise the basic assumptions
and categories in terms of which aspects of reality are
conceived and classified.
The crucial point for Hagerstrom is that to change
reality one has to change man's thinking, feelings and vo¬
litions concerning reality. And this implies that one has
to revise the basic and prevailing assumptions and catego¬
ries. Then to speak of Hagerstrom's Copernican Revolution
in epistemology makes sense. It also makes sense to make a
comparison between Hagerstrom and Copernicus. As Popper
writes,
"Copernicus' idea of placing the sun rather than the earth
in the centre of the world was not the result of new obser¬
vations but of a new -interpretation of old and well-known
facts in the light of semi-religious Platonic and Neo-Pla-
tonic ideas."251)
Hagerstrom's idea of placing the principle of reality
rather than man's consciousness in the centre of knowledge
of the world is not, I suggest, the result of Hagerstrom
making new observations, but a result of a new interpreta¬
tion of facts in the light of his way of thinking. This way
of thinking consists in adopting materialism rather than
idealism and realism as the only proper way of approaching
reality.
What is wrong with idealism and realism is that they
offer an inadequate and incoherent conceptual scheme, since
they both assert that the source of knowledge lies within
the individual, either ideas in the individual's mind, i.e.
idealism, or the individual's sense-experience, i.e. realism
or empiricism. This leads to adoption of an epistemological in¬
dividualism which in turn leads to an ontological individua¬
lism. The consequence is, as Hagerstrom sees it, "the uni-
252)
versal tendency to personify natural phenomena".
251) Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 187 (his italics).
252) Hagerstrom, PR p. 281.
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These approaches lead to conceptual schemes in terms
of which what is observed is described and explained in an¬
thropomorphic terms , i.e. psychical terms of sensations,
feelings or volitions, using teleological explanations.
Hagerstrom's philosophy can be seen as a revolt against
these ways of approaching the world. Epistemological indi¬
vidualism is wrong, since it fails to recognize that there
is a public external world existing apart from the indivi¬
dual and his ideas or sensations.
Ontological individualism is wrong as well, since it
fails to give an account of this external world in catego¬
ries and classifications using material terms and causal
explanations. - From Hagerstrom's point of view we must re¬
volt against epistemological individualism and ontological
individualism and replace these positions with Hagerstrom's
epistemology and ontology. Hagerstrom's epistemological
point of view is, as I have tried to show, above p. 145.
considered to be the only scientific view. It is materia¬
lism as the only possible world-view. This view implies
that objects in the world must be de-personified and de-
psychologized in order to present what is given to man's
intellect in scientific terms. This implies that instead
of personifying objects we must take steps to objectify or
materialize objects.
Turning towards materialism as the only possible onto¬
logical view Hagerstrom oscillates between a strict version
of materialism and a modified version of materialism. Accord¬
ing to the strict version of materialism only matter exists
in the sense that everything can be explained as modifica¬
tions of matter. Mental states can be identified with mate¬
rial states, i.e. activity of the brain. As Hagerstrom
writes,
"it is only through his more highly developed brains and
thus through his greater capacity for knowledge that man
can make himself the master of all living beings and there-
by procure the conditions for the satisfaction of his needs."
This view implies that the intellect is passive in the
253) Hagerstrom, PR p. 299.
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sense that knowledge streams into us - once we have got
rid of the confusions caused by feelings and emotions -
through our senses. - According to this version Hagerstrom's
view involves a conception of the world as a rational or¬
dered machine which is governed by inexorable causal laws,
constraining our minds. It follows that the legal order
"is throughout nothing but a social machine in which the
254)
cogs are men". It follows, too, that human beings are
objects, not agents, in a chain of causes and effects.
Thus, Hagerstrom turns away from personifying everything
to materializing, that is mechanizing, everything. Man is
nothing but a machine, a bundle of processes of bodily feel¬
ings which can be subjected to social engineering by skil¬
ful scientists having insight into the complicated machinery and
knowing how to operate the laws of human behaviour. For Ha¬
gerstrom, it must be stressed, cause and effect are linked
by logical necessity, and the individual who disobeys a law
is abnormal, since he puts himself, or tries to put himself,
outside the regular order of events which operates by neces¬
sity. These laws, whether descriptive natural laws or pre¬
scriptive legal rules, are of an impersonal nature. There
is no personal deity, nor any will of the state,sovereign or
255)
whatever behind the laws. This is the strict version of
Hagerstrom's materialism.
There is also a modified version of materialism to be
found in his writings. According to this version, mental
phenomena cannot be identified with material phenomena. In
the modified version of materialism Hagerstrom holds that
whatever exists can be explained in natural terms, that is
to say on scientific lines. The entire world consists of
natural objects which exist within the spatiotemporal causal
order. The legal order consists of and owes its existence,
continuance and end to the operation of natural causes, and
it is solely with reference to these natural causes that it
254) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 354.
255) Hagerstrom seems sometimes to confuse laws in a descriptive sense
and laws in a prescriptive sense. I shall return to this in Ch. VI.
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is possible to explain changes in the behaviour of human
beings. Human beings are agents, not objects, but they are
confused agents and need a philosopher to set the right
course. Nature is in principle intelligible in all its
parts. As Hagerstrom writes it is the most absurd view to
make "use of thought in order to show the inadequacy of
4_u . i ii 256)thought".
In his modified version of materialism Hagerstrom's
message is a proclamation of the omnicompetence of thought
or reason, which is identical with science. The language
of science is the language of causes, and causal explana¬
tions of nature, society, and men's actions are fundamental
and take precedence over any other explanation, e.g. the ex¬
planation of human actions in terms of reasons. Man is still
to be conceived as a link in the unbreakable chain of causes
and effects. Man needs laws as a bridle to harness his in¬
stincts and help him to fulfill his function. Again, the
point is - as is the point with materialism in the strict
version - that science is power over nature and society.
Man can make himself the master of all living beings, since
Hagerstrom still holds the view of causality outlined above.
It is the scientists knowing the laws of association of
ideas in the human minds who govern the world. What becomes
important is to study the historical and psychological ori¬
gin of ideas in order to explain the existence of legal
rules. If it is known how ideas are generated it is possible
to control them and in this way it is possible to gain as¬
cendancy over people. Man's mind is composed of the facul¬
ties of thinking, willing and feeling, and it is the facul¬
ty of thinking which is constant and orderly which is im¬
portant in contrast to the other faculties.
The significance of the modified version is that it
can afford to be liberal, that is religion can be saved.
Religion belongs to the realm of feelings, and there "is
only one way to rescue religion from collapse, and that is
257)
to tear it loose entirely from the question of truth".
256) Hagerstrom, PR p. 262.
257) Hagerstrom, PR p. 273.
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Perhaps, too, there is only one way to rescue law and mo¬
rality from collapse. Law and morality belong to the realms
of volition and feeling. To save these realms from collapse,
one must tear law and morality loose from the question of
truth, away from science.
In their blindness some fanatics do not understand
that religion and law belong to "the very highest values
* 4-u u .. 258)of the human race .
Hagerstrom's modified version saves religion and law,
his strict version is leading law and religion to their
demise. This is a conflict within Hagerstrom himself, and
it is presented outwardly in his writings. This is also
the reason why Hagerstrom's philosophy in general is riddled
with ambiguities and contradictions. Since Hagerstrom's
philosophy is based upon the principle of contradiction, he
cannot use the Hegelian notion of the fertility of contra¬
dictions. Hagerstrom is committed to the view that his
theory must be free from contradictions. Since Hagerstrom
also claims that he has not changed his mind, and that his
philosophy is a consistent whole, he cannot claim that the
inconsistency in his philosophy is due to a change of view.
Perhaps Hagerstrom has confused consistency with obstinacy.
If I change my opinion on Hagerstrom's philosophy this in¬
volves that my former opinion is inconsistent with my pre¬
sent opinion. I can see no harm in this, since it is a sign
that I am willing to revise my opinions in the light of the
reasons available. What is objectionable is if my present
opinions are inconsistent, that is if, say, this thesis
contains any inconsistencies. I hope that this is not the
case, I have in any case tried to avoid being inconsistent.
My claim is, however, that Hagerstrom's opinions are
inconsistent, and this is perhaps a reason for their attrac¬
tiveness. Interpret his judgements in one way, and you have
a set of tautologies, interpret his judgements in another
way, and you have a set of interesting claims, but their
truth is highly questionable. Perhaps Hagerstrom with his
258) Hagerstrom, PR p. 273.
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emphasis on consistency confuses this with orderliness, be¬
lieving that since thinking demands consistency, it follows
that there must be consistency, i.e. tight order and regu¬
larity in things as well. But consistency is by no means
equivalent to tight order, and the description offered by
Waller of Hagerstrom's huge desk and his working room
shows that Hagerstrom after all is able to combine a dis¬
orderly arrangement of books as reasonable with the alto¬
gether different position of trying to present his philoso¬
phical judgements in a consistent way.
On the other hand there is a danger that he confuses
consistency with orderliness in things which easily leads
to tyranny in politics by way of his view that it is un¬
reasonable of people to behave in a disorderly way, i.e.
p-
disobey legal rules, cf. above p. 164 f., p. 173 f. .
To return to Hagerstrom's version of materialism I wish
to point out that Hagerstrom is inconsistent. Hagerstrom's
objection against the conceptual schemes offered by other
philosophers is that they personify objects. This is due to
the capital mistake of taking man's consciousness as start¬
ing-point. If this is a capital mistake then Hagerstrom
commits that very mistake. Hence, he is inconsistent. Hager¬
strom implies that his starting-point is not man's conscious¬
ness. But my objection is that this is precisely the case.
To be sure, his conception of man differs from the concep¬
tions offered by the philosophers Hagerstrom criticizes, but
nonetheless Hagerstrom's starting-point is man. Man, accord¬
ing to Hagerstrom's conception, is a mechanical being, so
his approach is still an anthropomorphic approach. The world
is conceived after the pattern of human activities in terms
of mechanical causes. His way of conceiving nature, society
and man becomes mechanomcrphic.^
If we hold with Hagerstrom that an anthropomorphic view
of personifying things is inadequate, then Hagerstrom must
also hold that another anthropomorphic view of mechanizing
259) I owe the latter word to Stephen Toulmin.
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things also has its inadequacies. The latter view may very
well be another prejudice. The danger is that the world of
causes working mechanically and necessarily is considered
to be the only real world, to the exclusion of the world
of feelings or volitions. And reasons for actions are either
dismissed as being illusory or a world of appearances, or
else forced into the conceptual scheme of operating causes.
This leads to the confusion between reasons for actions and
causes of behaviour. It seems to me that Hagerstrom's scien¬
tific view is fraught with these dangers.
It must be noticed that Hagerstrom's step to initiate
a categorical revolution is by no means a unique step. Long
ago, Reid writes,
"there is a disposition to materialize every thing, if I
may be allowed the expression, that is, to apply the no¬
tions we have of material objects to things of another
nature".260)
Hagerstrom, I suggest, succumbs to this disposition,
and tries to express this within the framework of the in¬
herited conceptual scheme. Thus he fails to take the further
step, to express his view in a consistent materialistic ter¬
minology; Hagerstrom uses a misleading terminology, and this
may be the reason for the inherent confusion of his followers.
As noticed above Hagerstrom has been successful to the ex¬
tent that he converted a lot of influential people to following
his course. Hagerstrom convinced legal theorists, Lundstedt
and Olivecrona for example, that notions such as "rights"
and "the binding force of legal rules" are, strictly speaking,
meaningless notions. If so, the consequence must be that we
cannot legitimately use these notions any longer. They must
be discarded in any scientific description of reality. As
Hagerstrom says, in another context,
"Nothing prevents one from saying such a thing (e.g. that
people have rights), but then there is no real concept
standing behind such words".'
In this respect Hagerstrom's revolt has failed. Lund-
260) Reid, Essays in the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 694-5.
261) Hagerstrom, PR p. 55 (my insertion of paranthetic comment) .
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stedt, to mention one example, rejects the notion of legal
rules as meaningless, writing "there is no such law as a
26 2)
body of rules, etc.". All the same Lundstedt proceeds
to write books on legal rules. Small wonder that Lundstedt
says that "only a few of those who criticized my work have
succeeded in coming to grips with my arguments". Characte¬
ristically Lundstedt uses the devices, mentioned above p.172.
to substantiate his own view. He refers only to the favour¬
able reviews and disregards completely the critical ones.
This is science, or so we are told. In this regard Hager¬
strom' s revolt is a step backward, not a step forward.
Olivecrona, to take another example, lapses into idea¬
lism. Like Lundstedt he holds that there are no legal rules,
they exist only as ideas in people's minds. Here is what
he says,
"It is impossible to ascribe a permanent existence to a
rule of law or to any other rule. A rule exists only as
the content of a notion in a human being. No notion of
this kind is permanently present in the mind of anyone.
The imperative appears in the mind only intermittently."
Does it follow then that legal rules are every moment
annihilated and created anew? Does it follow that legal
rules exist only when they are permanently present in some¬
body's mind? If legal rules only exist as ideas in the
minds of people, one can understand why it is necessary to
insist on the use of force, and on the use of propaganda,
as advocated by Olivecrona. Since talk of rights and justice
is meaningless, the legal rules cannot be subject to any
moral standards. Might is right. As Hagerstrom says "one
must seek for the strongest powers in the race" and have
"faith in the power of the social instincts in the race".^^'
Law becomes social hygiene to "counteract the anti-social
forces which destroy community and solidarity".
Scandinavian legal realists insist, following Hager-
262) Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised, p. 23; the following quota¬
tion is found at p. 11.
263) Olivecrona, Law as Fact, 1st ed. p. 47-8, cp. Berkeley, Objec¬
tions to the Principles § 45, Selections p. 64.
264) Hagerstrom, PR p. 303, and p. 304.- Notice the use of 'race', cf.
Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol.11, p.61 f.
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strom, that the concept of right is a meaningless concept,
just as Berkeley insists that the concept of matter is a
direct repugnancy with no distinct meaning. And just as
Berkeley appeals to his own thought to bolster his claim,
so does Hagerstrom, and both try to convince others of this
by entreating them to attend to their own thoughts. By this
attention the emptiness or repugnancy of the concept of
right must appear, and surely nothing more is requisite for
the conclusion that the concept of right is a word without
meaning. If this is evident, then it is incomprehensible
why these writers still continue to use the concept of right,
sometimes using the device of inverted commas to signify
that they are, after all, talking sense, not nonsense. Since
the concept of right is, by definition, without any sense,
this use implies that the concept must be taken in some
other sense, but what that is they do not explain. This is
incoherent, and nonsensical. But it serves a purpose after
all, that is to take advantage of people's sentiments instead
of wasting the time on efforts to establish a proper scien¬
tific terminology.
Then Hagerstrom's revolt does present a challenge, since
Hagerstrom's feeling of self-evidence is mistaken for the
efforts of powerful and profound thoughts, only concealed
by the obscurity of his terminology. Hagerstrom's revolt
makes also a challenge if there are some thoughts behind
his words. Then Hagerstrom's revolt can be understood as
an invitation to consider materialism as the proper frame¬
work for describing and explaining the way the world is
like.
I also suggest that we take Hagerstrom's invitation
seriously. To do so is to realize that Hagerstrom has only
taken a first step. The implementation of his invitation
has to be carried out by substituting meaningful terms in¬
stead of the meaningless ideas of, say, rights and the va¬
lidity of legal rules.
To offer such an alternative conceptual scheme raises
the question whether one should accept Hagerstrom's invita¬
tion. It is one thing to take the invitation seriously,
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quite another to accept it. Should we accept it? We have
then to search for the reasons for and against materialism,
in the strict or modified version, and judge in the light
of those reasons whether or not to accept the invitation.
I remain in doubt about that, but I do not remain in doubt
that we ought to do what we can towards eradicating the
evil habit of just believing Hagerstrom on account of his
authority, and without regard to evidence.
Hagerstrom has issued an important invitation. What
I resist is being conditioned into accepting it on pain
of dismissal as irrational. In this respect, our duty is
to revolt and undermine Hagerstrom's influence.
6. Hagerstrom's Metaphysics
The title of this section is provocative. After all Hager¬
strom's motto for his own philosophy is "praeterea censeo
metaphysicam esse delendam", that is to say "it is a decla¬
ration of the opinion that we must destroy metaphysics, if
we ever wish to pierce through the mist of words which have
arisen out of feelings and associations and to proceed
265)from sounds to things".
Thus, Hagerstrom's philosophy is a declaration of war
against metaphysics, which links Hagerstrom with other phi¬
losophers - predecessors as well as contemporaries - who
are also engaged in a battle against the harmful effects
of metaphysics. Metaphysics is not a serious philosophical
discipline, and the pronouncements of metaphysicians must
be set down as entirely lacking in any real significance,
and the adjective "metaphysical" must be used as a term
of abuse or in a pejorative sense to mean words without
any thoughts behind. This is Hagerstrom's position, and
his attack against metaphysics is also an attack against
idealism. Whatever the difficulties, in which Hagerstrom
and his true disciples have found themselves, it must be
granted that the force of their polemics against metaphy-
265) Hagerstrom, PR p. 74, cf. p. 33.
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sics and idealism is unaffected. Few philosophers, and few
jurisprudents, nowadays, would wholly reject the label of
being a "realist", and most of them will reject the label
2 66)
of being a "metaphysician".
Of course, when rejecting metaphysics, the question
is what is meant by "metaphysics"? According to Hagerstrom's
definition metaphysics "ist jede Anschauung zu bezeichnen,
die aus der Wirklichkeit selbst - der Wirklichkeit an sich -
26V)
etwas wirkliches macht". That is to say a metaphysical
view is characterized by its concern with either pure being
(Wirklichkeit an sich) or with a particular real object, where
reality (Wirklichkeit selbst) is regarded as a property.
Thus, we have Hagerstrom's definition of metaphysics as
"nothing but a series of combinations of words, concerning
whose character the metaphysician knows nothing".
Hagerstrom's point is first that natural things and
events cannot be explained by transcendent causes, but
everything must be explained as belonging to the single
and all-inclusive system, which is reality or the world of
experience in time and space. No cause can be conceived as
somehow outside or independent of the order of reality,
e.g. a transcendent God creating reality. Reality is in
principle intelligible in all its parts and self-contained
as a system with reference to the furnishing of natural ex¬
planations in terms of necessary causes. This is Hagerstrom's
naturalism or materialism, his argument is aimed at showing
that there is no empirical evidence for the existence of
God provided by aspects of the nature of reality or of hu¬
man experience.
The second point Hagerstrom makes is the familiar Kan¬
tian view that reality or existence is not a property of
anything. Hagerstrom's argument is aimed at showing that
the attempt to prove God's existence from reason alone
266) Cf. Neil MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact, The Law Quarter¬
ly Review, vol. 90, 1974, p. 102 ff., at p. 103. Cf. John Pass-
more, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 264.
267) Hagerstrom, Selbstdarstellung, p. 136, cf. PR p. 60 for the
following quotation in the text.
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breaks down, since existence is not a property.
It has been claimed, by Cassirer, that Hagerstrom's
definition of metaphysics, quoted above, cannot in earnest
268)
be considered to be a definition. For Cassirer, it is
rather "ein Schlagwort und ein Kampfwort". I agree about
this, but I fail to see the force of Cassirer's claim.
Hagerstrom, to be sure, is engaged in a battle against me¬
taphysics, but this does not rule out that he supplies a
definition of the word "metaphysics" as well. Hagerstrom's
definition must be considered to be a stipulative defini¬
tion of how Hagerstrom is going to use the word in his
writings. This can be seen as another sign of Hagerstrom's
self-conscious attitude of setting up a meaning relation
between the word "metaphysics" and some object, i.e. some
views which he dislikes. Hagerstrom simply rules that any
previous meaning of the word "metaphysics" is now entirely
to be annulled by his stipulation. It follows that it is
beside the point to criticize Hagerstrom's definition for
failing to comply with an established meaning. But it is
not, of course, besides the point to ask whether there is
any reason for going along with Hagerstrom and accepting his
stipulative definition. My answer to this is that we should
not. Hagerstrom insists on accurately defined words, but
what his stipulative definition of the word "metaphysics"
implies is that only Hagerstrom and his followers are talk¬
ing sense in contrast to the adversaries who do not. This
reflects a contemptuous attitude to the views of the non-
followers of Hagerstrom, and represents also the potential
danger of glib and pretentious pseudo-history of philoso¬
phical ideas, which is potentially more dangerous than no
history at all. Hagerstrom's stipulative definition should
then be rejected because it does not clarify, but clouds
the issues.
Having stated his stipulative definition it follows
that Hagerstrom is committed to use the word "metaphysics"
in the sense announced. It may very well happen that he
268) Cassirer, Axel Hagerstrom, p. 16.
189
fails to do so, and then he is liable to criticism. If
this is the case, then Hagerstrom's stipulation implies
a false promise. It is not necessarily the case that Hager-
strom is dishonest, but even he may be liable to be de¬
ceived by words. This is actually the case, as I shall try
to show. Hagerstrom is engaged in metaphysics, in his sti¬
pulated sense. It follows then that there can be no con¬
trast between a metaphysical view and a non-metaphysical
view, and this implies that everyone is talking nonsense,
and this is nonsense.
Hagerstrom is, however, also a metaphysician in an al¬
together different sense. What I mean by this claim is that
Hagerstrom's approach to reality is based upon a metaphy¬
sics or on an ontology. I shall use the word "ontology"
rather than "metaphysics" in order to distinguish between
Hagerstrom's use of the word "metaphysics" and his metaphy¬
sics in the sense of ontology. Hagerstrom believes that
everyone who thinks, and does not chatter, must have some
ontology, that is to say some view of what really exists
in contrast to what only seems to exist, of what exists
permanently in contrast to what only exists temporarily,
and of what exists independently and unconditionally in
contrast to what exists dependently and conditionally. If
everyone holds a view concerning these issues, then the
important thing is to have the right view. And Hagerstrom
sets out to provide this. His ontology is based upon the
denial of the distinction between form and matter. His
approach to reality is not based upon Kantian categories
which structure the sensible reality and condition the in¬
determinate and chaotic mass of sense-experiences into a
unified and orderly body of knowledge.
Sensible reality has an inherent and independent logi¬
cal structure. Thus, Hagerstrom's view is not that there
can be a scientific method without any ontology. On the con¬
trary, Hagerstrom claims that "the real as such is something
constant"This is tantamount to Hagerstrom's ontologi-
269) Hagerstrom, PR p. 288 (my italics), and p. 37 for the following
quotation.
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cal proposition: "to maintain the completely logical cha¬
racter of sensible reality, i.e. to repudiate the concep¬
tion of a logical form and non-logical matter in the know¬
ledge of the sensible". This is an ontological proposition
directed against the Kantian Copernican Revolution, see
above p.99. Hagerstrom's problem is the problem of the ra¬
tional understanding of reality, more precisely to provide
an account of the world as a whole which is completely in¬
telligible. His solution that the sensible reality has a
logical character is an attempt to refute the Hegelians
and the Marxists who also claim that sensible reality has
a logical character but in the altogether different sense
that reality is contradictory and develops dialectically
as a universal and irresistible force before which nothing
can stay. Hagerstrom sets out to arrest this force by offer¬
ing his ontological thesis, stating that reality is non-
contradictory, the nature of reality cannot be other than
it is. Reality exists necessarily and cannot be caused or
explained by anything else, be it the gradual unfolding
of the Hegelian Idea or the material forces of production
in society as Marx holds. The world which confronts us is
not a dramatic theatre of change but an authentic display
of things and events which exhibit, for the discerning
mind, that everything in the world is in its real nature
essentially and necessarily related to everything else.
To be means to be a determinate object in space and time
or to have a determinate place in space and time in the
necessary chain of cause and effect. This Hagerstrom claims
is the only possible scientific outlook.
When Hagerstrom claims that sensible reality has a lo¬
gical character, his claim is based upon the view that sen¬
sible reality imposes its laws upon the intellectual mind.
It is the law of contradiction, which "declares, in fact,
what reality in itself is, although it is not a consequence
of this, that it makes any declarations about what is
270) Hagerstrom, PR p. 42.
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Thus, for Hagerstrom the law of contradiction is pri¬
marily descriptive of reality as such, and this corresponds
to the logical standard of correct thinking. This is in
accordance with Hagerstrom's view that objectivity belongs
to independent objects, and the corollary that "the objec¬
tivity of knowledge must lie in the very nature of what is
271)
apprehended, in the very nature of the object".
Hagerstrom's defense of his ontological thesis is ba¬
sed upon the appeal to "the intuitively given reality of
272)
the object". Truth is guaranteed by the origin and di¬
rectness of our ideas or perceptions, which is in turn su¬
pervised not by God but by the principle of reality. It
follows that Hagerstrom adheres to what Popper calls "the
273)bucket theory of mind". From this position the important
thing for Hagerstrom is to fill the bucket, that is the
minds of people, with the correct information, which implies
a distinction between what is apparent and what is real.
Since what is real for Hagerstrom is equivalent to what is
objective and material, it follows that what is not real
is non-objective and non-material, that is to say feel¬
ings and volitions in contrast to thinking. The important
point then becomes either to destroy the feelings or voli¬
tions or to subdue them to thinking, that is to restrain
and repress men's feelings and immoderate volitions by the
use of laws based upon thinking and using force to constrain
the recalcitrants. Another important point is that truth is
manifest, at least for an unprejudiced and intellectual mind
hence ignorance is, for Hagerstrom, a sin which can be cured
not by God's grace but by the insight of the philosophers.
Hagerstrom's ontological thesis is presented as the
true view, since it depends upon no particular assumptions
but is a simple record of things as they are, determinate
and simple and exempt from change. From this solution to
the problem of change, the implication is that some ideas,
i.e. the truly scientific ideas, do not change, have no
271) Hagerstrom, PR p. 36.
272) Hagerstrom, PR p. 51
273) Popper, Objective Knowledge, p. 60.
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history, and are not socially conditioned. Other ideas,
i.e. the non-scientific ideas of, say, right and justice,
are located in history and are socially conditioned. The
first sort of ideas carry their rational credentials with
them, so to speak, since they are self-reinstating. If you
try to deny the law of contradiction the very fact of doing
so is proof of the existence of it. The second sort of
ideas do not carry their rational credentials with them.
The business of the philosopher is then obvious, his task
is to offer explanations of the origin of such ideas in
terms of social and historical causes. This explains why
Hagerstrom, in his writings, is so concerned with the ori¬
gin of ideas.
Hagerstrom's ontological thesis is thus of central im¬
portance for his own work, and invites the question whether
we should believe it or not. Or rather whether to believe
it or its contradictory, for one of them must be true. This
274)
is a distinguishing mark of good thinking. Good think¬
ing is reverenced by Hagerstrom, so I follow the latter
approach.
The question then is whether to believe (A), Hager-
strom's thesis, which is an example of a universal affirma¬
tive, or A, proposition: all sensible reality has a logical
character (all reality is logical), or to believe (0), the
counter thesis, which is an example of a particular nega¬
tive, or 0, proposition: some sensible reality has not a
logical character (some reality is not logical).
The task is to decide, and adopt, the true proposition,
which is either A or 0, and reject the false one, which is
either 0 or A. But which of these is the true proposition?
To answer this question in a proper way one must look upon
and decide whether the propositions are analytic proposi¬
tions or synthetic propositions.
If the propositions are considered to be analytical
propositions, the criterion of truth is the law of contra¬
diction, and this is in accordance with Hagerstrom's own
274) Cf. Richard Robinson, An Atheist's Values, Oxford 1964, p. 76.
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view, as quoted above p. 99.
An example of a self-contradictory proposition is "the
sum of the angles of a triangle is not 180 degrees". If this
is a meaningful, yet false proposition, it follows that the
meaningful and true statement is "the sume of the angles of
a triangle is 180 degrees". As Hagerstrom says,this propo¬
sition "signifies ... something real, and not merely an
apprehension. It is so.
To revert to Hagerstrom's thesis about reality. Does
his proposition A also signify something real and not mere¬
ly an apprehension, that is to say it is so: all reality
is logical? But what is the reason? Hagerstrom offers no
reason for the truth of the proposition about the triangle.
Hagerstrom does not discuss whether this is an analytical
truth, or perhaps, following Kant, that it is a synthetic
a priori truth. For Hagerstrom, it is so! This is self-
evident. Perhaps it is also self-evident that Hagerstrom's
proposition is true? If this is the case, then it is an
analytical proposition, and it is true in virtue of its
meaning alone. The consequence is that so conceived Hager¬
strom's proposition does not give any important information
about the world. If Hagerstrom thinks so, then it only
shows his own misfortune consisting in mistaking words for
reality, or to use the language of Hagerstrom, that Hager¬
strom has failed to proceed from sounds to things.
If Hagerstrom wishes to move from the A proposition
as an analytical proposition to things in the world, then
his argument is a version of the ontological argument. To
use the ontological argument is to indulge in metaphysics,
in Hagerstrom's sense, so Hagerstrom is taking steps to in¬
dulge in metaphysics. Hagerstrom's thesis is that reality
is logical, which implies that we have an apprehension or
idea of reality as logical. This idea must signify some¬
thing real, that is to say it is necessary to recognize
the existence of this idea not only in thought but also
in fact. If the idea exists in thought and in fact, the
275) Hagerstrom, PR p. 39.
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idea is more perfect or real than if the idea only exists
in Hagerstrom's mind.
Since Hagerstrom claims that it is a capital error to
treat existence as a property, it follows that he fails to
establish any link between his A-proposition and reality.
It is not a logically necessary or conceptual truth that
all reality is logical. Hagerstrom may very well wish so,
but it does not follow that reality complies with his wish.
If Hagerstrom thinks so, he only deludes himself by wish¬
ful thinking, which, incidentally, is Hagerstrom's objec¬
tion to other writers, except himself. It follows we should
believe in the truth of O-proposition, and reject Hager¬
strom's thesis.
It may be that Hagerstrom's thesis is advanced as a
synthetic a priori truth, based upon Hagerstrom's rational
insight into the nature of reality. This approach cannot
be based upon the nature of the human mind, as Kant argues.
For Kant it is because the human mind is active and imposes
order that reality has a logical character. Hagerstrom de¬
nies the distinction between form and matter, and holds that
the human mind is passive and determined by a logical rea¬
lity that exists independently of human mind. - Hagerstrom
then claims that his powerful mind is able to grasp that
reality is necessarily logical.
This view puts Hagerstrom in the camp of the rationa¬
lists as opposed to the empiricists. For Hagerstrom the A-
proposition is at once the proposition of an ontological
truth concerning the way things are and a proposition of a
logical requirement of thinking about things. But who says
that Hagerstrom's rational insight is correct except Hager¬
strom himself, of course? He relies on his intuition or
rational insight, and it is a well-known fact that different
people's rational insights or intuitions may conflict. If
I, for one, claim that my intuition is that the O-proposi¬
tion is true,it follows immediately that I dispute Hager-
strom's insight, since then his A-proposition is false.
Here the argument ends, and the fight takes over. Even Ha¬
gerstrom does admit that he cannot prove that his A-propo-
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216)
sition is true. And then he proceeds to persuade other
people to accept it as the truth, writing "when it comes
to calculating the consequences of our actions, only ob¬
jective reality has meaning". When my rational insight is
in conflict with Hagerstrom's, Hagerstrom resorts to the
pragmatic view that history is our judge, and it is success
which counts as the final arbiter between opposing views.
Against this view I wish only to say that then we must try
to prevent Hagerstrom's success by refuting the argu¬
ments he offers.
If Hagerstrom's thesis amounts to stating an a priori
synthetic proposition, then it is in my opinion false, and
the truth of the O-proposition is then vindicated. It may
be that Hagerstrom's thesis is advanced as an empirical or
purely synthetic proposition, that is to say Hagerstrom's
thesis states a factual truth. It is then a scientific hy¬
pothesis and it is a truism that it is logically possible
that it is false. This is perhaps also what Hagerstrom
hints at in the passage quoted above that the law of con¬
tradiction does not make any declarations about what is
real. If this is so, then Hagerstrom must appeal to expe¬
rience as evidence for the truth of his ontological thesis.
This is, in fact, what Hagerstrom does. According to Hager¬
strom's ontology whatever is occupies space, and what is in
space can be discovered only and always by sensations. The
problem is whether these sensations of objects are true or
false. Hagerstrom thinks that they are always true, writing
"aber weshalb haben gerade die Wahrnehmungen, die man mit
Hilfe des Mikroskops macht, aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Er-
kenntnis einen Vorzug? Offenbar einzig und allein deswegen,
weil unsere Induktionen wirklich Erkenntniswert haben, und
es sich davaus ergibt, dass es Gleichformigkeit im Geschehen
gibt. Ware das im Mikroskop neu Hinzukommende nicht durch
die eigene Beschaffenheit der Sache selber bestimmt, son-
dern entstiinde es regellos, dann wiirde Regellosigkeit auch
im Universum herrschen und Induktionen keinen Erkenntnis¬
wert haben."277)
What Hagerstrom is saying is that inductive reasoning is
276) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 58, for the quotation in the text see p. 54.
277) Hagerstrom, EE p. 16 (Hagerstrom's italics).
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the basis for genuine knowledge, because it is a defining
characteristics of objects that they are all causally deter¬
mined .
But this will not do. The suspicious word" which Hager-
strom uses are "Induktionen wirklich Erkenntniswert haben",
that is genuine or actual knowledge. If Hagerstrom is asked
how he knows that his inductive reasoning has informative
value and constitutes genuine knowledge, then he can cite,
for example, some evidence from the past. If I come up with
some other evidence to the contrary, then Hagerstrom is able
to dismiss my evidence by saying that this has nothing to
do with the question at all, since my inductive reasoning
does not amount to "wirkliche Erkenntnis", or genuine
knowledge. The rejoinder to Hagerstrom is that his evidence
has nothing to do with the question at all, since he is pre¬
supposing that all events are causally determined, and this
is precisely what I am questioning. Hagerstrom simply begs
the question.
If Hagerstrom says that it is a defining characteris¬
tics of objects that they must necessarily have an inherent
orderly character (durch die eigene Beschaffenheit der
Sache bestimmt), then the rejoinder is that this argument
is unsuccessful as well. Hagerstrom, although powerful,
cannot legislate centaurs into existence by defining a word,
nor can he legislate order into existence by defining the
word 'object' (Sache). From definitions of "x", Hagerstrom
is not entitled to draw any conclusion whatever about whether
there are any x's in the world.
Whether there are any x's in the world and whether they
do exhibit order are matters for scientific investigation,
and in this respect Hagerstrom simply ignores Hume's criti¬
cism of induction and the subsequent discussion of this pro¬
blem. This is, of course, a serious flaw in Hagerstrom's
philosophy, but having said that, I shall not enter into
a discussion of this problem.
Hagerstrom's evidence for his ontological thesis is
based upon the proposition that something contingent exists,
such as himself, for example. What Hagerstrom means by this
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proposition is that the object so described, i.e. Hager-
strom, does not exist through itself alone but owes its
existence in space and time to some other object, i.e. his
parents, and th^y in turn owe their existence to their pa¬
rents, and so on. Contingent objects are not self-complete,
but demand the existence of something else if they are to
be fully explained.
Thus, Hagerstrom makes the move from contingent exis¬
tence to necessary existence, the logical structure of rea¬
lity which necessarily exists. This is a version of the cau¬
sal argument for God's existence, the only difference is
that Hagerstrom substitutes reality or rather the prin¬
ciple of reality for God. Hagerstrom's argument faces then
the same difficulties as does the empirical argument for
God's existence, which I shall only notice, and not develop.
The conclusion is that Hagerstrom's substantiation for
his ontological thesis, if offered as an empirical proposi¬
tion, fails. Hence the reasonable thing to do is to believe
in the O-proposition rather than Hagerstrom's A-proposition
on the basis of his evidence.
Perhaps Hagerstrom's thesis is not to be considered
to be an ontological proposition, but it is rather to be
considered to be a methodological principle. This interpre¬
tation carries some force, since Hagerstrom writes that
"when we remove the presupposition that reality is some¬
thing constant, which cannot be in more than one mode, we
2 78)
cut the life-nerve of thought".
There is clearly a difference between
A) reality is, as a matter of fact,
something constant, and
B) it is presupposed that reality
is something constant.
A is an ontological doctrine which asserts whereever
there is an object in space and time, this object can be
explained as a link in a constant chain of causes and ef¬
fects.
B is a methodological principle which makes the weaker
278) Hagerstrom, PR p. 288 (my italics). Cf. p. 54 and p. 58.
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claim that whereever there occurs an object in space and
time there is in principle an adequate explanation available
in terms of causes and effects. The methodological principle
expresses a programme of looking for order in the world, and
as such there can be no objections against it. It has been
held before by philosophers, e.g. Thomas Reid, who claims
that this is one of the first principles of contingent
279)
truths. It is also the basis for Kant's Copernican Re¬
volution. But what holds as a methodological principle can
be challenged and replaced by another methodological prin¬
ciple. It need not be necessary for scientists to adhere to
280)
Hagerstrom's thesis in their investigations of the world.
And if Hagerstrom's methodological principle is adopted,
then it does not follow that the world is inherently con¬
stant. To argue in this way is to confuse a regulative prin¬
ciple of thinking with a constitutive principle of reality.
I think it is fairly clear that Hagerstrom's thesis is
a mixture of the methodological principle and the ontologi-
cal proposition. What does conform to his thesis is treated
as real. What does not conform to his thesis is dismissed
as unreal. Then Hagerstrom's thesis is neither an ontologi-
cal proposition nor a methodological principle but is an
assumption which Hagerstrom assumes to be true so staunch¬
ly that he will not admit to himself that it can be refuted
or even doubted, and will not permit others to refute or
doubt even though such a refutation or doubt is at hand,
as I have tried to show. If this is correct, then Hager¬
strom is like the patient who says to the doctor: "Doctor
I am dead". The doctor tries in vain to convince the pa¬
tient that he is alive, offering the final and conclusive
test that dead persons do not bleed, to which the patient
agrees. When pinched by the doctor the patient bleeds, and
281)
says "Doctor I was wrong, dead men do bleed".
Like the patient who is so convinced that he will not
279) Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 642.
280) Cf. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. II, p. 220 f.
281) I am indebted to John Hospers for the story.
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accept any contrary evidence, Hagerstrom is so convinced
of possessing the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth that he is not prepared to accept any contrary evi¬
dence. The upshot of Hagerstrom's attitude is to debase
reason, and his situation is different from the patient's
situation, since Hagerstrom after all is a professor re¬
sponsible for the education of pupils, where he conceives
himself in the role of the doctor of the human soul. The
consequences of his attitude are then by no means to be
ignored.
There is then no room in Hagerstrom's philosophy for
the world of man's changing feelings and volitions. They
are unreal or illusions in contrast to the real world of
thought, which does not change. Since feelings and voli¬
tions do occur, they must be arrested or at least planned
and controlled. The obvious question is then, planned and
controlled by whom? And Hagerstrom's answer is Plato's
answer: by the philosophers who have rational insight into
the logical structure of the world and possess the truth.
Then we have Swedish Legal Realism with a vengeance. It is
time for a counter-revolution. I wish to stress that the
revolution is needed, not because Hagerstrom's thesis has
dangerous consequences for life in society; it has indeed,
but that it is beside the point. I side with Hume who says
"when any opinion leads us into absurdities, 'tis certain¬
ly false; but 'tis not certain an opinion is false, be-
^ .. 282)
cause 'tis of dangerous consequence .
The revolt should then be directed against Hagerstrom's
ontological thesis, since if we adopt this, we are led into
absurdities. The absurdities are Hagerstrom's thesis that
all reality is logical, i.e. all events are causally and
necessarily determined, which leads to the view that there¬
fore nothing is contingent. All change in nature or in so¬
ciety is contradictory, and therefore it does not exist.
Hagerstrom's thesis may be characterized as static monism,
i.e. the world is eternally the same. This is Hagerstrom's
282) Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Sec. II, p.409.
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insight, and it is only delusion on our part, which makes
us suppose that reality is not timelessly realized. For
Hagerstrom progress consists in the removal of this common
delusion, which leads people into forgetting their place
in society and nature. I think that it is rather Hagerstrom
who suffers from a delusion that everything is fettered by
283)
the law of contradiction to taking the course it does.
Hagerstrom fails to realize that only conclusions can
be logically inevitable, given the premises, and a revolt
is not a conclusion. We are not all absolutely and logical¬
ly powerless, and should revolt against taking the false
step of accepting Hagerstrom's ontological thesis which de¬
nies us this power.
7. Hagerstrom's Philosophical Method
Hagerstrom has a sincere belief in his mission in life, cf.
above Chapter I, p. 21 f. He has a sincere belief in philo¬
sophy, rather than religion, as the foundation for "the
ascertainment of the place which Man occupies in nature and
of his relations to the universe of things", to use a phrase
from T.H. Huxley. He has also a sincere belief in his
own philosophy as the only foundation for genuine knowledge
of reality.
Thus, Hagerstrom's mission is defined and determined
by its end, i.e. to correct and improve human understanding
by stressing the primacy of man's reason or thinking as
opposed to man's passions, his feelings and volitions. This
is, I suggest, important for understanding Hagerstrom's
philosophy. His whole philosophical effort is determined
by the aim of initiating a rational and radical revolt
against irrationalism exemplified in theories which make
will prior to or superior to reason.
Hagerstrom is reacting against voluntarism, expounded
for example by Arthur Schopenhauer, for whom the real is
283) Cf. Gilbert Ryle, Dilemmas, Cambridge 1954, Ch. I, expecially
p. 22 f.
284) T.H. Huxley, Man's Place in Nature and Other Essays, London 1910,
p. 52. - Cf. above Ch. II, p. 43.
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28 5)
regarded as the embodiment of man's will. For Schopen¬
hauer, the proper task of philosophy lies in removing the
veil of deception that reality is the incarnation of ratio¬
nal order and setting the truth in a clear light, viz.:
that reality has the character of an endless, and in the
last analysis meaningless, struggle for existence, in which
all is stress, conflict and tension.
Hagerstrom shares Schopenhauer's conception that the
task of philosophy lies in removing the veil of deception
and setting the truth in a clear light. But Hagerstrom
parts company with Schopenhauer and stresses that the truth
is just the opposite. The truth is that reality has the
character of an ordered logical structure. The stress, con¬
flict and tension among human beings can be explained as
a result of their failure to realize this. The sickness of
the human mind consists in man's self-consciousness. As
Hagerstrom says
"every stage of natural thought is infected by immediate
self-consciousness, which is constantly, so to speak,
throwing sand in our eyes, and preventing us from seeing
reality clearly".286)
This resembles Berkeley who writes
"upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater
part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hither¬
to aroused philosophers, and b]ocked up the way to know¬
ledge are entirely owing to ourselves - that we first
raised a dust, and then complain we cannot see". '
For Berkeley, what blocks up the way to knowledge is the
idea of matter, which is either a contradictory or an un¬
intelligible idea. For Hagerstrom, what blocks up the way
to knowledge is by contrast the idea of spirit or self-
consciousness, which is either a contradictory or an unin¬
telligible idea.
To realize this it is necessary to take account of
285) Hagerstrom does not, at least to my knowledge, refer explicitely
to Schopenhauer, but no doubt he is one target for Hagerstrom's
revolt. For my remarks on Schopenhauer, I am indebted to Patrick
Gardiner's article on Schopenhauer in The Encyclopedia of Philo¬
sophy (Edt. Paul Edwards) vol. 7, p. 325 ff.
286) Hagerstrom, PR p. 296.
287) Berkeley, Introduction to the Principles, § 3, Selections p. 9.
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the facts of self-consciousness. From one point of view I
am a body that occupies space, endures through time, and
causally responds to stimuli. From another point of view
I am spirit, a self-moving active being, whose ^,ert per¬
ceptible behaviour directly expresses my wilL. Hagerstrom
holds the former view, Schopenhauer holds the latter view.
The former view is presented as the true view, since
288)
the latter view "is absurd from the logical point of view".
From a logical point of view everything is what it is as
the consequence of necessary laws, which operate independent¬
ly of human will. To understand man's place in nature and
society is to exhibit his behaviour from laws of nature.
The soundness of man's mind, its essence, consists in think¬
ing, which discovers that human beings are but material ob¬
jects, which like other objects are spatially and temporal¬
ly ordered and stand in determinate and necessary causal
relations with one another.
This is for Hagerstrom the truth. He invites us to
follow the way of thinking as the only sure path of know¬
ledge as opposed to the wrong way of wishful thinking, which
leads to ignorance, superstition, and magic. From Hager¬
strom 's logical point of view, thinking or reason is the
harmonizing force in nature as well as in society. He con¬
curs with Spinoza: "In so far only as men live in obedience
289)
to reason, do they always agree in nature". Truth makes
itself manifest to an unprejudiced mind, and needs no other
sign than that of an adequate idea in the world of thought
which is necessarily the same as its correlate in the world
of reality.
Hagerstrom also concurs with S0ren Kierkegaard's dictum
that "Christianity does not unite men, on the contrary, it
separates them - in order to unite each single person with
288) Hagerstrom, PR p. 234.
289) Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, Prop. XXXV, p. 209.
290) Quoted from Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man, p. 252. - Hager¬
strom admires Kierkegaard. He became immersed in Kierkegaard's
thought around 1898 and "almost thought of nobody else". Letter
of December 1898 to his parents, Waller p. 124 (my translation).
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Indeed, for Hagerstrom the proper function of man's
reason has been corrupted by Christian theologists who ele¬
vate feeling above reason. Reason is for Hagerstrom what
Grace is to the Christian. He upholds the sovereignty of
reason in nature, in society and in human beings as parts
of nature and society, and in this respect he can be clas¬
sified as a successor to the "philosophes" of the Enlighten¬
ment. Hagerstrom further believes that the proper function
of man's reason has been corrupted by contemporary philoso¬
phers and scientists who stress that the basis and origin
of all scientific knowledge is sense-experience.
This approach implies that nothing is real except the
perceptions of individuals, and leads to the position of
Ernst Mach that all science is ultimately an economic adap¬
tion of our ideas to our perceptions. Mach wishes to elimi¬
nate metaphysics, to take away the magic of things, from the
conduct of life.^"^
Hagerstrom holds to the entirely antithetical position
that Mach's view is a piece of metaphysics, since it eli¬
minates the concepts of space, time and causality. For Hager¬
strom the basic aim of science is the discovery of a fixed
world picture independent of the variation of time and
people. The correct path is not man's sense-experiences,
which are always changing, but man's reason which is always
constant and competent to disclose the real nature of ob¬
jects .
Hagerstrom is also opposed to the view that concepts
and scientific laws are nothing but free creations of the
human mind, which can be neither true nor false, but may
be convenient or inconvenient. This approach, made popular
by Henri Poincare, makes scientific language into a language
which scientists deliberately construct in order to talk
about the way things are. This is a piece of metaphysics
according to Hagerstrom, since it ignores that concepts and
291) Cf. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 320 f.; for Henri
Poincare mentioned in the text, ibid. p. 326 f. Hagerstrom does
not mention Poincare by name.
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scientific laws are logical constraints forced upon the
human mind as part of the world and its inherent logical
structure.
For Hagerstrom, then, what is crucial to the under¬
standing of reality is neither will nor sensations, but
thinking or reason. For Hagerstrom reason stands in con¬
trast to faith as well as experience. What human beings can
achieve by reason is taken to embrace the entire field of
knowledge, since reason guarantees certainty. What holds
for reason is "necessarily and universally valid" to speak
292)
with Kant. In contrast to Kant, reason does not make
the order, but it finds the order. Reason or scientific
thinking reveals the real nature of objects as opposed to
the illusions and mirages of wishful thinking dominated by
feeling and volition.
What is crucial for understanding Hagerstrom's posi¬
tion is that his way of thinking is determined by the Pla¬
tonic and Aristotelian view of the conceptual primacy of
the end or goal. The end or goal needs to be known in
order to understand anything. The question then is what
is the end or goal of Hagerstrom? The answer is that Hager¬
strom's supreme end is order. This aim is, in turn, the
foundation for his more specific aims, which are the typi¬
cal basic aims of the rationalist philosophers, as e.g.
293)
G.W. Leibniz and B. Spinoza.
Hagerstrom's specific aims, then, can be classified
as follows:
a) to discover the truth about man and nature,
b) to promote personal happiness,
c) to achieve social harmony.
These three aims do not require the idea of certainty, which
Hagerstrom holds is the criterion of genuine knowledge which
292) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. B 140 (p. 158).
293) Cf. William Berkson, Skeptical Rationalism, Inquiry, vol. 22,
1979, p. 281-320, cf. below note 320. I have already referred
to the great similarity between Hagerstrom and Spinoza, cf.
above Ch. I, p.2 f. and this ch. p.118 f. As for Leibniz it is worth
noticing that Hagerstrom also holds that the world is a harmo¬
nious order, although Hagerstrom discards that God is the author
of the pre-established harmony.
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is so vital, in a quite literal sense, for human beings.
There is, therefore, yet an aim, viz.
d) to have a rational method to force agreement
amongst contending parties.
Hagerstrom has the rational method, and this is the reason
for his bitter criticism of all other philosophers. What
they say "is nothing but a combination of words, concerning
294)
whose character the metaphysician knows nothing".
Like Plato, Hagerstrom thinks that a necessary condi¬
tion of knowledge is the ability to give a rational account
of one's beliefs concerning objects. To give a rational
account of one's beliefs concerning objects is, in turn,
for Hagerstrom to discover the causes of the object and
the causes of the object and the laws by which the occur¬
rence of the object can be adequately explained as a neces¬
sary link in the infinite chain of causes.
This is the basis for Hagerstrom's claim that ordi¬
nary human people suffer from confusions and illusions,
because they are ignorant of the causes of objects. When
people do not know the cause of something, e.g. the evils
in the world, they offer explanations in terms of inexpli¬
cable acts of will, e.g. the will of God or the will of
man. This is inadequate just as it is inadequate to explain
the fall of a stone from a roof as the result of God's will.
For Hagerstrom as for Ludwig Wittgenstein the purpose
of philosophy consists in "curing philosophical thought of
295)
the madness which besets it". in this respect they are
followers of Schopenhauer. So there is nothing revolutionary
about Hagerstrom's philosophy in this respect.^^' The true
purpose of philosophy for Kant is "to expose the illusions
294) Hagerstrom, PR p. 60 - compare Plato's statement that poets, like
oracles, say "many fine things, but know none of the things they
say" (Apologia, 22 c). Quoted from J. Hintikka, Knowledge and
the Known, Dordrecht 1974, p. 36.
295) P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, Oxford 1972, p. 116 with
references; Hacker also discusses the relation between Wittgen¬
stein and Schopenhauer, see index.
296) But see N.E. Simmonds, The Legal Philosophy of Axel Hagerstrom,
The Juridical Review, 1976, p. 210.
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297)of a reason that forgets its limits". Reason prevents
errors, and
"this gives it dignity and authority, through that censor¬
ship which secures general order and harmony, and indeed
the well-being of the scientific commonwealth, preventing
those who labour courageously and fruitfully on its be¬
half from losing sight of the supreme end, the happiness
of all mankind".
Kant's therapeutic method is the critique of pure
reason. Wittgenstein's therapeutic method is the critique
of language. The result of Kant's critique of pure reason
is that Kant "found it necessary to deny knowledge, in
order to make room for faith". Hagerstrom does not accept
that it is necessary to make room for faith, which implies
God, freedom, and immortality. It is faith which is the
source of wars against reason which is omnicompetent, cf.
above p. 137. The result of Wittgenstein's critique of lan¬
guage reaches a far more radical conclusion than does Kant's
298)
"knowledge is denied to make room for silence".
I do not know whether Hagerstrom is familiar with
Wittgenstein's philosophy. But he does not accept Wittgen¬
stein's conclusion, since it is ridiculous to set out to
cure people by being silent. And Hagerstrom rejects Wittgen¬
stein's dictum "I am the centre of the world" as a version
of extreme voluntarism, which is the root of evil and dis¬
order in the world. The result of Hagerstrom's philosophy
is rather to affirm knowledge in order to make room for
practise, i.e. curing people by preaching the scientific
gospel that reality is orderly and on its way to the supreme
end, the happiness of all mankind. As Hagerstrom claims
"one can definitely observe a development towards univer¬
sality in moral ideas. That is, that mode of action is
good which is demanded by the well-being of the whole race".
Thus, Hagerstrom's programme for his therapeutic mis¬
sion is rather the Platonic view: "He will restore us to
297) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. B 763 (p. 591); the following
quotations are from p. B 879 (p. 665), and p. B xxx (p. 29).
298) Cf. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p. 26. The following quota¬
tion is from p. 82, cf. 204.
299) Hagerstrom, PR p. 303.
207
our original nature, and heal us, and make us happy and
blessed" . Although strongly opposed to the doctrines
of voluntarism, Hagerstrom has a sincere belief in his own
uniqueness and mission as a leader and healer of the sick
human soul. The difference is that Hagerstrom, as a philo¬
sopher, is a lover of truth and reality, whose thoughts
are fixed on true reality, and thus he is able to see more
clearly than anybody else what is happening to society if
passions, rather than reason, govern. Thus, Hagerstrom sets
out to act, in Friedrich Nietzsche's phrase, as "a physi¬
cian of culture".^"''' Hagerstrom has freed himself from the
distorting influences of feelings and volitions and his ca¬
pacity as a physician of culture lies precisely in the
soundness of his thinking, which is capable of discovering
things objectively. All his judgements are detached from
the various aims, feelings and volitions that accompany the
ordinary consciousness and blind their understanding of
reality. As a consequence his judgements are disinterested
and solely concerned with curing the human mind.
Thought must move along fixed lines, otherwise we
would have, in Gottlob Frege's words, a "hitherto unknown
type of madness"This is also Hagerstrom's approach,
303)
although I do not know whether Hagerstrom has read Frege.
But Hagerstrom fully agrees that the structure of thought
must be grasped in its entirety, here piecemeal methods
of science are inapplicable, and any error will affect
everything else. Frege1s endeavour is to displace epistemo-
logy from the centre of philosophy and put logic in the
centre as prior to all other parts of philosophy.
300) Plato, Symposium 193d, quoted from Popper, The Open Society and
its Enemies, vol. I, p. 169, cf. Plato, The Republic, Ch. XXII
(VI 497A-502C) .
301) Quoted from Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 99. -
Hagerstrom also admires Nietzsche, cf. above Ch. I, p. 14.
302) Quoted from Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p. 136, p. 36 and
p. 5 for the quotations later in the text.
303) Hagerstrom does not refer to Frege in any of his writings I
have read. Nor has anyone before suggested a relation between
Frege and Hagerstrom. Knowing Hagerstrom's interest in mathe¬
matics, cf. above Ch. I , p. 8, it is perhaps likely that he
has studied Frege.
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Hagerstrom's endeavour implies that epistemology is no
longer in the centre of philosophy once Hagerstrom's basic
principles have been accepted. In a way Frege's principle
of purity: "always to separate sharply the psychological
from the logical, the subjective from the objective" is
also Hagerstrom's principle of purity. Hagerstrom's prin¬
ciple of purity is to free thought from its foreign ele¬
ments, viz. feelings and volitions. This principle is based
upon Hagerstrom's epistemology and ontology.
Knowledge for Hagerstrom is an infallible apprehension
of objects in the world expressed in judgements which are
necessarily true, and being necessarily true these judge¬
ments are also universal and eternal. These characteristics
of judgements can only be obtained if they are found in the
objects judged about. Consequently objects must, to be real,
share the same characteristics, i.e. objects must be deter¬
minate and not subject to change. The world which is known
must be a system that is rational and necessary. If it is
such a system, then it must be the only system, since any
other assumption must infallibly lead to contradiction.
That there is, in fact, only one system, i.e. the world,
of which the thinking man is a part, is discovered by an
intellectual intuition.
Thus, Hagerstrom's method is what Popper calls the me¬
thod of essentialism, which Popper traces back to Plato
and Aristotle. This method states that the task of the
philosopher is to discover and describe the true nature of
things with the help of intellectual intuition. By an act
of intellectual intuition, the philosopher comes into con¬
tact with the essence of the object and thus has genuine
knowledge. Hagerstrom is, of course, a philosopher whose
passion is to see the truth as revealed by an act of in¬
tellectual intuition, resulting in knowledge which corre¬
sponds to the real as opposed to the unreal or imaginary.
Hagerstrom has direct access to the true, unchanging rea¬
lity of genuine concepts, as distinct from the common
304) Cf. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. I, p. 31 f.,
vol. II, Ch. 11.
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world of changing opinions of ordinary human beings. This
is precisely the reason why he is in a position to offer
the final account of received opinions and their misunder¬
standings. The key to the knowledge of human misunderstand¬
ings is history, since thought in the proper sense has no
history.
If we talk of knowledge as a discovery of objects, I
think it is vital to notice that Hagerstrom's conception
is that this is a discovery in the sense of revealing the
existence of given objects or concepts in their interrela¬
tionship with other objects or concepts. For Hagerstrom
discovery does not imply that knowledge creates or invents
objects or concepts, which is something arbitrary as op¬
posed to discovery in the first sense which is something
fixed. Knowledge implies order expressed in judgements
which state everything that can be truly affirmed of an
object. To know anything properly one must know everything
about it, in effect everything whatever. This is Hagerstrom's
conception of a sound mind as opposed to an unsound, i.e.
confused, mind. For a confused mind it is enough to be
capable of recognizing and identifying an object without
reflecting upon the concepts it uses and without recognizing
the coherent structure of concepts revealing the coherent
and intelligible order in nature and society. A sound mind,
by contrast, has reflected and recognized that thought it¬
self reveals the eternal structure of necessary relations
in the world, which is grasped by an intellectual intuition
where knowledge is defined as reality.
Thus, Hagerstrom parts company with the tradition that
man's knowledge is maker's knowledge which can be traced
back to Plato and Aristotle, T^e assumption is that
only the maker of a complex mechanism knows it, because
only he can know its purpose. Hence the indispensability
of the glory of god for some philosophers since the world,
conceived as an infinite and complex mechanism, implies an
omniscient mind, viz. God's mind. For other philosophers
305) Cf. Hintikka, Knowledge and the Known, especially Ch. IV.
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it is rather the glory of man which is stressed, since man
is able to discover the laws of motion which govern nature
as well as society. For the Marxists, for example, man's
knowledge is maker's knowledge, since man is a tool-making
and tool-using animal, and society is a necessary outcome
of this activity. Man's knowledge of nature and society
is proved to be true knowledge by human practice which
, .. , 306)makes it serve men's purposes.
It is the Aristotelean idea that the essence or de¬
fining characteristics of any object is its particular func¬
tion. Once you know the true function of an object, then
you can work backwards to the means of bringing it about.
That genuine knowledge is maker's knowledge is also stressed
by Francis Bacon, advancing knowledge as power. It is also
the position of Thomas Hobbes and his notion of science
based upon geometry. Hobbes says that "it is because of this
fact (that is, that we ourselves create the figures), it
307)
happens that geometry hath been and is demonstrable".
Hence Hobbes' call is for a science of politics and ethics
based upon geometry.
Kant also teaches that "reason has insight only into
that which it produces after a plan of its own .v. constrain¬
ing nature to give answers to reason's own determining.
Kant's result is well-known. It is because the human mind
imposes order, that there is order in the world. For Hager-
strom, by contrast, the order is given, not imposed; human
thinking is passive, not active. And Hagerstrom is, among
all human beings,the omniscient mind, who knows that the
world is a coherent rational system. It is only because of
the fact that scientific language is riddled with confusions
that human beings fail to realize this. Language is not of
man's making. Hagerstrom is opposed to theories which stress
that man makes meaning. The meaning of words is given, not
306) Cf. Lenin, Materialism and Empiro-Criticism, p. 101.
307) Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen (edt. B. Gert), London 1972,
p. 42 (De Cive, Ch. X). Cf. Leviathan (Edt. C.B. MacPherson)
Harmondsworth 1974, Part IV, Ch. 46, p. 682.
308) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. B XIII, (p. 20).
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imposed. The root of error is to be found in language. As
Hobbes writes
"man, alone among the animals, ... can create general rules
for himself in the art of living just as in the other arts;
and so he alone can devise errors and pass them on for the
use of others. Therefore man errs more wildly and dangerous¬
ly than can other animals.
Hagerstrom claims to be able to detect the errors and
inconsistencies in the theories of other philosophers. But
he does not always show a comparable critical acumen with
regard to his own ideas, as I shall try to show in what
follows.
For Hagerstrom the aim of philosophy is determined by
its purpose. The purpose of philosophy is on the one hand
to further "the social, true instincts which generally
sustain society without which the race could not continue
as the master of nature, making use of it for its service"?'1'^
On the other hand the aim is to "counteract the antisocial
forces which destroy community and solidarity".
In a world which is governed by necessary laws it be¬
comes a mystery why ordinary people can fail to realize
this. Hagerstrom is faced with a problem of explaining hu¬
man illusions and superstition. It is akin to the similar
problem for the theologian of explaining the existence
of moral evil in a providentially governed world. For the
theologian the problem is how man can be at one and the
same time an image of God and corrupt. For Hagerstrom the
problem is how man can be both a part of nature and corrupt
in the sense of failing to see things as they are. If Ha¬
gerstrom insists that man is a "particle of perfection"
(to use a religious phrase) then the inference is that he
has no need to strive for knowledge. This natural inference
must be resisted, Hagerstrom stresses. If Hagerstrom then
insists that man constantly goes astray, then the inference
is that the perfection or logical order of the world as a
whole is threatened.
309) Hobbes, Man and Citizen, p. 40 (De Cive, Ch. X).
310) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 303 for this quotation and the next one.
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Hagerstrom's way out of these problems is that there
is, in the words of C.D. Broad,
"both need and room for a science which shall try to ana¬
lyse and~~define the concepts which are used in daily life
and in the special sciences. There is need for it, because
these concepts really are obscure, and because their ob¬
scurity really does lead to difficulties. And there is room
for it, because, whilst all the special sciences use these
concepts, none of them is about these concepts as such.^^
This is a very apt description of Hagerstrom's philosophy
as a science based upon the method of essentialism.
Hagerstrom's diagnosis of the mystery is that the hu¬
man mind is not corrupted by original sin, as the theolo¬
gians hold, nor by his physical environment, the economic
system, as the Marxists hold. The mystery is rooted in the
nature of man's existence in the world, where the human
mind is split between reason or thinking on the one hand,
and its self-consciousness, i.e. feeling and volition, on
the other hand.
Hagerstrom's prescription is to free the human mind,
the essence of which is thinking, from its foreign elements,
which are feelings and volitions.
For Hagerstrom, as for Frege, ordinary language is
riddled with confusions. Ordinary thought is, as Frege re¬
marks "enslaved by the tyranny of words". This is also Ha¬
gerstrom's opinion, and his call is "to pierce through the
mist of words which has arisen out of feelings and associa-
312)
tions and to proceed from sounds to things".
The question is what Hagerstrom means by the phrase
"from sounds to things", since Hagerstrom declares that
"certain 'concepts' in the ordinary consciousness -
the 'concepts' of thing, motion, and power - reappear in
modern natural science. But these are nothing but words
whose character has not been carefully considered" .313)
If we carefully consider the concept of thing, Hager-
311) C.D. Broad, Critical and Speculative Philosophy, in Contemporary
British Philosophy (Edt. J.H. Muirhead), 1st Series, London 1924,
p. 77 ff., at p. 83.
312) Hagerstrom, PR p. 74.
313) Hagerstrom, PR p. 301 (my italics). The following quotation is
from the same page.
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Strom's conclusion is that this analysis shows that the
concept "dissolves into words without thought". If the con¬
cept of thing is equivalent to the concept of material sub¬
stance, then Hagerstrom's conclusion is just Berkeley's
conclusion. The consequence is that Hagerstrom after all
sides with the thesis of idealism, that objects are col¬
lections of sense-experiences. For Hagerstrom words without
thought are equivalent to nothing but sounds. If this is
so, then the concept of things reappears in Hagerstrom's
philosophy. Does it follow then that Hagerstrom's call is
to be understood as meaning that we must proceed from
sounds to words without thoughts, i.e. other sounds?
This is hardly to be considered a great step forward,
since to replace sounds with other sounds is not a clari¬
fication of concepts, nor does it eliminate misunderstand¬
ings. Is it Hagerstrom's contention that philosophy, as
Ludwig Wittgenstein claims, leaves everything as it is?
Wittgenstein advances, in his later philosophy, the thesis
that
"philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of
language; it can in the end only describe it. For it can¬
not give it any foundation either. It leaves everything
as it is."314)
Since Hagerstrom's claim is to initiate a revolt in
philosophy, i.e. to restore the ordinary and scientific
consciousness to soundness, it is misleading, to say the
least, to claim that his philosophy leaves everything as
it is. Or else it implies that Hagerstrom's efforts have
been in vain. This is certainly not Hagerstrom's opinion.
After all, his philosophy provides the only possible founda¬
tion for knowledge of reality which in turn is the basis for
his therapeutic activity. Since thinking is a passive affair
this involves Hagerstrom in a problem of explaining why his
will is to be decisive. He also faces another problem con¬
cerning his epistemology. Hagerstrom relies upon the law of
314) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (transl. and
coll. by G.E.M. Anscombe), Oxford 1968, § 124, cf. the commen¬
tary by Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p. 124 f.
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contradiction. To ask for a demonstration of the law of
contradiction betrays a lack of training in logic, since
it is the very principle of proof. In this respect Hager-
strom simply follows Aristotle. Since Hagerstrom also holds
that the law of contradiction applies to objects in the
world, it betrays a similar lack of training to ask for a
demonstration of objects in the world being by necessity
as they are. As Hagerstrom writes "reality itself cannot
315)
be determined through any other thing". Since Hager¬
strom equates "reality" with "knowledge", it follows that
knowledge itself cannot be determined through any other
thing. Hagerstrom's conclusion is that knowledge is know¬
ledge. This is, of course, a truism. The corollary is that
knowledge is simple, ultimate and indefinable. Any attempt
to justify knowledge turns out to be circular. In this re¬
spect Hagerstrom's view is akin to the Oxford philosophy
of John Cook Wilson, ^16)
If this is Hagerstrom's considered opinion, i.e. that
knowledge cannot be justified, then his "most important book"
to use his own phrase, Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft, rests
upon the logical mistake of attempting the impossible. HagerstrSm
is engaged in establishing a foundation for knowledge, which
is not logically possible, according to his own doctrine.
Hagerstrom's philosophy must then be rejected. As a rationa¬
list Hagerstrom must follow the argument to its logical con¬
clusion, and the logical conclusion is that it rests upon a
mistake, asking questions which cannot be legitimately put
forward, since they admit of no informative answers.
This is, not needless to say, Hagerstrom's position.
But it is instructive for an understanding of his method.
His dictum, mentioned above, to proceed from sounds to
things, is understandable in the light of Hagerstrom's
epistemology and ontology. He has established that his
315) Hagerstrom, PR p. 50.
316) Cf. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, Ch. 10, Cook Wilson
and Oxford Philosophy. I do not know whether Hagerstrom is fami¬
liar with the writings of Cook Wilson, but certainly Hagerstrom
is familiar with Aristotle.
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mind is sound, therefore back to reality and improve man's
confused mind. Hagerstrom's dictum is, incidentally, akin
to the motto of Edmund Husserl. His motto "zu den Sachen
317)selbst" for his scientific philosophy of phenomenology.
Husserl1s call is not a demand for realism, i.e. to con¬
sider things independent of consciousness, since the things
at stake are acts of consciousness and the objective enti¬
ties that get constituted in these various acts which
Husserl calls phenomena. What is meant by Husserl's call
is the taking of a fresh approach to concretely experienced
phenomena free from conceptual presuppositions, and the
attempt to describe these phenomena on the basis of a care¬
ful study of concrete examples supplied by experience and
intellectual intuition of essences. Thus, Husserl's method
318)
of phenomenology is the method of essentialism. This
is also Hagerstrom's method when he proceeds from sounds
to things. The things in question for Hagerstrom are human
acts of consciousness.
At the centre of Hagerstrom's philosophy is the pro¬
blem of giving a scientific account of the natural history
of the human mind and its sickness. Thinking is objective
and impersonal, genuine concepts are objective, awaiting
discovery. There can be no history of genuine concepts,
but there can be an empirical history of human errors. Thus,
Hagerstrom turns philosophy into a genetic account of how
human beings come to entertain erroneous views concerning
knowledge and reality. Thus, Hagerstrom advances psycho-
logism as the proper way of doing philosophical analysis.
This is, of course,in complete contrast to Frege, and Bern¬
ard Russell, and the followers of the movement known as
319)
logical atomism. They also take "a logical point of
view" and their cure of confusion of man's mind lies in the
construction of an ideal language of logical notation.
317) For Husserl's philosophy, I am indebted to Passmore, A Hundred
Years of Philosophy, p. 185 ff., cf. above Ch. II, p. 72.
318) Cf. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. I, p. 216.
319) Cf. J.O. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, Oxford 1956 for an out¬
line .
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From his "logical point of view" Hagerstrom does not
set out to construct an ideal language. Why is this so?
After all, Hagerstrom is a rationalist who is convinced
that the process of logical argument is the only way to
restore man's soundness.
The construction of an ideal language also fits with
Hagerstrom's basic aims mentioned above p. 204. Once we
have the proper logical language to argue in, then we can
completely avoid quarrels. This is the position of Leibniz
and of the philosophers of the Enlightenment who claim that
men's wild errors about nature and society will finally
disappear once we have the ideal language to express the
320)truth. It is a similar idea Jeremy Bentham has in mind
with his calculus of the values of the pains and pleasures,
321)and his efforts to construct a proper legal terminology.
It is interesting to notice that in this respect Ha¬
gerstrom shares Cook Wilson's hostility to symbolic logic.
My question is why Hagerstrom is so hostile, since he
shares the aims of the philosophers of the Enlightenment?
I suggest that the explanation for Hagerstrom's lack of
interest is that a construction of an ideal language is a
case of discovery. It is discovery in the sense of inven¬
tion in contrast with discovery in the sense of revelation.
Invention implies for Hagerstrom bringing something new
into existence through the exercise of the imagination.
This is perhaps suitable for a poet, but not proper for a
stern philosopher who rejects feelings, and clings to
thought. If this is right, then Hagerstrom totally misunder¬
stands scientific thinking, and his objection to an ideal
language fails to convince.
Another reason for Hagerstrom's lack of interest in
an ideal language, or indeed lack of interest in replacing
ordinary concepts with more proper and scientific concepts,
cf. above See.5 p.178 ff. is perhaps that Hagerstrom has rea-
320) Cf. Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man, p. 202 f., cf. p. 272 f.,
and the article by Berkson mentioned above in note
321) Cf. Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General (Edt. H.L.A. Hart) London
1970.
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lized that an ideal language is a hopeless undertaking any¬
way, not suitable for everyday purposes, and this holds
also for the replacement of ordinary concepts with scien¬
tific concepts. If it is hopeless, the rational person
does not engage himself in such business. And suppose such
replacement is possible after all, then it can only direct
attention away from the problematic aspects of our ordinary
322)
concepts by focusing on their unproblematic aspects.
There is nothing to be gained by such analysis, since it
engages thinking people into construction and contemplation
of an ideal world, whereas genuinely thinking people are
concerned with the real world.
If this is Hagerstrom's reason, then it seems to me
that he begs the question. The philosophers concerned with
ideal languages or replacement of concepts are offering im¬
plicit proposals for the reform of scientific or philosophi¬
cal language, and this may very well turn out to be fruit¬
ful for further inquiries, scientific or philosophical. Ha¬
gerstrom cannot rule out this possibility a priori, by de¬
nying other philosophers the right to use a technical voca¬
bulary. But it is important to notice that this is a divid¬
ing line among Scandinavian realists. The approach by Hager-
strom and Olivecrona holds firmly to customary meanings as
the basis for analysis, whereas the approach by Lundstedt
and Alf Ross is that we can freely stipulate new meanings.
Hagerstrom's second reason is perhaps linked with a
third, and decisive reason against the construction of an
ideal language. This third reason is the point made by Spi¬
noza, that an emotion can only be checked or removed by an
emotion contrary to itself, and possessing more power in
323)
restraining emotion, to which Hagerstrom subscribes.
One way to check an emotion by another emotion is not
to interfere with the actual use of ordinary language, to
322) Perhaps Hagerstrom falls back on Kant, cf. Critique of Pure Rea¬
son, p. B 745 f. (p. 579 f.) and p. B 763 f. (p. 590 f.).
323) Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, Prop. LXIX, p. 233, and Hagerstrom,
Ratten och Staten, p. 252, Hagerstrom, however, does not mention
Spinoza.
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quote Wittgenstein. An ideal language does not serve this
purpose. A much better way to check the emotions of ordinary
people expressed in ordinary language is to use ordinary
language to deter these emotions. Hagerstrom's point is
that you persuade ordinary people into believing that when
they use ordinary language they talk nonsense. By contrast
when you (i.e. Hagerstrom) use ordinary language you talk
sense, since you know how things are and have stripped off
"the irrelevant accretions which veil the thought from the
324)
eyes of the ordinary mind". Thus, to take an example,
the notion of having rights: it is an absurd idea to say
that people have the right to govern themselves, Hagerstrom
325)
claims. The reason why this is an absurd idea is that
reality is devoid of values. Thus, it is meaningless to
talk of rights, but instead of abandoning the notion com¬
pletely, Hagerstrom follows Berkeley's advice that "we ought
326)
to think with the learned and speak with the vulgar".
Marx claims that the weapon of criticism certainly
cannot replace the criticism of weapons, material force
327)
must be overthrown by material force. Hagerstrom knows
better, since the weapon of his criticism, i.e. his use of
ordinary language, is capable of forcing agreement among
people without using force.
It is easier to change people's minds, far more diffi¬
cult is it to change the material forces of production.
The facts of reality cannot be changed by being classified
as negative or positive, evil or good. But people's atti¬
tudes to the given facts of reality can be changed. This
is what matters. An ideal language is not suitable for
achieving this purpose, but the manipulation of ordinary
language is. Reason can combat passion by using the medium
of ordinary language. This is Hagerstrom's solution to
324) Cf. Frege, quoted in Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p. 35.
325) Hagerstrom, Ratten och Staten, p. 153.
325) Berkeley, Objections to the Principles, § 51, Selections p. 69.
327) Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (transl. by
Annette Jolin and (also edt.) Joseph O'Mally), Cambridge 1977,
p. 137, the quotation later in the text is found at this page
as well.
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counteract solipsism or egoism, which is private and sel¬
fish as opposed to ordinary language which is public and
328)
in the common interest of people. In this way it is
possible to realize, in a peaceful way, the aims listed
above.
Thus, Hagerstrom stresses, in an Aristotelean fashion,
the importance of ordinary language. This is also the ap¬
proach of Cook Wilson and his Oxford Philosophy, and also
a characteristics of the contemporary movement known as
329)Oxford Philosophy, i.e. the appeal to ordinary language.
The aim for these philosophers is the avoidance of being
misled by language. The aim is not the discovery of the
logical concatenation of facts or the structure of language,
as is the aim for the logical atomist. Nor is the meaning
of a statement the method of its verification, as the logi¬
cal positivists hold. Rather, with Wittgenstein, the slogan
is "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use". This is
not Hagerstrom's approach. He says he is engaged in a con¬
ceptual analysis. The truth is that he is rather offering
an empirical account of the causes of why people are mis¬
led by language.
In contrast to Marx the sickness of the human mind is
not due to man's social conditions, but the sickness is in¬
herent in man's "soul-life", to use Hagerstrom's own phrase.
For Hagerstrom,
"the history of civilized man ... cannot be explained by
reference to any particular temporal circumstances, but must-,
be explained directly by reference to the human soul-life".
This contention is central for the understanding of his
whole philosophy. It expresses, at one and the same time,
a methodological principle and an empirical claim.
As a methodological principle it turns philosophy into
328) My guess is that Hagerstrom equates solipsism with egoism,
a) epistemologically, b) ontologically, and c) morally, of. Reid,
Essays in the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 138 f., 179 f.,
199, and p. 680 for a) and b), and for c) Kant, Anthropologie,
in Werke, Band 10, Darmstadt 1970, § 2 p. 408.
329) Cf. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p. 163 ff., especially p.
167 and p. 179 for the aim mentioned in the text.
330) Hagerstrom, PR p. 210.
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a genetic or historical inquiry into the origin of man's
confused ideas. As an empirical claim it offers an expla¬
nation how man is led astray by his feelings and volitions.
According to the laws of association Hagerstrom uses the
analytic method of reasoning from effect to cause. The
effect, i.e. that man's ordinary thinking is erroneous,
is given as a fact. We have to look for the cause, which
is found in man's feelings or volitions. This, in short,
is the structure of Hagerstrom's reasoning.
It is the origin of ideas which matters. This explains
why Hagerstrom's writings abound with discussion of ideas
in the minds of people. This puts Hagerstrom in the British
331)
philosophical tradition of Locke, Berkeley and Hume.
Hagerstrom cannot, then, claim to initiate a revolution,
since Hume already makes the claim to "introduce the ex-
332)
perimental method of reasoning into moral subjects".
Whereas Hume points to experience and observation, Hager¬
strom relies on his intellectual intuition. His point is
that man's thinking is often perverted by feelings and vo¬
litions. There is nothing revolutionary in this diagnosis.
It forms the subject-matter for Francis Bacon's famous
theory of the idols of the mind, and it is Thomas Reid's
333)
plea for a nosology of the human understanding.
What Hagerstrom offers, as his discovery, is that he
has purified his own thinking from feelings and volitions.
I am not quite sure whether Hagerstrom follows Auguste
Comte and believes that human thinking goes through three
stages: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive.
This idea can also be found in Sir James Frazer's "The
Golden Bough", which Hagerstrom had studied and used as
evidence for his own theory.
331) Perhaps Hagerstrom is influenced by the German philosopher F.A.
Lange and his History of Materialism.
332) Hume's subtitle to Treatise of Human Nature, and see Hume's re¬
marks in his preface, especially p. XIII and p. XVI.
333) Cf. the discussion by Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of
Man, Essay VI, Ch. VIII, p. 691 ff.
334) See Hagerstrom, PR p. 238 f., cf. Olivecrona in Hagerstrom INLM,
p. XVIII, and for criticism Geoffrey MacCormack, Hagerstrom's
Magical Interpretation of Roman Law, The Irish Jurist 1969, p.153 ff.
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What I do know is that Hagerstrom is convinced that
he has arrived at "the positive stage" of perfect know¬
ledge, where "the concept of reality" prevails and governs
man's thinking in contrast to the distorting feelings and
335)
volitions governed by the "concept of pleasure". Thus
Hagerstrom's mind is a sound mind directed at the things
themselves, i.e. exposing the illusions which are deeply
engrained in the ordinary human soul. The basis for Hager¬
strom is his capacity of possessing the final truth about
the mechanism of the human mind. Philosophy is, then, to
sum up, a doctrine as well as an activity. It is a doctrine
of scientific judgements concerning the human mind which
forms the basis for the scientific activity of improving
the ordinary as well as the scientific consciousness. A
comparison with Wittgenstein is illuminating. For Wittgen¬
stein "the civil status of a contradiction, or its status
336)
in civil life: there is the philosophical problem".
The consequence for Wittgenstein is that philosophy is not
a doctrine, but an activity where the decision between con¬
flicting views is left to the ordinary consciousness. By
contrast Hagerstrom's philosophy supplies the ordinary con¬
sciousness with the only possible decision of resolving
the contradiction, i.e. to accept the verdict of the Thera¬
pist. Thus, Hagerstrom's opposition to voluntarism ends in
a reinforced dogmatism. It is based in the end upon a non-
rational commitment to his own philosophy. This philosophy
has the merit of being capable of explaining everything. But
this is not a merit, since this is tantamount to explaining
nothing at all.
Like other Hegelians Hagerstrom "adopts the dogmatic
method of laying down his philosophy without argument. We
337)
can take it or leave it. But we cannot discuss it."
If we take Hagerstrom's philosophy we are, by his standard,
335) The quoted phrases are from Hagerstrom, PR p. 277, p. 41 and p.
179 respectively. I do not know whether Hagerstrom is familiar
with the writings of Sigmund Freud.
336) Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 125, cf. Hacker,
Insight and Illusion, p. 117.
337) Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. II, p. 249.
222
rational. If we leave it, this will show progress as a
movement towards a consensus. If we try the impossible and
discuss it, we are considered to be irrational, failing to
realize the proper meaning of concepts.
I shall, anyway, try to do the impossible and discuss
Hagerstrom's contentions and show the implications of his




Axel Hagerstrom's Inquiry into the Nature of Meaning and
Knowledge
"All the mind's activity is easy
if it is not subjected to reality."
Marcel Proust*
1. Introduction
Hagerstrom's philosophy is, in his own opinion, a Coperni-
can Revolution. If my argument in the preceding chapter
is correct, then this is not the case. It is rather to be
seen as a revolt against developments within physics,
e.g. Einstein's theory of relativity, against develop¬
mentswithin philosophy, e.g. the approach which makes sen¬
sations the ultimate foundation of scientific knowledge,
against developments within society, e.g. leaders who
try to bring about social reconstruction of institutions
by inciting actions referring to "right" and "justice",
thus stirring up class against class. No such teaching
is justifiable according to Hagerstrom, because it fails
to take account of the fact that men are governed by laws.
No great change ever occurs with a leap, this is as much a
law of history as of nature. Somewhat inconsistently, Ha¬
gerstrom thinks that his philosophy constitutes a complete
break with the past and the present. His revolt is, how¬
ever, justifiable, since his philosophy is the result of
the gradual growth of evolution. It is the progressive and
final result which will permanently benefit all mankind,
since it is a replacement of superstition and magic by
thought.
I have tried to show that Hagerstrom's thought is
based upon the conceptual primacy of the knowledge of the
Remembrance of Things Past: Cities of the Plain. Quoted from The
International Theasaurus of Quotations (compiled by Rhoda Thomas
Tripp) Penguin Books, 1970, Entry 968, No. 44.
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end, aim or goal of his intellectual endeavours. Hager¬
strom' s basic aim is to liberate mankind from the bondage
of ignorance and superstition by presenting a theory that
instructs mankind of the truth and of a way to accept the
world they live in, rather than a theory that gives them
news about an altogether different world. The primacy as¬
cribed to this aim by Hagerstrom is exhibited in his epi-
stemology, chiefly in his rejection of nihilism or scepti¬
cism and his rationalistic acceptance that there must be a
single basic principle as the only solid foundation of
knowledge, viz. the principle of absolute knowledge. In
his ontology, this way of thinking leads Hagerstrom to re¬
ject the view that the world is irrational and governed by
passion or will, and to accept the view that the world in
which we live represents an intelligible, ordered system
of causal laws which are accessible to the human intellect.
HagerstrSm's basic aim, then, is his longing for unity and
harmony, in nature as well as in society, and this in turn
leads to his fundamental claims which can be summarized, I
believe, as follows:
1) Man is a being with the faculties of thinking,
feeling, and willing.
2) Man's essence is the faculty of thinking which
is what marks man off from other living crea¬
tures .
3) Man is capable of knowing the world by using
the faculty of thinking, and capable of over¬
coming feelings and volitions; when these fa¬
culties interfere with the faculty of thinking,
the result is meaningless words concerning the
world.
4) The method to be used in knowing the world con¬
sists in looking for causes. Genuine knowledge
consists in knowledge of causes and their ef¬
fects .
5) The world is a rational or logically coherent
system governed by laws.
6) The acquisition of perfect knowledge of the
causal laws, operating independently of man,
can be utilized by thinking people in a manner
that will insure the constant improvement of
man's life in nature and society. In short,
the authority of sound reason propagated by
leaders of thought must guide the great mass
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of the population to happiness and social soli¬
darity .
Hagerstrom remains with the rationalistic tradition, found¬
ing his epistemology upon the Cartesian conception of man
as a thinking being confronted with an unthinking and in¬
dependent world of unthinking objects. Hagerstrom accepts
the rationalist doctrine that to know anything is to know
ourselves as knowing it.
Thus, Hagerstrom's position is similar to the position
of British philosophers who also put the emphasis on "the
knowledge-relation as providing the clue to 'Reality'",
which Passmore says is "characteristically British"."^
This perhaps explains the interest in Hagerstrom's writings
shown by British philosophers and jurisprudents. Hagerstrom's
philosophy is anything but characteristic in its attitude
to the "common sense" of the Scottish school of Thomas Reid,
and the Cambridge school of G.E. Moore. In this respect Ha¬
gerstrom's is more akin to the philosophy of J.F. Ferrier
with its search for the Absolute and contempt for "the sub¬
marine abysses of popular opinion".
I have already discussed Hagerstrom's epistemology
and his rejection of ordinary language, cf. above Chapter
III, p. 150 f. What I wish to do in this chapter is to ful¬
fil some promises made in Chapter III. I made the promise
to discuss Hagerstrom's theory of meaning, which I shall
do in Sections 2 and 3. - In Section 2 I shall consider
Hagerstrom's claim that self-contradictory judgements are
meaningless, and argue that this claim is false. - In Sec¬
tion 3 I shall consider Hagerstrom's insistence on a dis¬
tinction between mere words based upon feelings and words
with thoughts behind. My thesis is that Hagerstrom's dis¬
tinction collapses, since he holds that the meaning of all
words in the end depends upon feelings. I have also pro¬
mised to discuss Hagerstrom's theory of judgement, which
I shall do in Sections 4 and 5. - Section 4 is concerned
1) Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 53, - commenting on
the philosophy of J.F. Ferrier; here also the quotation in the
text concerning common-sense.
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with negative judgements, Section 5 with affirmative judge¬
ments. Hagerstrom insists on a distinction between con¬
sciousness as a mental act and its direction toward an ob¬
ject. My claim is that Hagerstrom's theory of judgement is
based upon an untruth. - In Section 6 I shall try to pre¬
sent Hagerstrom's theory of truth and argue that it is an
incoherent theory. - In Section 7 I shall argue that Hager¬
strom's "scientific world-picture" is based upon a coherence
theory of truth. I have finally promised to consider Hager¬
strom's path of knowledge as opposed to the paths of igno¬
rance and opinion, which I shall do in Section 8, relating
Hagerstrom to Parmenides. I shall argue that Hagerstrom re¬
turns to the Parmenidean way of truth as the only proper
way of achieving knowledge. I shall also try to show that
this way is not the only way of truth.
2. Hagerstrom's Theory of Meaning: Contradictoriness
Hagerstrom's general objection to other philosophers and
scientists is that they talk nonsense, i.e. they use words
and sentences yet fail to realize that there are no genuine
thoughts behind their utterances. Thus, Hagerstr5m's accusa¬
tion is that their philosophy and even their science is do¬
minated by metaphysics, but metaphysics is "nothing but a
series of combinations of words concerning whose character
2)
the metaphysician knows nothing".
In this respect Hagerstrom's rejection is similar to
the logical positivists' rejection of metaphysics as mean¬
ingless. The logical positivists reject metaphysics on the
ground that there is no possible way of verifying metaphysi¬
cal judgements in experience.
But Hagerstrom does not accept the logical positivists'
verification theory of meaning or their verification prin¬
ciple. To be sure, Hagerstrom's theory about the nature of
meaning is based upon experience, and his criterion for
what it is for a word to have meaning is based upon experience.
Yet this experience is not, in the end, experience by means
of sense-observations, but experience based upon a logical
2) Hagerstrom, PR p. 60
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feeling of evidence. Thus, for Hagerstrom the basic dis¬
tinction between meaningfulness and meaninglessness is a
distinction between knowledge and metaphysics. This dis¬
tinction depends upon the question whether there is a unified
3)
consciousness behind the words or not. The former is an
act or state of thinking directed towards an object and ex¬
pressed in words with real meaning in indicative sentences.
By contrast the latter is an act or state of feeling or
volition expressed in empty words. Or there is "a peculiar
state of consciousness", which may express itself as a "si¬
multaneous association" of different states of conscious¬
ness, the association of thinking and feeling, or the
association of thinking and volition, "expressed together
4)
in a single sentence". This association is due to the
inveterate tendency of the human consciousness to move from
genuine ideas to fictitious ideas, caused by the influence
of feelings upon thinking.
Hagerstrom's distinction between meaningfulness and
meaninglessness can also be expressed in terms of ideas.
The distinction is then between objective ideas and subjec¬
tive ideas. Objective ideas have an ontological reference
to objective or natural objects in space and time. Subjec¬
tive ideas, by contrast, lack ontological reference to ex¬
ternal objects, and refer only to the individual and his
state of consciousness.
An objective idea arises from the impact of the nature
of things in the objective world of matter and is expressed
in meaningful words, where there is a "real concept standing
5)
behind such words." A subjective idea, by contrast, arises
from men's reactions to the impact of the nature of things
on men's sense organs that causes them to experience de¬
sires, aversions, and volitions. In this case there is "an
6)
inseparable combination of feeling and conception". Hence
"the consciousness of value is characterized outright by
3) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 65 and INLM p. 136.
4) Hagerstronr,'. INLM p. 109 and p. 112.
5) Hagerstrom, PR p. 55.
6) Hagerstrom, PR p. 65.
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the fact that the object - value - depends upon the feel-
7)
ing or desire which belongs to it". Hence good and evil,
right or wrong, are not in the objective world of matter.
These values are rather men's internal and variable reac¬
tions to the ways in which they are stimulated by things
in the world. I shall return to Hagerstrom's moral theory
in Chapter V.
Hagerstrom insists on a basic distinction between
meaningfulness and meaninglessness. In this respect he is
close to the logical positivists. Their contention is, to
use a Wittgensteinian phrase, that "the logic of our lan¬
guage is misunderstood". Hagerstrom's contention is that
acts of human consciousness, expressed in words, are mis¬
understood .
The corollary of this is, however, for the logical po¬
sitivists as well as for Hagerstrom, the same. Once the lo¬
gic of our language is grasped, problems of moral philoso¬
phy, of philosophy of law and of philosophy of religion can¬
not be posed, since they are not genuine problems but rather
the product of illusion. And the source of this illusion is,
Hagerstrom contends, that in these disciplines
"everything is metaphysics, i.e. in reality there is for
consciousness nothing but words, whose meaninglessness
from a conceptual standpoint one does not see clearly, no
matter how much these words may express feelings or wishes,
or inversely, may influence the life of feeling or of will".
From a conceptual standpoint words have real meaning.
From a non-conceptual standpoint words are meaningless.
From his conceptual standpoint Hagerstrom presents, as far
as I can see, two lines of argument concerning the nature
of meaning, i.e. what it is for a word to have meaning, and
what constitutes the criterion of meaning, i.e. what a word
must be if it is to be meaningful to a given person.
One line of argument is the appeal to experience, which
I shall present in Section 3. In this section I shall pre¬
sent the other line of argument, the appeal to self-con¬
tradiction. This is the thesis that words expressing self-
7) Hagerstrom, PR 69.
8) Hagerstrom, PR p. 68.
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contradictory concepts are meaningless words. When such
words are used in sentences they express self-contradic¬
tory judgements, which are meaningless judgements. To be
sure, Hagerstrom's thesis is correct, since the self-con-
tradictoriness of concepts is a defect, which needs a reme¬
dy. It is a defect, since such concepts include irrelevan-
cies, and thus may lead inquiries astray. Self-contradic¬
tory judgements are defective as well. In this respect Ha¬
gerstrom's thesis is also correct. If self-contradictory
judgements are admitted, then any judgement whatever must
be admitted. The reason is that from a couple of contra¬
dictory judgements any judgement whatever can be validly
inferred. Hagerstrom realizes this, and attacks Hegel's
dialectical method for the very reason that this method de¬
nies the principle of contradiction. The result is that
Hegel's method leads to epistemological irrationalism or
"nihilism", viz. the termination of the possibility of
9)
achieving knowledge.
What I wish to argue is that Hagerstrom's thesis,
nevertheless, is meaningful, but false. The flaw in Hager¬
strom's way of thinking is that he equates what is meaning¬
ful with what is true, and what is meaningless with what
is false. His diagnosis is to locate meaning and truth in
the faculty of man's thinking, and nonsense and falsity in the
faculties of man's feeling and volition, which interfere
with thinking. His remedy then is to exclude feelings and
volitions in order to improve our concepts and judgements.
Only feelings and volitions are the villain for Hagerstrom.
And thinking alone is our saviour. My claim is that Hager¬
strom overlooks or ignores that thinking also may result
in incoherent concepts and judgements. There is clearly a
case of incorrect as well as correct thinking. Hagerstrom
also overlooks or ignores that the meaning of a sentence is
distinct from the truth or falsity of a judgement expressed
by a sentence.
Hagerstrom sets up his theory of meaning with the claim
9) Hagerstrom, Ratten och Staten, p. 267, cf. Popper, Conjectures and
Refutations, Ch. 15.
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that "it is absolutely meaningless to say that gold is both
soluble and insoluble, and it is absolutely meaningless to
say that it is neither soluble nor insoluble".^^ - Or as
Hagerstrom also says: "The contradiction can only be a
collection of words without meaning, even if one does not
know that one is only operating with words".
Hagerstrom's thesis about what it is for a word to have
meaning may be stated in this form: "the meaning of a word
is a non-contradictory concept". And his criterion of mean¬
ing may be stated thus: "A sentence is meaningful to a given
person if, and only if, he knows how to operate with words
expressing concepts".
I shall call the judgement: "gold is both soluble and
insoluble" A for easy reference. Clearly the sentence used
to express judgement A is meaningful, but A is a self-contra¬
diction. It is a meaningful but false judgement. Judgement
A can be contrasted with another judgement, call it B, con¬
sidered to be meaningful from Hagerstrom's conceptual stand¬
point, viz. his claim "that if one does not chatter, but
12)thinks - some kind of thought must be present". Judgement
B says: "if one thinks then some kind of thought must be pre¬
sent", which is a tautology. Hagerstrom's sentence used to
express B clearly has a meaning, and his judgement is true
but uninformative, since B does not say whether the thought
is true or false. Hagerstrom, however, holds that the thought
expressed in the judgement is always true as well, but I
shall consider this in Section 4.
To use Wittgenstein's terminology, tautologies, like B,
lack reference for they say nothing about how things are in
the world, but they are not meaningless or nonsense. This
is, however, denied by Hagerstrom who claims that the judge¬
ment, call it C, "'The table is a table' is a purely meaning¬
less judgement - a mere accumulation of words without any
13) '
meaning". If judgement C is a mere accumulation of words
10) Hagerstrom, PR p. 62.
11) Hagerstrom, PR p. 64, cf. p. 262.
12) Hagerstrom, PR p. 62.
13) Hagerstrom, PR p. 212.
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without any meaning, then the same holds for judgement B.
This, then, is also a mere accumulation of words without
any meaning. Since Hagerstrom denies this in case of B, but
affirms this in case of C, there is a flaw in Hagerstrom's
thought, since he defies his own criterion of meaning. It
is a manifest self-contradiction. Hagerstrom does not think
but chatters according to his own criterion.
Self-contradictions, like A, also do not say anything
about the way the world is. But again self-contradictions
are not a mere accumulation of words without any meaning.
They are meaningful, but false,judgements. It is clearly
possible to state, in a meaningful sentence, what one is
thinking of when one utters the judgement A. This is denied
by Hagerstrom who claims "what one is thinking of with these
14)words (in A) cannot be stated". However, Hagerstrom pre¬
supposes that he, from his conceptual standpoint, knows the
meaning of the words used in A. The charge of contradiction
presupposes a grasp of the meaning of the judgement A. And,
to generalize from this judgement to metaphysical doctrines,
until the meaning of these doctrines is established Hager¬
strom cannot properly consider whether or not these doctrines
must be rejected as true or false. He may, of course, reject
the doctrines merely by saying, "Well, I do not understand
the doctrines put forward by metaphysicians, since they
amount to unconstruable gibberish like the utterance (D)
"grillanyzgbormfemstlazx"". What one is thinking of in D
cannot be stated. It follows that we cannot consider whether
or not to believe it for there is no it to believe.This
may be Hagerstrom's considered position.
If so, then he overlooks the vital difference between
the judgements A, B, C and the utterance D. A, B, C in con¬
trast with D have a logical structure. If we generalize from
these judgements, the same may be the case with metaphysical
doctrines. Hagerstrom cannot reject A, B, C on the same
ground as he rejects D. Perhaps Hagerstrom's position is
14) Hagerstrom, PR p. 62, my bracket.
15) Cf. Jonathan Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume. Central Themes, Ox¬
ford 1971, p. 130.
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akin to Berkeley's position when he writes,
"when words are used without a meaning, you may put them
together as you please without danger of running into a
contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two
is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take
the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation,
but for marks of you know not what."16)
What this suggests is that Hagerstrom's attack is based
upon his thinking that A and C are logically false. Yet
the meaning of A and C must be established before Hagerstrom
can know whether they are true or false. This, in turn, pre¬
supposes that it is possible to state what one is thinking
of in uttering A and C. Hagerstrom denies this, as is evi¬
dent from the quotation above. However, at the very same
page he also asserts it, offering an explanation why the
judgement A is meaningless. Hagerstrom's argument is that
"both the idea of the solubility of the gold and the idea
of the subjectivity of this idea are subjective". What Ha¬
gerstrom is saying is, I think, that "the idea of the solu¬
bility of gold" is subjective, i.e. an idea in a person's
mind, whereas a genuine concept is something interpersonal.
Thus, he reverts to Locke's theory of ideas: "the mind, in
all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Ob-
17)
ject but its own ideas".
If this is the case, then Hagerstrom is committed to
the view that a concept also is something in a person's
mind. That this is actually the case is confirmed, when
Hagerstrom writes about consciousness and objects. Hager¬
strom sitting in his working-room reflects upon the rela¬
tion between his consciousness and his garden. He writes,
"I apprehend my work-room and the garden it faces as both
real, but I can do this only because they present them¬
selves in the same complex of space".18)
But this is an untruth. In one interpretation it is
the truism "Hagerstrom's apprehension of his work-room and
garden is Hagerstrom's apprehension of his work-room and
16) Berkeley, Objections to the Principles § 79, Selections p. 87.
17) Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Ch. I, § 1,
p. 525.
18) Hagerstrom, PR p. 47 (his italics).
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garden". In another interpretation it is a meaningful but
false judgement, "Hagerstrom's apprehension can never be of
anything which is not part of his apprehension". That Hager-
strom endorsed the untruth is confirmed when he goes on to
claim "the garden is actually present in consciousness at
19)
the same time as the room". Clearly Hagerstrom violates
with this claim his own criterion of meaning.
To return to Hagerstrom's claim that the idea of solu¬
bility is subjective, Hagerstrom writes,
"I have before me as something real the idea of the solubi¬
lity of gold and the idea of this substance as possessing
the quality of gold, and I affirm the solubility of this
substance as belonging to the same idea, just as I affirm
the meaninglessness of denying this".20)
Now, in this case it is clearly the thing gold, not
the idea of gold, which has the property of being soluble.
Hagerstrom's judgement E "Gold is soluble" is meaningful,
and may be true or false. The judgement E presupposes that
gold is the sort of thing which can have the property of be¬
ing soluble. This judgement E may be contrasted with judge-
21)
ment F "Gold is just". This judgement, in turn, presup¬
poses that gold is the sort of thing which can have the pro¬
perty of being just. This is a case of a category mistake,
since it is of necessity false that gold can be just. Consi¬
dering judgement A it is not of necessity false that gold is
the sort of thing, which has the property of being soluble.
Quite the reverse is actually the case, as Hagerstr5m im¬
plies by his judgement E. Hagerstrom's claim is that the de¬
nial of E is meaningless, but the denial of E is rather a
meaningful but false judgement. Judgements A and E are ex¬
pressed in meaningful sentences, but this is denied by Hager¬
strom. A lacks meaning, since the ideas are subjective, where¬
as E has meaning. Since both judgements involve the same idea,
it is hard to see that there is any difference in meaning. Of
course, there is a difference in respect of their truth-
value. But in this respect Hagerstrom's prescription is
19) Hagerstrom, PR p. 47 (my italics). - I shall return to this example
later, see below p. 65.
20) Hagerstrom, PR p. 46.
21) Hagerstrom, PR p. 83.
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inadequate, since it amounts to an investigation of the
judgements rather than an investigation of the substance
22)
called gold. This is no doubt due to the fact that Ha-
gerstrom claims that all qualities "are not naturally in
23)
space". Thus, Hagerstrom, like Berkeley, does not deny
that there are physical objects in the world, e.g. gold,
but he denies that they have any qualities independently
of consciousness. Hagerstrom, like Berkeley, supports his
thesis about the nature of meaning and the criterion of
24)
meaning by reference to his own ideas. Thus, Hagerstrom
confines his thought about meaning to his own ideas. So
long Hagerstrom does that, he cannot see how he can easily
be mistaken. Of the objects he considers, it is clear that
HSgerstrom has clear knowledge, for Hagerstrom cannot be de¬
ceived in thinking he has a thought. Hence judgement B is
meaningful and true. But can he be deceived in thinking that
his thought is true? No, Hagerstrom replies. His thinking
and expressing the thought is true, and what the thought is
about is true as well. I shall consider this in Section 4.
And, again like Berkeley, Hagerstrom entreats his read¬
ers that they make his ideas the occasion of their own think¬
ing, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in
reading as Hagerstrom had in writing them. For HSgerstrom
it is evident that the words of judgement A mark out either
a direct contradiction or else nothing at all. And to con¬
vince us of this, Hagerstrom entreats us to follow him at¬
tentively and to consider our own thoughts: "Try to think
it possible that something should really exist in nature
which implies a repugnancy in its conception". Surely, the
contradiction of the expressions is obvious and of itself
justifies their rejection, or so Hagerstrom claims.
But Hagerstrom's claim that the judgement B is meaning¬
ful because it is consistent, and the judgement A is mean¬
ingless because it is self-contradictory does not stand up to
22) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 62.
23) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 297, cf. p. 56, 235, 263.
24) Cf. Berkeley, Introduction to the Principles,§ 22, Selections p.
28; § 25, p. 30 f., and Rationale of the Principles, § 24, p. 49.
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closer scrutiny. Hagerstrom confuses
a) whether a sentence can be said to be meaningful,
for example the sentences "Gold is both soluble
and insoluble", "Gold is soluble", and "The table
is a table"; and
b) whether the judgements A, E, and C, expressed
by the above-mentioned sentences, are true or
false.
The distinction between the false and the meaning¬
less is important, since truth and falsity presupposes
meaningfulness. There can be no such thing as a meaningless
judgement, since if a sentence is meaningless it does not
express a judgement, true or false. - Hagerstrom's charge
is that all other doctrines, except his own, are meaning¬
less, and if so, then the question of their truth or fal¬
sity does not even arise. This may be the reason why Hager¬
strom on the one hand does not bother to test them. On the
other hand Hagerstrom also claims that the doctrines are
false, which presupposes that they have meaning. The latter
is, however, denied by Hagerstrom, since he, wrongly, equates
meaninglessness and falsity.
Thus, my conclusion is that Hagerstrom has not succeed¬
ed in his rejection of metaphysics from his conceptual stand¬
point. From the conceptual standpoint there are flaws in
Hagerstrom's way of thinking. He fails to distinguish be¬
tween meaning and truth . He also involves himself in self-
contradiction by claiming that the judgement B about his
own thinking is meaningful, but the judgement C about the
table, which logically has the same structure as B, is no¬
thing but words without meaning.
I think, therefore, that I have established my claim
that thinking also can lead to error. It has led Hagerstrom
into error. What is the consequence of this? Let Hagerstrom
provide the answer: "Now the way is open for uncontrolled
fantasy". The way is also open for Hagerstrom to discover
"that his own thought-structure is a fragile one. This is
25)
shown in the fact that he finally appeals to feeling".
Hagerstrom's criterion of meaningfulness is also an
25) Hagerstrom, PR p. 212 and p. 213.
236
appeal to his logical feeling of evidence. This is radical¬
ly defective, as I shall try to substantiate in the follow¬
ing section.
3. Hagerstrom's Theory of Meaning : Ideas and Meaning
Knowledge for Hagerstrom is expressed in judgements about
objects. Judgements, in turn, are expressed in indicative
sentences, where the words have real meaning. Judgements
are "the naturally forthcoming expression for a real state
of consciousness", in which "something is characterized
as being such and such" formulated in words with real mean-
26)
ing, i.e. "the thought behind the words".
Words, then, are the medium through which conscious¬
ness expresses itself. The unit of real meaning is the in¬
dividual words, which are put together in sentences and
yield meaningful sentences. As sentences are built out of
words, Hagerstrom holds, so are thoughts built out of ideas,
which are "expressions for the objective properties of pre-
27)
sented objects".
Words, when used meaningfully by a speaker, are attached
to objective ideas in the speaker's consciousness, and the
speaker's words excite similar objective ideas in the con¬
sciousness of the hearer. An objective idea is an atom of
real meaning, expressible by a word, which is an atom of
language. In this case words are signs of thought and serve
in indicative sentences as logical terms as a means of com¬
munication. Words, however, are also used by speakers as
signs of their subjective acts or states of minds such as
feelings and volitions, which, when expressed in senten¬
ces, tend to evoke similar attitudes in the minds of the
28)
hearers. In this respect Hagerstrom simply follows Berkeley.
Words, when used to express feelings and volitions in sen¬
tences, may mislead us. Here words do not function as logi¬
cal terms but rather as signs, which raise passions. The
individual is a member of
26) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 134, cp. 109 and p. 82.
27) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 138.
28) Cf. Berkeley, Introduction to the Principles, § 20, Selection p.26.
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"a social linguistic community, so that similar states of
mind in different persons who use the same language are si¬
milarly expressed. But through their unconditional and
extra-individual character such sentences apparently ac¬
quire just the same properties as sentences which really
express underlying judgements."29)
As I have indicated, Hagerstrom holds that there is
a danger that the individual is deceived by language. The
deception is to be found in the distinction between sen¬
tences, which really express underlying judgements of a uni¬
fied consciousness, and sentences, which express apparent
judgements. The latter is generally the case in scientific
thinking, in philosophical thinking and in ordinary think¬
ing, where metaphysics dominates. Hagerstrom's intention
is to intervene and arrest "the giant wave of metaphysics,
30)
which runs through the entire history of civilization".
Metaphysics is nothing but "an intellectual play with ex¬
pressions of feeling, as if something real were designated
31)
thereby". Hagerstrom wants to put a stop to the intellec¬
tual play, which employs the faculties of feeling and vo¬
lition, and change it into intellectual work directed to
the accomplishment of a specific end. This end is social
harmony and happiness which can only be achieved by the
intellectual exertion of the faculty of thinking, as opposed
to indulging in wishful thinking, due to the association be¬
tween thinking on the one hand and feelings and volitions
on the other hand. "We must", Hagerstrom says, "destroy me¬
taphysics, if we ever wish to pierce through the mist of
words which has arisen out of feelings and associations and
32)
to proceed "from sounds to things'".
I have already mentioned and discussed this passage,
in Chapter III, Section 7. Here I wish to draw attention
to the fact that Hagerstrom's dichotomy is between knowledge,
which is conversant about truth and terminates in things, and
the force of feelings, which threaten to obscure knowledge
by "the mist of words". I wish also to draw attention to the
29) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 138 (my italics).
30) Hagerstrom, PR p. 178.
31) Hagerstrom, PR p. 74.
32) Hagerstrom, PR p. 74 (my italics).
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relationship between Hagerstrom and Locke in this respect.
Consider what Locke writes,
"when ... I began to examine the Extent and Certainty of
our Knowledge, I found it had so near a connexion with
Words, that unless their force and manner of Signification
were first well observed, there could be very little said
clearly and pertinently concerning Knowledge: which being
conversant about Truth, had constantly to do with Proposi¬
tions. And though it terminated in Things, yet it was for
the most part so much by the intervention of Words, that
they seem'd scarce separable from our general Knowledge.
At least they interpose themselves so much between our
Understandings, and the Truth, which it would contemplate
and apprehend, that like the Medium through which visible
Objects pass, their Obscurity and Disorder does not seldom
cast a mist before our Eyes, and impose upon our Under¬
standings . "33)
This is important, since Hagerstrom by calling words
a "mist" concedes to the Lockean view of language as merely
a public vehicle for activities which have a self-sufficiency
of their own independently of language. This does not square
with Hagerstrom's conception that meaning involves the use
of concepts logically related to one another; in other words
it involves the use of a public language. This language has
not the character of this or that individual person's con¬
sciousness, but has an unconditional and extra-individual
character. "It should be noted", Hagerstrom says, "that it
is just the extra-individual character of the involuntary
34)
expression which makes communication possible".
He also holds that "in so far as a real community of
speech exists, the utterances themselves are not in any way
formed deliberately". If sentences are formed deliberately
then we end up with "arbitrarily formed conglomerations of
words".
Hagerstrom's point is that this is to use words without
meaning in contrast to use words with meaning. The latter
is to use words associated with determinate and objective
33) Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Ch. IX, §
21 (p. 488), cf. Book II, Ch. XXXIII, § 19 (p. 401). For the Lockean
view of language mentioned in the text, I am indebted to Jonathan
Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, p. 57.
34) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 139, p. 140, and p. 138 for the next two quo¬
tations .
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ideas of a single or unified consciousness to express judge¬
ments in indicative sentences. The former is to use words
associated with subjective ideas to express nothing at all
or to express the association of subjective and objective
ideas of a complex consciousness which expresses itself in
35)
an "inseparable combination of feeling and conception".
In this case
"an expression of feeling can also be expressed in an in¬
dicative sentence in virtue of its association with a con¬
ception, and so one believes that "value" is a real deter¬
mination of the object, that is one does not notice the
meaninglessness of the words from a conceptual standpoint".
This is Hagerstrom's reason for the claim that language
may mislead people. This raises the question for Hagerstrom
how to avoid being misled grammatically by- words and their
sentences. Hagerstrom's answer is to proceed from sounds
to things. Is this a satisfactory answer?
Obviously, words are, in one sense, sounds, and Hager¬
strom holds that these sounds are like a mist. The implica¬
tion may be that since this is so, we should disregard words
so that we may, to quote Berkeley, "clear the first prin-
37)
ciples of knowledge from the embarras and delusion of words".
This is important, because it is tantamount to Hagerstrom's
resolving not to take words seriously as an object of study.
We must rather take things seriously as an object of study.
The metaphysicians are dealing with sounds, i.e. words,
which Hagerstrom wishes to stop in order to concentrate on
things. But it is a rather radical measure to silence the
metaphysicians by precluding all further use of words. This
is absurd, since Hagerstrom's study of things must be ex¬
pressed in words as well. When Hagerstrom urges us to study
things, he overlooks or ignores that words are essentially
means by which human beings deal with things, so that a
sentence about words is necessarily also a sentence about
human beings and things. In fact, Hagerstrom tries to stop
metaphysicians by using words himself. This implies that
35) Hagerstrom, PR p. 65.
36) Hagerstrom, PR p. 70. My translation differs from Sandin's.
37) Berkeley, Introduction to the Principles, § 25, Selections, p.30.
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Hagerstrom must explain how he knows that metaphysicians,
when they use words, are just making sounds and are by no
means capable of dealing with things. According to Hagerstrom's
theory the metaphysicians are in the same position as Locke's
parrots "taught to make articular Sounds distinct enough,
38)
which yet, by no means, are capable of Language". And
the metaphysicians, be it noted, cover for Hagerstrom not
only philosophers and scientists, but also ordinary people.
So the job is to teach the metaphysicians to make articular
sounds with meaning in contrast with articular sounds as
mere sounds. - We must proceed from sounds to things, from
insignificant noise to meaningful concepts. Hagerstrom wishes
to maintain that words and sentences that have been taken as
meaningful for centuries are, in fact, meaningless noises.
This, in turn, requires that Hagerstrom must give argu¬
ments in support of his contention on the basis of some
account of what is required for a word to have meaning and
a criterion of meaning in order to distinguish sense from
nonsense. I have, in Section 2, considered one account offer¬
ed by Hagerstrom. I have also argued that this account is
unsatisfactory. In this section I wish to examine the other
account offered by Hagerstrom. This account is by no means
an original account.
Hagerstrom simply adheres to the account offered by the
British philosophers Locke, Berkeley and Hume. In short,
39)
Hagerstrom is an empiricist about meanings. He holds that
no classificatory word makes sense to us unless either
a) we have sensorily encountered things, to which
words apply, or
b) we can define it in terms of words, which satis¬
fy (a) .
Hagerstrom does not present his thesis in any detailed
way. I think, however, that it is fair to summarize it as
follows: His theory of meaning of words can be stated thus
"the meaning of a word is an idea in one's mind caused by
38) Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Ch. I, § 1,
p. 402.
39) See Hagerstrom, PR p. 65, cf. p. 69, INLM p. 142, cf. Bennett,
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, p. 26.
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a present object", and his criterion of meaning is "a sen¬
tence is meaningful to a given person if, and only if, the
person has the correct ideas in his mind caused by present
objects". This is radically defective, since it links the
meaning of words with mental accompaniments. It leads Ha¬
gerstrom into difficulties about how we can talk in a mean¬
ingful way about the past. Since the past, by definition,
is not present, it cannot act upon the mind. And yet "if
the past were nothing, the black night, it would be abso-
40)
lutely impossible to have knowledge of it". Hagerstrom's
way out of this difficulty is to claim that historical events,
e.g. the death of Karl XII, exist now. The only correct way
of putting it in the ordinary sense is that Karl XII who
exists does not have the same temporal property that we
have. - But surely, this is not the only correct way of put¬
ting the fact that Karl XII, who died in 1718, nevertheless
exists now. Hagerstrom involves himself in a self-contra¬
diction, since he is implicitly committed to the view that
existence is a predicate, which he on the other hand re¬
jects .
To be sure, we cannot talk about Karl XII without having
a distinct conception of him. In contrast to Hagerstrom's
account this does not involve one's having a distinct image
of Karl XII in one's mind. It is obvious that we can use
words meaningfully without having any images. Indeed, there
are words, such as the phrase "a four-dimensional space",
which we cannot interpret in terms of images. Since this
is so, it leads Hagerstrom to reject the phrase as meaning¬
less. This is wrong. The flaw in his thinking is no doubt
due to the assumption that all genuine meaning either is,
or is based upon, a report on some immediate presentation,
some actual event, occurring in the mind. It seems to me
that Hagerstrom's theory of meaning is grounded upon this
principle, to quote Reid, that "in every kind of thought
there must be some object that really exists, in every ope-
41)
ration of the mind, something to work upon".
40) Hagerstrom, PR p. 211.
41) Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 417.
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This turns Hagerstrom's theory of meaning into a "la¬
bour-theory of meaning". There must be a present object of
thinking. If one thinks of Karl XII, he must be present as
an idea in one's mind. If Hagerstrom does not find that
there is any kind of effect or impression made on his mind
by words, then such words are just empty words. This is
quite similar to Berkeley's theory of meaning. For Berkeley,
the word "matter" means nothing, since "I do not find that
there is any kind of effect or impression made on my mind
42)different from what is excited by the term nothing".
For Hagerstrom, of course, the word is not "matter" but
"spirit".
Hagerstrom's theory of meaning is closely associated
with his theory of perception. This is the labour-theory once
again. We cannot see anything unless it lies immediately be¬
fore us, unless the object is present to us and experienced.
Thus, Hagerstrom uses the term idea (Vorstellung) to denote
objects of thought as well as objects of perception. This
double use of the term "idea" embodies his substantive mis¬
take of assimilating the intellectual far too closely to the
4 3)
sensory. The result is meaning, truth, and knowledge as
a sort of vision.
In his account of perception Hagerstrom uses the term
"idea" as a key-term, holding that the object acts upon the
mind and produces ideas in the mind of the passive percipient
At the same time Hagerstrom also holds that the object acts
upon the mind and is immediately perceived without any inter¬
mediate medium of images. As Hagerstrom says "dies bedeutet,
dass der wirkliche Gegenstand gleichsam in das Bewusstsein
eindringt. Das ist zwar sinnlos". I agree, this is "sinnlos"
or absurd in the sense that it is false. Therefore the view
should be rejected. An object, in being perceived, does not
45)
act at all. Hagerstrom's theory of perception, whether
immediate or mediated by ideas, is false, cf. also above
42) Berkeley, Objections to the Principles, § 80, Selections, p. 88.
43) Cf. Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, p. 25 for criticism of this view
44) Cf. Hagerstrbm. EE p. 25, and p. 27 for the quotation.
45) Cf. Reid, Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 218.
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Chapter III, Section 5.
Hagerstrom ignores that perception is active, not pas¬
sive, and further ignores that distinctions between kinds or
classes of objects are not found but made by us. This leads
to Hagerstrom's account of meaning in terms of ideas, where
ideas cover concepts. He holds that ideas or concepts neces¬
sarily react on the subject as a force, which operates in
a certain way independently of the subject, causing him to
.46)
use certain expressions.
The objection is that just as Hagerstrom builds coer¬
cion into the conception of sense perception, so he builds
coercion into the conception of the meaning of a word. He
may do this, of course, but the decisive objection is that
he then "corrupts a language, by using words in a way which
47)
the purity of the language will not admit".
Since ideas are received from particular objects, Hager¬
strom also faces the problem how ideas become general. This
is the problem of universals, i.e. the problem of providing
an account of how we classify particular objects as being
of the same kind. Hagerstrom rejects Locke's notion of ab¬
straction, without mentioning Berkeley at all, but his ar-
48)
gument is similar to Berkeley's. Whatever Hagerstrom
imagines, must have some determinate form and shape, and he
cannot by any efforts of thought conceive abstract ideas.
As Hagerstrom writes,
"with regard to the unknown we operate with nothing but ab¬
stract determinateness, without anything standing before
us which possesses the determinateness. Now, since this has
no meaning we must be concerned here with an entirely dif¬
ferent form of knowledge. But we designate this for our¬
selves by means of misleading words."49)
I shall not discuss the merits or demerits of abstrac¬
tionism. Suffice it to mention Hagerstrom's theory concern¬
ing how to classify particulars by using words which
"must possess real meaning if it is to be possible to deter¬
mine something as real or determinate in contrast to that
46) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 98.
47) Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 21.
48) Cf. Berkeley, Introduction to the Principles, § 10, Selections, p.14.
49) Hagerstrom, PR p. 61, cf. p. 44.
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whose determination as real or as determinate appears to
be a mere collection of words".50)
The contrast for Hagerstrom is between meaningful words,
i.e. words with real meaning wiJ"h thought behind, and mis¬
leading words, i.e. words with apparent meaning with feeling
behind. Hagerstrom's theory is "that there must be something
universal which determines the denotation of words". Hager¬
strom rejects that the universal can be "the content of a
universal idea attached to the words". Why he rejects this
position, which is nominalism, he does not tell. But pro¬
bably his reason is that all objects that exist are only par¬
ticular objects.
So for Hagerstrom the solution can only be found "in
a general, determinable feeling, for which the words, imme¬
diately regarded, are the expression". I have italicized the
word "feeling", since this implies that Hagerstrom's con¬
trast between meaningful words and misleading words collapses.
Hagerstrom's criterion of meaning is then, in
the end, based upon "a general determinable feeling", and
this feeling turns sounds into words with real meaning. The
metaphysician's sounds are still just sounds or empty words,
since these sounds are based on nothing but the metaphysi¬
cian's feeling. But what is, then, the difference between
Hagerstrom and the metaphysician, since Hagerstrom appeals
to feeling as well?
Feeling, for Hagerstrom, in contrast to thinking, does
not objectify. The nature of feeling is "in its very nature
objectless as being free from all elements of conception",
Hagerstrom claims.51' This is in contrast to thinking of some¬
thing as real "which involves one's conceiving it as exist¬
ing independently of the consciousness itself". According
to Hagerstrom's own contrast between feeling and thinking
his own criterion of meaning is a case of confusion between
conception and feeling. Hagerstrom is guilty of the very
same error, which he reproaches others for committing. The
50) Hagerstrom, PR p. 59, also here the following quotations in the
text.
51) Hagerstrom, PR p. 241, also here the next quotation.
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crucial objection to Hagerstrom's criterion of meaning is
that nothing can possibly be known about public meanings
of words, if Hagerstrom's theory is correct. According to
Hagerstrom's theory it is his logical feeling which pro¬
vides the only accessible criterion for what is meaningful.
No wonder, then, that his henchmen were bewildered, when
Hagerstrom died, cf. Chapter III, Sec. 5, p. 139, since
Hagerstrom's criterion is quite useless as an instruction
for anyone who does not know in advance how to distinguish
between meaning and nonsense. Hagerstrom's way out is, I
think, to insist that a distinction can be drawn between
his "general determinable feeling" and the feeling of the
metaphysician. Hagerstrom's appeal to feeling is an appeal
to the rational feeling of logical evidence, not the appeal
to an irrational feeling as is the case with the metaphysi¬
cian, who is shut up in his own subjective world. The ra¬
tional feeling of logical evidence is "connected with the
52)
consciousness of the real".
Thus, Hagerstrom's theory of universals can be seen
as a version of conceptualism. A word is general or meaning¬
ful, because in the mind there is a corresponding general
concept or idea. He then faces the question how to explain
what a general concept is. The only answer is, Hagerstrom
says, a "general determinable feeling". According to this
feeling reality is preordained and preorganized in such a
way that words expressing this order in genuine concepts
are given and forced upon us. What this amounts to is the
thesis that all the material of human knowledge falls into
a fixed scheme of categories. The task of inquiry is then
simply to find out what the fixed scheme is. This implies
that Hagerstrom's theory is close to realism, as a theory
of universals. The objection to Hagerstrom's thesis is
that he tends to underrate that concepts shape experience
itself, that concepts are not fixed but rather open-ended
entities, and that concepts are not found but created. If
Hagerstrom does recognize this, he explains it away as a
52) Hagerstrom, PR p. 257.
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case of using imagination as opposed to using reason. It
is a case of fictive concepts versus genuine concepts. On
Hagerstrom's view certain things are called "gold", because
they are gold, that is these objects possess a common fea¬
ture of goldness, in contrast to the nominalist view that
objects are gold, because they are called "gold". The latter
view is for Hagerstrom just the case of empty words, since
no answer at all can be given to the question why these ob¬
jects are called "gold" and not, say, "animals". According to
Hagerstrom's view, he can offer a satisfactory answer to
the question why an object is called gold. And the answer
is that this is determined by a logical feeling of evidence,
the intellectual apprehension of the essence of the object.
The consequence of this theory is that the world has
a predetermined ordered structure to be revealed in words
with thoughts behind. This entails for Hagerstrom that there
must be exactly one correct account of the world, viz. the
scientific account. Hagerstrom parts company with Wittgen¬
stein and the logical positivists in their view that human illusions con¬
cerning the way the world is can be eradicated by a proper
logical notation. This is metaphysics according to Hager¬
strom. For Hagerstrom illusions can be eradicated only
by eradicating the feelings and volitions attached to ge¬
nuine concepts. This cannot be done except through a histo¬
rical inquiry into the origin of ideas, separating adequate
from inadequate ideas by tracing their historical develop¬
ment. Thus, Hagerstrom adheres to a genetic account of the
causal, psychological processes of passions, which accompa¬
ny man's thinking. If the metaphysician claims to have a
logical feeling as well, how can Hagerstrom distinguish be¬
tween his logical feeling and the metaphysician's feeling?
How can Hagerstrom know that a metaphysician talks nonsense?
The metaphysician's feeling is an irrational feeling, not
a rational feeling, is the answer. This answer, however, rests
only on Hagerstrom's own ipse dixit. For Hagerstrom is not
entitled to claim that this assertion is true without an
investigation of the credential of the metaphysician's
judgements. In this respect the inner accompaniments, whether
247
a logical feeling of evidence or an irrational feeling, are
not constitutive of the meaning of words used in sentences
to express judgements. The origin of judgements is quite
irrelevant for the meaning and truth-value of judgements.
Hagerstrom's mistake is to overlook or ignore this.
Once this is realized there is no reason to take Hagerstrom
seriously. His charge of metaphysics and his dismissal of
views as meaningless can safely be ignored. There is a case,
however, for taking Hagerstrom's own criterion of meaning
seriously.
Hagerstrom is concerned with the question whether cer¬
tain sentences are meaningful or meaningless and with the
question whether we understand anything by such sentences.
He, quite rightly, stresses that these questions are impor¬
tant for people's actions. Granted that these questions
are important, they matter for the present. It is odd, then,
to look at the past and write bulky volumes about Romans
and their magic instead of concentrating on providing a
comprehensive theory, which relates meaning to the use of
sentences to-day. Since Hagerstrom does recognize the pub¬
lic character of language, his failure is to see the possi¬
bility of a theory of meaning, which connects the meaning
of a word with the roles it can play in sentences, as put
forward by Wittgenstein in his later work.
Hagerstrom's failure to provide such a theory is due
to the fact, I suggest, that Hagerstrom is not concerned
at all with analytical questions of meaning but rather with
genetic or causal questions of what motivates people. Hager-
strom is concerned with the genetic question what must occur
in one's consciousness before words can be considered to
be meaningful, rather than being concerned with the analy¬
tical question what it is for an expression to have meaning.
Hagerstrom's theory of meaning is then a step backward
since the meaning of words is connected with inner, mental
accompaniments, which must be present in order to speak in
a meaningful way. Hagerstrom's theory of meaning turns an
analytical question into a psychological inquiry of the




Hagerstrom's criterion of meaning turns out to be a
piece of psychologism as well. Hagerstrom links his theory
of meaning to a causal theory according to which the crite¬
rion of meaning of words and sentences now becomes the re¬
sponse produced by the words or the sentences. This crite¬
rion is a failure, since it is quite possible to understand
the meaning of a word or a sentence without being moved to
act. In the terminology established by the late J.L. Au-
54)
stm Hagerstrom pays too much attention to the perlocu-
tionary act, i.e. what is done by saying something, e.g.
getting a person to go away; at the expense of both the il-
locutionary act, i.e. what is done in saying something,
e.g. ordering him to go away, and the locutionary act, i.e.
what is said. Hagerstrom in effect confounds the perlocu-
tionary act and the illocutionary act.
I shall consider the implications of Hagerstrom's view
for the understanding of moral and legal language in Chap¬
ter 5 and Chapter 6.
4. Hagerstrom's Theory of Judgement : Negative Judgements
In this section and the next I shall consider Hagerstrom's
theory of judgement. In my discussion I shall follow his
advice that "it is of the greatest importance... above all,
to avoid being deceived by the propositions which have been
55)
put forward". What is the proposition put forward by Ha¬
gerstrom? In his own words:
"the first proposition which I affirmed was that in every
judgement the reality of something is presupposed. Every
judgement is an apprehension of some state of affairs as
real."56)
Hagerstrom does not inform his reader of the basis
for his first proposition. He just declares that he has "re¬
nounced every attempt to define the judgement without taking
53) Cp. Hagerstrom's own rejection of psychologism concerning the
question of the objectivity of knowledge, PR p. 35.
54) J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford 1962.
55) Hagerstrom, PR p. 207.
56) Hagerstrom, PR p. 39 (my italics). For the next quotation, see
p. 40.
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into consideration the reality judged about".
I shall argue that Hagerstrom does not avoid being de¬
ceived by the proposition he puts forward. In fact, to use
a phrase from Hagerstrom, "there is a surreptitious logical
57)mistake". I wish to turn this phrase against Hagerstrom's
"first proposition". The logical mistake involved is to con¬
fuse the proposition
(a) whenever there is a judgement then there is an
object thought about,
with the proposition
(b) whenever there is a judgement then there is an
object thought about which is both thought about
and really existing.
Proposition (a) is a truism. Proposition (b) is false, since
an object of thought need not really exist. If I am right
then Hagerstrom's theory of judgement rests upon untruisms.
An "untruism" is an ambiguous sentence, expressing on one
interpretation a trivial truth or a truism, on another in¬
terpretation, a substantial falsity.
In what follows I shall try to substantiate my thesis
that Hagerstrom's theory of negative judgement is a series
of untruisms. In the following section I shall deal with
his theory of affirmative judgements.
The first untruism concerns Hagerstrom's denial of ne¬
gative judgements. This follows from Hagerstrom's first
proposition, quoted above, that every judgement is an appre¬
hension of some state of affairs as real. - The word "judge¬
ment" is an ambiguous term, sometimes denoting the mental
act of judging, and sometimes referring to that which is
judged. It is the distinction between the process of judging
and the product of judgement.
Knowledge is expressed in judgements and if one adopts
the position of knowledge as maker's knowledge determined
by the product, then it becomes absurd to engage in a pro¬
cess of judgement terminating in a product which is nothing.
As Hagerstrom writes "concerning pure nothing, nothing at
all can be judged", or "concerning that which lacks reality
57) Hagerstrom, PR p. 47.
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which has nothing to do with reality - concerning the pure
58)
nothing - we can have no knowledge".
Now I have argued, above Chapter III, Section 7, that
Hagerstrom makes a break with the conception of knowledge
as maker's knowledge. Knowledge is rather conceived by Ha¬
gerstrom as finder's knowledge. Again the finder in his
search is determined by his purpose, viz. to discover the
truth about objects, which exist independently of him. So
the same conclusion comes to light. It is absurd to search
for nothing. If the consciousness is constrained or forced
by external objects, and this is what Hagerstrom holds, then
the consciousness cannot be forced by nothing. This is ab¬
surd, Hagerstrom holds. So Hagerstrom has created a problem
for himself, viz. that "it appears impossible that a judge¬
ment, in which the reality of something is always declared,
59)
should deny the reality of that which is judged about".
It is worth noticing first that Hagerstrom, considering
the relation between judgement and reality, moves from his
first proposition, where "the reality is always presupposed"
to the position that "reality is always declared". He offers
no explanation for this move, and in fact it embodies the
untruth described above.
Secondly it is worth noticing that Hagerstrom uses the
word "appears" which suggests that Hagerstrom is offering
a tentative hypothesis. Hagerstrom's example of this hypo¬
thesis is the negative judgement: "Man does not breathe
60)
with gills". His analysis of this judgement, call it
(N), is as follows. (N) involves
(a) a conception (Vorstellung) of man-breathing-with
-gills
(b) (a) "must be apprehended as present" in a per¬
son's (P) mind
(c) (P) "finds" that (a) "has a different character
from that of the complex to which it belongs".
In an obvious sense, in judgement (N) "reality is always
declared", since (P) puts forward a judgement. It is a
58) Hagerstrom, PR p. 42, and p. 211.
59) Hagerstrom, PR p. 42 (my italics).
60) Hagerstrom, PR p. 42.
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manifest contradiction to think without a conception. It
is a truism that if (P) thinks then he has a thought (b).
It is not a truism that there, besides the thought, also
is an image of man-breathing-with-gills (a) . In j_act it is
false.
Considering whether the judgement (N) is true or false,
we must also consider whether its contradictory judgement
is true or false. There is, in this case, a question of in¬
terpretation. What does Hagerstrom mean by his judgement (N):
"Man does not breathe with gills"? Does he merely mean "not
all men breathe, etc." (a), or that "not one man does breathe,
etc." (b)? That is to say, does he assert:
a) "Not all men breathe with gills", i.e. (a) some
men do not breathe with gills, which gives the
contradictory judgement (A): All men breathe with
gills; or
b) Not any man does breathe with gills, i.e. (E) no
men breathe with gills, which gives the contra¬
dictory judgement (I): "Some men breathe with
gills" .
According to Hagerstrom the law of contradiction is
formulated as follows "two judgements, one of which denies
61)
what the other affirms cannot both be true". Ordinarily
it is added "and cannot both be false" to distinguish con¬
tradictories from contraries which cannot both be true,
but two contrary judgements can both be false.
If we accept Hagerstrom's formula, cited above, he
abandons the empirical hypothesis in order to present a
case for the logical impossibility of negative judgements.
But then he must proceed on the assumption that the sub¬
ject-term of judgement (N) "man" actually denotes something
real. In other words he must proceed upon the assumption
that there are men.
If so, (A) and (E) imply a contradiction and are clear¬
ly incompatible. But then Hagerstrom's doctrine is serious¬
ly muddled, since he then assumes that existence is a pro¬
perty. Hagerstrom lays down that it is impossible to speak
6 2)
of reality as a property. But he breaks his own rule in
61) Hagerstrom, PR p. 42.
62) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 41. Thus, Hagerstrom adheres to the Humean-
>
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the real act of stating it, and deduces himself into the
world.
Hagerstrom's theory of negative judgements asserts
that what is not the case is altogether unreal, and no one
can think of or affirm what is not. Thus, dealing with
judgement (N), Hagerstrom claims that we must compare (a):
the conception of all men-as-breathing-with-gills,.with
(not-a): the conception of no-man-as-breathing-with-gills.
Taking together (a) and (b) imply a contradiction. If (a)
and (b) "are given to consciousness together", he says,
"one would not have before one a unified object, since they
do not stand in mutual connection with one another. That
6 3)
is, one would not apprehend anything at all".
This is inconsistent, since (a) and (b) are quite com¬
patible. But if both (a) and (b) are given to consciousness
together, surely Hagerstrom is right that (a) and (b) shade
out the whole circle of men. That is, (a) and (b) can both
be true only if there are in fact no men. But this is a case
of contrary conceptions, not contradictory conceptions. So
Hagerstrom's thinking is confused. If we turn to consider
contradictory conceptions and contradictory judgements Ha¬
gerstrom's theory is false.
Hagerstrom thinks that a comparison of the conceptions
of (a) and (b) together involves a contradiction. Hager¬
strom's view is based upon the acceptance of the premise
1) nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contra¬
diction, together with the premise 2) whatever we can dis¬
tinctly conceive as an existing object, we cannot also con¬
ceive as a non-existing object; consequently 3) there is no
object, whose existence implies a contradiction.
This argument, it seems to me, is valid, that is the
conclusion 3 follows from the premises 1 and 2. But the
argument is not a sound argument. The crux of the argument
is premise 2, which is false, since whatever we can dis-
62) ( continued) Kantian doctrine that reality is not a property, cf.
Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, Sec. 6. (p. 66 f.).
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. B 628 (p. 505).
63) Hagerstrom, PR p. 53.
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tinctly conceive as an existing object, we can also con¬
ceive as non-existing. Even Hagerstrom grants that it is
possible to conceive of centaurs, but it does not follow
from our conception of a centaur that this animal also is
an existing object in space and time.
I conclude that Hagerstrom's theory of judgement, as
far as it concerns negative judgements, is a muddle. - Ha¬
gerstrom claims that it is impossible to have negative
judgements about an independent reality. But if negative
judgements become impossible, affirmation appears also to
stand condemned. From the falsity of (0) follows the truth
of (A), and from the truth of (A) follows the falsity of (0).
Similarly in case of (E) and (I). Since Hagerstrom accepts
affirmative judgements, it is inconsistent to deny negative
judgements. Hagerstrom's argument is, in effect, that any¬
thing we can find to talk about, in a meaningful way, must
somehow be there in the world to be discussed. The corolla¬
ry is that it is impossible to speak of what is not. Thus,
Hagerstrom eliminates negative judgements in favour of ad¬
mitting only affirmative judgements.
I suggest that the basis for this elimination is Hager¬
strom's thinking that there is a distinction between belief
and unbelief. Affirmative judgements express belief, where¬
as negative judgements express unbelief. This in turn is
coupled with his principle of reason that it is obligatory
to believe and wrong not to believe. I have already criti¬
cized this principle, above Chapter III, Section , and
shall not repeat my criticism. Only notice that if you be¬
lieve, this belief must have an object. Hagerstrom grants
this, but overlooks that the same holds for the case of un¬
belief .
5. Hagerstrom's Theory of Judgement: Affirmative
Judgements
Turning to affirmative judgements, Hagerstrom's point of
departure is his own definition of the nature of judgement.
This is his foundation for his critique of the views of
other writers. Hagerstrom does not specify the precise
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identity of his opponents, so it is difficult to test whether
these writers in fact "attempt to define the judgement with¬
out taking into consideration the reality judged about".
Perhaps what Hagerstrom has in mind, in his critique, is
the point of view of the logician in contrast to the point
of view of the philosopher. From a logician's point of view
the judgement, or perhaps better, the statement or proposi¬
tion, is an expression of a thought. For him logic is the
theory of propositions, i.e. the expression of truth or fal¬
sity, and the important thing to investigate is the formal
relationship of implication.From the philosopher's point of
view the judgement is saying something about the world. For
him logic is concerned with inference or the human activity
of reasoning, which takes place in space and time and is con¬
cerned with reality as the ultimate ground of our judgements.
If the theme of logic is the formal relationship between
propositions then, I guess, Hagerstrom's objection is that
we are bound to conclude that this study has not anything
to do with reality.
For Hagerstrom, like Bradley, formal distinctions be¬
tween propositions are superficial and insignificant.^'
All judgements ultimately have the same form, viz. they
assert a unified content of reality. For Hagerstrom, like
Bradley, to infer is to reason. And we reason whenever we
come to realize that reality must be what a judgement asserts
it to be. The starting point for Bradley is
"the judgement, defined as 'the act which refers an ideal
content (recognized as such) to a reality beyond the act'.
The starting point of logic, then is not the idea taken
simply as something 'in my mind' - the 'ideal content' -
but the idea considered as having a meaning, pointing to
a reality."
For Hagerstrom, in a similar way, the starting point
is the judgement, defined as "apprehension of some state
of affairs as real". It is the apprehension which has a
meaning, pointing to a reality beyond itself. This is quite
clear from Hagerstrom's examples, adduced to illustrate his
64) Cf. for Bradley, Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 159,
and p. 157 for the following quotation.
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definition. I quote the passage in full because of its im¬
portance :
"(A) If I think that 'The horse is running', I mean, natu¬
rally, that the running itself, as a state of the
horse, actually is present and is therefore not mere¬
ly something which I imagine.
(B) 'The sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees'
signifies that the 180-degree-sum-of-the-angles is
something real and not merely an apprehension. It is
so.
(C) If I think that I should be honest, I presuppose ob¬
ligatoriness as something which belongs to honesty
as something real, and not merely an apprehension.
(D) Indeed, even if I make a judgement about something
which I know exists only in my imagination, e.g. an
animal which is half horse and half dog, and if I
assert that what is given in the image is in form
both a horse and a dog, what I mean is that this thing
given in the image actually has partly the appearance
of a horse and partly the appearance of a dog. It is
indifferent whether or not I myself, who have this
image, actually distinguish these formal concepts
when the image arises. They are present in my case."
From Hagerstrom's examples of judgements it emerges that
"taking into consideration the reality judged about", the
reality in question may refer to three distinct elements,
viz. :
1) the act of apprehension, that is to say judgement in
the sense of somebody judging something, e.g. (C) and
(D)
2) the content of the apprehension, that is to say judge¬
ment in the sense of a representation or image in
somebody's mind which defines and determines the di¬
rection of thought to this or that particular object,
e.g. (C) and (D), and perhaps (A) and (B)
3) the object of the apprehension, that is to say judge¬
ment in the sense of a thought reference pointing to¬
wards a real object which is given for somebody's
mind, e.g. (A) and (B).
What has Hagerstrom precisely in mind, when he renounces
every attempt to define the judgement without taking into
consideration the reality judged about, that is to say does
he think of 1, 2, or 3?
Hagerstrom's problem is the objectivity of knowledge,
65) Hagerstrom, PR p. 39 (Hagerstrom's italics). I have numbered the
passages for easy reference.
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which is expressed in judgements. For Hagerstrom it is an
important fact that "every consciousness refers to some¬
thing other than itself". Hence, there is a vital distinc¬
tion between 1 on the one hand and 2 and 3 on the other hand.
Hence, it follows that 1 is excluded from consideration,
since 1 refers to the mental or psychological act of the
judgement. This is in accordance with Hagerstrom's view.
It is "an incredible confusion of thought", he claims, "to
solve the problem of the objectivity of knowledge through
66)
a psychological investigation of human consciousness".
If this is a confusion of thought, then Hagerstrom is
himself guilty of that confusion. This emerges from his
criticism of "an inclination to regard the judgement as the
idea of the 'validity' of that which is comprehended in the
6 7)
judgement". Hagerstrom says that "especially at the pre¬
sent time" this inclination is prevalent. It must neverthe¬
less be resisted, he says, because "in all 'validity' one
presupposes the reality of a thinking being, for whom the
68)
content of the judgement is valid".
But, of course, the logician need not and does not deny
that. He is only insisting on the distinction between the
psychological act of thinking and the content of thought.
It is the latter, not the former, which it is the proper con¬
cern of the logician to consider. He would reject, as
'psychologism', all reference to the psychological processes
of the thinking being.
So Hagerstrom has involved himself in a manifest self-
contradiction. Hagerstrom mentions another attempt to de¬
fine the judgement as "the idea of the value of a certain
way of apprehending (an object)". But this attempt also
fails according to Hagerstrom, since this definition
"presupposes that one thinks of the value in question as
really present. It is likewise presupposed that one is
thinking of conscious beings for whom the value holds. And
one cannot maintain, without arguing in a circle, that the
reality of these beings signifies only that it is of value
66) Hagerstrom, PR p. 35.
67) Hagerstrom, PR p. 41.
68) Hagerstrom, PR p. 41. The following quotations are from p. 40.
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to conceive them".
What is wrong with this attempt, then, is that it takes the
individual, and what is of value for him, into account. But
this is irrelevant for a definition of judgement which has
nothing to do with the individual's apprehension, but is
only concerned with impersonal thought.
Leaving element 1 out of account, which Hagerstrom also
admonishes us to do, I turn to a consideration of elements
2 and 3.
Does Hagerstrom, by his thesis that "every judgement
is an apprehension of some state of affairs as real", think
of element 2 or element 3? If Hagerstrom thinks of element
2, then the nature of judgement is considered from an indi¬
vidual's point of view, that is to say his mental images.
This in turn implies that psychology is the basis for the
objectivity of knowledge. The only instrument in an investi¬
gation is introspection or self-observation of the mental
images which are present in man's consciousness. Following
this procedure of self-observation the claim is that it is
possible from man's consciousness or mental images to infer
the existence of external objects. This approach is tant¬
amount to subjectivism, i.e. "the view that consciousness
itself is the immediately given and that knowledge of ob¬
jects is mediated through this immediately given - that the
69)
object is merely an abstraction from the latter".
Since Hagerstrom is strongly opposed to subjectivism,
he must, if consistent, renounce the attempt to define the
judgement in terms of element 2. In fact he does insist on
the distinction between element 2 and element 3, that is
the distinction between the content of an apprehension and
the object of an apprehension. If element 2 (the content)
and element 3 (the object) are identified, then my mental
image of "the-horse-is-running" is identified with the ex¬
ternal object : the horse which is running. The effect of
this identification is that "the horse which I apprehend
is only an image, that is the apprehension in which it is
69) Hagerstrom, PR p. 51.
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70)
given to me belongs to it as a property". According to
Hagerstrom this is a contradiction, since
"the real horse, indeed, has the same properties as the
horse which I apprehend, while yet not being identical
with the real horse. However, the 'reality' of the horse
cannot be determined in any other way than by means of
the assertion that there is something, which is not the
same as that which is given in my apprehension."
Hagerstrom's argument is that my mental image is one
thing, the object of the image is another. What is present
to consciousness is for example a living object, the horse,
which is solid, figured and moveable. The horse, as an ob¬
ject, cannot possibly be a constituent of a mental appre¬
hension. Hagerstrom's claim is that the horse "can be imme¬
diately apprehended in its reality", and the horse "in its
reality" cannot be determined in any other way than by means
of the judgement in the sense of element 3, that is as a
thought reference. If anyone judges that the horse is run¬
ning, then the horse is actually running, for judgement in¬
volves thought, and thought requires an existing or real ob¬
ject. This is the reason why Hagerstrom rejects the attempts
to define the judgement as "an apperceptive combination of
71)
ideas (Vorstellungen)".
Hagerstrom's criticism of this view is that a combina¬
tion of ideas can only be "an occasion for a judgement to
arise, it cannot be the judgement itself". The "judgement
itself" does not, then, consist in the application of one
idea (the predicate, e.g. "... is running") to another idea
(the subject, e.g. "the horse"), since the judgement, in
sense of element 3, is a single determinate content "on the
basis of which we apprehend something as real", e.g. "the
horse-is-running" or "reality is such that the horse is
running".
70) Hagerstrom, PR p. 39. Hagerstrom uses the word "table", which I
have substituted with "horse", in order to refer to Hagerstrom's
example of judgement (A).
71) Hagerstrom, PR p. 40. Sandin translates "Vorstellungen" as "con¬
cepts" but I think that "idea" is better, and, in fact, Sandin
later also translates "Vorstellung" as "idea". - Also here the
following two quotations.
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If I have understood Hagerstrom's investigation of
the nature of the judgement, then Hagerstrom's claim is
that every judgement holds together a diversity, but there
is an underlying identity for this diversity, viz. reality.
72)
Thus, Hagerstrom, like Bradley, emphasizes that every
judgement holds together a diversity, e.g. the horse on
the one hand, and its movement on the other, but also that
every judgement is a species of identity - an equation -
as for example the judgement (B), "the sum of the angles
of a triangle is 180 degrees". The identity between the
terms, e.g. the horse and its movement, and the triangle
and the sum of its degrees, is not a relation between its
terms, since "the concept of relation is a metaphysical
73) '
concept". The identity between the terms consists in
the fact that in the judgements "one is conscious that, ...
the content of the conception (Vorstellung) appears not
only in the conception (Vorstellungsinhalt), but also in
74)the complex to which the conception (Vorstellung) belongs".
The complex to which the conception belongs is, for Hager¬
strom, reality or "the world of experience in space and
time", see below Section 6.
Hagerstrom's theory is hardly satisfactory, since he
still accepts that there are images in the mind, which some¬
how act as medium between the mind and the object. Why does
Hagerstrom think that it is necessary to have images in
order to judge? The answer is the result of his theory of
the intentionality of consciousness, requiring that the men¬
tal act of judging must be directed toward some object. So
'object' for Hagerstrom denotes a) image as a psychic ele¬
ment, and b) thing as a non-psychic element. It is by up¬
holding (a) and (b) and claiming the objectivity and inde¬
pendence of things about which we think and speak that Ha¬
gerstrom opposes the subjectivism of idealism and empiricism.
Does Hagerstrom succeed in his opposition? I think not.
If Hagerstrom says that there must be an image of the
72) Cf. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 159.
73) Hagerstrom, PR p. 45.
74) Hagerstrom, PR p. 42.
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animal present in his mind, and if he means, by this way
of speaking, that we must have a distinct concept in order
to judge, then there is no fault in his analysis. But it
seems to me that Hagerstrom is saying more than that. He
infers from this that there is really an image in the mind,
which is distinct from the operation of conceiving the ani¬
mal. This, however, is a mistake. It is, as Reid says, to
be misled by an analogical expression:"as if, from the
phrases of deliberating and balancing things in the mind,
we should infer that there is really a balance existing in
75)
the mind for weighing motives and arguments".
No doubt, Hagerstrom has been misled by his own analy¬
sis of the nature of judgement, according to which there
must always be an object to take into consideration. The
object, in judgement (D), is purely an operation of my ima¬
gination, and to speak of an image of the object is just
another way of saying that we have a distinct conception of
it. However, Hagerstrom does not stop here, but infers,
based upon his claim that thinking requires an existing ob¬
ject, that there must be an existing object, hence the need
for the image. The argument is valid, but not sound, since
the premise that thinking requires an existing object is
false.
What is worse for Hagerstrom is that in case of the
judgement (A), where I think that the horse is running, Ha¬
gerstrom implies that we cannot think of the horse as run¬
ning, unless we have in our apprehension an image of the
horse running as distinct from the external situation,
where the horse is actually running. This in turn implies
that there are two objects of my thinking that the horse
is running, one object which is immediately present in my
mind, viz. the image, and another object of the same thought,
viz. the external situation of the horse, which is running.
So every thought of external objects has a double object,
viz. the image and the object distinct from the image. By
contrast every thought or judgement of internal objects of
75) Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 421.
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the imagination has only one object, viz. the image. The
latter judgement is not, properly speaking, a judgement,
since there is no reference to an external object. Proper¬
ly speaking, for every real judgement there is an image pre¬
sent in the mind, and a reference to an independent object.
But Hagerstrom claims that we have direct and imme¬
diate access to objects, in the sense of external things
in space and time, e.g. judgement (A) and (B). But judge¬
ment (A) and judgement (B) are judgements belonging to dif¬
ferent categories. Judgement (A) is an empirical judgement, a
categorical judgement which asserts existence, and there¬
fore requires a reference to an existing horse. Judgement
(B) is a geometrical judgement of identity, which neither
asserts nor requires the existence of anything. Hagerstrom,
it might be objected, confounds the 'is' of predication and
the 'is' of identity.
That this is the case is confirmed by Hagerstrom's
treatment of the concept of number. If it be true that what¬
ever is objective must exist in space, then the concept of
number must be treated either as spatial, as a group of
marks on paper, or else as subjective ideas. It cannot be
the latter, hence the concept of number for Hagerstrom "sig-
76)
nifies a sensibly given difference" of objects in space.
Hagerstrom's analysis of judgements is an analysis in
terms of ideas. Hagerstrom's mistake is to reify the image,
making it a special mental entity inside the mind. This is
wrong, because this is to confuse psychology with epistemo-
logy. A man's claim to understand a certain word, or to have
a concept is to be established, not by an investigation of
his mind to see whether there are any images, but by finding
out how he uses the word or the concept. An "image in the
mind" then is equivalent to a concept. To judge that there
is a horse without using concepts is impossible, just as
to perceive a horse without having the concept of horse is
impossible. It does not follow, however, that we have some
image of a horse in our mind in order to judge or perceive,
76) Hagerstrom, PR p. 48. See for Frege's rejection of this view,
Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 148.
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as Hagerstrom thinks.
Hagerstrom's analysis of the nature of the judgement
is that if anyone judges that a thing exists, then it does
exist, for judgement involves thought, and thought requires
an existing object. In one interpretation this is a truism,
since in every kind of thought there must be some object,
i.e. a distinct concept, thought of. On another interpre¬
tation it is an untruth, since we may have a distinct con¬
ception of things, which never existed, e.g. the animal
which is half dog and half horse. Hagerstrom seems to be
committed to the view that an affirmative judgement about
a thing implies a presumption of its existence in the mind
as conception, and in the real world as object. But this
theory is false. Hagerstrom's theory of judgement, I con¬
clude, should be rejected.
6. Hagerstrom's Theory of Truth
According to Hagerstrom, we must investigate the nature of
judgements and the reality judged about. This inquiry is
separately linked. You cannot understand judgements without
taking the reality judged about into consideration, and you
cannot understand something, which is real, without taking
the judgement into consideration. Given that a judgement
must always have an object, no question of a judgment utter¬
ly failing to correspond to some reality can possibly arise.
This is Hagerstrom's argument. "Every judgement is an appre-
77)
hension of some state of affairs as real". And if we ask
whether the judgement is true, Hagerstrom's answer is that
"the truth of a judgement is the same as the determinate-
70)
ness of the content or its non-contradicrtariness". Or,
as Hagerstrom puts it, "the truth of the judgement is the
reality of the thing". This is Hagerstrom's theory of truth
79)
which claims that "in itself every judgement is true".
This is, of course, a very convenient theory. I have
argued above, Chapter III, Section 4, that Hagerstrom be-
77) Hagerstrom, PR p. 39.
78) Hagerstrom, PR p. 314; the next quotation is from p. 313.
79) Hagerstrom, PR p. 50.
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lieves with Hegel that all that is reasonable is real. This
means, in turn, that all that is reasonable must conform to
reality, and therefore must be true. Truth develops in the
same way as thinking or reason develops, and everything that
appeals to thinking in its latest stage of development must
also be true for that stage. In other words, since Hager¬
strom's thinking is the final stage of development, every¬
thing he thinks must be true. Thus, we have Hagerstrom's
theory that every judgement is true.
I wish, in this section, to examine Hagerstrom's theory.
Hagerstrom insists on a distinction between thinking and
the object thought about. I shall argue that Hagerstrom con¬
founds this distinction and ends up with the unity of think¬
ing and the object thought about.
Hagerstrom's theory is, of course, true, if by "judge¬
ment" is meant that there is a person who judges. To take
an example: my judgement is that the cat is on the mat. Of
course my judgement is true in the sense that I put forward
a judgement to the effect that there is a cat on the mat.
This is a truism. But this does not settle the question
whether my judgement, in the sense where it refers to the
cat on the mat, is true as well. This is to recognize the
distinction between judging as a mental operation and the
object judged about, which Hagerstrom also wishes to upholdr
In this respect Hagerstrom's theory that every judge¬
ment, in the sense of proposition put forward, is true may
mean that he holds that every proposition has a truth-value.
This is, of course, unobjectionable, but it still does not
settle the question whether my proposition about the cat on
the mat is true or false. It only says that my proposition
must be one or other.
This is not Hagerstrom's theory. When he holds that
every judgement is true, then this amounts to a denial of
the possibility of false judgements. Thus, my proposition
"the cat is on the mat" is either a true judgement or no
judgement at all. This implies that the word "true" is re¬
dundant, since every judgement is, by definition, a true
judgement. The word "false", as applied to judgements, is
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a misnomer, since, again, it is, by definition, logically
impossible for a judgement to be false. This is a remark¬
able doctrine, but it is a false doctrine, and this I shall
try to show by considering Hagerstrom's argument.
For Hagerstrom the act of judging is always directed
towards an object. The object is, in turn, described by Ha-
8 0)
gerstrom as "the reality of something". The phrase "the
reality of something" is, of course, the key-phrase. And it
turns out that Hagerstrom by this means "the object which
is the content of the judgement as an idea of the object
... is at the same time reckoned as belonging to the spa-
81)
tial complex". Hagerstrom uses the word "reckon" - in
German "rechnen" - which means "to perform a mathematical
calculation without suggesting the manner of calculation".
To reckon the reality of objects for Hagerstrom depends
also upon an immediate sense of reality accompanying every
act of cognizing an object. This sense of reality is desig¬
nated by Hagerstrom by such terms as "the feeling of cer¬
tainty", or "the logical feeling of evidence", or "the
world of experience in space and time", or "thought in the
82)
proper sense". For this sense of reality every judge¬
ment is directed towards what is and constitutes true judge¬
ments, since in such judgements "something determinate is
83)
always given as real". By contrast, a false judgement
is directed towards what is not. Only true judgements have
to do with reality. Never false judgements. That a judge¬
ment is false "has nothing at all to do with the question
84)of reality", Hagerstrom claims. This is a remarkable ar¬
gument, because it implies that a false judgement is never
a judgement. Hagerstrom's theory is a step backwards to
8 5)
Plato's dialogue Theaetetus.
Hagerstrom's argument is: to think what is false is
to think what is not; but that is to think nothing; and
80) Hagerstrom, PR p. 39.
81) Hagerstrom, PR p. 49.
82) Hagerstrom, PR p. 60, 55. 54.
83) Hagerstrom, PR p. 51.
84) Hagerstrom, PR p. 49.
85) Cf. F.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London 1935.
265
that, again, is not to think at all: therefore we can only
think the object that is, and all judgements must be true.
To explain anything is to demonstrate by judgements that
it cannot be other than it is. To demonstrate this is to
reveal the place of what is to be explained within "the
1 i ■ r; • „ 86 )universal continuum of experience .
The objection to this argument is that on this view
erroneous thinking will not be thinking at all. But clearly,
erroneous thinking is a species of thinking. So Hagerstrom's
argument must be rejected.
Hagerstrom tries to save his argument as follows. If
people utter false judgements they are, strictly speaking,
87)
uttering true judgements about "another real thing". 'Hager¬
strom's view is that if anyone is thinking, then there must
necessarily be an object of thought. True thinking is di¬
rected towards real objects, whereas erroneous thinking is
directed towards imaginary objects. The consequence is that
"for every individual, his world of experience, given in
every case, is the continuum. Even the world of dreams can
88)
serve as the continuum".
But there clearly is a difference between the world
of dreams and the world of reality. To revert to the example,
previously mentioned above p. 232, of Hagerstrom's discus¬
sion of the relation between his working-room and his gar¬
den, Hagerstrom asserts:
"The fact that the room as such is not connected with the
garden implies only that its reality does not face the
garden. And this is certainly true, for the reality of a
matter of fact cannot itself be limited."89)
The room is clearly a matter of fact, and I fail to see
that it cannot be limited. The garden, again, is a matter
of fact, and it is limited as well. And even Hagerstrom
does acknowledge that if a thing is material then it is
90)finite. Of course Hagerstrom may dream that his room as
86) Hagerstrom, PR p. 61, cf. INLM p. 267.
87) Hagerstrom, PR p. 49.
88) Hagerstrom, PR p. 56 (Hagerstrom's italics).
89) Hagerstrom, PR p. 47 (Hagerstrom's italics).
90) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 227.
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well as his garden cannot be limited. If we follow Hager¬
strom's theory of truth, his judgement: "my garden is un¬
limited" is true. Suppose that I wish to dispute Hager¬
strom's judgement. Then my judgement, to the effect that
it is not the case that Hagerstrom's garden is unlimited,
is also true. Hagerstrom's garden has a boundary, and faces
my garden. Confronted with these two opposing judgements
or propositions, call them AH and JB, we ask the philoso¬
pher Hagerstrom for advice. His reply is
"two judgements, one of which denies what the other af¬
firms, must have for their contents different worlds, which
do not cohere with each other".91)
This is false, since, to quote Reid
"every proposition that is necessarily true, stands opposed
to a contradictory proposition that is impossible; and he
that conceives one, conceives both".92)
If we are to contradict each other, we must at least
presuppose some kind of common system or reference as to
whether there is or is not a garden, and a limit to that
garden. We must refer to the same place within the same
system of space. Hagerstrom's position is then either that
contradiction is impossible, in which case his analysis of
truth ends in subjectivism, or that contradiction is after all
possible, in which case his analysis of judgements amounts
to objectivism.
According to Fries' commentary to Hagerstrom's "Selbst-
darstellung" "Hagerstrom holds that one can never contra-
93)diet oneself in the traditional sense". Hagerstrom must
then offer an explanation of his use of the word. He does
not, and neither does Fries. If this is Hagerstrom's con¬
sidered doctrine, then he ends in subjectivism.
Hagerstrom then contradicts himself, in any case if
"contradiction" is used in the normal sense. Hagerstrom
claims that subjectivism is not-true. It follows that ob-
91) Hagerstrom, PR p. 43.
92) Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 433.
93) Fries, in Hagerstrom, Filosofi och Vetenskap, p. 261. - Fries'
argument is that this is self-evident once "the idea of the sub¬
stantial reality of the logical subject is denied" as Hagerstrom
does.
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jectivism is true, in which case Hagerstrom's theory of
truth collapses. If we follow Fries' interpretation of Ha-
gerstrom, then Hagerstrom also claims that subjectivism is
true, since one can never contiadict oneself. "There is a
surreptitious logical mistake here" to quote Hagerstrom's
remark from another context.
Considering the judgements AH and JB Hagerstrom is
committed to taking "into consideration the reality judged
about". The question is whether
(I) the reality judged about in judgements JB and
AH refer to the ideas of the situation, in my
mind and HagerstrSm's mind respectively,
or whether
(II) JB and AH refer to what there is, independent¬
ly of our minds, viz. the existence of the gar¬
den and its limits.
If (I) is the case, then of course Hagerstrom is right that
we do not contradict each other, since I am talking about
my idea, and Hagerstrom is talking about his idea. The rea¬
lity in question is, however, "subjective reality", to use
94)
Hagerstrom's phrase, and "reality itself ... cannot be
95)determined as subjective", Hagerstrom declares. It fol¬
lows then that Hagerstrom must reject (I), since it for him
leads to the absurd conclusion that "knowledge has itself
96)for its object". In fact Hagerstrom's theory leads him
exactly to this position, which involves him in a manifest
self-contradiction.
But we must consider (II). The judgement JB and Hager-
strom's judgement AH cannot both be true, or both be false.
Either JB is true and AH is false, or AH is true and JB
false. How do we establish which of the two judgements JB
and AH is the true one? Hagerstrom is not very helpful in
this respect, since "in general it is meaningless to ask
whether the reality of the thing determined in a judgement
is itself real".
The reason why it is "meaningless" is, I think, that
94) Hagerstrom, PR p. 48.
95) Hagerstrom, PR p. 49.
96) Hagerstrom, PR p. 50. - Here also the following quotation.
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for Hagerstrom a judgement presupposes "the reality of some¬
thing". But, as I have argued, this is either a truism or
an untruth. If taken as a truism, the question remains to
be decided whether there is, in fact, a limit to Hagerstrom's
garden. If taken as an untruth, then the question whether
there is a garden or not is settled. As far as I am concerned
it is the case that there is a limit to the garden, as far
as Hagerstrom is concerned it is not the case that there is
a limit to the garden. But this settlement of the discus¬
sion amounts to the subjectivism, which Hagerstrom rejects.
The way out for Hagerstrom is to acknowledge that there is,
after all, the possibility of contradiction between the
judgements JB and AH, if these judgements are the elements
of a third judgement JA, and so on. The way out is then ob¬
jectivism, but it is bought at a high price. Only if one
has "discovered the only comprehensive and internally cohe¬
rent whole to which every possible determinate thing must
97)
belong", is it possible for a person to apprehend what
is real, as distinct from what is appearance. If one has
discovered this whole, then "it is clear that this is given
to consciousness immediately", and "one would have ... be¬
fore one a unified object". This "unified object is the
natural expression for a unified consciousness" expressing
98)itself in true judgements. If one has not this unified
consciousness "one would not apprehend anything at all".
This is the Hegelian theory that the truth is only realized
in the form of a single and all inclusive system, which
Hagerstrom calls "the world of experience in space and time".
Hagerstrom's assertion is that for this unified conscious¬
ness only it is the case that every judgement is true. That
is to say, Hagerstrom endorses the Hegelian view that "truth
9 9)is simply the unity of concept and existence".
However, this unity cannot be thought apart from con¬
scious beings. It follows that Hagerstrom thinks that there
are persons who are in possession of this unified conscious-
97) Hagerstrom, PR p. 53 (my italics) .
98) Hagerstrom, PR p. 65, cf. p. 53.
99) Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 280, p. 185.
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ness. Hagerstrom himself thinks he has this unified con¬
sciousness .
The dispute between me and Hagerstrom can then easily
be settled. And the result is as follows. My judgement JB
is expressed in the words: Hagerstrom's garden is limited.
According to the philosopher my judgement "is meaningless
with regard to given facts - the idea that to these words
100)
there corresponds a unified idea is subjective". Hence
it must be discarded in favour of the judgement AH, since
this is expressed in words with a unified idea behind. That
is to say, the unlimited character of the garden "of course,
is present in the idea of the garden and to that extent be¬
longs to the universal continuum of experience".
My objection to Hagerstrom is that according to the
universal continuum of experience, to use Hagerstrom's
phrase, the reverse is the truth. Hagerstrom's judgement
AH is simply false, and it follows then logically that my
judgement JB is true. When Hagerstrom upholds his theory
that every judgement is true, then he refers to persons,
not to objects. My objection is based upon the fact that
this is false, since contradictory judgements do not refer
to persons, but to objects. Hagerstrom has confused himself
by his own theory, since it is obviously the case that the
judgement AH and JB are incompatible, and whatever Hager¬
strom may choose to ordain, his judgement AH is, and re¬
mains, false.
7. The Scientific World-Picture
For Hagerstrom there is a contrast to be drawn between "the
universal continuum of experience" or the "scientific world-
picture" on the one hand and the particular continuum of
experience or the "unscientific world-picture" of indivi¬
duals on the other hand. This is the difference between
reality and appearance, between fact and fancy, between
truth and falsity. In upholding this contrast Hagerstrom
resorts to the idealist doctrine of degrees of truth. Let
100) Hagerstrom, PR p. 61 for the quotations - I have replaced "gar¬
den" by "gold".
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Hagerstrom speak for himself to make this obvious:
"That the scientific world-picture is the true one, in com¬
parison with the unscientific, implies only that the former
construes the latter, with regard to new contents of con¬
sciousness, as merely a member of a more comprehensive con¬
tinuum. By no means is the latter thereby made void. Only
the metaphysical 'world-view' must be determined as void,
on account of the complex of feelings and representations
which lies at its foundation. For in this view, under the
influence of this complex, one constructs meaningless com-
Ultimately reality for Hagerstrom is a system of judge¬
ments, and Hagerstrom identifies true judgements and reali-
terms of the coherence of judgements with one another to
form a single and harmonious system. There are therefore
degrees of reality and degrees of truth with a system of
judgements cohering by internal relations, and the truth
of a judgement reflects its place in the system. Thus, I
claim that Hagerstrom contradicts himself, when he asserts
that "reality itself has no degrees" .
For Hagerstrom the concept of reality is a logical re¬
quirement for knowing the truth. He asks the question what
is required for a person to have knowledge. The answer is that the
concept of reality is a necessary requirement. Thus, a per¬
son having knowledge must relate his judgement to reality.
If the concept of reality is logically necessary for a per¬
son's knowledge, then Hagerstrom's thesis is that if there
is knowledge, then there is reality. This is equivalent to
the thesis that if there is no reality, then there is no
knowledge. Knowledge is expressed in true judgements.
What is then the criterion of the truth of a judge¬
ment? How can we distinguish between truth and error?
Hagerstrom's answer is that a person's judgement, e.g.
"there is a cat on the mat" (p), is true if it describes
an actual state-of-affairs, i.e. that there is a cat on
101) Hagerstrom, PR p. 56.
102) Hagerstrom, PR p. 313 f., cf. the Hegelian view that to be real
and to be thought of are the same thing, cf. above p. 105 and
p. 133, below p. 364.
103) Hagerstrom, PR p. 53.
that the words have a
ty.
102)
It is my thesis that Hagerstrom defines truth in
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the mat. - To claim that (p) is true is for Hagerstrom not
merely to say that (p) corresponds to, or is a picture of,
some external object or event, but also to state (p's) re¬
lation to other judgements in a logically coherent system
of judgements which represents the true order of causal re¬
lations in nature. When a person's judgement is rejected
as false, this implies that his judgement does not fit into
the system of order or does not cohere with other judgements
in relation to a more comprehensive system of judgements
which more adequately represents the order of objects. Ha¬
gerstrom identifies true judgements and reality. ^ This
is equivalent to identifying knowledge and reality.
Thus, Hagerstrom rejects the view that a judgement is
true when it corresponds to reality. This view is known as
the correspondence theory of truth, which states that there
is a contrast between the judgement (p): there is a cat on
the mat on the one hand, and the reality of there being a
cat on the mat (r), which (p) affirms or denies, on the
other hand.
Hagerstrom rejects this theory, because it is impos¬
sible to compare (p) and (r). There cannot be any resemblance
between (p) and (r). As Hagerstrom writes that he rejects
the view "that reality means something different from what
is apprehended, with which the apprehension may be compared"?"^
What, then, if not (p's) correspondence to reality, is the
distinguishing characteristic of a true judgement according
to Hagerstrom?
The standpoint he adopts is the coherence theory of
truth, although he does not use this label. By his accep¬
tance of this theory Hagerstrom is a follower of the ratio¬
nalist tradition. According to the coherence theory of truth,
a judgement is true if it coheres with other judgements with¬
in a system of other judgements constituting "a logical uni¬
ty ".106) ^ use Hagerstrom's own words "Every possible
104) Compare in this respect the view once held by G.E. Moore to the
same effect, Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 203 f.
105) Hagerstrom, PR p. 50.
106) Hagerstrom, PR p. 45, and p. 53 f.
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determinate thing must belong to a comprehensive whole, be¬
sides which none other can be discovered". This comprehen¬
sive whole is what Hagerstrom calls the world of experience
in space and time.
Thus, if asked to test whether the judgement (p) that
there is a cat on the mat is a true judgement, Hagerstrom's
reply is not "you look and see, and if what you see corre¬
sponds to your judgement, then your judgement is true".
This reply presupposes, Hagerstrom claims, "that something
determinate is ... given as real". This claim, in turn, pre¬
supposes another judgement or set of judgements determining
the truth of the original judgement that the cat is on the
mat.^^ What provides the verification of the judgement (p)
is the coherence between this judgement and other judgements
as "common members of that coherent unity to which the judge¬
ments themselves belong" . ^
According to Hagerstrom, then, to say that a judgement
is true is to say that it is a member of a system, whose
elements are related to each other by ties of logical impli¬
cation. And to test whether a judgement is true is to test
it for coherence within a system of judgements by applying
the principle of non-contradiction.
Every person, Hagerstrom says, has his own "world of
experience" and relates his judgement to his own system of
judgements based upon sense-experience and memory. Even the
child, as soon as it learns to think and to use a systema¬
tic language, is conscious of itself as living in a world
in which it distinguishes itself from what is external to
it."^^ But knowledge, as Hagerstrom sees it, following
Kant and Hegel, is architectonic. It involves having a more
or less coherent picture of the world. The child moves from
a narrow picture of the world to a more comprehensive view
of the world. The child must use a system of concepts in
order to organize its sensations into a coherent experience
of a coherent world. But children, and this applies for
107) Hagerstrom, PR p. 51.
108) Hagerstrom, PR p. 43.
109) Cf. Hagerstrom, RE p. 14.
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many adults as well, do not and need not reflect upon the
concepts they use. Many persons use concepts without analy¬
zing them and this may be the occasion for their failure
to see the world as a coherent and intelligible world.
Error is a matter of having relatively incomplete knowledge.
The individuals do not have complete and coherent knowledge
of the world and their illusions and errors must be replaced
by scientific knowledge, where judgements are placed "in a
larger context, which involves a transition to a larger,
not a lesser, domain of content"."'"''"^ our common-sense know¬
ledge, which is inadequate and confused must be absorbed
and replaced by a larger system of scientific knowledge,
which reveals more of the causal chains in nature and socie¬
ty, cf. the quotation above p. 270. In scientific knowledge
our sentences are meaningful and express judgements. These
judgements, in turn, become more and more logically coherent,
and so we can be said to understand more and more fully the
true order of causes in nature and society. The system,
then, in which all true judgements must cohere is for Hager-
strom the system of scientific knowledge, which constitutes
the single all-inclusive system of logically coherent judge¬
ments. In the end, the highest level of knowledge is for
Hagerstrom "the intuitively given reality of the object,
which transforms apprehension into cognition". This cogni¬
tion yields a unified science, in which "reality as self-
identity is the very validity of all knowledge and in sense
the immediately given".^
Hagerstrom's plea for a unified science has nothing
to do with the similar claim of the logical positivists.
They advocate the principle of the unification of sciences
based upon sensations. For the logical positivist the world
is constituted by sensations. Hagerstrom's plea is based
upon the view that the same method must be applied in all
sciences, this is the method of studying causes as necessa¬
ry relations between events. For Hagerstrom the world is
110) Hagerstrom, PR p. 52.
111) Hagerstrom, PR p. 51. Also here the next quotation.
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constituted by necessary causes.
Hagerstrom's theory of truth and the dependent theory
of the world as a coherent order are put forward to show
man's place in the world as a thinking being. Hagerstrom's
argument is that this must be understood, and once under¬
stood, there is the possibility of man's complete happiness
and escape from error and superstition.
In this respect Hagerstrom's philosophy is linked si¬
multaneously to two divergent tendencies, the tendency of
extreme rationalism which asserts that we do not need to be
taught what genuine knowledge is, because we all necessari¬
ly possess some standard of truth, and the tendency of ex¬
treme empiricism, which asserts that we do need to be taught
what genuine knowledge is. For the rationalist, the truth is
already within us, but we fail to realize this by the in¬
fluence of passions. For the empiricist, we are strangers to
truth, which must be brought from outside, cf. above Chap¬
ter III, p. 142.
For the rationalist, one may learn science from this
or that teacher, but the question of the truth of a judge¬
ment is independent of the question from whom we learned
it. For the empiricist, the situation is not so. Since the
truth must be brought from outside, it will follow that
the moment at which we learn the truth and the teacher from
whom we learn it will not stand in a merely accidental re¬
lationship to us. Hagerstrom on the one hand claims that
the truth is within us. On the other hand he also thinks
that it is his mission to bring the truth to us from the
outside. He must transform human beings who do not know the
truth into beings who are acquainted with it. It is impos¬
sible to conceive of any greater task. It is the task of
subordinating the individual to the authority of reason.
For the rationalist, in contrast to the empiricist,
knowledge and its object are essentially one. On the one
hand Hagerstrom insists on the distinction between the know¬
ing mind and the object known, but on the other hand the
knowing mind and the object known are, at least for an ab¬
solute unified consciousness, inseparable aspects of a
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single unified experience, or "thought in the proper sense".
For this "unified consciousness" the truth of a judgement
put forward is determined by its coherence with other judge¬
ments to form a comprehensive whole besides which none
other can be discovered.
But notice that Hagerstrom's claim rests upon the am¬
biguous judgement (p) "If one has made a discovery (q),
then it is clear that this is given to consciousness imme¬
diately". Call the antecedent (p), and the consequent (q).
Then Hagerstrom's claim is: if (p), it must be the case
(necessarily) (q). But Hagerstrom's claim is ambiguous be¬
tween: a) necessarily (if (p) then (q) ), and b) if (p) , then
(necessarily) (q). Of course (a) is a truism: necessarily
if anyone makes a discovery then this discovery is given
immediately to one's consciousness. Thus (a) is true. But
it is far from true that if anyone claims to have made a
discovery then it is necessarily the case that one actual¬
ly has made a discovery. Thus (b) is an untruth.
Again, Hagerstrom claims that on the basis of "the uni¬
versal continuum of experience in space and time", what we
judge must be true. This formula is ambiguous, since it
is either a truism: necessarily if Hagerstrom judges that
something is the case, then Hagerstrom judges that some¬
thing is the case; or false: if Hagerstrom judges that some¬
thing is the case, then necessarily something is the case.
For Hagerstrom, what we know must be true, which again
is either a truism or false. The truism is: necessarily if
anyone knows something, then it is true. The false position
is if anyone knows anything, then it is a necessary truth.
Hagerstrom's doctrine is based upon the assumption
that knowing is equivalent to being in an infallible state
of mind. The ground for this assumption is that if one
knows something to be true, then one cannot be mistaken.
For Hagerstrom, for an object to be known the object must
be such that no one could be mistaken about it, or such
that the facts could not have been otherwise. It follows
that for Hagerstrom all truths are necessary truths.
The objection is that this is not the case. Hagerstrom
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ignores that there are also contingent truths expressed in
empirical judgements. But for Hagerstrom all judgements are,
properly speaking, analytical judgements. This is Hager-
strom's scientific world-picture, which is based upon the
112)
thesis of internal relations. This thesis holds that
nothing but the world as a whole is independent of every¬
thing else and everything in the world is in its real na¬
ture. For, Hagerstrom holds, we do not fully know anything
until we know all of its relations to other things. As
against the view, which is held by ordinary people, that
things, to be identified and classified by the set of their
defining characteristics as opposed to their accidental
characteristics, stand in various external and contingent
relations which are not part of the definition of things,
Hagerstrom holds that the true definition of a thing con¬
tains all its qualities and relations. Hence there can be
no distinction between a thing's defining characteristics
and its accidental characteristics. To understand anything
properly we must know everything about it; in effect every¬
thing whatever. It follows that it is necessary to have
true knowledge to know the true definitions of things. We
have only to use a phrase from Hobbes, "to examine the de¬
finitions of former authors" and correct and replace their
113)
definitions with the correct definitions. This is also
Hagerstrom's approach. His approach makes, in effect, any
empirical inquiry into objects in the world impossible.
Hagerstrom's scientific world-picture is based upon
thinking, but his view leaves no room for observations of
what actually happens, or for predictions of future events.
Hagerstrom's scientific world-picture aspires to present
the case for the pursuit of genuine scientific knowledge,
but it is rather a case for the determination of scienti¬
fic knowledge.
Hence I hope I have vindicated my claim, made above
p. 229, that not only feeling but also thinking can lead
112) Cf. for a survey, C.A. Ewing, Idealism, Ch. IV.
113) Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, Ch. IV, p. 105.
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us astray. Hagerstrom's scientific world-view implies an
omniscient and infallible being, and this given, it follows
that any judgement he makes is true. The final objection to
this view is that Hagerstrom is a man, and all men are fal¬
lible. Given this, nothing follows about the truth or fal¬
sity of any particular judgement Hagerstrom makes. His judge¬
ments must be examined and accepted, not in the light of
their origin but rather in the light of the reasons avail¬
able for or against his judgements.
8. Hagerstrom and Parmenides
For Hagerstrom it is vital to follow the right path of know¬
ledge, and it is just as vital to abandon the wrong paths
of ignorance and superstition. And the right path is the
straight way of truth, not the crooked way of falsity.
Hagerstrom is at the crossroad, and so, he claims, are
the rest of us. Hagerstrom has also discovered the right
path, and this is expressed in his philosophy as a sign¬
post leading us toward the end of a rational understanding
of the world. The right path is the logical way, i.e. Hager¬
strom's thesis: "the completely logical character of sen-
.. ... „ 114)sible reality .
Ordinary people and their ways of seeing the world do
not amount to genuine knowledge, because their opinions
are based upon unsatisfactory or unknown causes, and these
opinions lead them to pursue the wrong ways. By contrast
Hagerstrom's philosophy and way of seeing the world is ba¬
sed upon satisfactory and known causes. Hence his thesis.
Hagerstrom's thesis recalls the ancient idea of Par¬
menides that there is a harmony between thought and action,
115)
knowledge and reality, or so I shall claim in this section.
Of course, there is a difference between the writings
of Parmenides and Hagerstrom, Parmenides writes in epic
verse, Hagerstrom writes in philosophical prose. The common
114) Hagerstrom, PR p. 37.
115) For Parmenides I am very much indebted to Jonathan Barnes, The
Presocratic Philosophers, London 1979, vol. 1, Ch. IX. I re¬
fer once and for all to this chapterf I have borrowed from Barnes
the appropriate archaic phrases he uses in his rendering of Parme-
ninedes' ideas.
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element in their writings is, however, an aim to write the truth,
not malicious fables. Neither Parmenides nor Hagerstrom
tolerates any semblance of contradiction, they both want to
establish everything in a perfect and rational manner. And both
claim an authority for their teaching and writing the truth.
The truth for Parmenides is expressed by appealing to the
most self-evident principles:
(1) what is, is,
(2) there is no Not-Being.
His thesis is "what can be spoken and thought of must be".
Parmenides, too, is at the crossroads faced with three ways
of inquiry about objects: the way of opinion (WO), the way
of ignorance (WI), and the way of truth (WT).
There is the way of opinion (WO), along which mortals
wander, concerned with both that it is and that it is not.
(WO) is paved with falsity and consequently this cannot be
the right way.
Next, there is the way of ignorance (WI) . (WI) is paved
with no news, since it is concerned with both that it is
not and it is necessary for it not to be. This is a way of
track beyond all tidings, and hence cannot be the path to
follow either.
Finally, there is the way of truth (WT). (WT) is con¬
cerned with both that it is, and that it is not for not
being.
These three ways are exhaustive, and since the first
and the second way are ruled out, there remains only the
third way. This way presents the secure path of scientific
research: The correct way of inquiry about any given object
is to assume that the object, whatever it may be, exists.
(WT) states the thesis, mentioned above, i.e. whatever we
inquire into exists, and it cannot not exist. The question
is, whether this thesis is true; I shall revert to this
shortly.
What I wish to do first is to point out that Hagerstrom
makes a quite similar classification of roads of inquiry,
i.e. the way of ordinary consciousness (WO), the way of
spiritual consciousness (WI), and the way of scientific
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consciousness (WT). The ways of (WO) and (WI) are "the two
roots of metaphysics". Hence (WO) and (WI) are "incorrect
points of departure" leading to "a confusion in human
thought" . )
The way of ordinary consciousness (WO) is the way of
epistemological realism. It is based upon sensation and gi¬
ves only incomplete or partial knowledge. Its starting
point is reality, its end is to determine reality itself
as a definite real thing. As one proceeds on this way there
is "a confusion in human thought", so one ends in "reality-
117)
metaphysics", or "scolasticism". If an object is stu¬
died, then the object must exist. For (WO), however, the
118)
object is there, and it is not there. There are ideas
in our minds, but we cannot transcend the veil of our own
ideas, and thus we end in "the completely unintelligible,
the "thing in itself", which nevertheless is regarded, in¬
consistently, as accessible to the apprehension". So this
way is only the way of opinions, not the way of knowledge.
Next, there is the way of spiritual consciousness (WI).
This is the way of epistemological idealism. It is based
upon feeling and gives no knowledge at all. Its starting
point is the self, its end is that reality itself is not
determinable. And proceeding on this way one inevitably
ends in "I-metaphysics", or "mysticism". If an object is
studied, then the object must exist. For (WI), however,
the object does not exist at all, only the ideas in my mind
exist. Hence, the real world becomes an appearance. This
is, indeed, the way of track beyond all tidings. This way
gives no knowledge.
We must turn away from (WO) and (WI) as bogus ways of
achieving knowledge. (WO) is wrong, because reality itself
cannot be a specific reality nor become an object for thought.
(WI) is wrong, because self-consciousness cannot be a spe¬
cific reality nor become an object for thought. It follows
for Hagerstrom that we must enter upon the secure path of
116) Hagerstrom, PR p. 60, p. 216, and p. 211.
117) Hagerstrom, PR p. 211, p. 175, and p. 180.
118) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 38 f.
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truth (WT). This is the way of scientific consciousness,
where the object for thought is a definite real thing. (WT)
is based upon thinking. Its starting point is the relation¬
ship between the knowing self and the reality known. Its
end is to replace ignorance and partial knowledge by com¬
plete knowledge of what there is. If an object is studied,
then the object must exist. As one follows (WT) one's mode
of thought is concerned with what exists which must be de¬
terminable and describable by means of fixed concepts, ad¬
vancing to genuine knowledge. This is the course of scien¬
tific research, where one holds that whatever we inquire
into exists, and it cannot not exist.
This is Parmenides' way of truth. It is also Hager-
strom's way of truth. His thesis is that (WT) has a destruc¬
tive side as well as a constructive side. The destructive
side is the rejection of (WO) and (WI). (WI) makes the ob¬
ject to depend upon the knowing mind. (WO) makes the object
to be known inaccessible to the knowing mind. The construc¬
tive side is to claim
1) the independence of object, i.e. the object
is given and is independent of the knowing
mind,
2) the immediacy of object, i.e. the object is
given and is accessible to the knowing mind.
We must, Hagerstrom claims, begin with the fundamental law
of thinking, the law of contradiction, which declares what
reality is. Hagerstrom's thesis is the Parmenidian thesis:
"What can be spoken and thought of must exist".
In order to substantiate my thesis that there is a
close similarity between Hagerstrom's and Parmenides' way
of thinking, I shall follow Barnes and his exposition of
Parmenides' argument, and I shall add my references to Ha¬
gerstrom in brackets in the text. In this way it is also
possible to test whether the thesis mentioned actually is
true.
Suppose there is a student (S), who wants to study an
object (O), say the student wants to study law. If he fol¬
lows the way recommended by Parmenides and Hagerstrom, then
(S) assumes that (0), i.e. the law, exists (INLM p. 16, 43,
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50, 281). The student proceeds as follows.
1. If (0) does not exist, then no one can recognize
(0), and no one can mention (O) (PR p. 42, 181,
211).
From this we infer
2. If law does not exist, then (S) cannot recognize
law, and (S) cannot mention law.
Why should the student accept 1? He should and must, be¬
cause whatever can be thought of can exist, and vice versa,
i.e.
3. (0) can be thought of if and only if (0) can
exist (PR p. 40, 53 f.).
This gives
4. If (S) can think of law, then law can exist.
This, however, does not offer any help. As Hagerstrom writes,
"if all content of consciousness, as something determinate,
is real, then the dividing line between that which is mere¬
ly thinkable and that which is real is obliterated, which
appears to be meaningless" (PR p. 53, cf. p. 48). Hence we
need
5. If (0) can be mentioned or (0) can be thought of,
then (0) exists (PR p. 40, 55) .
This gives
6. If (S) can mention law or can think of law, then
law exists.
7. If (O) can be recognized, (0) can be thought of
(PR p. 39, 42).
From 7, we infer
8. If (S) can recognize law, then (S) can think of
law.
There is now an argument for 2: If law does not exist, then
(S) cannot recognize law, since 2 is entailed by 6 and 8.
We still have the premise 3, which so far has not done any
work in the argument, and besides 5 is unsupported, so we
need
9. If (0) can be mentioned or (0) can be thought of,
then (0) can exist (PR p. 42, 53).
Hence it follows
10. If (S) can mention law, then law can exist.
But then we have the Parmenidean principle "nothing is not",
that is "no thing is not for being", which amounts to that
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nothing cannot exist. This principle is also adhered to by
Hagerstrom, cf. above Section 4. Hence we have
11. If (0) does not exist, (0) cannot exist (PR
p. 42, 55).
Hence
12. If law does not exist, law cannot exist.
Now we can use 3: "(0) can be thought of, if and only if
(0) can exist", since the premises 4 and 10 and 12 together
entail 6: "If (S) can mention law or think of law, then law
exists".
Suppose the student is advised to follow the way of
ignorance (WI). (WI) says of an object inquired into that
it is necessary for it not to be, if we follow Parmenides'
way of thinking, and also Hagerstrom's way of thinking,
since for him (WI) lacks any "concrete foundation" and
"yields only negations, it declares what is not ... which
do not have any truth in the proper sense" (PR p. 192).
The student is then in this predicament.
13. If (S) studies law, then law does not exist.
Evidently, a student must be able to say what he is study¬
ing, or at least he must be able to recognize the object,
i.e. law, of his inquiry. That is to say
14. If (0) is studied, then (0) can be mentioned
or (0) can be recognized (PR p. 62).
Hence
15. If (S) studies law, then (S) can mention law,
or (S) can recognize law.
But notice that if (S) studies law, then he can infer -
from the premises 6, 15, and 13 - that law exists, and law
does not exist. But this is impossible. If (S) is a student
of law, then law does not exist. This is absurd, and no one
can proceed along (WI). - As Hagerstrom's writes "it should
always be observed that he who remains within a self-con¬
tradiction only combines words without meaning, although
he expects there will be a meaning there" (PR p. 262) .
If the student (S) is determined to study law, the pre¬
mise 13 is false, so no student can proceed on the way of
(WI). If a student, say Felix Somlo, nevertheless does pro¬
ceed on this way, he may produce a book "Juristische Grund-
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119)
lagen". What is one to judge about such a book? He
follows the track beyond all tidings, according to Parme-
nides. And Hagerstrom concurs "the whole book is a collec¬
tion of absurdities".
Rather than advising the student to follow (WI), the
student may be advised to pursue his study of law along
the way of opinion (WO). The student is then committed to
the view that at least some objects of inquiry do exist,
and some objects of inquiry do not, or may not exist. Sup¬
pose that law is an object of inquiry that does not, or may
not exist. Hence we have
16. Since (0) does not exist, it will never be shown
that (0) does exist.
This yields for a student of law
17. Since law does not exist, it will never be shown
that law does exist.
The argument of the way of ignorance shows, abbreviated,
18. If (0) is an object of inquiry, then it does not
exist.
Or for a student of law
19. If law is an object of inquiry, then law does not
exist.
Thus, (WO) leads to a contradiction, since it is based upon
the assumption that law, as an object of inquiry, does not
exist. Again we end up with a contradiction, and it follows
that (WO) must be abandoned. To illustrate again, this is
Hagerstrom's judgement concerning the theory of Kelsen. His
theory is, Hagerstrom says "very well worthy of attention.
In particular it cannot but be useful to jurists, who wish
to attain to real clearness about their own presuppositions
to study thoroughly the Allgemeine Staatslehre, which ex¬
pounds the system of ideas in a concentrated yet clear treat¬
ment with a wealth of material as basis".
Nevertheless, Kelsen's theory is false, according to Ha¬
gerstrom, since it is permeated with "medieval scholasticism",
that is Kelsen is concerned with "the fictive idea (of the
119) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 261.
120) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 297, the reference is to Kelsen, Allgemeine
Staatslehre, Berlin 1923.
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ought", which is "no real idea at all" but "what is present
(in Kelsen's mind) is just this wavering between the two
121)alternatives". Medieval scholasticism is the way of
opinion with "this wavering between the characteristics of
space and time, on the one hand, and the characteristics
of being lifted up above space and time on the other". In
the study of an object as law it is the wavering between
law as fact or positive law and law as fiction or natural
law. The way out is to abandon (WI) and (WO) and proceed
along the way of truth (WT). This is to be committed to the
view that all objects of inquiry do exist.
The way of truth is based upon premise 11, mentioned
above, viz. 11. If (0) does not exist, (0) cannot exist.
This is Hagerstrom's starting point as well, viz. what does
not exist, cannot exist (PR p. 58).
Barnes' criticism of Parmenides is that this premise
11 is an untruism, viz. an ambigous sentence, expressing
on one interpretation, a trivial truth, viz.:
11T) It is not possible that what does not exist,
exists.
This is a truism, since necessarily if an object does not
exist, the object does not exist. But 11T does not yield 11.
On another interpretation, the sentence expresses a
substantial falsity, viz.:
11F) If an object does not exist, then it is not
possible for it to exist.
This is a false proposition, since if an object does not
exist, then it does not follow that it necessarily does not
exist.
Hence the premise 11 must be based upon 11F, not on
11T. But since 11F is false, there is no need to accept 11.
Many objects might, but do not, exist, and hence the Parme-
nidean attack on the other ways fails. Parmenides' thought
wavers between 11 based on 11T and 11 based on 11F. And so
does Hagerstrom's thought. The consequence is that scienti-
tific research is restricted to objects which "really exist"
and their natural properties, as opposed to fictional ob-
121) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 298 for the phrase "medieval scholasti¬
cism" and PR p. 215 for the description (my brackets).
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jects which only exist in the imagination.
The objection is that we can think of non-entities,
say centaurs, and if this is the case it follows that we
can identify and refer to a centaur, although it is obvious
that the centaur does not exist in the sense that the crea¬
ture can be touched or seen in a Zoo.
Parmenides' way of truth is committed to rule out any
scientific research into non-entities, like centaurs. Hager¬
strom shares this commitment. For Parmenides a mythologist
studies centaurs, not horses. If the mythologist is "a tough-
minded Parmenidean" says Barnes, he "may argue that mytholo-
gists are really investigating not the nature of non-exist-
122)
ing beasts but the beliefs of once-existing men". Just
as it is the case that historians study Shakespeare not Ham¬
let, they inquire into the intentions of Shakespeare, and
not the character of his fictions. This.is, as Barnes says,
unconvincing, since why may we not inquire into the charac¬
ter of Hamlet rather than of Shakespeare?
For Hagerstrom, a jurist studies law, and if the jurist
is a tough-minded Hagerstromian, what he studies is not the
nature of law in the sense of obligatory rules "which lacks
all basis in reality" but really the nature of law as "the
actual conception of law" as "a merely social-psychological
fact".123 ^
Based upon 5: If law can be mentioned and thought of,
then law exists. Hagerstrom infers that law can only be
mentioned and thought of as a social-psychological fact.
This is Hagerstrom's way of truth, but it is not convincing.
It is also possible to think of law as obligatory rules.
But if we do so, then Hagerstrom invites us to believe that
law, in this sense, does not exist. The consequence is that
we think of what does not exist. We are, in Berkeley's
124)
phrase, "all the while only contemplating our own ideas".
For Hagerstrom, this raises the question of the real




Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 172.
Hagerstrom, INLM p. 287.
Berkeley, Rationale of the Principles § 23, Selections p. 49.
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it raises the question whether there is any possibility of
moral and legal knowledge. This is to be discussed in the
chapters to follow. To conclude this chapter, and to anti¬
cipate what follows, Hagerstrom's way of truth implies that
discourse concerning moral and legal obligation to obey the
law is fatuous. This is, I submit, a failure, since we can
and do think of things that do not exist and study those
things. The only reason for rejecting such studies offered
by Hagerstrom is his argument of the way of truth that
scientific inquiry is restricted to the essence of things
which really exist in the world of space and time. In this
respect he is a follower of Parmenides. Following Jonathan
Barnes I have tried to show that Parmenides' way of truth
is based upon an untruism. So is Hagerstrom's way of truth.
Thus not only feelings and volitions, but also thinking may
lead us astray. It has put Hagerstrom on a false scent.
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Chapter V
Axel Hagerstrom's Inquiry into the Nature of Morality
"There are no moral phenomena at all,
only a moral interpretation of phenomena"
Friedrich Nietzsche*
1. Introduction
Hagerstrom's personal problem is to understand the world,
in which he lives, and thus himself as part of this world.
Hagerstrom solves his personal problem by relying on think¬
ing or reason as the essence of consciousness. According
to Hagerstrom the distinctive characteristic of human be¬
ings is consciousness. Consciousness is, in turn, divided in¬
to the faculties of thinking, feeling, and volition. Man's
essence is reason, which for Hagerstrom comprises thinking
and experience, which is always related to an object. This,
then, constitutes the rational part of man in contrast with
the irrational part of feeling and volition, which are not
related to any objects except the particular individual it¬
self. It is precisely because of the influence of the irra¬
tional part on the rational part that individuals are liable
to errors and confusions concerning their place in the world.
What we can achieve by means of reason is to realize that
the world must necessarily be a single all-inclusive system.
Since all events and things are"equally ruled by causal laws,
miracles cannot occur. Man is part of nature, but man may
also be put in contrast with nature. To oppose man and na¬
ture may support an unwarranted and distorting anthropocen-
tricity. It is to see nature in terms of feelings and voli¬
tions, and means and ends as products of feelings and voli¬
tions, which is absurd.
Man is part of nature, and there is only one nature.
* Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (transl. and introd. by
R.J. Hollingdale), Penguin Books, 1973, p. 78.
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It is folly to contrast the natural world, man included,
with the supernatural. This is again to see nature in terms
of the will or feelings of a supernatural being, e.g. God.
This view is rooted in man's feeling and volition. For Ha¬
gerstrom it must be possible to restore the human soul to
soundness and thus recognize its historically created place
in the natural and social world. For Hagerstrom the empha¬
sis is not the Christian emphasis on the soul being saved
from sin, but the philosophical emphasis on the soul being
saved from thinking affected by feeling and volition, which
leads to fanaticism and superstition. Thus, Hagerstrom's
lesson is that cognitive thinking must be kept apart from
emotional thinking."^
For Hagerstrom the lesson of cognitive thinking is
that there is but one kingdom of which man is a member, viz.
the Earthly Kingdom of nature and society, where man can
deploy his reason properly by seeing things and events as
they are, and govern his relationship with others in accord¬
ance with reason. By contrast the Christian lesson is that
man is depicted as being a member of the Earthly as well as
the Heavenly Kingdom. The appeal is in the end to feeling
or faith, making the Earthly Kindgom an appearance, and the
Heavenly Kingdom the true reality.
Thus, Hagerstrom is a rationalist in the sense that he
opposes reason to faith. He denies the role of feeling and
relies solely on reason in achieving knowledge. Hagerstrom
is also, I submit, a rationalist in the sense that he iden¬
tifies reason with experience. To be sure, concepts are de¬
rived from sensations, but one must know the essence of a
concept in order to determine whether it is a genuine con¬
cept to be used in scientific inquiries, or a pseudo-con-
1) Perhaps Hagerstrom is influenced by H. Maier, Psychologie des emo-
tionalen Denkens, Tubingen 1908. In this book Maier maintains a
distinction between "kognitives Denken" and "emotionales Denken".
The former is related to cognition or thinking, the latter is re¬
lated to conation or willing, and to affection or feeling. The
area for conation is morality and law; the area for affection is
aesthetics and religion. - Hagerstrom had read Maier, cf. "Kriti-
ska Punkter i Vardepsvkologien" and INLM p. 119.
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cept which has to be abandoned. According to Hagerstrom's
theory of knowledge we apprehend, in our scientific or uni¬
fied consciousness, "laws of what occurs or sequences of
2)
concepts which determine what occurs". What occurs is
things and events which are spatially and temporally ordered
and standing in determinate causal relations both with one
another and with ourselves as thinking beings. "Knowledge
is", as Hagerstrom says, "only a non-contradictory apprehen¬
sion of something as real or as determinate".
For Hagerstrom reason uses the method of reflection in
achieving knowledge. The method of reflection or thinking
is in the same case as its correlate in the world of nature
or reality. To be certain that our starting point concerning
knowledge of the world of nature is really the true starting
point Hagerstrom relies on the law of contradiction. This
law is presupposed in all meaningful thinking, since it is
this law which makes proof possible. Since this is the case,
the law of contradiction cannot be proved, but we can demon¬
strate that the law of contradiction is the only true start¬
ing point by the results one gets by its denial. A person
who were to deny the law of contradiction, e.g. his judge¬
ment "this is a table and also not a table", passes beyond
the pale of consistent thinking. In short, for Hagerstrom
the truth of the law of contradiction makes itself manifest.
This law is fundamental, and Hagerstrom will have nothing
to do with the dialectical logic of Hegel and his Marxist
followers who, in his opinion, blur this law. Contradictions
emerge only from men's inadequate ways of conceiving and
perceiving what is real. By no means are contradictions a
feature of what is real as Hegel and the Marxists hold.
Philosophical thinking reveals that there is only one
world, the objective Newtonian world of an unchanging three-
dimensional universe, where everything can be assigned a
place in temporal and material reality which can be com¬
pletely known. To see man as part and parcel of this uni¬
verse is to emphasize the continuity of the human race. It
2) Hagerstrom, PR p. 57; next quotation is from p. 315.
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is also to suggest that human behaviour may be amenable to
the same kinds of investigations that are effective in stu¬
dying other domains of nature, viz. that everything can be
explained as the effect of some cause. Rational understand¬
ing consists in knowledge of causes.
If we understand the laws which govern the universe it
is possible to take them into account in our planning. Thus,
we are set free from a blind acquiescence to the consequen¬
ces of laws and are in this respect set free. Thus to under¬
stand the laws that govern man in society is likewise to be
set free. It is consequently of the first importance to de¬
termine the character of these laws. It is even more impor¬
tant to approach such inquiries from a conceptual point of
view of philosophical thinking. It belongs to philosophical
thinking to present a system of mutually consistent non-
contradictory concepts by clarifying and rendering consist¬
ent the concepts used in ordinary and scientific discourse
concerning moral and legal judgements.
Concerning knowledge of nature Hagerstrom abandons his
nihilism in favour of rationalism. I have discussed, above
Chapter III, p. 129f., whether Hagerstrom has changed his
mind between the publication of his book "Das Prinzip der
Wissenschaft" and his "Selbstdarstellung". Hagerstrom's own
opinion is that this is not the case, cf. above Chapter III,
p. 181.
Turning his philosophical mind to values, to moral and
legal judgements, Hagerstrom explicitly acknowledges that
he has changed his mind around 1916. In his "Selbstdarstel¬
lung" he claims that he "discerned for the first time that
the whole idea of value, which is supposed to belong to the
3)
reality of the valued object, was impossible".
A change of view involves, of course, that Hagerstrom's
opinion concerning values in his Selbstdarstellung is in¬
consistent with his opinions concerning values expressed
in his former ethical writings. According to these writings,
for an outline I refer to Chapter II, p. , values are part
3) Hagerstrom, PR p. 70.
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of the world. So Hagerstrom must accept that his former
ideas were inadequate or confused. These ideas are not in
accordance with the order of the intellect. Consequently
Hagerstrom has failed to realize "the meaninglessness of
the words from the point of view of thought", to use his
4)
own words. There is no harm in this. It is also perfect¬
ly consistent with Hagerstrom's theory of knowledge and his
coherence theory of truth.
Hagerstrom's reaction against the possibility of moral
knowledge is then only the stronger, because he once held
the view that there is the possibility of arriving at ge¬
nuine moral knowledge. This is just to say, in other words,
that Hagerstrom's criticism is a form of self-criticism.
Merely by attending to his own consciousness, his own think
ing, Hagerstrom has now realized that there is no such
possibility. His new view is that "knowledge of value is
5)
impossible". This is the thesis of moral nihilism.
This new view sometimes conflicts with the old view as
I hope to make clear in the following discussion of Hager¬
strom's thesis. I shall, however, restrict my discussion
to Hagerstrom's thesis of moral nihilism pointing out in¬
consistencies, which can be traced back to his older views.
Hagerstrom's thesis implies that there are no genuine
moral judgements. I am not suggesting, in this chapter,
that I am able to solve the question whether there are such
judgements. What I am suggesting is that Hagerstrdm's ar¬
gument for his thesis fails to establish it. I shall pro¬
ceed as follows. - In Section 2 I shall deal with Hager¬
strom's conception of the proper subject-matter of ethics.
- Next, in Section 3 I shall present his analysis of moral
judgements. - In Section 4 I shall consider his discussion
4) Hagerstrom, PR p. 70.
5) Hagerstrom, PR p. 315.
6) A full account of Hagerstrom's ethical thinking is still wanted.
But it must be pointed out that Petersson's claim that Hagerstrom'
work before 1907 does not deal with ethical questions is without
any substance. See Bo Petersson, Axel Hagerstroms vardeteori, Upp¬
sala 1973, p. 13. - I have not been able to consult a recent book
by Dieter Lang, Wertung und Erkenntnis, Untersuchungen zu Axel
Hagerstrom's Moraltheorie, Amsterdam 1981.
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of some fundamental standards for moral judgements. - Final¬
ly, in Section 5 I shall comment on the importance of morals
for life in society.
2. The Subject-Matter of Moral Philosophy
On 18th March 1911 Hagerstrom held his inaugural lecture
"Om moraliska forestallningars sanning" (On the Truth of
7)
Moral Ideas). He had finally succeeded in being appointed
a professor in moral philosophy in the University of Uppsa¬
la. The Rector of the University admitted Hagerstrom to his
professorship by a formal speech, where he said that the
situation for a professor now has changed. Hagerstrom could
not expect to attain "the great public influence of his pre-
8)
decessor Bostrom". In fact, the Rector was proved to be
wrong. In his lecture Hagerstrom concluded by saying that
"moral philosophy cannot be a teaching in morality, but only
9)
a teaching about morality".
This statement caused an uproar in Sweden, since Hager-
strom's professorship constituted a break with the estab¬
lished view that moral philosophy is a branch of knowledge,
which consists in teaching what is, normatively speaking,
good conduct, i.e. a teaching in morality which provides
an account of normative standards of evaluation and norma¬
tive rules of conduct. What Hagerstrom is saying is that it
is not the business of the moral philosopher to tell people
what to do. This is, by no means, a revolutionary claim.
It is, for example, voiced by Bradley.^^ It is thought
that moral philosophy has to provide the individual with
knowledge of what is right and wrong in particular situa¬
tions. Bradley's claim is that this is an erroneous thought.
7) It has been translated by Robert T. Sandin into English as "On the
Truth of Moral Propositions", but his translation is not quite
accurate. For example Hagerstrom uses "forestallningar", and this
is best rendered as "idea". In fact, Sandin does use this word,
e.g. p. 83, in translating "forestallningar", but sometimes, e.g.
p. 83, he also uses "judgement". - I have provided my own transla¬
tion which sometimes differs from Sandin.
8) Waller, p. 189 (my translation).
9) Hagerstrom, PR p. 96, whose translation is somewhat different.
10) Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 193.
293
In his own words,
"We remark, and with some confidence, that there cannot be
a moral philosophy which will tell us what in particular
we are to do, and also that it is not the business of phi¬
losophy to do so. All philosophy has to do is 'to under¬
stand what is', and moral philosophy has to understand mo¬
rals which exist, not to make them or give directions for
making them.Such a notion is simply ludicrous."
This is, of course, an echo of Hegel, "To comprehend
what is, this is the task of philosophy, because what is,
is reason"."'""'"^ The instruction which Hegel's book may con¬
tain cannot consist in "teaching the state what it ought
to be, it can only show how the state, the ethical univer¬
se, is to be understood". Hegel's book aims neither at
teaching the state what it ought to be nor the citizen how
he ought to behave. Its aim is rather to explain what the
state, or the ethical universe, is, which involves explain¬
ing what it is to be a moral being.
This is, I suggest, also Hagerstrom's claim in his
lecture. "Since science has only to indicate what is true,
while it is nonsense to regard an idea of an obligation
(ought) as true, no science can have it as its task to in-
12)dicate how we ought to act". if the task of a moral phi¬
losopher does not consist in teaching people what is right
and wrong conduct, then what is his task? The answer is
that his task is to dispel false views of the nature of mo¬
rality by providing an analysis of morality that can stand
up to philosophical criticism. - In Hagerstrom's own words:
"Moral philosophy as a science is purely and simply a
science of actual moral valuations in their historical
development, based on a psychological analysis and con¬
ducted by a critical philosophical investigation of the
ideas which are operative therein".
On the basis of Hagerstrom's critical investigations
of moral ideas, his conclusion is that moral ideas cannot
be said to be either true or false. This implies Hagerstrom's
thesis that such ideas are meaningless. This claim is the
cause of the uproar. Hagerstrom's inaugural lecture created
11) Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Preface, p. 11.
12) Hagerstrom, PR p. 95.
13) Hagerstrom, PR p. 96.
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something of a sensation in Sweden which can be compared
with the similar effect of A.J. Ayer's publication of "Lan-
14)
guage, Truth and Logic". As Passmore remarks, people
heard with a sense of shock that metaphysical propositions
are neither true nor false, but nonsense. Within the com¬
pass of metaphysical propositions are ethical propositions
which do not express genuine propositions but rather are
to be seen as expressions and excitants of feelings. Ethics,
as a branch of knowledge, is for Ayer nothing more than a
department of psychology and sociology.
In his introduction to Hagerstrom's "Socialfilosofiska
uppsatser", Fries claims that "Hagerstrom is, as far as I
(i.e. Fries) know, the first person in the history of phi¬
losophy to demonstrate that value lacks all character of
reality". ^ That is to say, Hagerstrom is the first phi¬
losopher who claims that value judgements are not, proper¬
ly speaking, genuine judgements. As a matter of historical
fact, Fries' claim is simply false. Hagerstrom's claim is
foreshadowed by Hume's claim that "morality ... is more
16)
properly felt than judg'd of". The rejoinder to this is
that Hume does not advance the thesis that moral judgements
are expressions of feelings, hence they do not express ge¬
nuine judgement. This is the emotive or non-cognitive the¬
sis. Rather Hume's thesis is that moral judgements are re¬
ports of feelings, hence they do express judgements, although
these judgements are not genuine judgements, since such
judgements are purely describing the individual's subjec¬
tive feelings. This is the subjectivist thesis.
According to Bo Petersson, Hagerstrom thinks that Hume
17)
holds the subjective thesis. This is true. But it is
14) London 1936, cf. for Passmore's remark in the text his A Hundred
Years of Philosophy, p. 582, note 18. And see Kai Nielsen, On De¬
riving an Ought from an Is. A Retrospective Look, The Review of
Metaphysics, vol. 32, 1978-79, p. 487 ff., at p. 488 "Axel Hager¬
strom (a kind of Scandinavian A.J. Ayer) ".
15) Hagerstrom, Socialfilosofiska uppsatser, 2nd ed., p. 17.
16) Cf. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part I, Sec. 2,
p. 470. - Cf. my Skandinavischer Realismus, p. 56 ff.
17) Bo Petersson, Axel Hagerstroms vardeteori, p. 10. I am not going
to discuss Petersson's interpretation of Hagerstrom's theory.
>
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also true that Hume holds the emotive thesis. That this is /
18)
the case is quite clear from Reid's discussion of Hume. j
Reid makes the distinction between the emotive thesis and
the subjectivist thesis. He also argues that if the emo¬
tive thesis is true then it leads to the view that moral
judgements can have no meaning at all, since what is mere¬
ly felt cannot be expressed in a judgement. So Petersson
is quite wrong, when he suggests that Hume "does not say
clearly that moral judgements are neither true nor false.
It is only a consequence of some of his (i.e. Hume's) assump¬
tions". His contemporary Reid thinks otherwise, and he takes
Hume to task for identifying moral judgements with feelings.
So Hagerstrom is not as original as he thinks himself,
and is taken to be by Fries and Petersson. And Hagerstrom,
like Hume, sometimes adopts the emotive thesis and some¬
times the subjectivist thesis in his account of moral
judgements, as I shall try to show below in Section 3.
It should be noticed that Hagerstrom's thesis of moral
nihilism, i.e. that knowledge of value is impossible, is
of a general epistemological character. It does not arise
out of a careful and close reflection on the use of value
terms in ordinary language. It is rather based upon Hager¬
strom's epistemology or his theory of the identity of know¬
ledge and reality. Hagerstrom's thesis of moral nihilism is
based upon his denial of the autonomy or freedom of the will.
Hagerstrom does not admit the Kantian principle of the cate¬
gorical imperative. Hence Hagerstrom arrives at the conclu¬
sion that morality is "a chimerical Idea without truth" or
19)
"a mere phantom of the brain" to use Kant's phrase.
17) (continued) Petersson1s claim is that Hagerstrom holds two theo¬
ries concerning value-judgements. One theory according to which
they are neither true nor false, another theory according to which
some are neither true nor false, whereas others are always false.
Petersson's theory collapses if I am right that Hagerstrom iden¬
tifies truth and meaning. - The translation by Sandin, PR p. 71,
lines 7-8, is not correct, Hagerstrom writes, "Die erwahnten
festen Assoziationen ... unterliegen selbst naturlich nicht dem
Wahrheitsgesichtspunkt".
18) Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (edt. by Baruch Brody),
London 1969, Essay V, Ch. VII, p. 457.
19) I. Kant, The Moral Law (transl. and edt. by H.J. Paton), London
1948, p. 106.
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For Kant, the categorical imperative depends upon the
individual acting as a law-giving member in society, making
universal moral laws. This position can be seen as a case
of the thesis of maker's knowledge, cf. above Chapter III,
p. 208f. This thesis covers two types of knowledge, theore¬
tical knowledge and practical knowledge. Theoretical know¬
ledge is, to use a Kantian phrase, the area, where "the un¬
derstanding is ... itself the lawgiver of nature, ... con¬
straining nature to give answers to questions of reason's
20)
own determining". Practical knowledge is the area, where
reason is occupied with human action, human doing and making,
and with the results of such action and doing. In this area, to
use Kant's words, "reason ... frames for itself with perfect
21)
spontaneity an order of its own according to ideas". Man
is also the lawgiver of morality, where "reason itself does
not work instinctively, but requires trial, practice, and
instruction in order gradually to progress from one level
2 2)
of insight to another".
Thus, Kant stresses, in theoretical knowledge as well
as in practical knowledge, the active use of reason or man
as lawgiver for the realm of nature and for the realm of
morality. In the theoretical area nature acts as a limit
to pure speculation. In the practical area the categorical
imperative is essential as a bulwark against the spontanei¬
ty of men's feelings and volitions, which, if unchecked,
23)
will tend to corrupt man's life in society. Moral philo¬
sophy, for Kant, has for its subject-matter to seek out and
establish the supreme principle of morality, viz. the cate¬
gorical imperative.
Hagerstrom denies the possibility of maker's knowledge.
For Hagerstrom knowledge is always spectator's knowledge.
Knowledge is the passive contemplation of a determinate and
20) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. A 126 and p. B XIII (p.148 and 20).
21) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. B 576 (p. 473).
22) Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltburgerlicher Ab-
sicht (1784), in Werke (Hrsg. W. Weischedel), Band 9, Darmstadt
1975, p. 35. I owe the translation to L.W. Beck, see T.C. Williams,
The Concept of the Categorical Imperative, Oxford 1968, p. 131.
23) Cf. Kant, The Moral Law, p. 69.
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coherent reality.
In the theoretical area it is not the case that reason
is constraining nature to give answers to questions of rea¬
son's own determining as Kant holds, but rather dne other
24)
way round, i.e. nature constrains reason or thinking.
There are limits to what we can conceive of, or make intel¬
ligible to ourselves, as a possible general structure of
thinking. For a thinking consciousness the world as we ex¬
perience it is objective. It is there for us to experience
independently of consciousness. We make a distinction be¬
tween the real, as what is there, from the imaginary, as
what we create for ourselves.
This distinction is vital for every kind of inquiry.
For Hagerstrom this distinction is based upon the real mean¬
ing of words. Words have a real meaning only if they are
determined from the side of thought, in contrast with being
determined from the side of feeling or will. From the side
of thought, the act of thinking or judging refers an ideal
content to a reality beyond the act of judging. The act of
judging is an expression of a unified consciousness, which
refers an idea as having a meaning determined by objects
in time and space. The natural expression for a unified con¬
sciousness is the grammatical form of an indicative sen¬
tence, i.e. a judgement to the effect that it is so. Genuine
judgements are about what determines ideas, i.e. the objects
which exist independently of consciousness in space and time.
This grammatical form can be a misleading guide to the logi¬
cal form of a proposition. This is the basis for logical
positivists, and their dismissal of moral judgements as
meaningless, since such utterances do not express genuine
propositions. Since moral judgements are meaningless, logi¬
cal positivists show no interest in any detailed discussion
of moral questions. Moral philosophy is not regarded as a
serious subject-matter.
It is quite otherwise in the case of Hagerstrom. Like
the logical positivists he also thinks that the grammatical
24) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 53.
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form of sentences can mislead us. It is a misleading guide,
not to the logical form of proposition, but rather to the
processes by means of which an individual arrives at judge¬
ments. The basis for Hagerstrom's dismissal of moral judge¬
ments is that there is no real state of consciousness be¬
hind such sentences.
In the area of practical knowledge, there is not a uni¬
fied consciousness behind the judgement. It is my duty to
do so-and-so, but rather "a peculiar kind of consciousness"
25)with "a peculiar meaning". This "peculiar meaning" is
due to "the association of states of consciousness", e.g.
the state of feeling is associated with the state of think¬
ing, or the state of volition is associated with the state
of thinking.26^
The peculiar meaning of value terms is, according to
Hagerstrom, that
"value itself means nothing except as there is present in
the person who values something a certain feeling of plea¬
sure or displeasure or a desire which is connected with
the object designated as good or bad. For an observer who
stood indifferently before everything (except knowledge
itself), the objects of which he possessed knowledge would
lack every character of value".
HagerStrom's argument is that in the area of theoreti¬
cal knowledge words have real meaning independently of feel¬
ing and will. This is so because there are thoughts behind
the words, and thoughts are impersonal, and hold for the
common world of material objects. Thoughts are expressed
in judgements. - This involves a distinction between the
act of judging expressed in an indicative sentence and the
object judged about. From the very nature of knowledge, it
follows that what we know must be there to be known, inde¬
pendently of our consciousness.
In the area of practical knowledge words have no real
meaning, since moral terms means something if and only if
there is a feeling present in the person who values. Feel¬
ings and volitions are private or subjective, since they
25) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 109 and p. 121.
26) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 122, cf. p. 136.
27) Hagerstrom, PR p. 68.
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are dependent on consciousness. If there were no conscious¬
ness of feeling or volitions there would be no values. Hence
there cannot be a distinction between the act of valuing
and the object valued. It follows that in this area of prac¬
tical knowledge we are confined to our own mental states.
What we know then is dependent on the existence of conscious¬
ness. But in that case practical knowledge is, strictly-
speaking, not genuine knowledge, since the very nature of
genuine knowledge is that what we know must be there inde¬
pendently of consciousness. Practical knowledge is what we
create for ourselves by means of feelings and volitions.
Values are not part of the furniture of the world save to
the extent that the world contains human beings that have
and pursue values. In no case do we desire anything, be¬
cause we deem it to be good, but on the contrary we deem
a thing to be good because we desire it. Since values lack
objective reality, there cannot be any moral knowledge.
This is simply a consequence of Hagerstrom's theory of know¬
ledge which states that there is knowledge if and only if
there is objective reality.
Thus, Hagerstrom arrives at his thesis of moral nihi¬
lism, there can be no moral knowledge, but only theoreti¬
cal knowledge about morality. - This has implications for
the possibility of moral philosophy.
Moral philosophy, to use a contemporary classifica¬
tion, covers three kinds of thinking:
1. there is descriptive empirical inquiry, histo¬
rical, sociological or psychological, which
describes and explains the moral life of man
as manifested in any given individual's moral
experience and in any given society's moral
codes.
2. there is normative thinking concerned with
questions of what is good and what is right
which are related to the construction of a
set of moral standards of evaluation and mo¬
ral rules of conduct.
3. there is analytical thinking, or meta-ethical
thinking, concerned with conceptual analysis
of the meaning of words and sentences used in
moral discourse, and analysis of the methods
by which moral judgements can be established
as true or false.
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Now, Hagerstrom has ruled (2) out as a proper subject-
matter for moral philosophy. His argument for this is not
that there are proper value-judgements but rather that it
would be improper to have a scientific teaching in morals.
Hagerstrom perhaps suggests this argument, when he writes
that "the fact that such a way of proceeding is often em¬
ployed, shows that one wishes to make science a handmaid of
morality, which is by no means better than its being a hand
28)
maid of faith". If this is so, then Hagerstrom has in¬
volved himself in a self-contradiction, since this view
presupposes that value terms do have meaning and also that
it is possible to have genuine moral judgements.
Hagerstrom's rejection of (2) is rather based upon,
as I have tried to show, his thesis of moral nihilism, i.e.
Hagerstrom invites us to believe that there are no proper
value-judgements. Or perhaps there is a distinction here
between value-judgements which are concerned with what is
good or bad, i.e. axiological judgements, and value-judge¬
ments which are concerned with what is right or wrong, i.e.
normative judgements. Hagerstrom holds that axiological
judgements are expressions of feelings, whereas normative
judgements are expressions of volitions. The former are,
properly speaking, meaningless from a conceptual standpoint
The latter, i.e. the normative judgements, involve Hager¬
strom into difficulties, to which I shall return in Section
3.
So there is, for moral philosophy as a scientific stu¬
dy, (1) and (3) to consider.
If Hagerstrom's analysis of value-judgements is the
subjectivistic thesis, i.e. in such judgements people are
reporting or describing their feelings or volitions, then
it follows that moral concepts may be definable in terms
of certain kinds of pro-emotion and anti-emotion, or cer¬
tain kinds of pro-volition and anti-volition. If the sub-
jectivistic thesis is true, then Hagerstrom is committed
28) Hagerstrom, PR p. 82, cf. for the notion of philosophy as the
handmaid of faith, Kant, Der Streit der Fakultaten, Werke Bd. 9,
p. 291.- Hobbes, Leviathan, Part IV, Ch. 46, p. 688.
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to naturalism. It also follows that moral philosophy be¬
comes a branch of psychology, i.e. Hagerstrom endorses (1).
If Hagerstrom's thesis is the emotive thesis, i.e. in
moral judgements people express their feelings and voli¬
tions, then it follows that there are no moral judgements
and no moral predicates. The task is then to explain how
we come to the mistake of thinking that we are expressing
judgements when we are in fact expressing feelings and vo¬
litions. Again it follows that Hagerstrom is committed to
naturalism. It is for him an ultimate fact about human na¬
ture that people tend to feel a certain kind of emotion or
volition, as the case may be, when they contemplate that
something is good or something is right.
Moral philosophy becomes a branch of psychology, since
emotions and volitions are explicable by general psycholo¬
gical principles relating to the influence to which most
people are subjected in childhood and through education.
Thus if this thesis is true, then Hagerstrom again endorses
(1) as the only proper scientific study. This is, in fact,
29)
also Hagerstrom's position. Moral philosophy, as a branch
of science, is moral-psychology.
Within this scientific study, Hagerstrom makes a dis¬
tinction between two main areas of inquiry, viz.: the con¬
tent of morality (I), and the formal concepts used in mo¬
ral discourse (II).
(I) The first area comprises two different lines of think¬
ing,
a) what people think is the supreme good, and the
origin of their thinking so,
b) how normative evaluation has developed.
(II) The second area deals with the questions such as e.g.
"what is meant by moral value?",
"what does it mean to say that something is morally
good?", or
"what does it mean to say that an action is a duty?".
Hagerstrom's contention is that it is necessary to keep (I)
29) Cf. Hagerstrom, Moralpsykologi, p. 15. - Here the quotation later
in the text.
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and (II) distinct in the scientific inquiry into the nature
of morality. For Hagerstrom, (II) is important. His example
is the answer to the question "what does moral value denote
(betyde)?" This answer is often, Hagerstrom says, that it
means common welfare. Then Hagerstrom objects, "this is only
an answer to the question: "To what do people ascribe value?".
It cannot be the answer to the question: "What do we mean
(mene) when we think of the common good as the morally good?"."
According to Hagerstrom, only recently have writers,
he mentions Harald Hoffding and Edward Westermarck, started
"a psychological investigation concerning the formal nature
of moral concepts", although Hagerstrom also says that such
an inquiry is also undertaken by David Hume and Adam Smith.
But the formal investigation is completely foreign for wri¬
ters like Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer and John Stuart
Mill.
I am not going to discuss whether Hagerstrom is right
or wrong in his interpretation of the philosophers mentioned,
excepting, of course, Hume, cf. above. What I wish to draw
attention to is that Hagerstrom does not mention G.E. Moore,
although Hagerstrom relies on the very distinction Moore
makes between what things are good and how "good" is to be
defined. ^ For Moore the latter question is the most fun¬
damental question. In the classification mentioned above,
this question belongs for Moore to (3). For Hagerstrom it
is also the fundamental question, but he thinks it belongs
to (1). For Moore it is a conceptual question, not an empi¬
rical question. For Hagerstrom it is also a conceptual
question, but this is for Hagerstrom equivalent to an empi¬
rical question.
The difference between (1) and (3) is important. Empi¬
rical questions (1) are solved by observation, whereas meta-
ethical questions (3) are solved by reflection. The test
for the latter solutions is self-contradiction. The solu¬
tions are false, if they are self-contradictory, and true,
if their contradictories are self-contradictory. In other
30) G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge 1903, Ch. I, § 5, p. 5.
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words,we are dealing with analytical propositions, which
are true simply by virtue of the meanings of the words in
the sentences, which express them. It is quite otherwise
in the former case of empirical propositions, where the
test of whether the solutions offered are true or false is
experience. Hagerstrom's thesis is that "it is forgotten
that it belongs to the notion of truth to be one", i.e. that
31)
the general criterion of truth is non-self-contradiction.
Hagerstrom forgets, however, the Kantian lesson that "a
sufficient and at the same time general criterion of truth
cannot possibly be given". There is, after all, an important
difference between analytical and synthetic propositions.
When Hagerstrom, in the quotation mentioned above p. 293,
talks of "critical philosophical investigation of ideas",
the crucial trouble is that Hagerstrom's philosophical in¬
vestigation is genetic and causal rather than analytical
and conceptual. Hagerstrom expresses it as a theory about
what must occur in people's minds before there can be under¬
standing of moral concepts, rather than a theory about what
it is for a moral expression to have a meaning. In other
words, Hagerstrom ignores the difference between analytical
and synthetic propositions. This in turn depends upon Hager¬
strom's quest for certainty, and thus Hagerstrom falls into
the trap of temptation looking for certainty in the area of
synthetic or empirical propositions, which are presented by
him as necessary truths.
Hagerstrom's "critical philosophical investigation" of
moral terms turns out to be on the one hand an inquiry into
the relations holding between moral words and the states of
consciousness of human beings, where he offers a psychologi¬
cal explanation of why such words produce the effects they
do, i.e. (1) in the classification above. The propositions
offered by Hagerstrom are then to be understood as empiri¬
cal propositions. On the other hand Hagerstrom's "philoso¬
phical investigation" is intended as a conceptual analysis
of the meaning, or lack of meaning, of moral terms, which
31) Hagerstrom, PR p. 231. - For Kant, see Critique of Pure Reason,
p. B 83 (p. 98).
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must be kept apart from empirical inquiries as the example,
mentioned above p. 302, clearly shows, that is (3) in the
classification. In this case the propositions offered are
analytical propositions, where Hagerstrom, quite rightly,
looks for certainty and employs, also rightly, the test of
contradiction. But then Hagerstrom's method is the analyti¬
cal method of reasoning from effect to cause. It is the case
that people feel pro-emotions or anti-emotions on certain
occasions, or have pro-intentions or anti-intentions concern¬
ing actions. This is manifest, and what the philosopher has
to do is to look for the causes of such effects, proceeding
on the assumption that every event has a cause. If so, then
it is, in my opinion, difficult to maintain that the propo¬
sitions offered must be considered to be analytical propo¬
sitions. They are rather empirical propositions, which means
that Hagerstrom after all abandons meta-ethics, and further
ignores his own distinction between content and form, i.e.
the distinction between (I) and (II) mentioned above.
G.E. Moore wrote that "one great difficulty which a-
rises in ethical discussions is the difficulty of getting
quite clear as to exactly what question it is that we want
,,32)to answer .
One great difficulty which arises in understanding Ha¬
gerstrom is the difficulty of getting quite clear as to
exactly what question Hagerstrom provides an answer to,
that is whether his analysis is concerned with meta-ethical
questions about meaning or empirical questions concerning
behaviour. His analysis of value-judgements is, I think, a
good example, and to this I now turn.
3. The Analysis of Value-Judgements
Hagerstrom writes, in his Selbstdarstellung, that he has
"devoted the later period of my authorship to the conside¬
ration of the real nature of the so-called value-judgements
(der wirklichen Natur der sogenannten Werturteile)".")
32) G.E. Moore, Ethics, Oxford 1972, p. 3 (First ed. 1912).
33) Hagerstrom, PR p. 68. My translation differs from that of Sandin,
who renders "wirklich" as actual, and omits "so-called".
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Thus, Hagerstrom's problem is "the real nature of the so-
called value-judgements".
This calls for a comment, in two respects. One is the
way Hagerstrom formulates his question, the other is Hager¬
strom's use of "wirklich", "Wirklichkeit", "real" and "Rea-
litat". Since Hagerstrom holds that the definition of a
judgement must take the reality (Wirklichkeit) judged about
into consideration, it is important to understand what Ha¬
gerstrom means by the notions mentioned. I must confess
that Hagerstrom's use of these terms has presented me with
difficulties, and I am still not quite sure whether Hager¬
strom wants to distinguish between "real" and "wirklich",
or whether he just uses these terms as synonyms. I am in¬
clined to think that the latter is the case. Hagerstrom
also uses the notions of "Wirklichkeit", "Wirklichkeit als
solcher" and "Wirklichkeit an sich", and his use of these
notions does not clarify but rather complicates the matter.
On the one hand Hagerstrom insists that it is important to
distinguish between "the reality (Wirklichkeit) and what
34)
is real (was wirklich ist)".
We must not, when we think, confuse "Wirklichkeit"
and "das Wirkliche", but this confusion is, according to
Hagerstrom, precisely to be found in metaphysical and ordi¬
nary ways of thinking. On the other hand, Hagerstrom holds
that
"the concept of relation is a metaphysical concept which
depends upon the confused pair of concepts "reality in it¬
self" (Wirklichkeit an sich) and "reality through some
other thing" (Wirklichkeit durch etwas anderes)".35)
As far as I can see Hagerstrom first says that it is
important to distinguish between reality and what is real,
and secondly he says that this distinction is not a tenable
distinction. In the end Hagerstrom says that he rejects
the view
"that reality means something different from what is appre¬
hended with which the apprehension may be compared (Wirk¬
lichkeit etwas von dem Aufgefassten Verschiedenes bedeute,
34) Hagerstrom, PR p. 47.
35) Hagerstrom, PR p. 45.
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36)
womit die Auffassung verglichen werden konne)
He holds that
"Reality as self-identity (Realitat als Selbstidentitat)
... is the only thing which is immediately given; or it is
knowledge (Wissen) (in contrast to mere factual certainty)
or it is the absolute; or it is the concept valid in it¬
self (an sich giiltiger Begriff)".
This is Hagerstrom's "world of experience" based upon the
law of contradiction.
How is it possible to understand what is meant by this?
Hagerstrom's answer is
"only if one has real knowledge (die wirkliche Erkennt-
nis) do such words as "the world of experience", "the im¬
possibility of the self-contradictory as a mere collection
of words", "judgement" acquire a real meaning (einen wirk-
lichen Sinn)". 3/)
This is of no small importance. First, when Hagerstrom
tries to achieve clarity concerning the question of what
words, e.g. "reality" and "real", mean, he is not engaged
in sorting out the ways in which these terms are used in
38)
ordinary or scientific thinking, like say J.L. Austin.
Austin discusses the traditional accounts of "reality",
which he contrasts with the uses of the word "real", which
takes its significance only from the implied contrast in
context with "artificial", "fake", "bogus" as well as with
"illusory" and "apparent".
By contrast Hagerstrom's analysis depends upon his lo¬
gical feeling of what is real and what is not real. What
is real is material, whereas what is not real is spiritual.
Hagerstrom claims that what is real is determinate, what
is not real is indeterminate. Further what is real is to be
taken as a criterion of what exists in the world.
But to be told that an object is determinate does not
settle the question of whether the object exists. To use
Hagerstrom's example of a horse which runs. We need, of
course, a concept of a horse, in order to identify horses.
But it does not follow that a horse must exist in the ex¬
ternal world in order for us to have the concept. Nor does it
36) Hagerstrom, PR p. 50.
37) Hagerstrom, PR p. 60
38) Cf. e.g. his Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford 1962.
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follow from our having the concept that the horse actually
exists. It is only because Hagerstrom sometimes uses "real"
in the sense of "determinate concept" and other times "real"
in the sense of "actual existence in the external world"
that he is able to establish his conclusion that the horse
39)
actually exists. Further, the horse in the judgement "the
horse is running" may be a "real horse" or "an unreal horse".
If I say that the horse is real, I contrast "real" with
"copy", e.g. a statue of a horse. The statue of the horse
is real as well, in the sense of "real" meaning "exist" and
"genuine". There is an existing genuine statue of a horse,
but it is an unreal horse, in the sense that it is made of
stone, not of flesh.
Hagerstrom claims that reality is not a property of
objects, but his example of the horse shows that he treats
reality as a property of objects.^
I conclude that Hagerstrom's account of "real" and
"reality" is unsatisfactory, and cannot be used as a proper
basis for deciding whether value-judgements are genuine
judgements or not. For Hagerstrom they cannot be judgements,
since they are not concerned with what is real but with what
is unreal. What is unreal, is, however, nothing, and "con-
41)
cerning pure nothing, nothing at all can be judged". This
line of reasoning is erroneous, since it wrongly treats
"nothing" as a name. Hagerstrom further confuses (a) propo-
sitional verbs, such as think or judge, with (b) cognitive
verbs, such as know and see. One significant difference be¬
tween (a) and (b) is this. It is a tautology to say: "If
he knows that the horse is running, then it is true that
the horse is running". It is not a tautology to say: "If
he judges that the horse is running, then it is true that
the horse is running".
Secondly, Hagerstrom holds, in the passage quoted above,
39) Hagerstrom, PR p. 57.
40) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 41 and 39. This is confirmed by the comments
made by Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hagerstroms filosofi, p.
86 f. who falls into the same trap.
41) Hagerstrom, PR p. 42.
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that only if one has real knowledge do words acquire real
meaning. This is an untruth. It is a truism that if one
does know the meaning of words then one does know the mean¬
ing of words. But it is a substantial falsity to claim that
this knowledge depends upon feelings, as does Hagerstrom,
writing that "the word "reality" (Wirklichkeit) is basical-
42)
ly nothing but the expression of the feeling of certainty".
If this is the case, then it follows that if I do not have
this feeling of certainty, then I do not understand Hager¬
strom's sentences. Small wonder, then, that it is difficult
for an outsider to understand Hagerstrom's writings. Hager-
strom's argument requires that the world is divided up into
only two classes of people: the people inside the circle of
actual knowledge, where words have real meaning on account
of their feeling of certainty, and the people outside this
circle. Outside the circle people do not understand any¬
thing, since they lack the proper logical feeling, so they
cannot put the question: "Is Hagerstrom's account correct?"
Inside the circle this question: "Is Hagerstrom's account
correct?" can be asked, since persons here have the proper
logical feeling of evidence of what the words mean. From
this it follows that they consider that Hagerstrom's account
is true. So they will not want to ask this question.
This saves, of course, Hagerstrom's account. But so,
if we pursue the argument to its logical conclusion, is
every form of superstition. And this is not, I take it,
Hagerstrom's intention. His intention is to consider "the
real nature of the so-called value-judgements" and to this
aspect I now turn.
Hagerstrom's way of formulating his problem can be
compared with the problem of knowledge. There are three
importantly different ways of formulating a problem in ana-
43)
lytical philosophy.
1. To investigate the nature of knowledge
2. To analyse the concept of knowledge
42) Hagerstrom, PR p. 59.
43) I am indebted to William P. Alston, Philosophy of Language,
Englewood Cliffs 1964, for the following description.
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3. To try to make explicit what one is saying
when a person says that he knows something
to be the case.
Hagerstrom's way of formulating the problem of knowledge
falls within 1 or 2. And 1 and 2 may be misleading methodo¬
logically. If one follows 1, then this suggests that the
task is one of locating and inspecting some entity called
"knowledge". This entity must exist and is what it is in¬
dependent of our thought. This is Hagerstrom's approach,
but as I have tried to show, Hagerstrom does not provide
us with an acceptable method for locating and examining
this entity. What he says is that "reality is knowledge",
which expresses "the intuitively given reality of the ob-
44)
ject". And this is clearly not a very helpful method
for a person who does not know what knowledge is but wants
to be taught what it is. - The second way of formulating
the problem is also apt to be misleading, since it suggests
that the task is one of introspectively scrutinizing and
locating ideas as states or acts of consciousness.
This approach is also favoured by Hagerstrom who claims
that knowledge is thought by means of concepts, which are
"the natural expression for a unified consciousness", which
finds expression in words with real meaning. Again no accept¬
able method is offered by Hagerstrom except "that it is
clear that everyone knows which actual idea (wirkliche Vor-
stellung) is to be designated as an apprehension of reali-
45)
ty or determinateness".
Finally, there is the third way of formulating the
problem, which suggests that conceptual analysis of know¬
ledge is concerned with features of the use of the word
"knowledge" in various situations. This links conceptual
analysis with language, and some sort of theory of what it
is for a word to have a meaning becomes then a vital point.
Turning to the problem of value, Hagerstrom's way of
formulating the problem suggests that his way of thinking
is along the lines of 1 or 2, to the exclusion of 3. Hager-
44) Hagerstrom, PR p. 51.
45) Hagerstrom, PR p. 59.
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strom proceeds on the basis that words do have a proper or
essential meaning. His assumption is that the proper mean¬
ing of words is to be names of objects or facts. The word
"horse" stands for the animal horse, hence it is a meaning¬
ful word. There is also the word "centaur", and since the
word exists, there must exist also the animal for which the
name stands. Now the centaur does not exist in the real
world in space and time, hence Hagerstrom concludes that
it must exist elsewhere, viz. in my imagination. This is
the referential theory of meaning. The proper, essential
meaning of words is to refer to things, which Hagerstrom
couples with the ideational and causal theory of meaning.
For a word, say horse, to have a proper meaning it is essen¬
tial that
(a) I have the idea of horse in mind
(b) that when I utter the word "horse" this causes
the same idea in the hearer's mind
(c) that the word "horse" refers to an actual ob¬
ject.
The elements (a), (b) and (c) are needed for expressing
thoughts or the essential or proper meaning of words. This
approach suggests that the task is to find the proper or
essential meaning of moral terms. For a moral word to have
meaning it is essential
(a) to have an idea of value in one's mind
(b) that this idea arouses feelings or attitudes
in one's mind
(c) that the moral word refers to some actual ob¬
ject.
Hagerstrom is misled by the fallacy of a word's essen¬
tial meaning into troubles about judgements about fabulous
animals. What is worse, he is also mislead into tracing the
reference of moral terms. If we talk about the meaning of
moral terms, it must refer to something. So Hagerstrom sets
about finding what moral terms refer to. Thus he writes:
"Suppose, as often happens, that one thinks in the follow¬
ing way: 'the original experience of value is a feeling or
desire. Hence an object comes to be determined as actual¬
ly good or bad, according as the idea of its reality arouses
in mankind generally a feeling of pleasure or displeasure
or a feeling of desire or aversion'. This is nothing but a
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4- i c „ 4 6)conceptual confusion.
The view,which Hagerstrom refers to,is ethical naturalism,
which holds that ethical words and sentences can be trans¬
lated into non-ethical words or sentences. In Hagerstrom's
example the definition offered can be called "the socio¬
logical definition". According to this definition "0 has
value" is equivalent to "0 has a tendency to cause mankind
generally to approve of 0". Now, what is the conceptual con¬
fusion in this definition?
Hagerstrom's reply is not very clear. He says that
"this idea (Vorstellung) would not be a consciousness of va¬
lue". Why not, since the elements of (a), (b) and (c) are
present. Hagerstrom's objection is that the object, i.e.
element (c), "would be entirely independent of the feeling
or desire to possess it", which is inconsistent, since a
naturalist holds that "value itself may be present only
for a feeling or desire". Then Hagerstrom goes on to declare
that "modern value-psychology is therefore completely mis¬
taken, in so far as it believes it possible to determine
47)what value is in the manner suggested".
Hagerstrom offers no argument for his rejection of na¬
turalism, but perhaps he thinks that the majority can be
stupid, unenlightened or simply mistaken. That the majority
or even mankind generally feels that an object is valuable
is a sociological fact, but of very little interest for
"what value is". This is the Kantian position that "no
matter how many natural grounds or how many sensuous im¬
pulses may impel me to will, they can never give rise to
48)
the "ought" but only to a willing".
This is the difference between the course of nature
or what is, what has been, or what will be and the course
of morality or what ought to be. This difference is also
stressed by Hagerstrom who says, in his inaugural lecture,
that "existence and value signify something entirely diffe-
49)
rent. Therefore value cannot be included within existence".
46) Hagerstrom, PR p. 69.
47) Hagerstrom, PR p. 69 (my italics).
48) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, P. B 576 (p. 473).
49) Hagerstrom, PR p. 87.
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This seems to me to be a bad argument. House and chairs
signify something entirely different. Therefore chairs can¬
not be included within the house. Of course they can. The
question is whether values are to be included in the world,
and in what manner.
Hagerstrom's argument rules out naturalism. He may then
opt for non-naturalism, where some ethical terms are verbal¬
ly indefinable. This is the position of Reid and Moore.
Reid holds that the concept of duty is "too simple to ad-
50)
mit of a logical definition". Moore holds that the con¬
cept of good is indefinable.^"^ Does Hagerstrom accept non-
naturalism, then?
It should be noticed that it is possible for him to
answer the question of moral knowledge: "How can I know
that there are values?" by the same method as he answers
the epistemological question concerning natural objects:
"How can I know that there are objects?", viz. by referring
to "the intuitively given reality of the action which trans¬
forms cognition into moral cognition". On this view, there
is moral knowledge, but since "duty" or "good", as the case
may be, is simple, ultimate and indefinable, any attempt
to define "duty", or "good", will be circular. The most the
philosopher can do is to exemplify good conduct, or to
exemplify what kind of things ought to exist for their own
sakes. ^
If this is the case, then Hagerstrom cannot be said
to subscribe to the thesis of moral nihilism. But Hager¬
strom holds that "the value-judgement which determines va¬
lue, as actually valid, whether it is for me or for man-
53)kind generally, cannot possibly be true". If so, then
this rules non-naturalism out.
Why is it that the value cannot possibly be true?
Hagerstrom's argument is that in case of true judgements
50) Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, p. 223, cf.
p. 471.
51) Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 7.
52) Cf. H.A. Prichard, Moral Obligation, Oxford 1949, especially Ch.
1:"Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" from Mind 1912.
53) Hagerstrom, PR p. 69.
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"the thing is so determined that it possesses in reality
(Wirklichkeit) a certain character and is thus independent
of the apprehension itself".
In case of value-judgements "the object - value - de¬
pends upon the feeling or desire which belongs to it".
Thus, I take it, it follows that the object is dependent
on the apprehension.
I have some comments to Hagerstrom's argument. First,
in the case of judgements concerning things Hagerstrom
holds that the characteristics of things, they qualify,
54)
are located in the mind, not inherent in objects. This
is, of course, a familiar doctrine, held for example by
Berkeley and Hume. But if we accept this, then Hagerstrom's
distinction between genuine judgements and value-judgements
breaks down. All characteristics depend then upon feelings.
This has not been noticed before, but in my opinion Hager¬
strom must then provide an explanation of why some feelings
result in judgement, whereas other feelings do not. Or else
he ends up with not only moral nihilism but general nihi¬
lism or scepticism, i.e. no knowledge at all is possible.
A second comment is that Hagerstrom, like Berkeley,
uses the expression whether a certain characteristics is
55)
"dependent upon the mind". The question is whether Hager¬
strom, like Berkeley, uses "depend" ambiguously as between
"owned by" and "caused by"? I think he does. - Hagerstrom's
argument is
1. some ideas are not dependent upon (caused by)
any human mind, e.g. ideas concerning things;
2. every idea is dependent upon (owned by) some
mind, e.g. ideas of things, and ideas of value:
from 1 and 2 Hagerstrom then infers the conclusion he wants,
viz.
3. some ideas are dependent upon (caused by) some
non-human mind, e.g. ideas of values caused by
feelings or volitions.
Feelings and volitions belong to the non-human mind, since
the human mind, in the proper sense, is equivalent to
54) See Hagerstrom, PR p. 56, 235, 297.




In the case of words with proper or essential meaning,
the conditions are, according to Hagerstrom's theory of
meaning, that
(a) there must be a simple idea in one's mind
of an independent object in space and time,
(b) that this simple idea is dependent upon
(caused by) a simple object,
(c) that the word which names this simple idea
refers to an independent (i.e. not owned)
existing object in space and time.
Hagerstrom holds that "the idea as such ... is neces¬
sarily simple" and it follows then, according to Hagerstrom,
that "the content (i.e. object) which determines the con¬
ey*
sciousness (i.e. the idea) must itself be simple".
This is a causal argument, relying on the principle
that something must always come from something and cannot
come from nothing. Hagerstrom's assumptions are that every
idea has a cause, and that any property residing in an idea
must also have been present in the cause. Hagerstrom relies
on the synonymy principle of causation: if anything comes
into being from a cause, then the cause is at least as com¬
prehensive as the effect.
And this principle is surely wrong. He who breeds fat
oxen need not himself be fat. According to Hagerstrom he
must be fat. This is meaningful but false. Further Hager¬
strom rules out complex ideas. Every object is necessarily
simple. But how can Hagerstrom possibly know that? His an-
58)
swer is that "consciousness can be investigated". This
is remarkable, since Hagerstrom then is placed in the idea¬
list camp of Descartes and his followers, which Hagerstrom
claims is a form of metaphysics which is nothing but "a
more or less ingenious play with words".
Hagerstrom also plays with words, and asks pseudo-ques¬
tions like: "How can a person have a consciousness of inten-
59)
tion which refers to another's action and not his own?"
56) Cf. HagerstrSm, PR p. 180.
57) HagerstrSm, PR p. 44 and p. 67 (my brackets).
58) Hagerstrom, PR p. 67; here also the following quotations.
59) HagerstrSm, INLM p. 123 (his italics).
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In the case of value terms, the person commanding must
have an idea of the right action in mind, in order for the
person commanded to carry out the right action. This follows
from Hagerstrom's synonymy principle. Now, Hagerstrom holds
that "a command as such does not refer to the recipient's
scheme of values" This is true, but it is an open ques¬
tion whether this is a conceptual truth or an empirical fact.
Hagerstrom thinks it is a conceptual truth. He holds that
"there must occur in the recipient an intention which is de¬
void of valuation".^ An investigation of the recipient's
consciousness establishes this as a fact. So now we can ar¬
gue from this effect to some cause. There must be a cause,
according to the principle that something must always come
from something. According to the synonymy principle of cau¬
sation it follows that the consciousness of the commanding
person "does not contain any valuations along with the feel¬
ing of conative impulse". This is then presented as a con¬
ceptual truth as well. This implies that commands, since de¬
void of valuations, can be seen as judgements. But a "psy¬
chological investigation" of the nature of command reveals
6 2)
that a command cannot be considered to be a judgement.
A judgement is characterized by the fact that it is an ex¬
pression of a single consciousness. A command "contains a
peculiar kind of consciousness". It follows then that in its
6 3)
"real meaning" a command has "a peculiar meaning". It
has a peculiar meaning, because the consciousness behind
the command is a state of mind characterized by an associa¬
tion of an idea and an intention to carry out the action.
A normative judgement is then an association of an idea and
an intention to carry out the contemplated action. The in¬
tention is devoid of vaiuation, or so Hagerstrom claims.
From this it follows, so it seems to me, that Hager¬
strom must hold that normative judgements are not proper
judgements, not because they express values, but because
60) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 120.
61) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 125, also here the next quotation.
62) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 109, cf. p. 135.
63) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 121.
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there is a complex state of mind behind the utterance.
Thus, Hagerstrom's claim concerning the nature of va¬
lue-judgements "that the object - value - depends upon the
feeling or desire which belongs to it" cannot be true for
normative judgements. Or else Hagerstrom contradicts him¬
self holding that commands and normative judgements after
all depend upon values. This is accepted by Hagerstrom in
case of axiological judgements. There is, however, the flaw
in Hagerstrom's argument concerning the use of "depend" in
the sense of "cause" and in the sense of "own".
I conclude that Hagerstrom's argument for his claim
is flawed. It is flawed because of Hagerstrom's theory of
meaning. This makes him set about finding and locating real
meaning of words in the consciousness of people.
A third comment is that Hagerstrom slides from the pre¬
miss "the thing is so determined that it possesses in rea¬
lity a certain character" to the conclusion "thus the thing
is independent of the apprehension of the thing". But this
conclusion by no means follows. A concept of a thing does
not imply that the thing exists.
Hagerstrom's fallacy is to rely on the assumption: the
concept exists if and only if the thing exists. There are
no value concepts, hence there are no values. Value terms
are mere words. The concept of duty does not exist, hence
there are no duties. Normative terms are mere words. The
argument is valid, but it is not sound, since the premiss is
false. But it leads to Hagerstrom's quandary: there are du¬
ties, there is "the word of command", but "how can we reve-
64)
rence a mere expression?" So Hagerstrom is deceived by
his own thinking about the way the world is, because he
begs the question by assuming that values are not part of
the external world, but are only to be found in the imagi¬
nation. This is confirmed, when Hagerstrom writes that "the
consciousness of value is characterized outright by the
fact that the object - value - depends upon the feeling or
64) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 160.
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65)
desire which belongs to it".
This is the essentialists' position. Hagerstrom asserts
that his definition of value is a true description of the
essence of value. If one asks why this is so, Hagerstrom
can only appeal to his own intuition. It is "intuitively
given" that values depend upon the feeling or desire which be¬
longs to them. What is so given cannot be mistaken. Hager¬
strom proceeds as follows. It is intuitively given that the
consciousness of something is simple, hence the content
which determines the consciousness must itself be simple.
What is simple is material. This being the case Hagerstrom
immediately knows, as a matter of logical necessity, that
his system of determinate and simple ideas is the real or
true system "besides which none other can be discovered"
This is so, for Hagerstrom knows that there cannot be two
systems of ideas, e.g. a system of material ideas (M) and
a system of spiritual ideas (values) (V), which are com¬
plete and comprehensive. To try to entertain the possibili¬
ty of two entirely consistent systems of different ideas,
M and V, is to try to conceive something which is self-con¬
tradictory. Since the only adequate system is M or the ma¬
terial reality, it follows that "a spiritual reality is a
6 7)
contradictio in adiecto".
A spiritual reality is equivalent to the reality of
values. So Kai Nielsen is wrong, when he claims that Hager-
strom's thesis of moral nihilism is "tied up with an empi¬
ricist epistemology". It is tied up with a rationalist epi-
stemology. Hagerstrom's thinking declares that there are no
values. What if my intuition is that there are values in¬
dependent of feeling or desire? This intuition cannot, then,
by parity of reasoning, be mistaken either.
There are two ways open for Hagerstrom. One is that
every judgement is true. Hence it is not possible to con¬
tradict Hagerstrom's definition. But this is a hollow vic-
65) Hagerstrom, PR p. 69 (my italics).
66) Hagerstrom, PR p. 54.
67) Hagerstrom, PR p. 55. - Kai Nielsen, Review of Metaphysics, p.
491 (cf. above n. 14).
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tory, since Hagerstrom's thesis concerning contradiction
is false, cf. above Chapter IV. - The other way is to accept
that it is possible to contradict Hagerstrom's definition,
but his intellect is superior, hence his definition is better.
The argument then ends in a deadlock, since how can Hager¬
strom possibly establish this except just by reiterating that
his definition is true.
If Hagerstrom endorses the subjectivistic thesis, in
the autobiographical version which says "0 is right =df "I
approve of 0", then it follows that there can never be any
disagreement about matters of conduct. This is quite a con¬
clusion to swallow for Hagerstrom, since he claims that some
"fanatics ... are in fact leading religion to its demise
and thus defiling one of the very highest values of the hu¬
man race".^' How can religion be saved then? The solution
is to endorse the emotive thesis which says "Religion has
value =df "I express my feelings". This thesis testifies a
fact concerning the speaker, i.e. he expresses his feeling
and attitudes. To quote Reid "this speech cannot be contra¬
dicted without an affront; for, as every man must know his
feelings, to deny that a man had a feeling which he affirms
69)
he had, is to charge him with falsehood". Thus, Hager¬
strom cannot be contradicted. But nor can I, even if I am
a fanatic leading religion to its demise.
I conclude that Hagerstrom's "natural conclusion" that
the value-judgement cannot possibly be true, is anything
but natural. His concept of fanaticism, like that of super¬
stition presupposes the existence of objective standards
to which Hagerstrom implicitly appeals. So Hagerstrom's na¬
tural conclusion is self-contradictory. But I suppose that
Hagerstrom has established his conclusion. Then it follows
that values are expressions of feelings. As Hagerstrom
writes "for him who lacks a feeling of obligation, there-
70)
fore, right and wrong are without meaning".
This is important for Hagerstrom's inquiry into law,
68) Hagerstrom, PR p. 273.
69) Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, p. 465.
70) Hagerstrom, PR p. 252.
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to which I shall return in Chapter VI. Here I wish to dis¬
cuss whether Hagerstrom endorses the emotive thesis, i.e.
moral judgements are not really judgements at all but ex¬
pressions of feelings or volitions, or the subjective the¬
sis, i.e. moral judgements are not really moral judgements
but nevertheless judgements about the judging person's state
of mind, that is autobiographical judgements.
Petersson, in his book on Hagerstrom's value-theory,
claims that Hagerstrom endorses the emotive thesis, where¬
as Hume, for example, is a proponent of the subjective the¬
sis, cf. above p. 294. What I wish to claim is that Hager¬
strom does not clearly state his thesis concerning moral
judgements. To be sure, he says that the
"consciousness involved in a feeling can never take the
form of a judgement in which the same content which is
experienced in the feeling-consciousness is characterized^^,
more determinately as a factor in the system of reality".
This lends support to the emotive thesis concerning axiolo-
gical judgements. Such judgements are never value-judgements
but simply expressions of feelings.
Concerning normative judgements about duties we have
to consider the consciousness of willing or intention to
do the right thing. In this case Hagerstrom says, there are
"two factors present in consciousness of intention, viz. a
feeling of conative impulse and the idea of a certain ac¬
tion, the imperative form as such represents by its "Thou
shalt" the former. The "I will" of an intention represents
just the conative factor in it."72)
This does not give any clear guidance whether Hager¬
strom holds that the emotive thesis also encompasses norma¬
tive judgements or whether these judgements are rather to
be classified under the subjectivistic thesis. The use of
"represent" may suggest the latter interpretation; so too
the fact that Hagerstrom writes, at the same page, that what
is needed to arouse a feeling in a hearer to do the right
thing
"is not the mere utterance of the words but in addition
that they should be uttered in a way which is characte¬
ristic of the expression of an already existing volition".
71) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 111.
72) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 123 (my italics).
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What then is this way? The answer is that "it is ne¬
cessary that the consciousness of the intention in ques¬
tion actually be present in the giver of the order". And
then Hagerstrom says that "in the region of value", e.g.
axiological judgements, "every attempt to translate the sen¬
tence into a genuinely indicative form ... is a mere flatus
• „ 73)
VOC1S .
Thus, axiological judgements are covered by the emotive
thesis. A value sentence has "no objective sense" but is
"merely couched in such a form that it produces the mislead¬
ing impression that there is a judgement at the back of it".
What about the region of duty? Here Hagerstrom says
"Against this solution (i.e. the emotive thesis) ... must
be set the fact that the duty-sentence in its indicative
form does not remain a mere flatus vocis; it influences my
way of thinking. It really is the case that "being under
an obligation" functions as a logical term."
If it is the case that "duty" functions as a logical
term, then it follows that there is a judgement behind the
duty-sentence. This, then, supports the view that normative
judgements are covered by the subjectivistic thesis.
Later Hagerstrom says that
"the real position is as follows: It is the presence of
the feeling of duty, in combination with the idea of a
certain action as the right one, which leads to the idea
that we are here concerned with an action ... which is of
essential importance for the preservation of one's auto¬
nomy. "74)
The vital point is how "the presence of the feeling of duty"
is expressed. Hagerstrom says that "it is only if I feel"
the conative impulse which is present in the feeling of duty,
that the word duty has any meaning. Now "feel" may denote
sensation, and in this case duty-sentences express such sen¬
sations. Sensations have no objects, the sensation (feeling)
75)and the thing sensed (felt) are one and the same. It
follows that duty-sentences do not express judgements at
all. Hence normative judgements are after all to be covered
73) Hagerstrom, UNTLM p. 136. Following quotations from this page (my
italics, and my brackets).
74) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 151-2 (my italics).
75) Cf. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 29.
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by the emotive thesis. But "feel" may also denote "percep¬
tions we have of external objects, by the sense of touch",
and in this case there is an independent object. The feel¬
ing and the thing felt are distinct. This involves judge¬
ment. "Feeling of duty" then may involve judgement. If this
is the case, then normative judgements are covered by the
subjectivistic thesis. I am not quite sure whether Hager-
strom does notice this ambiguity of the word "feel".
Certainly Hagerstrom holds that neither "value" nor
76)
"duty" are objective properties of things or actions.
This rules out that Hagerstrom subscribes to a cognitive
theory in the version of non-naturalism, which he held, at
11)least for normative judgements, until 1910. It does not
rule out that Hagerstrom subscribes to a cognitive theory
in the version of naturalism. As far as axiological judge¬
ments are concerned this is ruled out by Hagerstrom's emo¬
tive thesis. There is no objective moral knowledge in this
area. This implies, of course, that there is no separate
science of values. It also implies that such judgements as
expressions of illusions are within the province of sciences
such as psychology or sociology. What is studied is the men¬
tal elements. Value thinking is really only an aberration
of human consciousness, a release of tensions which have
been built up in the organs of the body. This fits with Ha-
gerstrom's materialism, cf. above Chapter III, Section 5 .
The problem is to offer an explanation of feelings and vo¬
litions in purely naturalistic terms. The answer is, per¬
haps, that the manifestations of feelings of pain and plea¬
sure may correspond to the nervous system of the body. Some
answer of this kind is suggested by Hagerstrom, but never
fully worked out. ^
There are then the normative judgements to consider.
Hagerstrom's analysis involves him in considerable troubles.
His basic position is the way of truth: if an object is
76) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 141, cf. p. 135.
77) Hagerstrom, Kritiska punkter i vardepsykologien, p. 33. This is
completely overlooked by Petersson, Axel Hagerstroms vardeteori,
Ch. 2.
78) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 264, cf. p. 236.
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studies then the object must exist in reality, cf. above
Chapter IV, Section 8. If normative judgements are studied
then they must exist in reality. On the one hand, normative
judgements are not mere words, i.e. there is a real meaning
to be found here, which implies that there are thoughts be¬
hind such sentences. These thoughts can be affected by
foreign elements, viz. feelings or volitions. On the other
hand, normative judgements are just mere words, i.e. there
is no real meaning to be found here, which implies that there
are no thoughts at all but only volitions. This is crucial
for Hagerstrom's analysis of legal rules, and I shall return
to it in Chapter VI on law.
Thus, Hagerstrom is on the way of opinion: the object
of study is normative judgements, but they are there as
thoughts, and they are not there as thoughts. I have an idea
of obligation in mind, which I apprehend as real, this idea
is on the one hand something determinate, i.e. a thought,
on the other hand it is something indeterminate, i.e. a vo¬
lition. Hagerstrom has to make up his mind what to do. To
accept the way of opinion leads to the completely unintel¬
ligible "thing in itself" or to "duty in itself". We must
proceed along the way of truth which declares what reality
in itself is. This way tells us that if a thing is studied
then it has the property of necessary existence. It follows
that if normative judgements are studied they must have the
property of necessary existence.
If the emotive thesis holds for normative judgements,
it follows that there must be volitions or intentions to
be found in human consciousness. But if we follow Hagerstrom
consciousness of willing is "not at all any kind of object
which could be assigned a place in material and temporal
79)
reality". There must be an object, so what is studied
is then volitions or intentions as bodily manifestations.
This fits again with Hagerstrom's materialism. Again the
problem is to provide an explanation of volitions in pure¬
ly naturalistic terms. The answer is, perhaps, that mani-
79) Hagerstrom, PR p. 235, cf. p. 236.
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festations of volitions may correspond to the muscular sy¬
stem of the body. Some answer of this sort is suggested by
80)
Hagerstrom. But then he faces, in his own words, "the
task of explaining the psychological possibility of the lo¬
gically absurd consciousness of activity". This is, I sug¬
gest, a case of confused thinking, since if activity of the
will is logically impossible, then the empirical possibili¬
ty of men's activity is ruled out. For Hagerstrom the con¬
cept of activity has no meaning, but then it is inconsistent
to say that thinking is affected by feelings or volitions,
since this implies activity. Hagerstrom's theory then tumbles
into ruins.
If the subjectivist thesis holds for normative judge¬
ments it follows that there must be judgements, which have
the property of necessary truths. There is then a case for
moral or practical knowledge. But if this is the case then
Hagerstrom's attack on "modern so-called value-psychology"
as a mere conceptual confusion is without any foundation.
The subjectivistic thesis holds that normative judgements
can be replaced by non-normative judgements without any
change of meaning. Ethics as a science of conduct can be
reduced to social-psychology. This is also Hagerstrom's
opinion, so he is then confused when he claims that John
Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer are metaphysicians. Hager¬
strom has failed to see the implications of the subjecti-
vistic thesis. Another example where his thinking leads him
astray.
The question of the status of normative judgements is
then important. Hagerstrom is not explicit as to which
theory he holds. In his book Inquiries he seems to en¬
dorse the subjectivistic thesis. In his later Selbstdar-
stellung his general claim is that in the area of practi¬
cal knowledge everything is metaphysics. This gives support
to the emotive thesis. He is, however, quite explicit that
the question of the nature of value judgements must be
solved by a psychological investigation of the peculiar
80) Hagerstrom, PR p. 233 f.
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states of consciousness which are bound up with the feel¬
ings of valuation and the feeling of duty. This is psycho-
logism, i.e. the theory that the meaning of terms depends
upon human consciousness. On Hagerstrom's account this is
a false theory concerning the objectivity of knowledge. It
is also a false theory methodologically, since consciousness
of feeling and volition do not exist, which Hagerstrom seems
to forget when he relies on introspection.
It is also a false theory concerning meaning, a point
which Hagerstrom overlooks. This leads Hagerstrom's thinking
astray. Rather than inquiring into the use made of moral
terms by living people in his own days, Hagerstrom turns his
back on the present and his eyes on the past. His investiga¬
tion of the meaning of moral, and especially legal, terms
is a genetic and historical inquiry into how the Romans
talked, according to Hagerstrom's way of truth. The result?
They talked nonsense, whereas Hagerstrom reveals the truth,
or so he invites us to believe. I think the invitation should
be declined.
4. Fundamental Moral Standards
One of the major problems of moral philosophy as an analy¬
tic enterprise concerns the meaning of moral terms which I
have dealt with in the preceding section. In this section
I shall deal with another major problem. This problem con¬
cerns whether or not moral judgements can be supported or
justified, and if so, on what grounds a justification is
made possible. These two problems are interrelated. Hager¬
strom's general position is his thesis of moral nihilism,
i.e. moral knowledge is a delusion. This thesis implies
that there is something fundamentally wrong with the gene¬
ral belief, which most men have, that there are proper or
improper ways of behaving at all, and that it is possible to
obtain moral knowledge concerning what actions are right
and wrong, and what things men ought to aim at. Hagerstrom
supports his claim that moral knowledge is a delusion by
arguing that it is fundamentally wrong to hold that certain
moral words, like "right", "wrong", "value", "ought", have
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real meaning. Such words are rather words without any mean¬
ing at all. Consequently, when men use these words in sen¬
tences they think they are putting forward judgements which
are true and important for social life in society. As a
matter of fact, from Hagerstrom's conceptual standpoint,
they are saying nothing at all. They suppose they are talk¬
ing sense when they use such words, but this supposition
is delusive. It "only gives expression to man's deep-rooted
tendency to make his own values into the true essence of
81)
reality". This delusion, of course, may have a profound
effect on the behaviour of men suffering from it. In this
way, Hagerstrom says "popular morality has come to work in
8 2)
an anti-social and anti-cultural direction". A rational
man, e.g. Hagerstrom, will not suffer from this delusion,
for a rational man would not suppose he was talking sense,
when he was in fact talking nonsense. Since moral words are
meaningless they cannot be used to express moral judgements.
If there is knowledge then it is expressed in judge¬
ments, and if there is moral knowledge then it is expressed
in moral judgements. There are no moral judgements, hence
there is no moral knowledge. Thus, Hagerstrom backs his
claim by considering the meaning of moral words. Since there
are no moral judgements, there can be no valid method for
obtaining moral knowledge. It follows that the question of
specifying the principles of moral reasoning does not arise.
Hagerstrom arrives at his thesis of moral nihilism by
taking another way, and it is this way I wish to consider
in this section. I shall first consider Hagerstrom's argu¬
ment relying on the notions of subjective and objective
ideas, and argue that this argument is a failure. Next I
shall consider Hagerstrom's discussion of fundamental stand¬
ards, and argue that Hagerstrom's account is incoherent.
The starting point for Hagerstrom is that there are
moral ideas. The question is next to consider the method
by which the truth or falsity of moral ideas can be estab¬
lished, and upon what grounds this method rests. The struc-
81) Hagerstrom, PR p. 90.
82) Hagerstrom, PR p. 94.
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ture of Hagerstrom's argument is that in the end these
grounds turn out to be "a subjective posture" of feelings
or interests concerning the supreme values. It follows that
the reasons given in support of moral judgements are wholly
subjective. If so, then "there is present no consciousness
8 3)
of objectivity whatsoever".
Moral predicates are not possessed by actions or human
beings in the absence of people who pass judgements upon
them or who respond to them with such feelings as approval,
indignation, or mercy. According to Hagerstrom's epistemo-
logy the possibility of moral knowledge presupposes that
it must have an objective reality, moral knowledge must re¬
late to an independent given object in space and time. Since
the supreme value is not an independent given object in
space and time, but rather depends upon our subjective pos¬
tures, it follows that there is no possibility of moral know¬
ledge .
Hagerstrom's assumption is that objectivity requires
a material object in space and time. For Hagerstrom a thing
or an event is objective if it exists outside anybody's
mind, e.g. a table, and it is subjective if it is or is
part of somebody's state or process of mind, e.g. a pain.
In connection with sentences, a sentence expresses an ob¬
jective judgement if it is concerned with something other
than a mental event in somebody's mind, e.g. judgements
such as (a) "there is a table" or (b) "the number of stars
84)
in the universe is actually determinate". A sentence
expresses a subjective judgement if it is concerned with
the existence of mental processes or state of mind, e.g.
judgements such as (c) "I am happy" or (d) "Hagerstrom
fears God".
Since there are other senses of the terms "objective" and
"subjective", I shall call the senses mentioned "objective (1)"
and "subjective (1)". I shall draw a different distinction be¬
tween "objective (2)" and "subjective (2)". In this case a judge-
83) Hagerstrom, PR p. 88.
84) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 62.
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ment is objective (2) if it is concerned with a subject-
matter which is something other than an event in the mind
of the author of the judgement. A judgement is subjective
(2) if it asserts or expresses the features of a mental pro-
cess or state of mind in the mind of the author of the judge¬
ment. On this understanding of the terms, the judgements (a)
and (b) mentioned above are still objective in both sense
(1) and sense (2), but judgement (d) about Hagerstrom is
objective in sense (2), since it is not concerned with my
state of mind, but with Hagerstrom's. To be sure, judgement
(c) is still a subjective judgement in both senses.
Hagerstrom does not make this distinction between ob-
jective in senses (1) and (2), and subjective in senses (1)
and (2). This involves him in great difficulties with judge¬
ments concerned with mental processes or mental states. Men¬
tal events must somehow be objective (1) if they are to be
spoken of in judgements.
To complicate matters there is a third sense of "sub^-
jective" and "objective". This sense implies nothing about
the subject-matter of judgements, but it does imply some¬
thing about the background of the author of a judgement. A
judgement is objective (3) if the author of the judgement
is indifferent, impartial or unbiased in putting forward
his judgement about any subject-matter. By contrast a judge¬
ment is subjective (3) if the author's judgement about any
subject-matter is greatly influenced by his passions.
Hagerstrom also fails to notice this difference. - It
may very well be the case that many judgements, which are
objective (1), are not objective (3) but rather subjective
(3). As Popper writes, "Everyone who has an inkling of the
history of the natural sciences is aware of the passionate
85)
tenacity which characterizes many of its quarrels".
For Hagerstrom, if a judgement is objective (1), it
follows that it is objective (2). This is true. But it does
not follow, as Hagerstrom invites us to believe that it is
also objective (3). For Hagerstr5m, if a judgement is sub-
85) Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. II, p. 217.
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jective (1), it follows that it is subjective (2) as well.
But this is by no means the case, as judgements (c) and (d)
illustrate. It is by this argument that Hagerstrom arrives
at his thesis of moral nihilism. But this is to beg the ques¬
tion. The correct inference is that if a judgement is sub¬
jective (2), then it follows that it is subjective (1). And
the question is precisely whether moral judgements are sub¬
jective (2). And again it by no means follows that if a
judgement is subjective in sense (1) or (2), then it is
also subjective (3). If Hagerstrom's argument is valid,
then no person can ever make a reliable report concerning
his own mental states. This is surely not a conceptual truth
but an empirical matter. Hagerstrom invites us to believe
that his judgements are objective in all senses, and that
this is so, since he has purified his mind from the delu¬
sions of words and the influence of passions. Hagerstrom
believes that his mission is to expose the false conscious¬
ness of other people. But how can Hagerstrom know that he
has freed himself from the religious and social complex
which determines the way of thinking of other people? The
answer is: by resting knowledge upon his own unified con¬
sciousness. The objection is then that the truth or falsi¬
ty of his judgements cannot be established by reference to
his unified state of mind. The truth or falsity of judge¬
ments must be established, as Popper claims, by the social
aspect of mutual criticism. Thus my conclusion is that Ha¬
gerstrom's thesis of moral nihilism fails, since he fails
to notice the ambiguity of the terms "subjective" and "ob¬
jective" whether moral judgements are objective (3) or sub'-
jective (3) is one thing. Quite another thing is the sub¬
ject-matter of moral judgements, i.e. whether these judge¬
ments are concerned with features of the world, i.e. objec¬
tive (1) or whether these judgements are concerned with men¬
tal features, i.e. subjective (1) or subjective (2).
This leads me to Hagerstrom's discussion of moral
standards. HagerstrBm's inaugural lecture begins by a re¬
minder. This is that our moral ideas are determined by our
environment and upbringing. Thus, Hagerstrom reports Hero-
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dotus' account that within the Persian Empire there were
some tribes that buried their dead and some that burned
them. Each group thought that the other's practice was
horrible. Another example is moral points of view of dif¬
ferent social classes, i.e. the bitter strife between Capi¬
tal and Labour, where there is another conflict of prin¬
ciple. What is outrageous for one view is precisely what
is just for the other. Thus, for Hagerstrom "the variations
86)
of moral values are unmistakable". This is a fact. And
this fact "unavoidably" leads Hagerstrom to ask the ques¬
tion, which view is the right one? "What is the standard,
by which we may measure the correctness of different opi-
87)nions?" This question is for Hagerstrom equivalent to
the question: "What is the standard which determines man's
moral purpose?" Hagerstrom's assumption is that there must
be an answer to this question if there is to be an objec-
88)
tive distinction between right and wrong.
To inquire into moral knowledge is to look for "the
ultimate goal",or "the good in the proper sense", or "a
certain relationship as the right", or "obligation (ought),
89)
or the supreme value itself". Hagerstrom's inquiry is
then guided by his belief that there must be a single supreme
value, which is determinative for what we ought to do. If
there is such a thing as "the supreme value itself", then
Hagerstrom claims "of course what we ought to do can be de-
90)
cided in an objective manner".
Hagerstrom's way of formulating his question casts him
as a follower of Plato and Aristotle. They also tried to an¬
swer the question: "What is the supreme good?" And the par¬
ticular way, in which a philosophical question is formulated
can make a great deal of difference to what answer is pos¬
sible to it, or whether, indeed, any answer is possible. I
suggest that Hagerstrom's way of putting his question leads
86) Hagerstrom, PR p. 77.
87) Hagerstrom, PR p. 79 (my italics).
88) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 79, 82, 84, 87.
89) Hagerstrom, PR p. 80, 86, 87.
90) HagerstrSm, PR p. 87 - cf. for the parallel case in the area of
non-moral knowledge, Ch. IV.
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him astray. It sends him searching for the standard which
determines man's moral purpose. Failing to find any such
standard, Hagerstrom then claims that there is no moral
knowledge. But the failure lies in the question, since Ha-
gerstrom's question implies the judgement that there is
such a thing as the moral purpose of man, and this implies
that there is one and only one thing, that is man's moral
purpose. Hagerstrom fails to examine his question before
he starts his examination of what man's moral purpose is.
No wonder that Hagerstrom on the one hand fails to establish
a conclusive answer, for the question is unanswerable be¬
cause wrongly put. It is for example never clear whether
Hagerstrom, when he talks about "man's moral purpose" is
thinking of "man" in the sense of "mankind" or "man" in the
sense of "individuals". It is far from obvious that mankind
has any moral purpose, unless perhaps there is a God, and
mankind is thus under a moral obligation to forward the
purpose which He has in mind. Since Hagerstrom is an atheist,
this is ruled out if he is consistent. As far as individuals
are concerned to talk of "purpose" is to talk of the con¬
scious intention of a living being, a particular human being,
to bring about something. But again this is ruled out by Ha¬
gerstrom, since intention or volition is objectless. Indeed,
91)
the notion of activity is logically absurd. But this is
absurd, since Hagerstrom then ignores the distinction be-
92)
tween a person acting and a person being acted upon.
Despite all this, Hagerstrom does establish an answer,
viz. that man's moral purpose is to obey the law. Thus,
there is a fundamental incoherence in Hagerstrom's account
of moral standards, as I shall show in the following para¬
graphs .
Hagerstrom records, as noticed above p. 328, the fa¬
mous passage in the history of Herodotus which contrasts
conflicting customs. The question is how to interpret these
facts. Members of each group profess horror at the prac¬
tices of the other. This may be understood as an empirical
91) Hagerstrom, PR p. 234.
92) Cf. Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, p. 13.
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claim or it may be understood as a normative claim. As an
empirical claim it amounts to a sociological theory that
a certain group of people thinks that it is right to burn
one's parents, whereas another group of people thinks that
this is wrong. This does not, however, exclude the possibi¬
lity that both groups are trying, in different ways, to ho¬
nour their dead parents. In so far as this is the case, we
have a sociological theory claiming that people think that
there is in the end one ultimate standard of harmonizing
people's interests which is applied to different circum¬
stances of practical life giving rise to specific rules.
Hagerstrom does not consider the last possibility. He takes
it as an established fact that there is a great variation
in the moral beliefs and practices of different cultures.
From this fact he argues, as far as I can see, to the nor¬
mative claim that what is right in one group may be wrong
in another group. This is the theory known as ethical rela¬
tivism which holds that moral judgements and moral norms
are to be considered valid only within the society or group
of people within a society which has adopted such norms as
part of its way of life. By implication any universal vali¬
dity of moral norms is denied.
If Hagerstrom uses the sociological fact of the varia¬
bility of moral beliefs as basis for his theory that there
is no moral knowledge, then he must follow the argument
where it leads and accept that the same holds in case of
scientific knowledge. There is also a great variability in
scientific beliefs. This is granted by Hagerstrom but he
arrives nevertheless at the conclusion that there is scien¬
tific knowledge, cf. above Chapter IV, Section 7. This is in¬
consistent. Either Hagerstrom must hold that there is scien¬
tific as well as moral knowledge or that the facts of people's
beliefs are irrelevant. All our beliefs, empirical ones no
less than moral ones are learned from society. We are not
born with any innate beliefs about chemistry or physics,
which we learn only in schools, if we learn it at all. Yet this
fact does not make us sceptical about the possibility of
scientific knowledge, if we follow Hagerstrom's account of
scientific knowledge. Hagerstrom believes perhaps that we
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are born with moral values, writing "we carry within us the
93)conflict between an altruistic and a vengeful morality".
This is an empirical claim, and it may turn out to be true.
Nevertheless Hagerstrom also believes that our moral atti¬
tudes and judgements are learned from the social environ¬
ment .
"One does not probe to the bottom of the matter if one
seeks to understand the way in which conscience functions
without considering the centuries of religious education".
This is true, but again this fact has no bearing upon the
possibility of moral knowledge. Hagerstrom apparently thinks
so. But then he overlooks that the origin or cause of a be¬
lief, whether scientific or moral, is one kind of inquiry.
The reasons that justify a belief, whether scientific or
moral, is another inquiry.
In other words, Hagerstrom overlooks the distinction,
made by Francis Hutcheson, between "exciting reasons" and
94)
"justifying reasons" for moral beliefs and moral actions.
Morally and philosophically, the important inquiry is into
the justifying reasons of moral judgements just as the im¬
portant inquiry of philosophy of science is the justifica¬
tion of scientific judgements by a valid method of inter-
subjective reasoning. In the latter case there is a valid
method, for Hagerstrom this is the principle of knowledge
and reality based upon the universal continuum of experience,
cf. above Chapter IV, Section 6. Does the same hold in the
moral area?
Confronted with conflicts of moral judgements Hager¬
strom considers some standards which may be used "for judging
the correctness of particular moral opinions". He mentions
three standards,
1) the standard of observable realities, viz. "evo¬
lution" ,
2) the standard of "unobservable realities", or "the
supernatural reality", viz. "consciousness of
obligation",
93) Hagerstrom, PR p. 79, for the next quotation in the text see p. 86.
94) Francis Hutcheson, Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728) in Bri¬
tish Moralists 1650-1800 (edt. D.D. Raphael) Oxford 1969, vol. 1,
p. 308.
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3) the standard of "our own moral consciousness".
I shall consider these in turn.
First there is the standard of evolution. The word "e-
volution" is ambiguous", Hagerstrom says. This is not quite
correct. It is rather people who use the word "evolution"
ambiguously. According to Hagerstrom people use the word to
signify either "progress towards the realization of an ob¬
jective purpose, lying within the thing itself" or "the de-
96)
veloping adaptation of a thing to the requirements of life".
What Hagerstrom has in mind is the question of man's moral
purpose. What he wants to know is whether there is something
which fashions human beings along with other objects in the
world to serve this end.
Evolution is considered to provide an answer to the
question: what is man's moral purpose? Hagerstrom objects
that when the word is used in the first sense, there is no
determinate answer. Hence evolution cannot serve as a stan¬
dard. When the word is used in the second sense, there is
a determinate answer. This is, Hagerstrom says, that "pro¬
gress is necessary". Hagerstrom probably thinks of Herbert
Spencer's equation of evolution with progress based upon the
principle of the survival of the fittest.
My objection to this principle is that it is either a
tautology (if "fit" means "able to survive") or false (if
"fit" means "physically fit"). So the principle is useless
as a standard.
Hagerstrom's objection is rather based upon that mere
life is not man's moral purpose. For Hagerstrom man's life
must have some meaning. Hagerstrom disagrees with the view
put forward by Macbeth:
"Life's but a walking shadow ; a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more : it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing."97)
95) Hagerstrom, PR p. 82, p. 79 f. - Cp. above Ch. IV, Sec. 8 for the
way of opinion, the way of illusion, the way of truth.
96) Hagerstrom, PR p. 79 f.
97) William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V, V,24.
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How can an issue between Hagerstrom and Macbeth be
settled except by fiat? Ruling "mere life" out as the ul¬
timate goal Hagerstrom in fact presupposes that he knows
what the ultimate purpose is. What this is remains to be
revealed after having discussed Hagerstrom's next sugges¬
tion. This is the standard of "the supernatural reality
which is supposed to manifest itself in the consciousness
of obligation". What Hagerstrom has in mind is the Kantian
doctrine of "Autonomy of the will as the supreme principle
98)
of morality". Hagerstrom's discussion of Kant is brief
and his quotation of the Kantian formulas is not accurate.
Hagerstrom follows Hegel in rejecting the Kantian principle
99)
of duty for duty's sake as an empty notion. I am not sure
whether this criticism is to the point. In another context
Hagerstrom claims that "for Kant morality in itself has no
1 U 4- " 10Q)value whatsoever .
Hagerstrom, it seems to me, is definitely wrong, but
I shall not pursue my criticism. Hagerstrom's discussion of
the relation between the supernatural will and the natural
order is also confused.10"1"' He uses the law of excluded
muddle, but confuses negatives (natural and non-natural)
with opposites (natural and supernatural). His discussion
is a muddle and there is no use trying to unravel it.
But Hagerstrom has then arrived at the third standard,
the standard of moral consciousness as a measure of man's
moral purpose. In this respect Hagerstrom claims that "it
is evident that we may not use for this purpose our own
moral consciousness, as that which is closest at hand. In¬
deed it is not itself determinate". This suggests that there
are two reasons for rejecting moral consciousness as stan¬
dard. One reason is the appeal to self-evidence. But this
may be counterattacked by Bishop Butler's claim that con-
98) Kant, The Moral Law, p. 101.
99) Hagerstrom, PR p. 82, cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 135, p. 89 f.
cf. Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 156. - And see for a discussion
Williams, The Concept of the Categorical Imperative, p. 72 f.
100) Hagerstrom, PR p. 201.
101) Hagerstrom, PR p. 80.
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science is our natural guide in moral matters.''"^' The other
reason is that moral consciousness is not itself determinate.
If it is determinate may it then be used as the standard,
or is this ruled out by Hagerstrbm's appeal to the first
reason of self-evidence? The latter seems to be the case,
since Hagerstrom later says,
"if one refers to conscience as that which affords the norms
for unifying these spheres of interest., then, as seen from
a purely scientific point of view, one has actually only
made a declaration of bankruptcy103)
Having found that there is no standard which determines
man's moral purpose, Hagerstrom concludes that "the conse¬
quence seems to be that there is no objective distinction
between right and wrong" This suggests that there is,
perhaps, an objective distinction after all. Perhaps Hager¬
strom has Hume in mind. Hume says that
"those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions
may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants, nor is it
conceivable that any human creature could ever seriously
believe that all characters and actions were alike entitled
to the affection and regard of everyone".105)
Hagerstrom does not seriously believe this. He is quite
adamant that "there is a duty for society to protect itself
from such natures (as a Caesar Borgia) just as there -is a
duty for the shepherd to prevent the wolf from doing harm".''"^'
He is also quite adamant that
"that the action ought to be done is not at all part of
what we can discover. The keenest analysis of what is pre¬
sent reveals no such thing. ... Every attempt to draw out
of the situation the conclusion that it is actually in the
highest degree of value to undertake the action is doomed
to failure."10^)
So Hagerstrom has involved himself in a self-contra¬
diction. On the one hand there is a duty, for society and
the shepherd, to react against "the anti-social individual
and anti-social behaviour". ^
102) Bishop Butler, On the Nature of Virtue (1736), in British Mora¬
lists, vol. 1, p. 379., cf. Hagerstrom's ref. to Butler, INLM p. 208.
103) Hagerstrom, PR p. 82.
104) Hagerstrom, PR p. 82 (my italics).
105) Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Sec.I,p.169 f.
106) Hagerstrom, PR p. 92 (my italics).
107) Hagerstrom, PR p. 88 (his italics).
108) Hagerstrom, PR p. 71, cf. p. 93 f.
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This implies that there is an objective distinction
between right and wrong. On the other hand, there is no ob¬
jective distinction between right and wrong, since it is
"nonsense to regard the idea of obligation as true".
On the one hand, no moral standard can be found which
determines man's moral purpose. On the other hand, a moral
standard can be found which determines man's moral purpose.
This moral standard is that "an actually autonomous morali¬
ty is within us, determined only by direct regard for what
we esteem most of all"."'"10^ If this is so, why does Hager¬
strom then consider it to be "necessary" to inquire into
the development of moral ideas? This seems to me to be an
indication that Hagerstrom does not understand his own ques¬
tion. If the standard of moral action is determined only by
the individual's direct regard for what he esteems most of
all, then the individual may consult his own conscience as
the only reliable guide. The sense that he ought to do cer¬
tain things arises directly from the various situations in
which he finds himself. At this stage his attitude to obli¬
gations is one of unquestioning confidence, determined by
his moral conscience.
The question is what do we esteem most of all? For Ha¬
gerstrom the answer is that "we wish first and foremost to
live an unobstructed life, but this unobstructed life we
find in God".^^ We may also find it in an orderly society,
and so live in "eternal blessedness". Thus, Hagerstrom
writes "we who long more than anything else for the happi¬
ness and refinement of the human race have no need to des-
112)
pair". There is no need to despair, since "all evidence
points to the fact" that a "popular morality ... will be
born anew out of the ashes of the old morality, with a more
113)
emancipated and farsighted vision".
Thus, Hagerstrom also appeals to the standard of evo-
109) Hagerstrom, PR p. 95.
110) Hagerstrom, PR p. 93.
111) Hagerstrom, PR p. 213, cf. p. 179 (my italics).
112) Hagerstrom, PR p. 94 (my italics).
113) Hagerstrom, PR p. 95.
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lution. The "popular morality" counteracts "the anti-social
forces which destroy community and solidarity". The measure
is that "the mode of action is good which is demanded by
114)
the well-being of the whole race". But he rejects this
standard, as is shown above. Thus, Hagerstrom is involved
in a self-contradiction.
By using "we" he also commits exactly the error which
he finds fault with other authors, viz. that his "philoso¬
phy of value ... only gives expression to man's deep-rooted
tendency to make his own values into the true essence of
reality".
What reduces me to despair is that Hagerstrom cannot eat
his cake and still have it. On the one hand, he claims that
the supreme purpose of man cannot be determined hence there
is no moral knowledge. Moral teaching is only a teaching
about morality. On the other hand, he claims that the supreme
purpose of man can be determined, i.e. to live peacefully in
society and obey the law. Hence there can be a teaching in
morals, whether this discipline then is to be classified as
legal science or moral science is a minor question. Hence
the basis for the conflicting opinions among Scandinavian
legal realists, e.g. the debate between Lundstedt and Ross,
115)
concerning the scientific status of the method of welfare.
Yet it is not surprising that Lundstedt and Ross, though
opposed to each other, can both appeal to Hagerstrom's philo¬
sophy. For Hagerstrom's philosophy is, as I have tried to
show, riddled with contradictions. Despite that, it has de¬
cided implications as to the conduct of human beings in so¬
ciety. These implications are considered in the next section.
5. Morals and Society
In this section I wish to consider Hagerstrom's thesis of
moral nihilism, i.e. that knowledge of value is impossible,
and the implications of this thesis for Hagerstrom's view
concerning the conduct of individuals in society.
Hagerstrom sets out his thesis in the inaugural lec-
114) Hagerstrom, PR p. 303.
115) Cf. my Skandinavischer Realismus, p. 104 f.
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ture which caused such commotion when it was delivered, cf.
above Section 2, p. 292. Just being nominated a professor of
moral philosophy Hagerstrom denies to moral philosophy its
accepted status as an academic discipline. The function of
this discipline is to propound and discuss various theories
about the difference between right and wrong conduct. Accord¬
ing to the received opinion the answers provided by the moral
philosopher help ordinary men to solve their moral problems
by giving them some practical guidance in the conduct of their
life, by telling them how to live and what they ought to aim
at. Hagerstrom's denial that it is the philosopher's business
to provide answers to moral questions, such as "what actions
ought we to perform, and what other sorts of actions ought we
to refrain from performing?", is perhaps shocking, but there
is nothing revolutionary in this view. It is held, for example,
by Kant and Hegel, although for different reasons.
What is shocking in Hagerstrom's thesis that knowledge of
value is impossible is the more radical claim that "it is non-
116)
sense to regard the idea of an obligation as true". Most
people would say that the idea of obligation is true and im¬
portant for life in society, but on Hagerstrom's theory they
are talking nonsense. This is a startling claim, since Hager¬
strom's thesis implies that plain men have been speaking non¬
sense in all ages. If this is so, then this may lead to the
view of ethical irrationalism, i.e. the view that there is no
moral order in the world, there is no proper or improper mode
of conduct, but people's moral opinions are in short - to use
Nietzsche's phrase - "only a sign-language of the emotions ...
117)from an intellectual point of view". This is also Hager¬
strom's view, from "the point of view of thought" moral terms
are "meaningless", or "combinations of words of the ordinary
metaphysical variety inasmuch as one does not pass over to
. , _ . . . „ 118)rdeas of reality .
116) Hagerstrom, PR p. 95.
117) Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 92, and p. 101. HSgerstrdm ad¬
mires Nietzsche, "head and shoulders above all others", letter from
May 1896, Waller p. 128 f. (my translation). Hagerstrom planned to
write a book on Nietzsche, but it was abandoned, ibid. p. 173.
118) Hagerstrom, PR p. 70.
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This suggests that there is no distinction between mo¬
ral conduct and immoral conduct or ethical conduct or un¬
ethical conduct. If this is so the peace within society,
and the peace among societies are put in jeopardy, since
moral opinions have no objective basis or justification.
Everybody can only appeal to his own feelings and no effec¬
tive standard of good conduct will be left. This leads to
anarchy.
Hagerstrom has a paramount interest in conduct combined
with an ardent desire for knowledge. I have argued that Ha-
gerstrom's philosophy is inspired by the philosophical,
scientific and political upheaveals of his own time. His
philosophy is presented as the way of truth which once and
for ever puts an end to the illusions of philosophy and
science. Hagerstrom claims that we know that the universe
is stable, governed by universal and unchanging laws which
function independently of human thinking, feeling and will¬
ing. These laws can be discovered and understood by ratio-
119)
nal men who in this way become "the master of nature".
Hagerstrom also wants an orderly society. He certainly
does not endorse Nietzsche's glorification of war, nor does
he endorse the thesis of ethical irrationalism that every¬
thing is permitted. On the one hand Hagerstrom claims that
his thesis of moral nihilism does not entail any ethical
irrationalism which will lead to dramatic consequences as
far as the conduct of individuals is concerned. On the con¬
trary Hagerstrom's thesis is neutral between particular mo¬
ral outlooks. This I shall call Hagerstrom's neutrality the¬
sis. I shall also wish to argue that it breaks down in Ha-
- i 120)gerstrom's case.
Hagerstrom's rejoinder to the accusation that his mo¬
ral philosophy has dangerous consequences is that it stands
121)
"beyond good and evil". it does not teach "that we ought
to leave aside all current moral rules and only give consi¬
deration to our selfish interests. This is the standpoint
119) HSgerstrom, PR p. 303,
120) I failed to realize this in my Skandinavischer Realismus, p. 59 f.
121) Hagerstrom, PR p. 96, also here the next two quotations.
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122)of the Sophists". This is the position of ethical irra-
tionalism or moral relativism according to which it is main¬
tained that everything is permissible. Hagerstrom's rejoin¬
der is that this is a moral portion, which
"establishes other valuations than those which are con¬
tained in our ordinary moral ideas. But science does not
have to make judgements.of value in this way. Just as it
cannot show that given rules ought to be followed, so it
cannot show that they ought not to be followed - and that
other principles of conduct ought to come forward instead".
Hagerstrom's rejoinder is, it seems to me, based upon
two independent, but opposing, arguments. One argument is
that the position of moral relativism is false. This is so,
since it "establishes other valuations than those which are
contained in our ordinary moral ideas". What are "our ordi¬
nary moral ideas"? According to Hagerstrom "we carry within
us the conflict between an altruistic and a vengeful morali¬
ty".123^
I take it that moral relativism relates to the vengeful
morality of egoism. If so, then moral relativism, if taken
as an empirical theory, is true on Hagerstrom's own account
of "ordinary moral ideas". So Hagerstrom has involved him¬
self in a self-contradiction. If moral relativism is under¬
stood as a normative theory, then Hagerstrom's rejoinder is
still that this is false moral theory, "since science does
not have to make judgements of value in this way". The true
moral theory is the altruistic moral theory. This also in¬
volves Hagerstrom in difficulties, since this is to make a
value-judgement. And a value-judgement, Hagerstrom says,
"cannot be said to be either true or false". Again Hager¬
strom has involved himself in a self-contradiction. I shall
return to this aspect below p. 351.
The second argument is more successful. This is that
science is neutral. It cannot show that a given rule ought
or ought not to be followed. Moral philosophy as a scienti¬
fic discipline is an empirical science which describes our
122) I pass over whether Hagerstrom's claim concerning the Sophist is
correct, for a discussion see Barnes, The Pre-Socratic Philoso¬
phers, vol. II, Ch. IX.
123) Hagerstrom, PR p. 79.
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ordinary moral ideas which conflict in a fundamental way be¬
tween altruistic ideas and vengeful ideas. This is Hager-
strom's conception of moral philosophy as a teaching about
morality which does not commit him logically to any moral
judgements. It only commits him to deliver a true theory which
124)
Hagerstrom also hopes will be advantageous to society.
Just as feelings and volitions interfere with thinking
and produce metaphysics so thinking can interfere and con¬
trol them. As he claims "not even our innermost beliefs can
125)
ultimately withstand the power of knowledge". This is
an echo of the conviction of eighteenth-century rationalist
philosophers.
Hagerstrom has a firm conviction in the power of the
"highly developed brains" of human beings to achieve know¬
ledge and abandon superstition. Some people are ignorant
and superstitious because they have been exploited in the
name of religion by cunning theologians and the classes
which have supported them. These superstitions must be era¬
dicated and people made to realize the proper functioning
of reason to achieve steady progress towards community and
solidarity. Hagerstrom writes "ultimately" and this quali¬
fication may render his claim quite vacuous. Nevertheless
Hagerstrom believes that his thesis will lead to
"a milder judgement on all human aspiration, which follows
from viewing things sub specie aeternitatis, from the in¬
sight that everything is only a moment in an endless natu¬
ral context, in which nothing is itself higher or lower". '
It is not consistent for Hagerstrom to consider things
under the form of eternity, since for him things are known by
us only as existing in relation to a given determinate space
and determinate time. Nor can it be consistent to pass "a
milder judgement" on all human aspirations, since according
124) In this respect Hagerstrom is perhaps influenced by Hume, Enquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals, Sec. IX, Part II, p. 279 or
Edward Westermarck,The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,
London 1906, vol. I, p. 17 f.
125) Hagerstrom, PR p. 93, cf. p. 299 f.
126) Hagerstrom, PR p. 95. - This is an echo of Spinoza, Ethics, Part
V, Prop. XXIX, p. 261 f., rather than a reference to Westermarek
as Petersson holds, Axel Hagerstroms vardeteori, p. 96.
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to Hagerstrom's own thesis of moral nihilism such a judge¬
ment is nothing but a meaningless string of words. The ob¬
jection from Hagerstrom may be that the distinction between
valuations and judgements is ignored. The neutrality thesis
is overlooked, this is the rejoinder to my objections. But
then my reply is that Hagerstrom's neutrality thesis breaks
down.
Hagerstrom wants to contrast scientific judgements
based upon thinking with moral judgements which properly
speaking cannot be considered to be judgements, since they
are based upon feelings or volitions. Hagerstrom has, as
far as I can see, two arguments for his neutrality thesis.
One argument is the origin and development of moral
ideas. They grow out of customs, and these customs are
thought of as having been ordained long ago by supernatural
beings and recorded in the traditions of the society. These
supernatural beings are not only the sources of moral ideas,
they provide the authority and the sanction for them. Moral
ideas are not thought of as obligatory in their own right,
they are always attached to an authoritative reality of super¬
natural beings,and moral rules are worthy of obedience simply
because they are the commands of a norm-establishing reali¬
ty. The penalty for disobedience is disaster in this world
and damnation in the next. Moral ideas are wholly dependent
on religion. It is not just that if there had been no reli¬
gion men would never have learned moral ideas. It is rather
that without religion there can be no moral ideas. Religion
is equivalent to irrationalism or mysticism, which is "essen¬
tial feeling and will, not consciousness of an objective
-t . . ii 127)reality .
Thus moral ideas are rooted in irrational feelings just
as legal ideas of rights and duties "have their roots in
traditional ideas of mystical forces and bonds", which have
12 8)
"no basis in reality". If modern moral philosophy and
modern jurisprudence still use such ideas as basis for their
judgements then this can only lead to a confusion of thought.
127) Hagerstrom, PR p. 225, cf. p. 250.
128) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 16, cf. p. 11.
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Such ideas express nothing but feelings and volitions. Neither
feeling nor volition leads to knowledge. By contrast scienti¬
fic judgements are based upon thinking which leads to know¬
ledge .
Hagerstrom presents his account of the origin of moral
and legal ideas as the truth. Morality and law are dependent
upon irrational ideas. His argument is that if religion and
Roman law can be explained to be an intellectual aberration,
an illusion induced by feelings and volitions, then modern
theology and modern jurisprudence can be discredited and dis¬
posed of in the same way. The argument fails to establish
this .
Modern chemistry grew out of the magical theories of
the alchemists, but Hagerstrom does not, on that account, re¬
gard it as owing its validity and truth to alchemy. Modern
jurisprudence grew out of the theories of Roman lawyers, and
in this case Hagerstrom regards the validity and truth of
modern jurisprudence as depending upon Roman law. If this
point can be used as an argument against the objectivity of
jurisprudence, then it can also be used as an argument against
the objectivity of chemistry, or logic, or of every other
branch of inquiry.
Hagerstrom's thinking is confused, since he confuses
the origin of a belief with the validity and truth of a judge¬
ment. In the case of morality and law he argues that if the
origin is irrational, as he supposes it is, then there can
be neither valid nor true judgements in these areas. But the
fact that I arrive at a judgement irrationally does not mean
that the judgement is false or meaningless. In the case of
thinking, Hagerstrom invites us to believe that if we arrive
at a judgement by thinking, this means that the judgement is
true. This does not hold either, since I may think and cal¬
culate and after all realize that I got the sum wrong.
For Hagerstrom judgements depend upon concepts. Concepts
are always objective and can be shown to be rationally linked
to other concepts which carry their rational credentials with
them, so no thinking person who understands one concept can
deny the other . Ideas, by contrast, do not carry their
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rational credentials with them. People are not logically or
rationally constrained to accept such ideas. Nevertheless
they behave in a way which shows that they accept such ideas
in terms of their rational merits. This fact requires an ex¬
planation and Hagerstrom sets out to provide an explanation
in terms of causes.
This is Hagerstrom's second argument for his neutrality
thesis. He writes in his inaugural lecture,
"note that in so far as we consider that something is ac¬
tually the case, i.e. that truth is present, we consider
also that it is so entirely without regard for our subjec¬
tive posture towards the fact, our feelings or our interests
vis-a-vis the fact".129)
Concerning values this is not the case. Here Hager¬
strom holds,
"that which is represented as right loses all meaning if
it does not hold sway in my will and exert pressure on it
in the form of a feeling of obligation. For him who lacks
a feeling of obligation, therefore, right and wrong are
without any meaning."130)
Thus, Hagerstrom's neutrality thesis depends upon the
contrast between saying that something is the case, which
does not involve any subjective posture, and saying that
something is right, which does involve my feelings. But the
thesis breaks down and Hagerstrom himself supplies the evi¬
dence. Saying that something is the case
"naturally loses all significance if one does not actually
have ideas associated with the feeling of certainty or the
feeling of evidence. For then one has no material by which
to verify the correctness of the sentence. '
This is disastrously wrong. The fundamental mistake is
Hagerstrom's search for incorrigible cognitive acts or states.
132)
For Hagerstrom to say "I know that my neighbour has a dog"
announces the occurrence of a cognitive act or state of feel¬
ing. But this is surely wrong, since to say "I know, etc."
is rather to insist that I am in a position to justify the
truth of what I am asserting.
129) Hagerstrom, PR p. 89.
130) Hagerstrom, PR p. 252, cf. p. 89. The same holds in case of God,
see PR p. 248.
131) Hagerstrom, PR p. 60.
132) Cf. Hagerstrdm, PR p. 63.
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Hagerstrom's fundamental mistake leads him to hold the
erroneous view that the claimant himself is the best judge.
This may be plausible, if knowledge is to be equated with a
mental act or mental state of feeling. But this is tantamount
to holding that the person who makes the judgement is also
the person who should set the criterion for the assessment
of the truth of the judgement, and further also decide whether
the criterion of logical feeling has been satisfied in the
case of the neighbour's dog.
Hagerstrom holds that a will cannot make an utterance
133)
true. This is true, but it is also true that claiming
or judging cannot by itself make the claim or judgement true.
Hagerstrom's theory of judgement thus actually makes nonsense
of the notion of a judgement; for a judgement is made to other
people, not to ourselves. The criteria for soundness of judge¬
ments must be interpersonal or public. Surely the truth of
the judgement about the neighbour's dog cannot be established
just by Hagerstrom's saying so and his logical feeling. The
material to be assessed is not his mental state of mind but
whether or not the neighbour has a dog. Hagerstrom, in fact,
abandons objectivism and lapses into subjectivism.
A second error follows from Hagerstrom's supposition
that there is but one, and only one criterion available for
testing the truth of any judgement, viz. the logical feeling
of evidence, which functions as an analogue to the British
Standard Yard. If this supposition were sound, there would
be no distinction between the activities or method of ob¬
taining knowledge and the position persons get into as the
134)result of such activities. Only causal conditioning would
be involved. This is confirmed when Hagerstrom writes that
"the most immediate psychological effect of experiencing an
expression of a command or of a volition is a conative im¬
pulse, just as the experiencing the expression of a judge¬
ment calls forth the corresponding judgement, and as the
awareness of an expression of feeling calls forth the corre¬
sponding feeling".135)
133) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 252, cf. p. 301.
134) See Hagerstrom, INLM p. 139.
135) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 172.
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If Hagerstrom's account is accepted then there is no differ¬
ence between sound arguments and unsound arguments. Equally
for a judgement or for a command, the only effective support
available will be the feelings aroused in the hearer by the
speaker. "Support" is no more than causal reinforcement.
Similarly there can be no distinction between logically re¬
levant and irrelevant considerations in relation to any
judgement or any evaluation of conduct as proper or improper.
"On the assumption of social community of speech, the one
and only intention which needs to be involved in the person
addressed is to pay attention to the communicator's utter-
ances in order that the corresponding ideas may be evoked".
The consequence is that Hagerstrom's neutrality thesis
breaks down, since every form of discourse is essentially
non-rational. It is a matter not of argument but of psycho¬
logical pressure. It is a matter not of reasons but of effi-
137)
cacious manipulation "paralyzing all genuine willing".
Hagerstrom's account of moral language is akin to the
account later presented by Charles Stevenson. It is worth
noticing that Alf Ross based his book "On Law and Justice"
on Stevenson's theory. And Ross runs into the same difficul¬
ties of explaining the difference between rational and irra¬
tional methods for obtaining agreement. In the end there
can be neither for Hagerstrom, nor for Stevenson, nor for
Ross any difference between information and propaganda.
Stevenson's account has been severely critized by J.O.
Urmson, and I refer to this, since I cannot add anything of
138)
significance to his criticism. I may add that Hager¬
strom's account is not restricted to the use of moral lan¬
guage, it covers also the use of scientific language. In
this respect Hagerstrom is influenced by the American psy-
139)
chologist Edward Thorndike.
Thorndike is primarily concerned with the studies of
136) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 140.
137) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 122.
138) C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, New Haven 1944, and see
J.O. Urmson, The Emotive Theory of Ethics, London 1968.
139) Hagerstrom, Ratten och Staten, p. 182. - I am indebted to Duane
Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology, 3rd ed., New York 1981,
p. 187 ff. for my short description of Thorndike's view, the
quotation in the text is from p. 188.
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learning in animals. His approach is mechanistic and deals
with overt behaviour rather than with mental elements or
conscious experience in any form. Learning does not involve
conscious reflection but is purely a matter of certain bonds
between events being fixed and strengthened, while others
are weakened or eliminated resulting in the appropriate be¬
haviour formation or appropriate responses.
Thus, he writes that
"if he were to analyze the human mind he would find connec¬
tions of varying strength between (a) situations, elements
of situations, and compounds of situations and (b) responses,
readinesses to respond, facilitations, inhibitions, and di¬
rections of responses. If all these could be completely in¬
ventoried, telling what the man would think and do and what
would satisfy and annoy him, in every conceivable situation,
it seems to me that nothing would be left out. ... Learning
is connecting. The mind is man's connection-system."
This position is a direct descendant of the philosophi¬
cal associationism of Hume, for example, a position which
Hagerstrom also endorses. Whereas Thorndike talks about con¬
nections between situations and responses, Hagerstrom rather
talks about associations or connections between ideas and
situations. Hagerstrom sees man as an animal who has evolved
from other animals. So he assumes that men's behaviour pat¬
terns must be fundamentally similar to those of animals.
Our behaviour is subject to the same causal laws of nature
as all animal behaviour. Men are only different in degree
of brain power from the rest of the animal world. Men have
instinctive behaviour patterns towards aggression or egoism
and peace or altruism. And it will be worse for us, unless
we come to recognize this. Thanks to our reason it is possible
to control our instincts by using proper restraints neces¬
sary to a peaceful civilized society, and impart these by
"compulsory courses on the social harmfulness of certain
„ 140)actions .
Thus, Hagerstrom uses Thorndike's results and applies
these to his analysis of human learning of what is pro-social
and what is anti-social. This is illustrated by Hagerstrom's
lengthy discussion of "the psychological content of command"
140) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 176.
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141)
and its relation with "the meaning of the idea of duty".
Hagerstrom holds that psychology is the science of experience,
and no one can observe an experience except the person having
it. So the method to be used must involve self-observation
or introspection. In this respect Hagerstrom differs from
Thorndike. This approach presents Hagerstrom with difficul¬
ties, e.g. "the possibility of another person's duty", which
he resolves by "postulating the existence" of a feeling of
duty. ^ But this is to evade the issue. For Hagerstrom
"there seems to be an insuperable difficulty in understand¬
ing such a state of consciousness which involves a conscious-
14 3)
ness of duty as something real". The difficulty is large¬
ly due to Hagerstrom's own way of formulating his questions
and the method he uses to answer them. And the reader of Ha-
gerstrom's book is presented with an "insuperable difficul¬
ty". On the one hand Hagerstrom holds that "it is necessary
that the consciousness of intention ... shall actually be
present in the giver of the order". On the other hand he
also holds that "we must assume that in an imperative the
144)
giver of the order has a feeling of conative impulse".
If it is "necessary" then it is misleading to say that "we
must assume" a feeling. And why must we assume a feeling
of duty anyway? The answer is probably that the feeling must
be there, otherwise there is no material to observe.
As far as I can see Hagerstrom confounds a methodolo¬
gical question with a logical question. The methodological
question is whether to study word-association in terms of
subjective feelings aroused by learning words on the basis
of introspection or rather whether it is more fruitful to
study behaviour and present an account of word association
in terms of bodily changes or responses, such as pulse-rate
or breathing, based upon observation and experiments. Hager¬
strom favours the method based upon introspection. But then
141) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 116 ff. (also printed PR p. 97 ff.). For a
discussion see also C.D. Broad, Hagerstrom's Account of Sense
and Duty and Certain Allied Experiences, Philosophy vol. 97,
1951, p. 99 ff.
142) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 170 f.
143) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 132.
144) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 123 and p. 124 (my italics).
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he confuses this point with the altogether different logi¬
cal question whether mental words are synonymous in meaning
with some behavioural words or not. If the latter is the
case, and Hagerstrom seems to hold this view, thti. are such
words then to be discarded as meaningless? Hagerstrom's
answer is affirmative, since they do not have any referent.
If so, then mental talk is meaningless noises. It follows
then according to Hagerstrom that there are no such things
as feelings. But according to the methodological point there
must be, otherwise there is no subject-matter for psychology
to study. The way out is then to hunt the referent of mental
terms and find this to be that they refer to ideas in the
mind. What these ideas then refer to is never made clear.
It is not quite clear to me what Hagerstrom's opinion is.
Hagerstrom also holds that "it is obvious that we sharp¬
ly distinguish between duty and feeling of duty".145^ If
this is so, then why engage in a psychological investigation
of the feeling of duty at all? The answer is that Hager¬
strom is confused. Duty becomes equivalent to the proper
feeling of duty. He practices introspection, and stamps his
ideas into the appropriate responses of his listeners.
Learning does not involve conscious reflection, since
"utterances themselves are not in any way formed deliberate¬
ly in so far as a real community of speech exists".
Utterances "necessarily react upon the subject" to impart
the appropriate response. So unsuccessful responses must be
seen as a case where no "real community of speech exists".
If the hearer of a judgement or a command is not causally
affected, then the hearer is not a rational person at all.^"4
Hagerstrom's theory of knowledge and learning is then im¬
portant for the life of individuals in society.
Hagerstrom conceives the social community of speech as
a way to change or reinforce beliefs and attitudes. When
used successfully the implication is that it renders itself
superfluous. The sole end of language is to attain agree-
145) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 133.
146) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 140.
147) Cf. Hagerstrom, Socialfilosofiska Uppsatser, p. 63.
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ment, so the use of language may be jettisoned when agree¬
ment has been attained. Hence Hagerstrom's henchmen never
asked, or were never allowed to ask "the dangerous question
whether the conviction is true or not".1^)
The question is a dangerous question to ask precisely
because once a conviction is challenged the important ques¬
tion becomes, how does one tell which of the alternative
possibilities ought to be accepted? On what basis can one
defend or refute one's claims? On Hagerstrom's account of
language and learning such questions need to be stamped out.
In his inaugural lecture Hagerstrom thinks that
"the course of the further development of morality ... ac¬
tually leads (to a prediction that) a revolution in the out¬
look of western civilization is at hand, the full scope of
which no one can comprehend".149)
Anyway, I will try to comprehend the kind of society to
which Hagerstrom's way of thinking leads. On the basis
of his theory of knowledge and learning we can look forward
to the perfect society described in George Orwell's "Nine¬
teen Eighty Four". A time when "the whole world will be unit¬
ed by the same sentiment which united the primeval clan, and
which made its members think, feel and act as one".15*"*)
To-day's Sweden is on its way to this state of blessed¬
ness. Hagerstrom and his henchmen have done a proper job.
They realized that it is easier to change people's attitudes
by propaganda than to change things by force, as the Marx¬
ists suggest. "We know", Hagerstrom writes, "that it is
possible by means of suggestion, i.e. by infusing faith,
to bring about purely physical changes in the organism which
are not under the control of the will - e.g. to raise blis¬
ters".151)
Applying this knowledge, Hagerstrom uses language as
a means of suggestion which brings it about that people feel
powerless to change things and direct their instincts away
from the "vengeful morality" towards the "altruistic morali-
148) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 167.
149) Hagerstrom, PR p. 93 (my parenthesis).
150) Quoted from Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man, p. 266.
151) Hagerstrdm, PR p. 233.
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ty"152) that people come to agree with Hagerstrom's theory
of a society free of change, in which "the fundamental norm"
153)
is "the general feeling of security". This reflects Ha¬
gerstrom's own dream of a stable world, in which he may
achieve the security for which he longs.
It presents him with a conceptual difficulty. According
to Hagerstrom's theory of knowledge he is "only a moment in
an endless natural context". According to his theory of lan¬
guage utterances are not deliberately created but rather we
are forced to use certain expressions. If this is so, it is
inconsistent to claim to have a mission, as Hagerstrom does.
It is inconsistent to claim that it is possible, by using
language, to redirect people's instincts in the proper di¬
rection. His utterances in this respect are themselves deter¬
mined by causal laws. But how can such utterances have any
causal efficacy in a deterministic world?
Hagerstrom's answer is, perhaps: Had he (per impossible)
not presented his philosophy, men would not have abandoned
their illusions and superstitions. Thus, his philosophy is
neither fatuous nor futile. Hagerstrom's comfort is then
that he is after all an important "moment in an endless na¬
tural context". But this comfort will dissolve when Hager¬
strom begins to think that this comfort is itself determined
by causal laws according to his theory of knowledge. So his
comfort is an illusion.
Hagerstrom's position is inconsistent. Hagerstrom's
philosophy is a revolution. But revolutions do not happen,
neither in the natural nor in the social order.
Hagerstrom's thesis of moral nihilism states "that mo¬
ral ideas have nothing at all to do with truth and reality
154)
itself". On the other hand, Hagerstrom also claims that
"one can definitely observe a universality in moral ideas.
That is, that mode of action is good which is demanded by
the well-being of the whole race".
I wonder how this is possible when "moral ideas" are
152) Cf. above p. 340.
153) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 176.
154) Hagerstrom, PR p. 303. - Following quotations are from this page.
352
"meaningless" and have "nothing to do with truth and reali¬
ty itself". As far as I can see Hagerstrom is involved in
a self-contradiction. Hagerstrom turns out to be a moralist.
To substantiate this claim I refer to the fact that Ha-
gerstrom has a meta-ethical theory according to which "good
conduct" is defined as "demanded by the well-being of the
whole race". He has a normative theory of conduct "to counter¬
act the anti-social forces which destroy community and soli¬
darity". This presupposes a distinction between pro-social
forces which preserve and anti-social forces which destroy
"community and solidarity". This distinction is based upon
"the instincts which underlie moral ideas". Here Hagerstrom
tells us "one must assume that the instincts which underlie
moral ideas are the social true instincts which generally
sustain society and without which the race could not conti¬
nue as the master of nature" and "the master of all living
beings". Again it presupposes that "happiness and culture"
are the basic goals which ought to determine man's conduct.
From the meta-ethical view that "good conduct" means
"demanded by the well-being of the whole race" and the empi¬
rical premise that "vengeance is not demanded by the well-
being of the whole race" Hagerstrom is logically committed
to the moral view "vengeance is wrong conduct". This is per¬
haps an illustration of Olivecrona's remark that "in his
more popular writings Hagerstrom sometimes gave expression
to his own valuations but such occasional utterances are,
of course, to be distinguished from his scientific proposi-
„ 155)tions .
My comment is that if Hagerstrom's valuations must be
distinguished from his scientific propositions then there
is not very much left for consideration. - I disagree with
Olivecrona that Hagerstrom does not establish "guiding prin¬
ciples of legislation, judicial practice, or social organi¬
zation". Hagerstrom does so on the basis of his meta-ethi¬
cal definition of "good conduct", cited above, and he also
holds a normative theory.
155) Olivecrona, in Hagerstrom INLM p. XXI.
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As far as I can see, to propound a normative theory is
not suspect per se. It only becomes so, when Hagerstrom de¬
clares that he is not engaged in moral teaching at all. He
is, and the basis for this theory is his causal theory of
learning, described above, combined with his normative theory
of good conduct. This is of some importance, since Hagerstrom
contends that morality is an illusion. When Hagerstrom puts
forward this contention all that is being contended is that
some value-judgements are illusions. It is a delusion, for
example, that some things are better for people to have than
others, e.g. that it is good to possess a barrel of potatoes
to mention Hagerstrom's example. j wonder whether starv¬
ing people will agree with this. On Hagerstrom's normative
theory of conduct "it is impossible to make oneself insen-
157)
sible to natural suffering".
So what is to be done? It becomes important to cause
the appropriate feeling of obligation and to purify this
feeling from "a foreign element of a norm-establishing rea¬
lity" or "the misleading idea of a commanding power within
158)
us which is determinative of right action".
So it is by no means an illusion that there are obliga¬
tions. It is manifest that a society where people do not be¬
lieve they have any duties and where people are not in any
way guided by these beliefs is a society where everybody
will be very badly off indeed. Hagerstrom claims that "one
may not draw the conclusion ... that it would be impossible
to delineate an obligation for other persons in any sense".
He also claims that "it is nonsense to regard the idea of
obligation as true"
This is perhaps inconsistent. It leads to Hagerstrom's
inquiry into the nature of law, which is the subject-matter
for the next chapter.
I conclude this chapter by claiming that Hagerstrom's
moral philosophy is seriously flawed. Hagerstrom's inaugu-
156) Hagerstrom, PR p. 70.
157) Hagerstrom, PR p. 283.
158) Hagerstrom, PR p. 89 and INLM p. 157 respectively.
159) Hagerstrom, PR p. 90 and p. 95.
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ral lecture caused a good deal of commotion in 1911. And
rightly so, but for the wrong reason. It was held that Ha-
gerstrom's thesis would lead to social anarchy. Precisely
the opposite is the case as I have tried to show. It seems
to me that if such a society will be realized, it will be
Hell, not Paradise as Hagerstrom invites us to believe.
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Chapter VI
Axel Hagerstrom's Inquiry into Law and Legal Science
"We must think things not words or at least we must
constantly translate our words into the facts for
which they stand if we are to keep the real and
the true."
*
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
1. Introduction
Hagerstrom's jurisprudential writings are fairly well-known
in the English-speaking world. Hagerstrom is presented as
the master and the founder of a distinctive approach to law
called the "Swedish School of Legal Realism", or more gene¬
rally "Scandinavian Realism"."^
Hagerstrom's approach to law and legal science is an
application of his theory of knowledge. It is to proceed
along the way of truth, taking as the object of thought the law,
which must exist if legal science is to be a genuine science.
Hagerstrom's aim is, in his own words "to throw light on the
real nature of law by means of the critical investigation"
2)
of the prevailing theory of law, viz. the will-theory.
When Hagerstrom uses the phrase "throw light on", what
he refers to is that it is by using reason that the philoso¬
pher discovers the real nature of law. Just as a candle ren¬
ders an object visible but does not produce it, so reason
does not make the nature of law, but reveals its essence.
The critical investigation referred to is Hagerstrom's theory
of meaning and knowledge, cf. above Chapter IV. This investi¬
gation proceeds on the basis of the method of essentialism,
which I shall present in Section 2. It is a version of the
* Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Address, New York State Bar Association,
17th January 1889. - Quoted from the International Thesaurus of
Quotations (edt. R.T. Tripp) Penguin Books, 1970 Entry 1057.16.
1) See Lon L. Fuller, Book Review, Columbia Law Review, vol. 41, 1941,
p. 965, at p. 966; and H.L.A. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, Cambridge
Law Journal, 1959, p. 233 ff.
2) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 56, and p. 248 for the next quotation.
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Platonic-Aristotelian method of revealing the real nature
of law by an intellectual intuition. On the basis of this
intellectual intuition, Hagerstrom dedicates most of his
jurisprudential writings to a sustained attack on every con
ceivable theory which holds that law is an expression of
will. This attack is quite consistent with Hagerstrom's
general attack on voluntarism, cf. above Chapter III, Sec¬
tion 5, especially p. 162 f., Section 6, especially p. 189
and Chapter V, Section 1, p. 287 ff.
The ground for the attack is that reality presents it¬
self as an intelligible ordered system, whose fundamental
character is accessible to human thinking. If the real na¬
ture of law is will, as the will-theory claims, then law
becomes something which is created, changeable and arbitra¬
ry. Hagerstrom's objection is that it is logically imposs¬
ible to establish anything through the mere existence of
wishing or willing. It is logically impossible to establish
genuine duties through mere willing. If law is will then
this implies that law is not amenable to the scientific me¬
thod of thinking which presupposes that reality is constant
cf. above Chapter III, Section 5, especially p. 143, and
p. 173 f.
I shall not enter into any detailed discussion of Ha¬
gerstrom's arguments against the will-theory. Suffice it
to mention that the general structure of his argument is
based upon the Aristotelian view: "for we say that that
which everyone thinks so, really is so, and the man who
attacks this belief will hardly have anything more credible
3)
to maintain instead".
Hagerstrom's argument against the will-theory then pro
ceeds as follows: Everybody says that he has rights inde¬
pendent of the will of state. Hence it is the case that
everybody has rights independent of the will of the state.
But the will-theory states that the basis for subjective
rights of individuals is the will of the state. Hence the
will-theory must be wrong, since it is in conflict with
3) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Ch. X, Sec. 2, p. 250.
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the ordinary consciousness.
Having refuted the will-theory, Hagerstrom then pro¬
ceeds to demolish the ordinary consciousness by using the
same argument: Hagerstrom holds that sound reason reveals
subjective rights to be illusory or pure magic. Hence it is
the case that subjective rights are illusory or pure magic.
But individuals believe that they have subjective rights. Hence
the ordinary consciousness of individuals is confused, since
it is in conflict with sound reason. Hagerstrom's argument
is unsound, since he confuses the meaning of "right" with
the quite different question: what actions are right or
wrong? It is one thing to ask how the words "right" and "ob¬
ligation" are used, quite another thing to ask what things
5)
individuals think are right or wrong.
I have written an exposition of Hagerstrom's attack on
the will-theory, to be included in this thesis. On second
thoughts I put it aside. It can be produced if so wished.
But I find that it is more interesting to try to concentrate
on Hagerstrom's own theory of law. - In Section 3 I shall
present Hagerstrom's theories of law. My thesis is that Ha¬
gerstrom has two theories of law, a formal theory of law
and a psychological theory of law as I shall call them. The
formal theory holds that the real nature of law is reason.
The psychological theory of law holds that the real nature
of law is interests, which are expressions of volitions. Ha¬
gerstrom's formal theory is akin to Kelsen's pure theory of
law. - In Section 4 I shall compare Hagerstrom's approach
and Kelsen's approach. - In Section 5 I shall consider Hager¬
strom's epistemological objection to Kelsen's theory, and
argue that it fails. - In Section 6 I shall consider Hager¬
strom's legal objections to Kelsen's theory, and argue that
they are misplaced. - In this section I shall also consider
the question: "Is it a duty to obey the law?" and Hager¬
strom's affirmative answer. - In Section 7 I shall consider
Hagerstrom's model of law as a machine, and argue that it
is de-humanizing. - Finally, in Section 8, I shall consider
4) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 217.
5) Cf. R.M. Hare, Essays on Philosophical Method, London 1971, Ch. 7.
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Hagerstrom's position in relation to his well-known pupils,
Lundstedt, Olivecrona and Ross.
2. Hagerstrom's Aim and Method
In Chapter III I have argued that Hagerstrom's philosophi¬
cal endeavour is determined by his aim at understanding the
world and man's place in the world.
Hagerstrom's claim is that the world is understandable.
The world is an intelligible natural order of events gov¬
erned by necessary laws of cause and effect .. This world
then displays a necessary regularity between events inde¬
pendently of man's thinking, feeling and willing. It can be
explored by sound reason which dispassionately teaches us
that there is only one world and this world is a connection
of causes and their effects. Rational knowledge consists
simply in knowledge of objects and their objective charac¬
teristics exemplified in genuine scientific concepts. These
objects exist independently of us, and what matters is to
state the essence or true nature of objects by real defini¬
tions. Such definitions are not mere conventions about the
use of words but are explanations of the essential nature of
whatever is the object of study. To arrive at definitions is
a matter of scientific thought, which does not make, but
finds the kinds of things in the world. As Hagerstrom says,
"an astronomer who made a statement about the position in
which the planets would be at a certain moment, and then
asserted that they will take up this position because of
his statement would at once show himself to be crazy".6)
The astronomer might be crazy, but what is not crazy is to
claim that a planet will take up a certain position and then
test whether this claim turns out to be true or false. Here
as elsewhere Hagerstrom overlooks that theories are not
forced upon astronomers but are their inventions. If a theo¬
ry turns out to be in conflict with the actual position of
the planets, it must be discarded as false.
Certainly we may - with Hobbes - say that "the privi-
ledge of absurdity, to which no living creature is subject
6) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 302, cf. Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Under¬
standing, Sec. XII, Part III, p. 164.
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but man only. And of men, thoese are all most subject to it,
7)
that professe Philosophy."
Turning to man and his place in society as the object
of inquiry, Hagerstrom's aim is to provide a definition of
"the real nature of law, which will lead up to an exposi¬
tion of the concept of law which realty covers the fact
which legal theorists have in mind in their attempts at
conceptual construction".8)
The wording of this passage is significant and revealing.
It shows that Hagerstrom thinks that to have the concept of
law is to know the real nature of law, to have apprehended
the facts which characterize law and make law what it real¬
ly is. It also shows that Hagerstrom thinks that having a
concept of law involves a cognitive relation between a le¬
gal theorist and the object he is studying, viz. law.
The question then becomes this: How is it possible to
know the real nature of law? When Hagerstrom refers to what
legal theorists have in mind, is he then doing empirical
psychology of their minds? This is hardly the case, at any
rate Hagerstrom does not provide us with any findings re¬
sulting from empirical research. Besides what is going on
in a scientist's mind in terms of ideas is one thing, quite
another whether these ideas are true or false. Hagerstrom
is interested in genuine knowledge about law, which implies
that he must consider ideas expressed in judgements or pro¬
positions by means of notions or concepts. So Hagerstrom is
engaged in a conceptual investigation of the real nature
of law, and the method he uses is the method of essentia-
lism. That this is the case is corroborated by a passage in
an article from 1935.
Hagerstrom asks the question what has a philosopher to
do with jurisprudence? Jurisprudence is a science Hager¬
strom says. Its function is "merely to establish the facts
within a certain region, to reach general principles by in¬
duction, and to make deductive inferences from the induc-
7) Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 5, p. 113. - Cf. for Hagerstrom's way of
investigation PR p. 62.
8) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 56 (my italics) .
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9)
tively established results". This is Hagerstrom's scien¬
tific method in a nutshell, which I do not intend to criti¬
cize in any detail. I only wish to point out that this Ba¬
conian recipe for jurisprudence as a rational science hard¬
ly stands a closer scrutiny. But it surely reflects the view
held by Lundstedt and Olivecrona that a scientist begins
with a careful and unbiased collection of all the facts un¬
der investigation as a preliminary to identifying "the true
nature of law".^^
It is evident that Hagerstrom is concerned with the
problem of constructing self-consistent and coherent con¬
cepts within which argument will proceed with formal rigour
and clarity. Hagerstrom is, I take it, following Hobbes'
view "he that Reasoneth aright in words he understandeth
can never conclude an error". ^^ This is precisely the task
of the philosopher to see what the scientist understands by
his words. So it is quite legitimate for a philosopher to
have something to do with jurisprudence.
Hagerstrom's argument is that
"the fact (is) that the notions which are used for describing
what is actual may very well be delusive. If they disclose
to analytic scrutiny a contradiction, they are notions only
in appearance. In that case there is merely a concatenation
of words without meaning. And the alleged fact, which is
supposed to have a nature defined by the "notion" would be
no fact at all. Ever since Socrates' time it has been held
that one of the highest tasks of philosophy is to analyze
notions which are in common use in order to attain a real
world of coherent concepts which must be internally coherent.
For the reality, with which science is concerned, cannot be
determined by means of judgements which contradict each
other. No doubt it is always possible to put such judgements
into words, but these words have no meaning. Therefore no
science which claims to describe reality can evade a concep¬
tual analysis of this kind."9)
The conceptual analysis Hagerstrom has in mind depends
upon the contrast between "reality" and "appearance", be¬
tween "a real world of coherent concepts" and "notions only
in appearance", between "facts" and "no facts", or between
9) Hagerstrom, INLM Ch. V: The Conception and Declaration of Intention
in the Sphere of Private Law, quotation at p. 299.
10) Olivecrona, Law as Fact, p. 9, cf. p. 11.
11) Hobbes, Leviathan, Part IV, Ch. 46, p. 682.
361
"words with meaning" and "words without meaning". If so,
then one important question is to indicate a method for
teaching another person the difference between reality and
appearance. Another important question is whose business it
is to teach the correct procedure. To the latter question
Hagerstrom's answer is that this is the task of the philoso¬
pher, not the task of the scientist. Why is this so? Hager-
strom's answer is that "it has been held that one of the
highest tasks of philosophy is to analyze notions".
The objection may be that it has been held to be the
task of philosophy, but this assumption is false. This
threatens to put an end to the whole enterprise of the phi¬
losopher's effort to attain a real world of coherent con¬
cepts, before he has begun his efforts. It is rather a task
for the scientist to establish a coherent set of concepts,
or at least scientists are not debarred from pursuing this
task. Hagerstrom's reply to the scientists is that before
science can begin it is necessary to provide a systematic
inventory of the various kinds to be studied. In this re¬
spect science - including legal science - rests on inarti¬
culate assumptions. It is the philosopher's task to bring
these into the open and examine them critically.
Philosophy is the highest form of inquiry, just because
it alone involves no presuppositions, cf. above Chapter II,
Section 5, especially p. 78 f. This is the Platonic approach
to philosophy. That it is shared by Hagerstrom and Olive-
12)
crona is confirmed by some extracts from his writings.
Hagerstrom states
"I have certainly not taken my basis in any theory concern¬
ing the nature of law. ... It is very dangerous, from a
methodological point of view, to allow an investigation
concerning the ideas of certain people during certain
epochs to be in the least degree influenced by any theory
concerning that which is called law."
It may be objected that it is very dangerous, from a
methodological point of view, to investigate the ideas of
certain people without a theory. In philosophy, as in science,
12) Hagerstrom, Der romische Obligationsbegriff, vol. II, p. 399. Quoted
from Olivecrona's introduction to Hagerstrom, INLM p. XIX. - For
Olivecrona see, Law as Fact, p. 11.
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one finds only what one seeks. One cannot have the answers
without knowing what the questions are. It is quite useless
to investigate, e.g. the Roman ideas of rights and obliga¬
tions, without some theory in mind which determines the kind
of evidence which is relevant for the truth or falsity of
the theory. A theory will tell a person what to look for,
it will not tell him, what, within the theory, is actually
the case.
I suggest that Hagerstrom has, after all, some theory
in mind. And this theory is his theory concerning meaning
and knowledge, i.e. that there is a necessary connection
between words and things, and that there is a necessary con¬
nection between genuine judgements. This connection can be
discovered by logical analysis. It is to proceed from sounds
to things, from the world of images to the world of facts.
This, in turn, involves the fundamental distinction between
reality and appearance which is left for the philosopher
to explore. His method is the method of induction in the
Aristotelian sense of the method by which philosophers are
13)led to perceive the essence or true nature of a thing.
This is for Hagerstrom "one of the highest tasks of philo¬
sophy". This suggests that there are other tasks of philo¬
sophy besides the task of conceptual analysis aiming at
attaining a real world of coherent concepts which must be
internally coherent. Suffice it to say that Hagerstrom has
not attained this world. His phrase "one of the highest
tasks" is incoherent, since "the highest task" implies that
there is one and only one task, whereas Hagerstrom implies
that there is more than one task.
Another task is, presumably, to provide the proper
guidance for men living in society. This guidance is based
upon thinking, and the true philosopher's thinking is objec¬
tive in the sense that it is devoid of values and precon¬
ceived notions, so it follows that his guidance is objec¬
tive. It is guidance not prediction which matters. This is
the fundamental difference between the Swedish realistic
13) Cf. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 12.
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approach and American legal realism, to which Alf Ross is
much closer. Hagerstrom's guidance is based upon his funda¬
mental values: to achieve peace of mind and to achieve peace
in society. Again with Hobbes' words: "Leasure is the mother
of Philosophy; and Common-Wealth, the mother of Peace, and
14)Leasure". This aim of peace is, I shall argue later, de¬
cisive for Hagerstrom's theory of law.
These tasks are intertwined for Hagerstrom, I suggest.
The philosopher's task is conceptual analysis, Hagerstrom
claims. This provides an answer to the question raised above
p. 13, concerning the proper method for teaching another
person the difference between reality and appearance. Hager¬
strom alludes to Socrates. And this is very revealing, since
it is precisely the aim of Socrates to ask questions in
order to destroy prejudices and false beliefs and help people
to look for the essence or true nature of things, e.g. the
true nature of virtue, or justice, or law. Socrates himself
does not pretend to know the answers to these questions. He
does not know what the essence of justice is. He only wishes
to make men think by his teaching. He calls to the intelli¬
gence of man believing that it will reply to the call. So¬
crates professes that his only knowledge is knowledge of his
own ignorance. His attitude is described by Aristotle in the
words "Socrates raised questions but gave no answers; for he
15)
confessed that he did not know".
Thus, Socrates' teaching is not aimed at teaching any
belief, but his teaching rather aims at purging or cleansing
the human soul of its false beliefs, its seeming knowledge,
its prejudices. Hagerstrom shares Socrates' view that the
human soul must be purged from illusory notions. Knowledge
must take the place of ignorance. In contrast to Socrates
Hagerstrom believes that he has got the right answers, so
his teaching aims at teaching genuine knowledge, cf. above
Chapter III, Section 4, p. 116 f. And those in whose minds
it is set must guide their lives in this light of genuine
14) Hobbes, Leviathan, Part IV, Ch. 46, p. 683.
15) Quoted from Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 13.
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knowledge. True knowledge and true teaching coincide. This
is exemplified in Hagerstrom's inquiry into legal notions.
If we follow Hagerstrom's mind, then we follow the way of
truth. The concept of right corresponds to the reality of
magical beliefs.
In order to establish this conclusion Hagerstrom adopts
the Platonic approach, i.e. the method of essentialism. A
subject-matter is discussed, e.g. the notions of rights and
obligations inside the individual mind. One view is set up,
only to be demolished by another. Hagerstrom's discussion,
in his introduction to Der romische Obligationsbegriff, is
16)
an excellent example of his technique.
Concerning rights "we seem to be dealing with something
whose meaning is obvious", Hagerstrom says. A child is quite
clear that the hobby-horse belongs to him, for example. So
Hagerstrom continues:
"It should, therefore, it would seem, present no particular
difficulty to explain what the rights in question realty
consists in. And yet to one's astonishment one finds a
mighty juristic literature whose object it is to determine
the meaning of these notions and which contains all kinds
of different views about them."
Hagerstrom's astonishment, I suggest, is based upon the
Hegelian view that "truth in philosophy means that concept
17)
and external reality correspond". But in the case of right
there is no such correspondence to be found. It may also be
based upon the way he formulates his question: "What does
right really consist in?" He assumes that it must be possible
to discover some identity in all the applications of an ambi¬
guous word. A word like "right" or "duty" is singled out.
A survey made of the ways the word is used which is governed
by Hagerstrom's assumption that the word "right" or "duty"
must refer to something tangible, just as the word "hobby¬
horse" refers to a stick with a horse's head.
This assumption may be wrong and Hagerstrom in fact says
that it is "a mistake to reduce the mystical notion of legal
18)
duty to factual relationships".
16) Hagerstrom, INLM Ch. I. The quotations are from p. 1 (my italics).
17) Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 21, Add. p. 231, cf. above p. 270.
18) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 8. Following quotations are from p. 1 and 16.
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He also says that "modern jurisprudence seeks to use
only such notions as correspond to facts". Now, if it is
mistaken to reduce the notion of legal duty to factual re¬
lationships, then it is quite wrong for modern jurisprudence
to "be pushed on by the demand ... to try to exhibit the
facts which correspond to its characteristic notions of
rights and duties". This is not Hagerstrom's answer. He sub¬
scribes to the view that a concept is altogether impossible,
and can have no meaning, if no object is given for it. So
there must be an object. Thus, he makes the demand that we
shall state what it is that is common to all the ways of
speaking of rights in virtue of which they all, and they
only are called "rights" or "duties". The answer is "mysti¬
cal forces". Hagerstrom presents this answer as the answer
to the question "what does the word "right" refer to?" This
question is then equated with the question "how do Romans
look at right and obligations?" The former question is to
ask for a nominal definition, i.e. correlating a word to a
thing. The latter question is to ask an empirical question
where the meaning of the word "right" is taken for granted.
This question is concerned with the question what a Roman
had in mind when he was buying or selling things. But then
Hagerstrom says that
"the relevant question is not whether the Romans entertained
a true belief when they meant, e.g. that the holder of the
imperium (the vis imperii) acquired it through the ability
to make auspices that was conferred upon him".-'-"'
I should have thought that this is the relevant question,
viz. is the belief which a Roman entertains concerning rights
and duties true or false? For Hagerstrom this question can¬
not be relevant. The reason is that Hagerstrom commits the
methodological error, which he imputes to other writers,
viz. "to introduce without justification modern points-of-
20)
view". In the absence of any possible means of knowing
how the Roman mind actually operates Hagerstrom foists his
magical interpretation on the Romans. The basis for this inter-
19) Hagerstrom, Der romische Obligationsbegriff, vol. II, p. 399.
Quoted from INLM p. XIX.
20) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 58.
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pretation is Hagerstrom's inductive conclusion that the
essence of right and obligation is a sort of magic. This is
the only natural explanation, Hagerstrom says. Why? His an¬
swer is that the Romans lived under the appearance that they
were able to cause things by exercising rational will and
choice. In reality this is a superstition, since everything
is determined by natural necessity. The implication is then
that Hagerstrom's own effort to purge the modern mind from
superstitions is also determined, and how can he possibly
interfere with natural necessity? He obviously thinks he can,
but only by involving himself in a self-contradiction, which
is not fit for a philosopher, who claims to present a real
world of coherent concepts.
To revert to Hagerstrom's natural explanation:this is
backed up with inductions in the sense of particular evi¬
dence from "some real knowledge ... of reading Justinian's
21)Institutions and Digesta from beginning to end". This is,
needless to say, dubious evidence, since Hagerstrom already
has made up his mind that individual rights and obligations
are delusions.
I have promised, in Chapter II, Section 5, p. 80 , that
I shall not discuss Hagerstrom's writings on Roman Law. And
I am prepared to keep this promise. However, I cannot resist
making this remark; Suppose that Hagerstrom's answer is
true. How is it that such magical beliefs and practices (which
are anything but reasonable according to Hagerstrom's way of
truth) could nevertheless be accepted by the Romans and help
to create an empire? Hagerstrom holds that law is a condi¬
tion of culture itself. If law, then, is equated with magical
beliefs, the surprising result is that magical beliefs are
a condition of culture. If we follow Hagerstrom we must de¬
stroy all magical beliefs. This gives the conclusion that
culture is destroyed as well. This is not Hagerstrom's in¬
tention. On the contrary there is a case for upholding cul¬
ture against attacks from anti-social individuals. So
Hagerstrom has created a problem for himself.
21) I have taken the quoted phrases from Olivecrona's introduction,
Hagerstrom, INLM p. XII.
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In this respect Hagerstrom's writings illustrate his
method of essentialism and also illustrate that Hagerstrom
misunderstands his own questions. Hagerstrom begins by ask¬
ing a conceptual question, viz. what is meant by the word
"right", and ends up by answering an empirical question
about the origin of ideas of rights and duties. The answer
provided by Hagerstrom is thought to be an answer which
covers the conceptual question, "what does the word "right"
mean?" as well as to the normative question, "what makes an
action a right action?". Hagerstrom's mistake is to ask the
question "what is the real nature of law?". Like Plato, he
uses the question form "what is x?" to ask for real defini¬
tions. And the confusedness of the concept of real defini¬
tion is an effect of the vagueness of the formula "what is
x?". For it is the vaguest of all forms of question except
22)
an inarticulate grunt.
Hagerstrom uses this formula to ask his questions about
the real nature of law. I think that HagerstrSm's use of this
question-form has the effect that he confuses real defini¬
tion and nominal definition. The question "what is x?" saves
Hagerstrom the trouble of thinking out and saying exactly
what it is that he wants to know about law. By saying "what
is law?", he can leave to his answerer the task of discover¬
ing what particular information about law Hagerstrom wants.
Hagerstrom is always playing safe, since he can dismiss an
answer by the remark this is not the sort of information
which he wants. Hagerstrom wants to see clearly what the ob¬
ject of jurisprudence is. This leads him to present his own
theories of law, to which I now turn.
3. Hagerstrom's Theories of Law
Hagerstrom's inquiry into law has been regarded as epoch-
making, at least in Sweden. Here Hagerstrom's teaching caused
many people to abandon rights and obligations as fictitious or
magical notions based upon the individual's feelings or voli-
22) Cf. Richard Robinson, Definition p. 190, to whom I am indebted for
the following passage.
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tions but without any basis in reality. These converts to
Hagerstrom's gospel purport to see the law from the purely
scientific poxnt of view of thinking. What they seem
to forget is that "we are very apt to overrate the import-
23)
ance of our own ideas" to use a phrase from Olivecrona.
This is, no doubt, true. Rather than just obey Hagerstrom
as a cognitive sovereign, it is essential to consider his
credentials. From the fact that Hagerstrom has offered a
theory it does not follow that we have to accept it. Hager¬
strom's cognitive sovereignty can be questioned, and this
is what I wish to do.
My thesis is that Hagerstrom offers two theories. There
is what I call the formal theory of law, according to which
"positive law is only a system of rules for the so-called
organs of the state - themselves defined in the rules - a
system of rules which is actually carried through". '
And there is the psychological theory of law, according to
which
"law is, at any rate to a large extent, an expression of
interests; and this is true both of its foundations and of
secondary rules. Therefore the question of the intention
and the significance of a law is a legitimate one."25)
According to the formal theory there is no reference
whatsoever to any will. According to the psychological theory
law is an expression of intention or will. To be sure, there
is no unified will, as the will-theory implies, but "the
real state of affairs is that, in the conflict of interests
within society, certain interests come to express themselves
in the form of laws".
According to the formal theory
"the legislator starts -with the accepted juristic technique
as a factor which is independent of him and regards himself
as determining the law which is put into force in contveto
only through the words in which it is formulated".26)
We are, Hagerstrom says,
"forced to the conclusion that the only volitional factor
in the legislator which can on the whole be considered as
23) Olivecrona, Law as Fact, p. 11.
24) Hagerstrom, PR p. 316, cf. INLM p. 354.
25) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 41. Here also the following quotation.
26) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 98 (his italics); also here the next quotation.
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positive law is simply the intention to use certain ex¬
pressions" .
If the only volitional factor is the intention to use
expressions, then there is no reference to any interests.
On the formal theory there are "thoughts behind the words",
which implies that legal rules have "real meaning" indepen¬
dently of the legislator's intention. "No personal power
exists which gives the law its force, and therefore no per-
28)
sonal wishes in themselves are at all relevant".
It is quite otherwise according to the psychological
theory, since here
"a certain mode of valuation becomes prevalent and stands
out as the correct one. It is plain that the standard of
values of the socially predominant class must have great
importance in this."29)
According to the formal theory the function of the
judge is to render "the straight judgement which is at one
30)
with the truth concerning the case".
Hagerstrom refers to Homer and Hesiod but continues
to say that
"the judge has the same pacificatory function nowadays by
ideal methods ... he is not merely an organ of the law as
power but also of the law as the doctrine of rights and
duties".
It follows that the judge in legal controversies does real¬
ly and truly express the objective norm for rights and du¬
ties, which is the cornerstone of social peace. The same
applies to the legislator who
"feels himself bound by an objective norm for rights and
duties which stands above him. He feels obliged to give
positive legal force to this, without regard to his social
wishes as to what shall become positive law.''
According to the formal theory
"from the normative system of conduct one can deduce with
logical necessity that in such and such a case, such and^)
such an action is a duty in respect to another's right".
27) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 354.
28) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 82, cf. p. 312, p. 241.
29) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 77.
30) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 89, also here the following quotation (his
italics).
31) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 91.
32) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 293, cf. p. 207, 241.
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According to the psychological theory (PT:)
"the law's utterance 'it shall be sol' is merely a phrase
which does not express any kind of idea, but serves as a
psychological means of compulsion in certain cases. (FT:)
But it is only from ideas that any logical conclusion can
be drawn. On the other hand, the ideal content of the law
is of course used in the case in question. And (PT) it is
only for psychological associative reasons and (FT) not for
logical ones, that the result he reaches by this applica¬
tion presents itself to him (FT+PT) as an ought."
I have inserted (PT) and (FT) in order to show that in
one passage Hagerstrom moves from the psychological theory
(PT) to the formal theory (FT) which "of course" is used by
the judges to present the parties in the dispute with a de¬
cision, where the use of "ought" is conflated. The confla¬
tion in question is between "ought" in the sense of motiva¬
tion or "exciting reasons", and "ought" in the sense of
justification or "justifying reasons", cf. above Chapter V,
p. 332. One final passage needs to be quoted in order to sub¬
stantiate my thesis. The passage runs:
"Laws are thus not imperatives in the usual sense, i.e. com¬
mands issuing from a certain authority. Their force there¬
fore does by no means rest only on their imperative form.
This is indeed important from the psyetiological point of
view and it is in fact a distinguishing mark of actual laws.
But a law as such is characterized only by the fact that it
occurs as an item in a whole system of pronouncements of
universal scope, produced in a certain way and issued in a
certain form, which do in fact get their ideal content ac¬
tualized in society."33)
There is here clearly a distinction made between the
psychological point of view, i.e. what I have called the
psychological theory of law, and the non-psychological point
of view which is concerned with a law as such, i.e. the for¬
mal theory of law. Thus, I think I have established that Ha¬
gerstrom has two theories of law.
To sum up: There is the formal theory of law. This
theory holds that law is a normative system of objective
rules for rights and duties. This system has binding force
or "categorical validity", i.e. it stands above the govern¬
ing authorities and the people. The legislator's will is
determined by his knowledge of right and wrong actions.
33) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 311-312 (my italics).
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The foundation of law is "its own spirit, i.e. on principles
34)
of equity and public utility". This is capabable of
being objectively ascertained by the law, which constitutes
the framework for activities, and there is an obligation to
obey the law. What is right and wrong is expressed in rules
which are made known to people through formal promulgation.
As a means to secure obedience, there are sanctions, in the
sense of penalties, attached to the rules. And the authori¬
ties are obliged to enforce the rules against offenders of
the legal system.
This theory, it may be added is a natural view to adopt
for an atheist like Hagerstrom, who wants to hold both that
there is no God, but there is nevertheless right and wrong
conduct. It fits with Hagerstrom's thought that nature is
an ordered system and so is society. Thus is upheld think¬
ing against willing and feeling. Hagerstrom's formal theory
is close to Hegel's view:
"For it is not what makes us irascible and resentful, but
the fact that it is not as it ought to be. But if we re¬
cognize that it is as it must be, i.e. that it is not ar¬
bitrariness and chance that make it what it is, then we
also recognize that it is as it ought to be. Yet it is hard
for the ordinary run of men to rise to the habit of trying
to recognize necessity and think it."35)
Hagerstrom has the capacity to recognize necessity,
think it, and implant his knowledge in the mind of his pu¬
pils .
Then there is the psychological theory. This theory
holds that law is an expression of conflicting interests.
Law is a coercive system of emotional and attitudinal re¬
sponses to independent imperatives. These imperatives have
binding force, i.e. they are upheld as links in a causal
psychological chain between predominant ideas of values of
the socially predominant class and the behaviour of people.
The feelings are maintained by the authorities using words
to cause the right behaviour. Promulgation is a piece of
34) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 71, 87, 204.
35) Hegel, The German Constitution, in Hegel's Political Writings
(transl. by T.M. Knox, introd. by Z.A. Pelczynski) Oxford 1969,
p. 145.
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magic which works. The important thing is that there are
unpleasant consequences, e.g. penalties, applied in case
the use of words alone fails to achieve the purpose of se¬
curing a comprehensive and harmonious system of feelings
to keep people in awe of the state and its officials. The
foundation of law is interests upheld by force. What is right
and wrong conduct is simply what the authorities use words
to command. To know what is right and wrong is a question
of paying attention to the commands. This theory, it may be
added, achieves the same purpose as the formal theory, viz.
to establish law and order; but by using persuasion rather
than by appealing to reason or thinking. The important
difference between the formal theory and the psychological
theory is this. If you hold the formal theory there are ac¬
tions which are right or wrong independently of any legisla¬
tion. If you hold the psychological theory then there are
no right and wrong actions independent of the words of the
authorities. In other words, if there is no civil authority
then Hagerstrom is logically committed to say that there
are no right and wrong actions. For, on this theory it is
only the words expressed in commands which make actions
right and wrong. Hence the importance attached to words by
the Swedes. The important thing is to offer guidance to the
authorities. The formal theory does this by supplying informa¬
tion as to right and wrong conduct. The psychological theory
does this by supplying motivation in terms of words to make
the authorities apply the formal theory in its unadulterated
form. This fits with the fact that Hagerstrom holds that
"the law is undeniably a condition of culture itself. With¬
out it, as the Sophist Protagoras already saw,we should
never have been able to win the lordship over other spe¬
cies " . 36)
This is perhaps a rather significant reference to Protago¬
ras. He was, to use Ernest Barker's description, "an apostle
of the State, who preached the sanctity of its law and the
37)
equality of its members". According to Barker, there is
36) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 262.
37) Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory, London 1918, (Reprint 1970)
p. 73. - Cp. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. I, p.66.
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for Protagoras no antithesis between nature and law. Simi¬
larly for Hagerstrom, there is no dualism between facts and
values. Law is fact, a link in a causal chain. And it is
logically impossible to criticize law from a moral point of
view, since morality is metaphysics according to Hagerstrom's
epistemology. Besides,if law in the sense of norms is re¬
duced to law in the sense of regularities between facts then
moral criticism becomes absurd. You do not blame the law of
gravitation, that would be absurd. The Scandinavian realists
invite us to believe that it is just as absurd to criticize
the criminal law. - The latter view is absurd.
Protagoras is no preacher of individualism, nor is Ha¬
gerstrom who repudiates individual rights and obligations
as appearances. Hagerstrom is far more interested in uphold¬
ing a system of compulsion from the standpoint of the con¬
scious exercise of social hygiene. The guidance offered is
neutral, since it is only concerned with facts. This is also
Olivecrona's approach. It seems to me that Olivecrona fails
to see that Hagerstrom has two theories of law. Olivecrona
writes, "the significance of legislating is not that the
draft acquires a "binding force" by being promulgated as a
38)
law". Thus, Olivecrona rejects the formal theory of law.
Olivecrona continues, "the relevant point is that the provi¬
sions of the draft are made psychologically effective. And
this result is attained through a certain form which has a
grip over the mind of the people. The form, therefore, is
the essential thing in legislation". Thus, Olivecrona en¬
dorses the psychological theory, which I hope to have made
clear is contrasted by Hagerstrom with his formal theory.
To be sure, Hagerstrom does not clearly present the
two theories as distinct theories. In this respect the ob¬
jection surely is that he has not adhered to his own claim
"to attain a real world of scientific concepts which must
be internally coherent. For the reality, with which science
is concerned, cannot be described by means of judgements
which contradict each other", cf. above Section 2, p. 360.
38) Olivecrona, Law as Fact, p. 60.
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Hagerstrom has not entered this world. This is manifest
from his own article "Ar gallande ratt uttryck av vilja?"
translated into English by C.D. Broad as "Is Positive Law
39)
an Expression of Will?" To translate Hagerstrom's Swe¬
dish into English is by no means an easy task, and Broad
has done an excellent job. As Olivecrona says, "the result
is a translation that actually reads more easily than the
40)
original text". This is true, but it is also a bit tricky.
To illustrate this, Hagerstrom uses the term "gallande ratt"
which Broad sometimes translates as "positive law". The
latter phrase is also used to translate Hagerstrom's term
"positive ratten". In other places Hagerstrom's phrase
"gallande ratt" is translated as "the validity of law" and
"the statutes in force".
To be sure, Broad's translation does make sense, and
I am not disputing the translation. It only shows that Ha-
41)
gerstrom uses his phrase "gallande ratt" ambiguously.
There is a difference between "the validity of law" and "the
statutes in force". A legal rule may be valid, but not in
force, i.e. enforced. Conversely, that a rule is in force
does not necessarily imply that it is a valid legal rule.
Another example is Hagerstrom's term "kraft" which
Broad translates sometimes as "force" sometimes as "autho¬
rity" and sometimes as "power". Now the relationship between
authority, power and force is a disputed question within
political philosophy. The sense of "power", for example,
covers a wide range of relations between actor and subject
39) Hagerstrom, INLM Ch. II, p. 17 ff.
40) Olivecrona, in Hagerstrom INLM p. X.- Olivecrona once said to me
that Broad, however, had made one error. This is at p. 165 at the
bottom which runs "the feeling of duty has been amptif-ied through
the consciousness of a norm". The word "amplified" is not adequate
and should be substituted with "formed" or "determined".
41) Cp. Alf Ross, Validity and the Conflict between Legal Positivism
and Natural Law, in Revista Juridica de Buenos Aires IV, 1961,
p. 46 ff. at p. 84 ff. Ross says that Hart misunderstands him,
and this is "caused by the linguistic fact that the word "valid"
in English can hardly be used in the same way as the Danish "gael-
dende". - It can, and the translation of "on Law and Justice" of
key phrases rendered differently shows that it is Ross' way of
thinking which is confused.
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and may include that of authority as well as that of force.
Yet one may have authority and no force, and conversely one
may use force without having any authority. Again the ambi¬
guity in Hagerstrom's presentation is not disclosed for an
English reader unfamiliar with the Swedish original.
But I agree with Olivecrona's judgement, Broad's trans¬
lation is excellent and reads more easily than the original
text.
Hagerstrom claims that the reality with which science
is concerned cannot be described by means of judgements
which contradict each other. This claim, I suggest, presents
Hagerstrom with a difficulty since he holds two theories of law,
the formal theory and the psychological theory. These theo¬
ries need not, however, be in conflict. The formal theory
is a non-empirical theory concerned with the conditions
which must be fulfilled in order that a rule is a legal
rule. The reality which corresponds to law "is in fact the
system of legal rules which is the result of following the
prevalent rules for interpretation and supplementation in
regard to actual law". There is no reference to the exist¬
ence of '"a social communal will' as the prino-iple for inter-
4 2)
preting and supplementing actual law".
The psychological theory is an empirical theory. This
theory is concerned with the influence of legal rules upon
people's behaviour. It is a causal theory which claims that
one set of events, viz. the promulgation of legal rules, and
another set of events, viz. that persons act in certain ways,
are links in a causal chain. The psychological theory pre¬
supposes that there are legal rules, whereas the formal
theory is concerned with the question how to bring rules
about as legal rules. The test for the psychological theory
is experience, i.e. whether the behaviour occurs as a "fac-
43)
tor in the system of nature". The test for the formal
theory is whether a rule is a legal rule, i.e. "a factor
in the established legal system, which it becomes through
42) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 103.
43) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 116.
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44 )
being formally promulgated". And "a law can cease to be
in force through formal abrogation". But then Hagerstrom con¬
flates or abandons his formal theory when he writes,
"it should be noted (PT:) that even law (in the modern sense)
becomes actually binding only through the interpretation
which gets itself accepted. Only this interpretation is
irresistibly in force. But (FT:) it cannot for that reason
be denied that the law itself in its abstract character, is
also positive law, provided that it actually binds the auth¬
orities who are empowered to apply it to particular cases
by means of interpretation."^'
In this passage Hagerstrom moves from the psychological
theory (PT) to the formal theory (FT).
As for the psychological theory the question is: "when
does a legal rule become binding?" Hagerstrom's answer is:
"through the interpretation which gets itself accepted".
This is a tautology if "binding" is equivalent to "accepted"
or "actually binds" which is the criterion according to the
psychological theory. Law then becomes accepted only through
the interpretation which gets itself accepted. Clearly then
the law is "irresistibly in force". According to the psycho¬
logical theory no empirical investigation is needed to estab¬
lish this, since it is a tautology.
The psychological theory fits with Hagerstrom's state¬
ment
"(PT) that it is quite fair to say that statutory law first
becomes positive law in so far as judicial dictum takes
account of it if the criterion for a law becoming "posi¬
tive" is that rules are actually applied in the relation¬
ship of real life. (FT:) But it does not in the least follow
that the state, in the person of the judge, gives its sanc¬
tion anew to the application of a given law through the
judge's taking account of it. For the judge is not free in
this matter. On account of the force of the constitution
and of his oath as a judge he is obliged to regard the law
as his guide in performing his office."46)
The first part of this passage is related to the psy¬
chological theory. And the issue is precisely what the cri¬
terion is. To be sure, Hagerstrom is quite right if the cri¬
terion or test for whether or not a rule is a legal rule is
44) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 38, for the following quotation p. 355.
45) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 69 (my italics and insertions of PT and FT).
46) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 61 (my italics and insertions of PT and FT).
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whether the rule is actually applied in the relationships of
real life. This is, however, a matter for empirical investi¬
gation, not a matter which can be settled by sitting and
thinking at one's desk as Hagerstrom invites us to believe.
Besides there is an ambiguity in the criterion offered by
Hagerstrom, since the actual application can be related to
the judge's activity in passing sentences on the one hand
and the actual infliction of the judgement upon the defend¬
ant in the form of being put into jail or actually paying
damages in civil cases on the other. The law may be "irre¬
sistibly in force" in the former situation, but not in the
latter. Hagerstrom fails to make clear whether the criterion
applies also to the second situation which necessarily
includes the first one. But the first one does not necessari¬
ly imply the second one. People being sentenced may have no
money or leave the country before being taken into custody.
As an empirical theory Hagerstrom's theory is false.
The psychological theory takes for granted that there
are legal rules and that we also know how to identify them.
This is precisely the issue. The question is whether the
criterion for x to be identified as legal rule is
a) the fact that x has been duly promulgated by the
relevant authority,* this is categorical validity,
or
b) the fact that x has been duly promulgated by the
relevant authority and x has been actually ap¬
plied to persons in the relevant state-of-af-
fairs within the scope of x. This is categori¬
cal validity and application.
According to Hagerstrom's formal theory only (a) is the re¬
levant criterion, cf. above p. 370. If (b) now is offered
as well within the formal theory, then Hagerstrom contra¬
dicts himself. The conclusion is that he has not attained
his aim of presenting a coherent system of concepts.
Of course, it may be that the criterion (b) is offered
only as a criterion within the psychological theory. But
then Hagerstrom's theory fails for the reasons mentioned
above p. 375 f.
I proceed to discuss Hagerstrom's phrase, in the passage
cited above "provided that it (i.e. the law) actually binds
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the authorities". This raises the question of the binding
force of law, and its relation to sanctions. Considering
this question, I think it is essential to notice that the
question is ambiguous. The question "what is the binding
force of law?" has but one question mark, but it is not on
that account only one question, for at least four questions
are raised. These questions are
1. The binding force of law with respect to its di¬
rective force, viz. the moral question: granted
that x is a valid legal rule, have I an obliga¬
tion to obey x?
2. The binding force of law with respect to the di¬
rective force of the criteria for a rule to be
a legal rule, viz. the jurisprudential question:
how are rules to be identified as legal rules?
This is the question of categorical validity.
It implies the question of the sanction of law
in the sense of promulgation or confirmation of
x as a valid legal rule.
3. The binding force of law with respect to the
coercive force of legal rules, viz. the juris¬
prudential question: is there a sanction attach¬
ed to a legal rule? The word "sanction" is here
used in a different sense from the sense mention¬
ed above under 2. "Sanction" may also mean "the
penalty" or other forms of specific enforcements
enacted in order to enforce obedience to a valid
legal rule in sense 2. The question may be put:
granted that x has been promulgated in due form
as a legal rule, is it the case that there is
also a penalty or damages enacted as a method to
enforce legal rules?
4. The binding force of law with respect to empiri¬
cal questions whether law is as a matter of fact
executed, viz. the question whether the sanction,
in the sense of penal or civil remedy is as a
matter of fact enforced by the authorities, and
the further question whether the person as a
matter of fact is put in jail or pays the damages
as the case may be. This is the question of cate¬
gorical application.
Hagerstrom conflates these distinct questions. This is seen
if we return to Hagerstrom's claim "that the law itself, in
its abstract character,is also positive law provided that
it actually binds the authorities who are empowered to apply
it to particular cases by means of interpretation", cf.
above p. 376.
This claim is based upon the view that the judge "is
379
obliged to regard the law as his guide" on account of the
force of the constitution and his oath as a judge? The ques¬
tion then is whether Hagerstrom's claim is concerned with
the questions 1 to 4 listed above. In this respect he says,
"there is no juridical rule which predetermined the validi¬
ty of the constitution itself. Again what is the rule of
law which authorizes the judge in a particular case to apply
customary law, the spirit of the law,etc., praeter or contra
legem? No such rule can be discovered. These applications
take place in consequence of general extralegal factors,
such as feeling of justice or quite possibly a scientifical¬
ly mistaken theory that the will of the state in this case
demanded the use of such sources of law. In just the same
way does the constitution derive its strength from such fac¬
tors, and genuine rules of law arise. Every attempt to con¬
struct an ought for the judge in relation to this or that
source of law is doomed to failure. The duty of judges as a
class to judge in accordance with the law ..."cannot be based
by judicial theory upon the law; it must rather be based by
ethics on the oath", by which the judge has bound himself.
We need not consider whether the latter constitutes a scien¬
tific foundation."47)
On the one hand Hagerstrom holds that the judge is ob¬
liged on account of his oath, on the other hand we are told
that we need not consider the oath, since it cannot consti¬
tute a scientific foundation. Does Hagerstrom contradict
himself? Not necessarily if he keeps the formal theory and
the psychological theory apart. It seems to me, however, that
he does not keep these theories apart, and I hope that my ex¬
tensive quotations have shown this.
If we ask the moral question: "Is the judge obliged to
obey the law?" Hagerstrom says that no juridical rule can
be discovered. This is true. But perhaps Hagerstrom has look¬
ed in the wrong direction. It does not fit with the claim
cited above p. 369. Hag*erstr6m's argument is that since he
cannot find any, nobody else can either, so the question is
a pseudo-question. Surely this does not follow. It does, in¬
deed, follow if we accept Hagerstrom's doctrine according
to which whatever is referred to must exist as an object in
space and time. There is no need to accept Hagerstrom's doc-
47) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 50. The quoted passage is Hagerstrom's and re¬
fers to Gustav Radbruch, Grundziige der Rechtsphilosophie, Leipzig
1914. - Cf. p. 95 for a similar argument.
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trine, so the question remains. And the converse also holds.
From the fact that Hagerstrom knows something it does follow
that what he knows is a necessary truth. To be sure, if Ha¬
gerstrom knows something, then it is true. This is a truism.
The untruth is that if Hagerstrom knows something, then what
is known is a necessary truth. If considered as a legal
question about the judge's legal duty, Hagerstrom also con¬
tradicts himself.
If we consider the legal question concerning the sanc¬
tion of law in the sense of promulgation, Hagerstrom holds
that no juridical rule can be discovered. To this the rele¬
vant objection is the one I have just made concerning the
moral question. Besides Hagerstrom then does contradict him¬
self, since he actually holds that it is possible to dis-
48)
cover such rules. It is the case that it is possible to
indicate "the 'primacy' of law" in relation to the state in
the sense of "a system of laws actually enforced". This has,
Hagerstrom says, "nothing to do with natural law for here
the only question is to indicate what actually is present
in what we call positive law". On what basis do we call rules
legal rules? The answer is "actual enforcement". This is to
confound the formal theory with the psychological theory. It
is tantamount to Right being Might.
I submit that Hagerstrom confuses sanction in the sense
49)
of promulgation with sanction in the sense of penalty.
In the passage cited above p. 376 he mentions that the state,
in the person of the judge, gives it "sanction anew". Now,
"sanction" I have argued may mean one of two things, either
promulgation or penalty. Sanction in the former sense is
Hegel's notion of the objective aspect of a law. To quote:
"in a completely organized state, it is only a question of
the culminating point of formal decision (and a natural bul¬
wark against passion). It is wrong therefore to demand ob¬
jective qualities in a monarch; he has only to say 'yes'
and dot the 'i', because the throne should be such that the
significant thing in its holder is not his particular make¬
up. "50)
48) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 54 (my italics).
49) Cf. also Hagerstrom, INLM p. 95, and Ratten och Staten p. 206.
50) Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 280, Add. p. 288-9.
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This is precisely Hagerstrom's view if he sticks to his
formal theory. A law can only come into force by promulga¬
tion and cease to be in force only through formal abrogation.
If a genuine legal order exists, Hagerstrom says, then even
if the legislator is "himself an autocrat . . . the social mecha¬
nism is so constructed that it functions immediately in ac-
51)
cordance with certain actions on his part in due form".
Now, sanction in the sense of promulgation need not involve
sanction in the sense of penalty. By contrast sanction in
the sense of penalty involves also sanction in the sense of
promulgation. This is endorsed by Hagerstrom, who writes,
"the promulgation of the law means no more than that certain
propositions have been published in a certain way as issuing
from the so-called legislative authority for the considera¬
tion of the general public. No real exercise of power takes
52)
place". ' I take it that the italicized sentence refers to
actual application of the legal rules. In the sense of pro¬
mulgation "the law itself exists as an item in the legal or¬
der, when certain formal actions connected with a declara¬
tion have taken place in due constitutional manner". This is
a clear statement of the formal theory.
Duty is related to sanctions in both senses, but Hager¬
strom explicitly defines duty in relation to coercive reac¬
tions. Promulgation alone does not involve, for Hagerstrom,
a real exercise of power. The rules must actually be applied
by the judges. This precisely turns "a genuine legal order"
into "nothing but a social machine in which the cogs are
men". This is in the end Hagerstrom's scientific point of
view. It is a clear statement that Hagerstrom either aban¬
dons the formal theory as a piece of metaphysics with no ba¬
sis in reality. Or else, which is more probable, that he
identifies the two theories. For Hagerstrom the answer to
the legal question: "is there a sanction in the sense of
penalty attached to a legal rule?" is affirmative. He then
links the affirmative answer to a similar affirmative answer
51) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 355, p. 354, and p. 348.
52) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 37 (my italics).
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to the empirical question concerning enforcement of rules.
Legal rules are,Hagerstrom claims, "in general applied and
irresistibly carried out as a matter of fact in a human so-
53)
ciety". This is Hagerstrom's psychological theory. If
the theory is an empirical theory, then it is false, since
as a matter of fact general rules are not "irresistibly
carried out". It leaves open whether the theory is put for¬
ward as a conceptual theory. If this is the case, the ques¬
tion is whether rules, which are not applied "in general"
are to be considered as legal rules? Hagerstrom's answer
is negative. This is false again, since there is no contra¬
diction involved in saying that this is a legal rule but it
is not in general applied. An ineffectual law is still a
law. So Hagerstrom's theory fails in this respect as well.
I conclude that Hagerstrom has two theories of law,
the formal theory and the psychological theory, which he
sometimes keeps apart, but in the end reduces to one theory,
viz. the psychological theory. - A further conclusion is
that Hagerstrom has not achieved his aim to see clearly what
the object of jurisprudence is. Hagerstrom then does not
54)
present "a true picture of the law itself". The phrase
is Olivecrona's and is meant to refer to Hagerstrom's theory.
I turn the phrase, with respect, against his master. A major
weakness in Hagerstrom's picture of the law itself is pre¬
cisely that it does not present the law itself. Hagerstrom's
picture diverts the attention from the law itself towards
a system of emotional responses, caused by using words. It
is, in short, to confuse an exposition and criticism of the
law with psychology based upon a dubious theory of meaning
which Hagerstrom never tried to present in a fully elaborated
theory using coherent scientific concepts.
I do not regard this as a promising way to settle juris¬
prudential questions. Rather, I consider Kelsen's way more pro¬
mising, and to this I now turn.
53) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 348 (his italics).
54) Olivecrona, Law as Fact, p. 11.
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4. Kelsen and Hagerstrom
It has been claimed that Alf Ross is the first continental
55)
jurist to discover the significance of Kelsen. This is
not true. Already in 1925 the Swedish writer Fredrik Lager-
roth applies Kelsen's theory, as stated in "Hauptprobleme
der Staatrechtslehre" of 1911, in an account of Swedish
constitutional law."^^ And Hagerstrom, in his paper "Ar gal-
lande ratt uttryck av vilja?" of 1916, and in his book
"Till fragan om den gallande rattens begrepp" of 1917, re-
57)
fers to and criticizes Kelsen's theory. In fact, many of
Hagerstrom1s arguments against the will-theory are quite
similar to arguments used by Kelsen in his Hauptprobleme
to a quite similar effect.
Kelsen is, in his Hauptprobleme, concerned with German
jurists who speak of law as being the will of the state.
Kelsen adopts this term and endeavours to penetrate beneath
it to the reality. Language exercises a tyranny over think¬
ing, and thinking is struggling against it, and not in vain.
The upshot of Kelsen's investigation is that the term "will"
in law cannot mean the same thing as the psychological will.
Psychology is irrelevant for jurisprudence, and the term
"will" is therefore to be understood as a juristic construct
and not as a real thing in the external world. This is pre¬
cisely the mistake committed by German theorists who apply
the term in a psychological sense and hence look for a body
which does the willing, a real personality in society as
the source of norms, rights and duties. This is a mistake.
It is wrong to identify the concepts of "norm" and "impera¬
tive". And to say that an individual has a duty says nothing
about his state of mind. It is rather to say that there is
a legal norm, and behaviour opposed to this norm is laid
55) Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings, London 1964,
p. 99 note 12.
56) Fredrik Lagerroth, Psykologisk Verklighet och Juridisk Fiktion
vid Tillampningen av Sveriges Grundlager (Psychological Reality
and Juridical Fiction in the Application of Swedish Constitutio¬
nal Law), in Lunds Universitets Arsskrift, N.F. Avd. 1, Bd. 20,
No. 6, Lund & Leipzig 1925.
57) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 19 f., p. 51 f.; p. 119, 234, 238.
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down as a condition of the application of coercion by the
proper authority which itself, in turn, comes into existence
in virtue of norms. The law, in short, regulates its own
creation, application and execution, based upon the basic
norm which states that the constitution ought to be obeyed.
Kelsen's argument is then that the concept of will in
a jurisprudential sense is the proper basis for approaching
the problems of norms, duties and obedience. Governance of
people is effective whenever its institutions are strong,
and corrupt whenever the legal norms fail to function pro¬
perly, i.e. when norms are no longer obeyed and applied by
the authorities.
This is one approach to establishing and maintaining a free
and happy civic life. Another approach is, by contrast, to
suggest that if the men who control the institutions of
government are corrupt, the institutions created by law to
shape and constrain them cannot be expected to be effective.
So the promotion of a healthy and uncorrupt form of social
life depends rather upon developing the energy and public
spirit of the civil servants in particular and the people as
a whole in general. In order to be sure of upholding the va¬
lue of peace what needs to be fostered is not so much the
structure of effective institutions and legal norms, but
rather a sense of duty and respect on the part of the indi-
., 58)vxdual.
I suggest that one difference between Kelsen and Hager¬
strom is that Kelsen is an exponent of the first approach,
whereas Hagerstrom rather is a representative of the latter,
which I hope to be able to show in the following sections.
Hagerstrom has shown great interest in Kelsen's theory
of law, and there is a certain similarity between Hager-
strom's theory of law in the formal version and Kelsen's
theory of law. The latter is discussed by Hagerstrom in a
lengthy review, published in German in 1928 in a rather ob-
58) Cf. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1,
p. 44 f. As an exponent of the first approach he mentions Hume,
of the second Machiavelli and Montesquieu.
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59)
scure Swedish journal. This may explain why it has by
and large been neglected except among the Swedes Lundstedt
and Olivecrona. Lundstedt dismisses Kelsen's theory as "pure
fantasy", as has been shown "briefly and irrefutably by
6 0)
Hagerstrom". For Olivecrona Kelsen's theory is "the great
mystery", which it is not worthwhile to explore.My aim
in this section is to show that Hagerstrom has not refuted
Kelsen's theory.
Alf Ross' book "Theorie der Rechtsquellen" appeared in
the Series Wiener Staats- und Rechtswissenschaftliche Studien,
published by Kelsen, and Ross dedicated his book "mit Dankbar-
keit" to Kelsen. Ross' book was severely reviewed by Hager-
6 2)
strom. This review, I think, turned Ross away from Kelsen
to follow Hagerstrom. Yet Ross treats Kelsen with respect.
Hagerstrom shares this attitude. Hagerstrom does not
dismiss Kelsen as a purveyor of nonsense. On the contrary,
Hagerstrom says that "Kelsen's theory ... is very well worthy
6 3)
of attention". Perhaps Lundstedt should have listened to
this piece of advice, i.e. reading Kelsen rather than de¬
preciating him as a "dilettante", who has failed to take
any part in "thorough and comprehensive discussions of so¬
cial and sociological questions" as Lundstedt has on the
basis of the scientific point of view of his master Hager¬
strom. But then Lundstedt fails to realize that the master
has two theories of law. The formal theory of law according
to which the essence of law is reason, i.e. law has authori¬
tative character as announcements of actual duties, and the
essence of duty is to submit oneself to the law. And the
psychological theory of law according to which the essence
of law is will, i.e. law is an expression of the interests
of the socially predominant class, and the essence of duty
is nothing but the natural feeling of duty that one ought to
59) "Litteris", vol. 5, 1928, reprinted INLM p. 257 ff.
60) Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised, p. 406 - and see p. 405 for
Lundstedt's decrying of Kelsen's intelligence.
61) Olivecrona, Law as Fact, p. 21.
62) Hagerstrom, Till Fragan om Begreppet Gallande Ratt, Tidsskrift for
Rettsvitenskap, vol. 44, 1931, p. 48-91.
63) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 297.
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observe the law, i.e. what the authorities say by means of
empty words. It is only by confounding these theories that
Lundstedt manages to speak of legal rules at all.
I have suggested that there are similarities and dif¬
ferences between the views of Hagerstrom and Kelsen. The
similarities are that they are both preoccupied with metho¬
dological problems of a science of law. Kelsen's campaign
aims at purifying legal science from foreign elements, and
establishing a pure theory of law. This is quite similar to
the campaign of Husserl and Frege for a pure logic as against
foreign elements such as psychologism. Hagerstrom wants to
purify thinking from the foreign elements of feeling and vo¬
lition, as I have tried to show, above Chapter III, Section 7.
Both Kelsen and Hagerstrom are in search of a method
whereby the intellect can penetrate through the mist of meta¬
physics to the structure of the real world. For both to know
an object means the same thing as to recognize it as an item
in a unified whole. And the basic principle of all cognition
64)
is the law of contradiction.
I have suggested that Hagerstrom's formal theory is
close to Kelsen's theory. Perhaps Hagerstrom is influenced
rather by Bostrom than by Kelsen. Lagerroth has shown many
similarities between Bostrom and Kelsen. This fact perhaps
explains Hagerstrom's reaction against Kelsen's theory. Ha¬
gerstrom' s philosophy in general is a reaction against Bo-
strom's philosophy which is a version of rational idealism
according to which nothing but minds and their perceptions
6 5)
exist. For Bostrom reality is a system of ideas. Ideas
are equivalent to persons, so reality is a system of per¬
sons, forming a hierarchy of persons. In this hierarchy the
perfect idea (i.e. God) is that which includes all other
ideas. Any idea is included in the perfect idea, and any
idea includes all ideas that rank lower within the hierarchy.
64) For Kelsen's conception of knowledge see my paper Hans Kelsen's
Theory of Law and Philosophy of Justice, presented at the 8th An¬
nual Conference of the UK Association for Legal and Social Philo¬
sophy, Edinburgh 1981.
65) See my Skandinavischer Realismus, Ch. II, for a short summary.
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Thus, to mention an example, society is included in the per¬
fect or absolute idea, but also in the state, which in turn
includes the family and the individual. The task for the in¬
dividual is to understand himself as idea or person which
involves understanding of other persons striving towards
the absolute idea or God.
Hagerstrom reacts against Bostrom's philosophy which
he condemns as metaphysics. This may explain Hagerstrom's
reaction against Kelsen's theory. This is a biographical
remark. What is more important is the epistemological dif¬
ference between Hagerstrom and Kelsen. As I see it the dif¬
ference is that Hagerstrom, like Freud, applies thinking as
a method to penetrate the irrational forces of the human
6 6)
soul, viz. volitions and feelings. Kelsen, by contrast,
applies thinking to apprehend in a rational way the mani¬
fold materials of law. The difference can also be put in
this way. Hagerstrom regards legal ideas as the outcome or
expression of certain interests. His interest is to unravel
the conditions which produce such ideas. Thus, he claims
that his psychological theory is the proper key to under¬
standing law.
Kelsen accepts this but thinks that this is a matter
for sociological or psychological research. Kelsen's inter¬
est is rather in legal ideas as norms, as an independent in¬
tellectual construction to be judged in terms of its con¬
sistency and clarity. This is akin to Hagerstrom's formal
theory. The similarity between Kelsen and Hagerstrom is
that both offer a general theory. Kelsen's theory of law is
a general theory of law stating a general scheme for the
criterion of validity of any legal system. Hagerstrom's
theory of law is rather a general psychological theory stat¬
ing various conditions which must operate in order to main¬
tain the legal system.
The difference between Kelsen and Hagerstrom is that
66) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 350 referring to instinct and his dis¬
tinction between an ideal ego and an empirical ego, p. 148, cf.
p. 129, 131, 181.
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Kelsen explicitly claims that cognition is creative, where¬
as Hagerstrom denies that this is the case. It is a clash
between the views of knowledge in terms of maker's knowledge
and knowledge in terms of finder's knowledge, cf. above Chap-
terlH, Section 7, p. 209. It is worth noticing, I think,
that Kelsen's scientific or jurisprudential aim is to con¬
struct a conceptual model for the legal universe. He is in¬
terested in an elucidation of fundamental legal concepts just
as Ernst Mach is interested in an analysis of fundamental
6 7)
scientific concepts. Mach's aim is to take away "the ma¬
gic from things", to present scientific knowledge as based
upon connection between experience, and to present the re¬
sults in an economically proper way. Science merely describes,
it does not explain, sensations. Mach dedicated his "Science
of Mechanics" to Karl Pearson. Kelsen refers to Mach as well
6 ft)
as Pearson in his book, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre.
As motto Kelsen refers to Pearson's distinction between the
civil and the scientific law. And Kelsen explicitly refers
to Mach's formula: science is not concerned with "why" but
it is solely concerned with "how". This is rather interest¬
ing because it suggests that Kelsen's background is the em¬
piricist foundation of Mach and Pearson, as against the
received opinion of his being influenced directly by Kant.
Like Mach and Pearson, Kelsen denies that legal science
explains. Legal science describes, in statements using the
concept of ought in a descriptive sense, the norms in which
the concept of ought is used in a prescriptive sense. It is
not the business of legal science to offer causal explana¬
tions of the origin of,rules, and how they function in so¬
ciety. This is not to say that such inquiries are unimport¬
ant. They are, indeed, important, but the method used, the
causal method, differs from the method of imputation used
in legal science. Like Pearson and Mach, Kelsen favours the
unity of science which depends upon method, not subject-
matter. The important thing for Kelsen is that there is not
67) Cf. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy p. 320 f.
68) Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, p. 3, cf. p. 353.
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just one method, the causal method,used in science dealing
with nature, but also another method of imputation used in
science dealing with norms. And then Kelsen, like Pearson,
uncompromisingly denies that religion or metaphysics pro¬
vides us with scientific knowledge. There are only two ways
of arriving at genuine knowledge, the methods just mentioned.
If we employ these methods we are bound to arrive at the
same conclusions. It is quite otherwise concerning a dis¬
cussion of values, where different systems compete. The ju¬
rist, qua jurist, cannot take sides in this conflict. That
is not to say that norms cannot be criticized from a moral
point of view. They can, but this is distinct from giving
a description of the normative meaning of legal norms.
Hagerstrom is opposed to metaphysics. But he is also
opposed to.Mach's approach which Hagerstrom condemns as meta¬
physics. The aim of science is to penetrate to things, not
to remain within the area of one's own sensations. This is
idealism. Kelsen's view implies that mind can only know its
own ideas. Since ideas are mental it leads to the view that
the real is mental. It is not, Hagerstrom claims. It is ma¬
terial. Hagerstrom holds the realistic view that the mind
does not create ideas of facts for itself nor does it create
the connections between facts. Everything that the mind can
apprehend, objects as well as relations, exists already in
the world independently of the mind whose function it is to
describe and explain objects and relations as they are.
If this is so, theories are rather forced upon us. This
raises immediately the question how error is possible. Ha-
gerstrom's answer to this is to refer to the influence of
6 9)
feelings and volitions upon thinking. Hence the importance
of the psychological theory. Hagerstrom is also interested
in taking away the magic, but he uses the causal method.
Hagerstrom's analysis is based upon reasoning from known
effects to looking for possible causes of norms, rights and
duties. It is a manifest fact that we have ideas of rights
69) This presupposes that feelings and volitions are active rather
than passive. Hagerstrom denies this. His theory is then incoherent,
cf. above Chapter III, section 5, especially p. 149 f.
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and obligations. It is also manifest for Hagerstrom that
foreign elements are attached to these ideas. These ideas
must then be purified to achieve a system of internally co¬
herent concepts of the empirically given reality. This is
Hagerstrom's formal theory, which is not kept distinct from
the psychological theory. The reason why is Hagerstrom's
theory of knowledge and meaning. We have direct and true
knowledge of the independent and actual reality. We find ob¬
jects and their characteristics divided by nature into real
and objectively delimited classes. This is expressed in judge¬
ments using concepts. Everything we know about the thing gold
is embodied in the concept of gold, that it is yellow, does
not rust, has great malleability, is highly valuable, etc.
Each of these facts constitutes part of our concept of gold,
of which the word "gold" functions as a name. Similarly for
the genuine concept of law. We have to look for the psycho¬
logical facts covered by the concepts, of which the word
"law" in a proper sense is the name.
This approach suggests that the task of inquiry is to
look for a real world of fixed and coherent concepts, i.e.
concepts stating all the characteristics there are to be
known about objects in the spatio-temporal world. This ap¬
proach then makes all judgements analytical judgements. This
is Hagerstrom's conception of science built upon the crite¬
rion of the law of contradiction as the only criterion of
meaning and truth.
Now Kelsen's approach and Hagerstrom's approach are
quite compatible, as far as I can see. It is to maintain a
distinction between an analytical inquiry and an empirical
inquiry into law. The analytical inquiry is based upon the
law of contradiction as the only relevant criterion of mean¬
ing and truth. The empirical inquiry must be supplemented
by another criterion - or criteria - for testing the truth
of judgements, which I shall not try to develop. The import¬
ant thing is only that different statements have different
criteria of truth.
Kelsen is quite explicit in this respect. Hagerstrom,
by contrast, obliterates this distinction by merging his
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formal theory and psychological theory. There can be but
one inquiry into law. This inquiry is based upon Hagerstrom's
epistemology and his method of essentialism. If there is
knowledge then there is only one independent reality of ob¬
jects related to each other in a systematically connected
order besides which no other is conceivable.
There can be only one correct definition of law stating
its essence, viz. the actual state of affairs of fixed rules
for the exercise of coercion which is irresistibly upheld
as a matter of fact by the authorities.
Kelsen thinks that another concept of law is conceivable,
viz. that there are fixed norms for the exercise of coercion
which ought to be carried out by the authorities according
to norms. This raises the problem for Hagerstrom how to de¬
cide between his definition and Kelsen's. Hagerstrom's an¬
swer is based upon the method of essentialism and the appeal
to his epistemology. This is unerringly and indubitably true.
Hence it follows that Kelsen's theory is not a case of know¬
ledge, but of opinion, cf. above Chapter IV, Section 8, p. 283.
This is Hagerstrom's epistemological objection which I shall
consider in the next section.
Hagerstrom has also another objection. This is based
upon legal considerations. According to Hagerstrom, if a ju¬
rist follows Kelsen's theory, then he is committed to "pri¬
mitive superstition and medieval scholasticism" or "primi-
70)
tive positivism". Primitive positivism claims that only
positive law is valid and eliminates considerations based
upon "an axiom given in the consciousness of justice". Pri¬
mitive positivism is against "sound reason". It follows that
a jurist should not follow Kelsen's theory. I shall consider
this objection in Section 6 in connection with Hagerstrom's
discussion of the concept of duty.
5. Hagerstrom's Epistemological Objection to Kelsen's Theory
Hagerstrom is full of praise of Kelsen. He recommends ju¬
rists to study throughly Kelsen's "Allgemeine Staatsrechts-
70) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 271, 272, 274, 278, 298.
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lehre" of 1925 "to jurists who wish to attain to real
71)
clearness about their own presuppositions". On the basis
of "positivism" Kelsen seeks to "introduce truth and order
by shedding all traces of natural law".
Kelsen's merit is to attack the will-theory, since the
validity and permanence of law cannot be established on the
basis of the always contingent will of certain persons.
Kelsen's attack on the prevaling theory of Felix Somlo which
is based on "the Austinian power-theory" is excellent. Kel¬
sen's acute criticism of this theory displays this theory
in "its falsification of reality and its unsound confusion
of legal and moral rights".
Turning to the demerit of Kelsen's approach Hagerstrom
says that Kelsen
"makes no incorrect statements about social facts, but one
finds also that he avoids all risk of doing so because he
does not allow jurisprudence to have anything to do with
actual social existence! A legal prescript is, in fact, for
him a judgment concerning a supernatural existent, which
nevertheless (at least in so far as his view is carried out
consistently) must be completely realized in the world of
nature."72)
What Hagerstrom is saying is revealing. His criticism shows
that he has totally misunderstood Kelsen's theory. Kelsen's
aim is to distinguish between what is pure or a priori and
what is empirical or a posteriori in jurisprudence. The
pure theory, according to Kelsen, consists of a construc¬
tion of a system of concepts which recommends itself to work¬
ing jurists. In this sense it is independent of the natural
order, but it does not follow that it is irrelevant for
understanding social facts. If Hagerstrom has misunderstood
other authors in a similar way, then his criticism of these
authors is similarly misplaced. The result is that Hager¬
strom moves round in his own make-believe world. It is quite
wrong that Kelsen does not allow jurisprudence to have any¬
thing to do with actual social existence. Kelsen is adamant
that there is room for empirical research into legal phenomena.
71) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 297, cf. p. 259 and p. 261 for the following
quotations.
72) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 267.
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He also insists, quite rightly in my opinion, that this re¬
search cannot be carried out without a conception of law, by
means of which it is possible to distinguish between legal
behaviour and non-legal behaviour. To establish this concep¬
tion is a task for jurisprudence. There is also room for a
science which deals with human conduct, not as it is as a
matter of fact, but as it ought to be according to legal
rules. This is legal science as distinct from jurisprudence.
Jurisprudence, in Kelsen's version, is a general theory of
law. Legal science, by contrast, applies jurisprudence and
is concerned with the norms for a given society. This science
also presupposes that it is possible to make a distinction
between legal rules of conduct and non-legal rules of con¬
duct, e.g. moral rules, rules of etiquette, and other social
norms. Again it is the task of jurisprudence to establish a
criterion to make this possible. Hagerstrom simply overlooks
that there is a distinction between science and philosophy
of science, between legal science and jurisprudence as a
general theory of law. The first of each pair is a branch
of applied philosophy. The second of each pair is a branch
of pure philosophy. The person who applies philosophy uses
philosophical techniques in the course of an inquiry, whose
questions are non-philosophical, i.e. scientific or legal
questions as the case may be.
The pure philosopher, like Kelsen, studies the nature
of the questions and answers, methods and arguments, con¬
cepts and propositions which are used by himself as well as
by the specialized scientists and jurists writing textbooks
or lawyers engaged in other juridical activities, e.g. judg¬
ing and pleading, including the legal activities of ordina¬
ry people. The pure philosopher is engaged in explaining how
to verify a scientific statement or how to establish the va¬
lidity of law. Kelsen's aim is to construct a system of con¬
cepts to deal with legal questions as a necessity of reason.
But this is a quite different matter from knowing that a
statement is verified or falsified or a legal rule is valid
or invalid.
Legal science and jurisprudence are mutually indepen-
394
dent activities, but it does not follow that they are mutual¬
ly irrelevant, as Hagerstrom's criticism implies. Juris¬
prudence is concerned with the crucial question how to iden¬
tify a rule as being a legal rule. To answer this question
involves the ability to pick out legal rules and describe
them alone as legal and also involves the ability to use the
word "legal" properly in general statements, questions and
so on. Jurisprudence is, then, concerned with the explica¬
tion of a scheme of classification for rules as legal rules
and the principles or criteria determining this classifica-
tory scheme. I do not wish to enter into an elaborate dis¬
cussion of this problem. What I wish to point out is only
that Hagerstrom's own theory, i.e. the formal theory, fails
in this respect. The crucial objection to Hagerstrom's theory
is that it provides no proper method for classifying rules as
legal rules as distinct from non-legal rules.
Hagerstrom's formal theory is concerned with a classi¬
fication which depends upon the ideas in one's mind. His in¬
quiry is aimed at an exposition of that conception of law
which really covers the facts which legal theorists have in
mind in their attempts at conceptual construction, cf. above
Section 2, p. 360. The objection is that "inner accompani¬
ments - whether physiological, imaginative, or what you
73)
will - are not constitutive of meaning".
For Hagerstrom having a concept, involves conceiving
something as real, "i.e. as belonging to the context of rea-
74)
lity whose elements are concrete and perceptible". This
cognitive relation between the conceiving subject and per¬
ceptible objects involves an apprehension of the properties
which characterize an object and make it what it is. Thus,
Hagerstrom believes that concepts are found. Hence his ob¬
jection to Kelsen's theory of law for implying that "the whole
75)
of the usual view of state functions is stood on its head".
This objection is misplaced and it involves Hagerstrom
73) Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, p. 7.
74) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 143.
75) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 289, but see p. 38.
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in a flagrant self-contradiction, to use one of his own fa¬
vourite phrases, since Hagerstrom applies Kelsen's theory
in his discussion of the meaning of the phrase "the state
builds railways". And Hagerstrom's theory of concepts being
found, not made, is totally wrong.
To quote Peter Geach, we can say,
"something that goes for all concepts without exception:
Having a concept never means being able to recognize some
feature we have found in direct experience; the mind makes
concepts, and this concept-formation and the subsequent use
of the concepts formed never is a mere recognition or find¬
ing; but this does not in the least prevent us from apply¬
ing concepts in our sense-experience and knowing sometimes
that we apply them rightly. In all cases it is a matter of
fitting a concept to my experience, not of picking out the
feature I am interested in from among other features given
simultaneously."76)
Hagerstrom does succumb to this temptation which is
shown in his discussion of the idea of duty. To this idea
there must "correspond a certain property which answers to
the name of 'duty'". Since Hagerstrom is unable to find any¬
thing he concludes that
"what is thought of here is merely an unrepresentable some¬
thing which is connected with the expression 'duty', 'obli¬
gation', and etc., and which cannot be distinguished except
by reference to just that expression".
This leaves Hagerstrom with the mystery of identifying
actions as obligatory actions, since we only have the word
"duty" but no referent. His answer is that an obligatory
action:
"is conceived as real only as having that essentially im¬
perceptible quality which is 'duty'. It exists in the world
of 'duty', not in 'our' world. If it also belongs to the
context of sensible reality, i.e., if it actually happens,
this has nothing to do with its reality as a duty. This im¬
plies that the same action, which exists as a term in an
imperceptible reality, viz., the world of duty, exists also
as a term in the perceptible world."77)
This is a rather interesting remark, since Hagerstrom
takes Kelsen to task for misunderstanding "the plain mean¬
ing of the positive legal rules". Kelsen regards a legal
76) Peter Geach, Mental Acts, London 1957, p. 40.




"imposing an obligation in a different sense from that in
which the prescript itself does so. The civil and penal
laws, according to their own meaning, impose obligations
in such a way that they establish certain rights (rights
in the proper sense of the word as general legal interests)
with powers of coercion attached to them."
This is mysterious, since Hagerstrom holds that the
the words "duty" and "right" are just words; now they sudden¬
ly have "a proper meaning". This is Hagerstrom's use of his
formal theory. I shall return to it in the next section. What
is interesting is that Hagerstrom operates with two realms
of existence. There is the perceptible realm of behaviour
and action, which has nothing to do with the reality of duty.
And there is the imperceptible realm of duty, which has no¬
thing to do with actual behaviour. Yet Hagerstrom somehow
manages to combine these two realms, as shown in the last
passage in the quotation cited above:"the same action which
exists in the imperceptible reality exists also in the per¬
ceptible world". So if Hagerstrom is capable of combining
the realm of duty with our world, why is it then that Kelsen
is damned for doing the same? Hagerstrom's main criticism
against Kelsen is precisely that it is impossible. I quote: (SP)
"It is an absurd idea. (1) The supernatural juridical system
cannot be thought of as even existing alongside of the na¬
tural order. For no knowledge of any reality is possible ex¬
cept through relating its object to a systematically interconnect¬
ed whole. But the supernatural and the natural system, as
being different in kind, cannot be co-ordinated in a single
system. Therefore, so far as I contemplate the one, the
other does not exist for me. (2) But, if the jurist as such
must abstract from the natural order, it is to be feared
that the legal prescripts he sets forth will be far too
empty. He cannot, e.g., talk of legal transactions as juri¬
dical facts for that becomes altogether meaningless, if one
may not assume any natural causal nexus. (3) Again, he can¬
not speak intelligibly of punishment, since a 'punishment'
which led to no consequences by way of natural causal con¬
nexions could not be called a punishment. (4) He must simply
be left gasping for the air!"78)
This passage presents Hagerstrom's main criticism of
Kelsen, and leaves the reader gasping for the air. I suggest
that it involves at least three different lines of criticism.
78) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 267 (my brackets).
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The starting point (SP) is that Kelsen's ideas are absurd,
the conclusion (C) is that Kelsen is left gasping for the
air. This gives one line of criticism, viz. the epistemolo-
gical objection put forward under 1. It gives a second line
of criticism, viz. the objection concerning abstraction, put
forward under 2. It gives a third line of criticism, viz.
the proper definition of punishment, put forward under 3.
In this section I shall concentrate on the first line
of criticism, leaving the objection against abstraction for
consideration in the next section, and the problem of the proper
definition of punishment for consideration in Section 7.
Hagerstrom's epistemological objection is based upon
his theory of knowledge, viz. that there is only one reali¬
ty, reality itself. This is based upon the distinction be¬
tween the natural order and the supernatural order. The na¬
tural order is concerned with social facts, i.e. actual so¬
cial existence in terms of natural causal connections between
things and processes according to descriptive laws. The super¬
natural order, by contrast, differs in kind from the natur-
ral order, since it is concerned with juridical facts, i.e.
ideal existence in terms of legal connections between norms
of rights and duties which must be realized in the natural
order.
Hagerstrom's argument is that there is only one realm
of being, viz. the natural order. This natural order com¬
prises the totality of things and processes to be found and
explained by using one principle of explanation, viz. the
method of causal explanation.
Kelsen's view, by contrast, is that there is one method
of explanation, viz. the causal method. But this method can¬
not be used within the realm of norms. Within this realm an¬
other method must be used, viz. the method which Kelsen calls
the method of imputation.
The case between Hagerstrom and Kelsen raises philo-
79)
sophical questions concerning monism and pluralism. I
do not have the capacity to solve these questions. I shall,
79) I am indebted to the account given by A.M. Quinton in the Encyclo¬
paedia Britannica, 14th ed., vol. 18, New York 1973, p. 66 f.
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however, try to clarify the questions. Monism is a philoso¬
phical doctrine which gives answers to two distinct questions.
The first question is how many things are there in the world?
This may be called the question of substance. The second
question is how many kinds of things are there? This may be
called the question of attributes. The answer offered by mo¬
nism is that there is only one thing or substance, and only
one kind of substance. Hagerstrom is a monist in both senses.
That is to say, he is a monist of substance, and a monist of
attributes. He claims that the world as a whole is the only
true thing, and further that this world is material in na¬
ture. The rival theory is dualism or pluralism. This theo-
ty states that there is not one thing but many things, and
there are many kinds of things in the world. If the two ques¬
tions are kept distinct, this gives four combinations.
One can be a monist in both senses, that is there is only
one substance and only one kind of substance, which Hager¬
strom, like Hegel, holds. They differ, of course, in their
conception of substance. For Hegel it is spirit, for Hager¬
strom it is matter. One can be a dualist in both senses, that
is there are at least two different substances and at least
two different kinds of substances. Descartes is a dualist in
both senses. Kelsen may be a dualist in both senses, since
he makes a distinction between the realm of is and the realm
of ought. There is next the possibility that there is only
one thing, viz. the world as a whole, but within this world
there are at least two different kinds of things, viz. the
mental and the physical. Thus, it is possible to be a monist
in the first sense (substantival monism), but a dualist in
respect of the kinds of substance there are (attributive dua¬
lism) . Spinoza may be mentioned as an example. There is,
finally, the possibility that there are many things in the
world (substantival pluralism), but they are all of the same
kind (attributive monism). Examples are Bertrand Russell
and Leibniz.
I suggest that Kelsen can be classified as a monist of
substance. There is but one world, but within this world
there is the realm of ought and the realm of is, hence he
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holds a position of attributive dualism. Thus, Kelsen's po¬
sition is that he is a substantival monist, and an attribu¬
tive dualist. Hagerstrom's position is that he is a substan¬
tival monist and an attributive monist as well. The import¬
ance of this is that Hagerstrom's argument against Kelsen
is based upon the assumption that there can be only one thing,
viz. the world as a whole, and only one kind of thing, viz.
the realm of is. In other words one must be a monist in both
senses. He overlooks that there is the possibility that Kel¬
sen may be a monist in the first sense, i.e. a substantival
monist but an attributive dualist.
Hagerstrom's argument is based upon his ontology, viz.
his materialism which commits him to the view that mental
phenomena are to be identified with physical or bodily move¬
ments. This excludes the possibility that bodily movements
can be brought about by a non-physical soul. It excludes the
possibility that bodily movements can be directed or redi¬
rected by the soul. This is precisely what Hagerstrom assumes
in his discussion of rights and duties as magical forces.
This is inconsistent. Strictly speaking it is inconsistent
for Hagerstrom to talk of "the intention of the legislator".
Hagerstrom's argument against Kelsen is also based upon
his epistemology, i.e. the view that there is only one fun¬
damental type of knowledge. Kelsen's view is based upon the
view that there are at least two types of knowledge, viz.
empirical knowledge in terms of causes and normative know¬
ledge in terms of reasons. This is a much disputed question
which I do not wish to engage in. I only wish to point out
that Hagerstrom's argument against Kelsen is directed against
Kelsen being a dualist. This may also explain why Hagerstrom
does not make a clear distinction between the formal theory
and the psychological theory. His attack against Kelsen is
based upon the view that they are rival theories, which is
not necessarily the case. This is Kelsen's position. Hence
the importance of the distinction between being an attribu¬
tive monist like Hagerstrom and an attributive dualist like
Kelsen. This is the issue. The issue for Hagerstrom is that
Kelsen is a substantival dualist, which he is not if I am
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right. He is, like Hagerstrom, a substantival monist, so
Hagerstrom's attack is a misfire.
It fails, since Hagerstrom overlooks that the question:
"How many things are there?" is different from the ques¬
tion: "How many kinds of things are there?" Hagerstrom's
quest for the unity of things leads him to a monistic
answer to the first question: "There is only one world". It
also leads him to a monistic answer to the second ques¬
tion: "Everything existent is material".
Kelsen's quest for unity leads him to a monistic
answer to the first question: "There is only one world".
As for the second question it leads him to the dualism be¬
tween the causal order of nature and the order of norms
established by human imputation. We must explain the facts
of the universe by referring to two independent and coexis¬
tent principles of thought. Knowledge of social and natural
facts in terms of experience is based upon the causal principle, but
knowledge of legal facts or knowledge of moral facts in terms
of reason is based upon the principle of imputation.
Kelsen's merit is to have recognized the dualism between so¬
cial facts and norms. The making of a law is a social fact belong¬
ing to the realm of is. The norm which is issued is a legal
fact belonging to the realm of ought, but related to the re¬
alm of is, since it refers to human actions. Kelsen's view
that an ought can only be derived from another ought leads
him to the view that law is brought about by a presupposed
basic norm.
Hagerstrom finds that this is an absurd idea that law
80)
creates its own existence. This criticism is based upon
his belief in determinism, and his belief that the only
proper method for obtaining knowledge is the causal method.
This is seen in his criticism of Kelsen's theory about the
making of legal norms. Hagerstrom says,
"the legal prescript which is given through a certain pro¬
cedure must itself be valid if it is to be able to make
another procedure legally relevant and that therefore the
whole notion of correlation is contradictory"1)
80) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 265, p. 275.
81) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 279-280 (my italics), cf. p. 265 for the next
quotation.
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Hagerstrom's argument is based upon the unstated assump¬
tion that the cause must possess at least as much reality as
the effect. The cause of Hagerstrom's idea of the world as
a systematically interconnected whole is therefore the world
as a systematically ordered whole. Hagerstrom's assumption
is not true, so his argument fails. But he uses the argument
to criticize Kelsen.
The argument runs then that my idea of the validity of
a legal prescript is therefore a "validity in itself". This
"validity in itself" is ideal, i.e. it refers to an ought.
It follows then that if a legal will (is) brings it about
that a pronouncement (is) is a valid legal prescript (ought)
then the nature of a legal will (is) is a valid legal pre¬
script (ought). This is, I take it, Hagerstrom's criticism
8 2)
of "the all-pervasive confusion of is and ought". But
surely, the rejoinder is that Kelsen is not guilty of that
confusion, since the basic norm provides the foundation for
the correlation of one norm with another norm. Hagerstrom's
objection is that the notion of correlation is self-contra¬
dictory, cf. above p. 400. This is again to use the causal
argument. In the realm of is, everything has a cause. In
the realm of ought, every norm is correlated with another
norm. If this is so then every norm must be correlated to
another norm, and so on, until we reach the basic norm. The
basic norm is the origin of norms. Therefore, the basic norm
exists, since there are norms.
Hagerstrom then raises the question if every norm is
correlated to another norm, then the basic norm must be
correlated to another norm. But Kelsen does not admit this.
The basic norm is the end of norms. If the basic norm is not
correlated to another norm, then it is not true that every
norm is correlated to another norm. Yet Kelsen's argument
is based upon the premise that every norm is correlated to
another norm. This is self-contradictory: the conclusion
says that the basic norm is not correlated to any norm. This
contradicts the premise which says that every norm is cor-
82) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 277.
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related to another norm. If the premise is true, the con¬
clusion cannot be true as well. And if the conclusion is
true, the premise cannot be true. The way out for Kelsen is
to say that every norm, except the basic norm, is correlated
to another norm. But to this the rejoinder is the story of
the Indian philosopher and his elephant, cf. above Chapter
III, Section 4, p. 120 f. I think that this is the ground for
Hagerstrom's dismissal of Kelsen's concept of the basic norm.
In this connection it is worth noticing Hagerstrom's objec-
83)
tion to the view put forward by Walter Jellinek.
According to Jellinek there is a supreme rule of law
which gives to all legal systems their validity. This supreme
rule of law says "If there is in a human corporative entity
a supreme holder of power, that which he ordains must be fol-
84)lowed". Hagerstrom's comment is "this proposition, which,
according to Jellinek himself, is a "necessity of thought"
and therefore not a prescript, obviously belongs to natural
law and it certainly cannot be said to be of much value".
In this respect Hagerstrom has been proved to be wrong.
Clearly, there is a problem here, which Hagerstrom just
dismisses. Hagerstrom's argument proceeds along with Hume
"If we stop, and go no farther, why go so far? Why not stop
8 5)
at the material world?". Hagerstrom stops at the material
world. His inquiry leads him into an investigation of the
ideas which uphold a legal system, rather than leading to
analytic inquiry into the logical structure of the legal
system. The formal theory gives way to the psychological
theory. What Hagerstrom then fails to notice is that there
are two distinct inquiries, the analytical inquiry and the
83) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 49 with reference.
84) This is close to Kelsen's notion of the basic norm, which Kelsen
also acknowledges himself. Cf. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souverani-
tat und die Theorie des Volkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer Reinen
Rechtslehre, Tubingen 1920, p. 98. It is often overlooked (I did
it myself in my paper on Kelsen) that it is Jellinek who intro¬
duced the concept, referring again to Hobbes' "dictate of reason"
concerning the right of dominion and ruling, De Cive II, 1, cf. I,
14. It would be interesting to read Kelsen in the light of Hobbes.
85) Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Part IV, quoted
from John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 2nd
ed., London 1967, p. 431.
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empirical investigation.
Kelsen is attacked on the basis of the psychological
theory, that is to say that he fails to deliver an empirical
account. Hagerstrom's criticism is misplaced, for Kelsen must be
attacked on his own ground, that is by offering a rival ana¬
lytical construction. This construction is not produced by
Hagerstrom. Whereas Kelsen's theory makes room for a distinc¬
tion between norms and facts, Hagerstrom's theory reduces
norms to facts. Hagerstrom turns his back on the mysterious
world of the legal ought in favour of the tangible world of
objects in space and time, failing to realize that a coherent
set of normative concepts is needed to secure the individual
against his fellows as well as the governing authorities, in
the struggle for existence and freedom. In the end of the
day, the dispute between Kelsen and Hagerstrom is not only
a dispute within epistemology, it is also a dispute between
Kelsen upholding individualism and Hagerstrom upholding col¬
lectivism. For Kelsen the primary thing is the individual,
for Hagerstrom it is society.
6. Hagerstrom's Moral Objection to Kelsen's Theory
In addition to the epistemological objection to Kelsen's
theory Hagerstrom has another objection to Kelsen's theory.
This objection is Hagerstrom's objection concerning Kelsen's
abstraction from the natural order of behaviour mentioned
above p. 397. The danger of abstraction is, Hagerstrom says,
that "we find that it is directly asserted in several places
that the jurist from his point of view (i.e. Kelsen) neces-
86)
sarily denies that one should act morally".
Hagerstrom's objection against abstraction is twofold.
Partly the objection is that if Kelsen abstracts from the
natural order, then the result is that legal prescripts be¬
come far too empty for regulating men's conduct. Partly the
objection is that if Kelsen abstracts legal duty from mo¬
ral duty, then the result is that men should not act morally.
For Hagerstrom these objections are interrelated, or
86) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 268.
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so I shall claim. This is the reason for Hagerstrom's attack
on the will-theory of law. Hagerstrom's objection against
Kelsen's view is based upon the rule of modus tollens; men
should act morally according to legal prescripts which de¬
termine not merely the general nature but also the particu¬
lar detail of his actions, hence Kelsen's theory must be re¬
jected. The argument is valid, but is it sound, viz. are Ha¬
gerstrom's premises true?
In this section I shall try to present and elucidate
Hagerstrom's premises.
Hagerstrom's aim is to make law intelligible. Volunta-
rist theories interpret legal rules in terms of a commanding
will. If this is a correct interpretation then law becomes
something which is created, changeable and arbitrary. This
is Hagerstrom's understanding of the voluntarist theories.
Quite generally he states that it is "pure despotism and
o 7 \
mob-rule", which serves as a model for law. For Hagerstrom
"where pure despotism or mob-rule exists one may question
whether there really is any legal order".
Thus, there is a distinction to be drawn between "the
existence of a legal community" and the existence of pure
despotism or mob-rule. There is a distinction between "the
notion of an objective rule concerning rights and duties,
a rule which the judge must apply if he is to make genuine
88)
legal decisions and not merely to exercise tyrannical force".
What is the basis for this distinction? Hagerstrom's answer
is that the existence of a legal community is characterized
by the fact that "fixed rules for the exercise of coercion
are maintained and the arbitrariness which belongs to terror¬
ism is excluded". I take it then that men act morally if they
act from fixed rules for the exercise of coercion.
The objection is that this description of the existence
of a legal community fits, I think, with Hobbes' description
of the civil order created by "that great Leviathan, or
rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to
87) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 34 f., and p. 351 for the following quotations.
88) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 63.
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which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and de-
89)
fense". And for Hobbes it is manifest "that Law in gene-
rail, is not Counsell, but command, ... of the Sovereign
(as) the sole legislator".
Hagerstrom shares Hobbes' basic aim of peace and de¬
fence. But he does not share Hobbes' view that law is the
will of the sovereign. This is pure despotism, since the
sovereign can use words as he pleases, thus creating what
is right or wrong. This is appalling to Hagerstrom. Nor does
he share Hobbes1 view that it is an "Errour of Aristotles
Politiques, that in a wel ordered Common-wealth, not Men
90)
should govern, but the Laws".
If my understanding of Hagerstrom is correct, he rather
shares what Ernest Barker calls "the two fundamental and
interconnected principles of Aristotle - the sovereignty of
the law, and the education of the citizens into conformity
with the law".^^
Law is for Hagerstrom the cohesive force and the sove¬
reign of the state. It is the law which determines the state,
92)
Hagerstrom contends. A genuine legal order is characte¬
rized by the fact that the sovereign, pace Hobbes, and pace
John Austin, is bound by legal rules. These rules are "logi¬
cally prior to the particular constitutional enactments,
93)
which determine ... who are the rightful holders of power".
This is to stress the sovereignty of law.
Aristotle's conception of law is that law has compul¬
sive power, while it is at the same time a rule proceeding
94)
from impersonal moral prudence and understanding. Thus,
law involves a rational principle. I suggest that Hagerstrom
shares this conception, when he sticks to his formal theory
of law. According to Hagerstrom's formal theory of law
"law is a system of declarations as to what the state-autho¬
rity has decided shall happen. From the practical point of
89) Hobbes, Leviathan, Part II, Ch. 17, p. 227, Ch. 26, p. 312 f.
90) Hobbes, Leviathan, Part IV, Ch. 46, p. 699.
91) Barker, Greek Political Theory, p. 43.
92) Hagerstrom, Ratten och Staten, p. 241.
93) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 33, and p. 35.
94) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, Ch. 9, p. 272.
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view it does not matter whether rules of law present them¬
selves as imperatives or as such declarations of will".95)
This is a crucial passage. A distinction is made be¬
tween imperatives as commands of reason as opposed to impe¬
ratives as commands of will. For Hagerstrom rules of law
are imperatives of reason. Hence legal rules involve a ra¬
tional principle, i.e. they are independent of will and they
are independent of values or feelings. They involve the ra¬
tional principle of duty. This duty is based upon the view
that there are right and wrong actions in "the absolute sy-
96)
stem of norms" holding for the members of the society.
If my reading of Hagerstrom is right then he holds that
legal rules are commands of reason, i.e. judgements which
are meant to hold universally, i.e. it "involves the sense
of duty that the only thing relevant is to know which way
of action is in accordance with the system of conduct which
"ought" to be carried out". That is to say, "from the stand¬
point of rightness which is concerned with the consciousness
of duty ... I always hold that the same action would be right
for another person with the same individual peculiarities
placed in the same situation". He further holds that "the
judge is always under an obligation to express in his deci-
98)
sion the objective law itself". As for the objective law
itself, I refer to Section 3.
What matters in this connection is Hagerstrom's claim
that "it belongs to the nature of society or of the indivi-
99)
dual to obey positive law". The importance of this view
is that if it is reason which brings it about that x is a
legal rule, then reason is the content of the legal rule.
This implies in turn that the will-theory can be refuted.
Hagerstrom's argument is
"If law is regarded as will, a legal ought must be a de¬
mand. And then a command is conceived as directed, not to
a human will, but to a mere state of affairs in the ab¬
stract; which is non-sensical." '
95) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 206 (my italics).
96) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 198, cf. p. 116.
97) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 157, and p. 145.
98) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 90.
99) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 54.
100) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 230.
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This is the objection to Kelsen's view of abstracting
legal norms from the natural order resulting in empty legal
norms. This is, I take it, why Hagerstrom says that it is
non-sensical to go along with the will-theory. The proper
view is, needless to say, Hagerstrom's view. The will-theory
"distorts the notion of demand to such an extent that it
loses all contact with what common-sense understands by it,
and indeed loses all meaning, so that nothing but the word
remains".101)
What then is to be understood by demand according to
common-sense? I wish to say at once that when Hagerstrom
invokes "common-sense" as support for his own statements it
is safe to be on one's guard. Why is this so? It is so, if
I may divert for a moment, because the structure of Hager¬
strom's argument is to reject the will-theory on the basis
of common-sense or common consciousness. Then common con¬
sciousness is rejected in turn as more consistent than the
will-theory, but wholly unrelated to reality.^ The argu¬
ment is really amazing, since it presupposes that common
consciousness is related to reality in the argument against
the will-theory. This works successfully, the will-theory
is rejected. The elevates common consciousness to be of
supreme importance for determining reality which is against
Hagerstrom's view that common consciousness is confused. So
it is rejected as wholly unrelated to reality on the basis
of Hagerstrom's own epistemology. It works, I suggest, allud¬
ing to Sir John Harrington, since "if it prospers, none dare
call it treason". But it is treason or rather to kill reason
itself, to use this method of argument.
To return to the meaning of demand Hagerstrom tells us
that the notion of demand is in fact used in two senses.
There is demand in the non-natural sense, and there is
demand in the natural sense, or "the word's original mean¬
ing". The non-natural sense is the common-sense notion of
the feeling of right in so far as it manifests itself in a
101) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 225. - I only notice in passing the rather
revealing remark that "only the word remains", cf. for the idea
of a moral norm as an expression of a command, Hagerstrom, INLM, p.164.
102) See for example Hagerstrom, INLM p. 286.
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demand upon another person to respect one's own or another's
right". The fundamental idea behind the notion of demand
(non-natural sense) is that the ground for the obligation is
the claimant's personality or, as Hagerstrom puts it, "one's
autocratic rights ^
This fundamental idea is for Hagerstrom "a logical ab¬
surdity", since it belongs to another world than the physi¬
cal world. It is, in fact, this "quite mysterious supernatu¬
ral bond on the will of the party who is under the "obliga¬
tion"; it is active will". Since there is no such thing as
active will, the notion of demand (non-natural sense) or
"obligation" (non-natural sense) is absurd. ^
This being the case Hagerstrom has solved the problem
concerning "the rightful holders of power", cf. above p. 405.
It cannot be the individuals, as is the case in Hobbes' com¬
mon-wealth. It is, Hagerstrom says, "profound nonsense to
say that members of Parliament represent the people's autho¬
rity to make laws. The people itself has, after all, no such
authority at So Hagerstrom dismisses Kelsen's ex¬
position of natural rights. Kelsen has "indeed given no
thorough analysis of natural rights. He ascribes to them the
meaning that a certain sphere of natural freedom may not be
infringed by positive law".^^ This is, indeed, an important
aspect of the theory of natural right.
It is discussed by Hagerstrom because Kelsen "ascribes
rights the meaning" which is not in accordance with "the pro¬
per meaning" as Hagerstrom sees it. As for the "rightful
holders of power" they are determined by law, Hagerstrom
says. There is no need to worry, since Hagerstrom assures
103) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 314 - and p. 325 for the following quotation.
104) I wish only to draw attention to the fact that this involves Hager¬
strom in the difficulty of explaining how the supernatural realm
of feelings can interact with the natural physical realm. It is
"a great mystery", cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 268.
105) Hagerstrom, Ratten och Staten, p. 153 (my translation), cf. INLM
p. 355.
106) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 291, cf. p. 260.
107) I refer to Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, Cambridge 1979
and John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford 1980. I
suggest that Hagerstrom's dismissal is wrong, but I shall not de¬
velop this point.
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us that "no legislator can ignore the good of society^
Perhaps what Hagerstrom has in mind in this respect is Pla¬
to's view that "what it is that the good lawgiver distributes
... is food and labour This fits anyway Hagerstrom's
claim that the only correct concept of right is "the advan¬
tages which the individual is granted through the system of
rules". ^ This is Bentham's view that to have a right is
to be the beneficiary of another's duty^ This brings me
to Hagerstrom's view of the concept of demand (natural sense).
However, before presenting Hagerstrom's view, just one
short remark concerning "the determination of the rightful
holders of power". The law which Hagerstrom thinks of in
this respect is law in the sense of descriptive law, viz.
the law that the strongest shall rule. This is "the only lo-
112)
gically possible view". I state it, but do not intend to
try to refute it by offering a lengthy argument. It is only
to be noticed that this is what Hagerstrom has in mind, when
he contrasts "a genuine legal order" and "pure despositism".
Now to return to the concept of demand in the proper
sense. In this case we must look for the "original meaning"
of the word, cf. above p. 407. We have an example of Hager¬
strom's method of essentialism. The original meaning of a
demand consists in putting forward a legal claim. In this
case, I take it, we are then in the physical world, the in¬
dividual referred to has no active will, but only a passive
108) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 362.
109) Plato, Minos (Loeb Classical Library, vol. VIII) London 1955, p.
421. It is the short answer to the question: "What is law as a
whole?".
110) Hagerstrom, PR p. 316 - cf. INLM p. 251: "the thought of the rights
of the community and also the idea of the rights of private indi¬
viduals" (my italics). The distinction is between thinking and
volition. The former is reality, the latter appearances.
111) For a discussion of Bentham's view I refer to the books mentioned
above note 107, and references given there.
112) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 298 f. - cf. the view of Thrasymachus, Plato,
The Republic, Ch. Ill (I 336 B - 347 E) p. 14 ff. - It may be no¬
ticed that Olivecrona in 1939 published a book "England eller
Tyskland" (Great Britain or Germany), in which he sided with Germany
This book is, strangely enough, not mentioned in the bibliography
attached to the Festskrift tillagnad Karl Olivecrona, 1964. -
Lundstedt and Ross, by contrast, sided with Great Britain.
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will. He is bound to obey, since Hagerstrom thinks that the
physical world is a coercive world. Hence we have Hagerstrom
saying that "an action which is in accordance with duty in
the ordinary sense j^isj "behaviour which avoids coercion"
How does one avoid coercion? How does one avoid getting
hurt by fire? The reasonable answer to the latter question
is by not getting in touch with fire, cp. Hagerstrom's ex¬
perience with fire, above Chapter I, Section 3, p. 4.
Hagerstrom's answer to the former question is by not getting
in touch with the authorities, viz. by respecting the law. Why is
this so? Hagerstrom's answer is that "we are concerned with
a demand which it is right to respect because respect itself
114)
xs as such the right action". Thus Hagerstrom makes it
an analytical truth that to say that x is a legal rule means
the same thing as x is worthy of respect.
If an individual says that some action prescribed in a
legal rule is not worthy of respect, then he contradicts him¬
self; he is saying that an action is the right one and it is
not the right one. I fail to see that this can be held to be
analytically true. There is no contradiction involved in say¬
ing this action is prescribed in a legal rule, but the legal
rule is not worthy of respect. Since this is a legitimate
question, Hagerstrom's theory must be rejected.
Hagerstrom's argument is that law has "an inherent inner
115)
value". The inherent value of a genuine legal order is
uniformity, i.e. that there are fixed rules for the exercise
of coercion. By contrast, a non-genuine legal order has no
inherent value, since there are no fixed rules for the exer¬
cise of coercion. I have a duty to submit myself to a genuine
legal order, but no duty to submit myself to a non-genuine
legal order. Hagerstrom refers to a German author who claims
that duty "consists in the fact that an action is commanded
by a social power which exercises a social-psychological
116)
pressure through the consequences that follow on omission".
113) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 271.
114) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 173.
115) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 197.
116) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 209.
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Hagerstrom correctly says, "In that case it is a duty
to ... submit to a brutal power in a community, e.g. a ty¬
rannical pack of thieves". And then the revealing objection is
put forward "but what has "duty" in this sense to do with
what we mean by duty?". If we mean by "duty" what Hagerstrom
says we mean, the answer is: everything since Hagerstrom de¬
fines "duty" to mean "avoid coercion". At least if we follow
Hagerstrom's psychological theory. This is clearly not what
Hagerstrom has in mind by putting his question. This is meant
rhetorically. The answer is: nothing. The reason why is that
what Hagerstrom means by "duty" is "the right action".
The formal theory presents the answer to this question
by exemplification of what kinds of actions are right, e.g.
obeying the law, and wrong, e.g. stealing! Since the formal
theory is based upon thinking, it is neutral, or so Hager¬
strom claims.
It is only a matter of persuading people to accept the
commands of reason. The legislator is here important Hager¬
strom says,
"A commanding power, even if be infinite, is not respected
merely as such. It is respected only if it appears as en¬
titled to command, i.e. able, by indicating its wishes, to
determine duties for others and thereby to present the re¬
spect-inspiring norm itself."
The point of Hagerstrom's formal theory is precisely to
represent law as binding because of its rational nature and
impersonal origin. There is, however, a problem concerning
motivation. Thus, the psychological theory is needed as well
in order to make law accepted. The law as impersonal commands
cannot be an object of hatred but only worthy of respect. To
introduce the concept of a commanding power is to introduce
the danger of hatred, since personal commands are objects of
hatred. As I see it Hagerstrom combines the formal theory
and the psychological theory in order to ensure obedience
without using force. Although law is a command it is an in¬
dependent command. As -independent command it is worthy of
respect, as independent command it is binding.
If I am right, then Hagerstrom is committed to a will-
theory according to which commands are expression of wishes
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of the commanding power. This does not fit with Hagerstrom's
117)
own analysis of the concept of command. I do not wish to
pursue this any further. I do think that Hagerstrom contra¬
dicts himself, or at any rate he does not express his theory
in a coherent way.
Hagerstrom, like Hobbes, is invariably opposed to any¬
thing which tends to make men "see double", and which makes
them commit the mistake of confusing an actual legal im¬
perative (as a command of reason) stating a "genuine ought"
with "the merely apparent duty which consists in being the
object of a command in the sense of being an object of the
118)
state-will's regulations". The "genuine ought" or demand
in Hagerstrom's natural sense is the duty of submitting one¬
self to those regulations. When confronted with a will which
issues a command, Hagerstrom says that the primary question
119)
always is: "Is it right to obey?". On Hagerstrom's theory
this question is excluded, since the essence of law is that
it is not a command of will.
Hagerstrom's formal theory presupposes that law is found
not made. What is made is arbitrary. What is found cannot be
altered. Hence the need for education to tune "the feeling
that it is natural to observe the existing legal rules"."''^'
Hagerstrom is rather sceptical that social harmony
requires representation to adjust and harmonize conflicting
interests. It should be noticed, Hagerstrom says, that "le¬
gislation under modern conditions is often the expression
of a compromise between opposed ideas of justice, and there-
121)
fore lacks any single line of thought". This is precise¬
ly what matters. In epistemology there is a single line of
thought expressed in Hagerstrom's theory of knowledge. What
matters is to have a single line of thought behind the le-
117) See Hagerstrom, INLM p. 119.
118) Hobbes, Leviathan, Part III, Ch. 39, p. 498, Hagerstrom, INLM
p. 215, and p. 244.
119) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 144.
120) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 39, cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X,
9, p. 273, "children start with a natural affection and disposi¬
tion to obey".
121) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 76.
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gal rules. This single line is presented by Hagerstrom's
formal theory. The objective is to persuade people to obey
the rules. The psychological theory takes care of this. What
matters is to develop this attitude by "compulsory courses on
122)
the social harmfulness of certain actions". This has im¬
plications for the formulation of legal rules. According to
Hagerstrom's formal theory law is brought about by reason,
not by will. This being the case law is characterized by two
elements, viz. the element of objectivity and the element of
concreteness. The element of objectivity is that law is some¬
thing objective and incorruptible when administered by
authorities conscious of the fact that law owes its autho-
rity not to personal will but to impersonal reason. Secondly,
there is the element of concreteness. Law as a demand of rea¬
son determines not merely the general nature of the right ac¬
tion but also the particular details of how the right action
•
4. v, . , 123)is to be carried out.
By contrast if law is conceived as a command it is
essential that one is aware of the command, and that one
understands the command. This is by no means true, if there
is the proper positive moral disposition. In this case the
rules operate "automatically".^
It is interesting to notice that Hagerstrom says, "A
judge does not as a rule consider for a moment whether he
actually shall follow the existing law". The sentence is
ambigous. Does Hagerstrom mean that a judge does not regu¬
larly consider whether he shall follow the law, but some¬
times he does? Or does he mean that there is a legal rule
saying that the judge shall not consider whether he shall
follow the law? The former question is an empirical ques¬
tion. Hagerstrom does not offer any evidence for his judge¬
ment. It may be true,it may be false. The latter question
is a normative question, and a judge should, in my opinion,
consider whether he shall follow the law of not. In this
122) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 176, cf. p. 352.
123) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 139 and p. 319.




respect Hagerstrom's judgement is false.
Secondly, commands are always general and abstract,
i.e. they are addressed to a class of people, prescribing
a course of action which can never comprehend all the de¬
tails. This is for Hagerstrom the vice of "abstraction". It
seems to me that it is rather a virtue. The more abstractly
the rule is framed, the vaguer it will be, consequently the
more freedom there also will be for individuals to choose
the particular means of its fulfilment. Hagerstrom's argument
against abstraction is at bottom an argument against freedom.
It should not be accepted, I suggest.
For Hagerstrom the important problem is the problem of
producing the moral disposition to obey the law. If my read¬
ing of Hagerstrom is correct, his theory of law is the for¬
mal theory according to which law is a dictate of reason.
This raises the important question of motivation to follow
the dictate of reason rather than the passions. It is neces¬
sary to persuade people to follow legal rules. Hence we have
Hagerstrom's psychological theory. The formal theory presents
what is right conduct, viz. the genuine legal order. The
psychological theory presents the means to maintaining the
legal order. If I am right in this, then Hagerstrom fails to
keep these two theories distinct. For Hagerstrom it is in¬
conceivable that a person has an obligation, recognizes that
he has an obligation, and yet has no motivation to perform
, -i . . . 125)his obligation.
To be sure, Hagerstrom says that "it is obvious that
we sharply distinguish between duty and feeling of duty".
How do I know what my duty is then? Hagerstrom's answer is
that "if the rule of law is the authoritative expression of
what is obligatory in such and such circumstances, one must
use in interpreting that expression the presupposed direct
intuition of duty, i.e. in effect one's own sense of jus-
.. „ 126)tice .
What does "one's own sense of justice" tell one?
125) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 122, p. 133.
126) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 204.
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Hagerstrom's answer to this is that I ought to perform the
action which will satisfy "myself in its true meaning" as
127)
an autonomous and moral being. My real self as an auto¬
nomous and moral being is then defined by reference to my
sense of justice. Hagerstrom says "that I must choose that
interpretation which can be regarded as ensuring that veal
128)
justice shall be done". And "real justice" is equivalent
to "what my sense of justice tells me". This is tantamount to
identifying duty and feeling of duty. This leads Hagerstr5m
to claim: "it is difficult to imagine that anyone ought to
act otherwise than in the way which he is convinced is
129)
right". Surely, it is true that whenever anyone acts in
the way he is convinced is right, then he acts in the way
he is convinced is right. This is a truism which does not
tell anyone which acts he ought to perform. But it is an
evident untruth that whenever anyone acts in the way he is
convinced is right, then he acts in the way he ought to act.
Hagerstrom does not notice this difference. ^
It must be noticed, however, that Hagerstrom makes a
distinction between one's "sense of justice" meaning
a) man's feeling of justice, and
,, , . . .. 131)b) man s consciousness of justice.
The former is a matter of feelings. The latter is "conscience
in its theoretic aspect",i.e. "the idea which arises in par¬
ticular cases, that a certain action is in accordance with
the system of conduct which has the expression of a command
as an objective property or, as we say, that it is in accord
with the moral law".''"^'
Conscience in this sense is a matter of reason, which
127) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 149.
128) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 204 (my italics).
129) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 53 (his italics), cf. p. 145 for a similar
argument.
130) This is clear from his statement "that it is quite unintelligible
that Adickes can nevertheless hold that a judge acts unjustly if
he sets aside the statute-law under any circumstances, and there¬
fore even if his doing so is determined by his conviction that
justice demands it", INLM p. 53.
131) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 344.
132) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 157-158.
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"is determinative of right action". The "right action" is
equivalent to the "moral law". And the "moral law" is equi¬
valent to "the genuine legal order", since it is the system
of rules which has the command as an objective property, cf.
above p. 412. As Hagerstrom says,
"The fact (is) that there exists a rule for determining what
actions ought to be done in particular cases. By this rule
one does not mean an ordinance of a will. ... The moral
norm itself is for us an objective rule, even though the
thought of a legislator is smuggled in in an unsystematic
way."133)
There can be no distinction between the legal duty to
respect the law and the moral duty to respect the law. They
coincide, since the law embodies the moral law. It seems to
me that this is wrong, on conceptual grounds. There is no
conceptual connection between obligation, in the sense of
an undertaking, and duty, in the sense of the right action.
I can say truly, and without contradiction, that I have an
obligation, but it is not the right action to perform. I
can say truly, and without contradiction, that I have an ob¬
ligation to obey the law, but no duty to obey the law. It
may happen that it is my duty to disregard an obligation,
e.g. the obligation to obey the law. This is not Hagerstrom's
view.
Hagerstrom's formal theory combined with the psycholo¬
gical theory leads to repressing "the dangerous Question vdiether
134)
the conviction is true or not". "Why is this a dangerous
question"? The answer is because it involves "an insoluble
conflict of duties". This may very well be so, if Hagerstrom
thinks of "duty" in the sense of an undertaking; which I
shall call "obligation" to keep it distinct from "duty" in
the sense of the right action. There can be a conflict of
obligations, which is soluble. There cannot be a conflict
133) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 160-161 - and see p. 165: "In principle it is
an expression of a command which confronts us in imagination in
the consciousness of a norm" (my italics). If "command" means "de¬
mand of will", Hagerstrom is inconsistent; if "command" means "de¬
mand of reason", he is not; "in principle" refers only to Hager¬
strom's curious theory of meaning, according to which I must have
an image of a horse in my consciousness in order to think of ahorse.
134) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 167, cf. p. 156.
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of "duties" in the sense of the right action. This conflict
is "insoluble" by definition, since there is but one and
only one right action. It does not follow, however, that
the "dangerous question" should be repressed, on the con¬
trary it should be asked. And when asked it should be dis¬
cussed by using reason, i.e. the ability to think and the
exercising of our ability to think in good ways. I am per¬
fectly aware that this raises large questions which I am
not going to discuss. I only wish to say that Hagerstrom's
theory fails in this respect. It fails because he does not
allow that the question: "Is it right to obey the law?" is
a legimate question. I conclude that Hagerstrom's objections
to Kelsen's theory should be rejected.
7. The Maintenance of the Genuine Legal Order
Hagerstrom's problem is: "How is it possible to understand
law?". The key offered by the will-theory is that law can
be understood by using the concept of will. In his paper
from 1916 "Is Positive Law an Expression of Will", Hager¬
strom has "tried to show that it is impossible to indicate
any will such that rules of law could be held to be its
135)
commands or declarations". The short answer to this is
that Hagerstrom then has failed, since he admits that
"law is, at any rate to a large extent, an expression of
interests, and this is true both of its foundations and of
secondary rules. Therefore the question of the intention
and the significance of a law is a legitimate one."
This is tantamount to saying that it is possible, after
all, to identify a will. Hagerstrom continues to say, "the
mistake consists in the fact that one thinks, in this con¬
nexion, of a unitary will".
Surely, Hagerstrom is right in this respect, but this
is not what he is claiming in the first passage quoted above.
So Hagerstrom has provided the refutation of his own theory.
However, Hagerstrom thinks that the will-theory is equiva¬
lent to understanding the law on the basis of the model of
despotism. Hagerstrom's model is, by contrast, that "the
135) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 250 (my italics), referring to the paper re¬
printed, INLM p. 16-55; next quotation from p. 41 (my italics again).
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legal order is throughout nothing but a social machine, in
136)
which the cogs are men". So Hagerstrom invites us to
use the model of a machine instead of will, in order to under¬
stand law.
It must be noticed, however, that Hagerstrom writes,
"A machine comes into existence and is brought into action
by a human will". So we still have the notion of will loom¬
ing in the background. Not so if we follow Hagerstrom. He
goes on to say
"But the investigation of the machine's structure and mode
of operation is not, for that reason, an investigation of
a certain human activity. It is concerned with a certain
limited part of external nature, which works in a certain
way in accordance with the laws of that nature."
This is also true. It is Kelsen's approach to separate
the origin of law from its manifestation as a system of
norms, i.e. provided that "laws of that nature" are under¬
stood in terms of norms. Hagerstrom assures us "that to
determine the conditions of the origin of law of course
settles nothing about its essential nature". Again Hager¬
strom provides the rejection of his own method.
Having rejected, as a matter of course, that the ori¬
gin of law settles nothing, he proceeds to investigate
"those forces which maintain the constitution and which
first make "statutes" into genuine rules of law". Surely,
this is incoherent.
Hagerstrom's conscious effort is to proceed from "sounds
to things" to use his own phrase. Clearly, a machine is a
thing, so this may be the reason for Hagerstrom's use of the
machine as equivalent to the legal order. Another element
is, of course, that a machine is orderly structured and works
automatically towards a predetermined end, viz. the delivery
of objects. It does not create something new in the sense
in which a poet creates something unexpected. The products
of a machine are predetermined by the designer of the machine.
Hagerstrom's approach also suggests that he, like Hume,
attempts to introduce the experimental method of reasoning
136) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 354, and p. 18 for the following quotation.
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into legal subjects. It is full time to attempt a reforma¬
tion in all legal disquisitions, and reject every system of
law, however subtle and ingenious, which is not founded in
137)fact and observation. This suggestion has to be rejected,
I submit. Hagerstrom proceeds in a dogmatic manner, based
upon the use of the method of essentialism.
In this section I wish to present Hagerstrom's view of
a genuine legal order and its maintenance. Hagerstrom's
theory is that the maintenance of law depends upon human
instincts. He is a follower of the theory of what Popper
calls "psychologism", i.e. the theory that society depends
138)
on the human nature of its members.
As a follower of this theory Hagerstrom claims that
moral judgements are expressions of emotion, moral norms
are habits, and standards for norms are just different points
of view. This leads to Hagerstrom's view that moral philoso¬
phy as a science is knowledge of actual moral valuations in
their historical development, cf. above Chapter V, Section 2
p. 293. Turning to law it leads Hagerstrom to adopt what I
have called the psychological theory. This leads to the view
that legal judgements are expressions of interests, legal
rules are habits, i.e. "the idea that when certain facts
exist, a person will as a rule enjoy certain advantages as
■
+. 4- • .. 139)against a certain other person or persons .
Standards or criteria for introducing and evaluating
legal rules are based upon points of view. And it is im¬
possible to show that one point of view is to be preferred
to another. What can be shown is the sociological fact, viz.
the actual existing legal rules explained in terms of habits.
It is a gross misunderstanding to claim that the individual
can evaluate legal rules in terms of moral standards. As
Hagerstrom says, "It has now penetrated into the common con-
137) The allusion is to Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding,
Sec. XII, Part III, p. 165, and concerning the principles of Mo¬
rals, Sec. I, p. 175.
138) Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. I, p. 84, cf. vol.
II, p. 88 ff. for a criticism which applies to Hagerstrom's view
of social instincts behind the law.
139) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 316-317.
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sciousness that only positive law can serve as a basis for
legal decisions, and that rational law (if such there be)
is of importance only as an ideal for legislation". ^ It
is rather the other way round that positive law (i.e. "the
rights of society or of a social class") provides the stan-
141)
dard by which the individual must be judged.
The rights of society provide the standpoint of justice
in terms of welfare. From this standpoint "there is no rea¬
son why punishment should not be inflicted on every injury
to the common interests provided that it is accompanied by
consciousness of the nature of the action". On this view
of it "punishment is regulated not from the standpoint of
revenge, but from that of the interests which determine the
norm underlying the right of the community". This leads to
the view of punishment as social hygiene. This view is op¬
posed to the common-sense notion of justice which connects
punishment with revenge and guilt.
Hagerstrom's objection to the common-sense notion of
142)
justice is that "revenge is of its very nature measureless".
This leads to "bloodfeud", and the danger of upsetting the
peace within society. This is a cultural danger which "de¬
mands a powerful legal order standing above the contending
parties".
Hagerstrom's objection to the element of guilt as a
necessary condition for the infliction of punishment is that
the idea of guilt involves the idea "that the criminal should
143)
suffer for the satisfaction of the injured individual".
Again we have the element of revenge.
Besides the idea of guilt depends upon "the notion of
freedom, viz. the idea of will as cause". This idea is ab¬
surd, since there is no such thing as an active will. And
the idea of revenge ignores "the thought of general harm-
fulness or anti-social disposition" of the criminal. The
140) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 298 (his italics) - cp. above Sec. 5, where
Kelsen is criticized for holding this position.
141) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 184, cf. p. 235 and p. 183 for the following
quotations.
142) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 182, and p. 181.
143) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 186, cf. p. 185.
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ideas of revenge and guilt are superstitious ideas "at the
lower levels of culture", which must be replaced by the
"modern tendencies to regard the reactions of the state
against so-cal!°d crime from the standpoint of the con¬
scious exercise of social hygiene. Here the notions of
justice which are concerned with the ideas of rights and
duties do indeed lose all significance". '
Indeed they do. According to Hagerstrom this is a step
forward to the "possibility of moral improvement" based upon
the consciousness of the "social harmfulness of certain ac¬
tions". I do not intend to discuss Hagerstrom's theory of
punishment. His view has certainly been influential in Swe-
14 5)den and Denmark. What I wish to say is that Hagerstrom's
theory cannot, if we follow his thesis of moral nihilism be
criticized on moral grounds. If criticism is forthcoming
nontheless it can be dismissed as expressions of feelings
in contrast to Hagerstrom's logical thinking, which by his
own definition is devoid of values.
Secondly, there is the question of how actions are to
be classified as socially wrong or illegal in contrast to
socially right or legal. In this respect Hagerstrom's theory
is that what is meant by the word illegality, if one takes
account only of factual reality, is
"nothing else than the behaviour whether it be omission or
positive action, which calls forth a certain coercive reac¬
tion in accordance with the rules for coercion which are in
general applied and irresistibly carried out as a matter of
fact in a human community. Legal duty (legality), in the same
context, is nothing else than the behaviour with the oppo¬
site character."146)
Thus, the word "duty" cannot be just a word without
meaning. It is so, I take it, when the word is related to
the supernatural world of moral qualities. It is not so, if
we follow Hagerstrom and the word is related to a factual
reality. Here the essential meaning of the word "duty" is
"right action in accordance with rules which are in general
144) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 187, p. 176.
145) It leads to the view of punishment put forward in Great Britain
by Lady Wootton of Abinger, see for a critical discussion and
references to the literature, The Philosophy of Punishment, edt.
H.B. Acton, London 1969, especially the paper by William Kneale.
146) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 348.
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applied and irresistibly carried out". The consequence of
Hagerstrom's view is then that to say that an action is
right just means that it does not call forth a coercive
reaction, and conversely to say that an action is wrong just
means that it calls forth a coercive reaction. Hence, where
there is a "genuine legal order", it is logically impossible
to raise the question whether it is the fact that an action
is wrong that causes a legislator to apply sanctions, or
whether, conversely, it is the fact that an action is com¬
manded by the legislator that causes the reaction. On Hager¬
strom's view there are not two different facts, being sub¬
ject to a reaction and being wrong, but just one single fact
which may be put indifferently by saying either that there
is a coercive reaction, or that the action is wrong. This
commits Hagerstrom, logically speaking, to hold the view
that if there are rules for coercion then there are sanc¬
tions which are in general applied and irresistibly carried
out as a matter of fact in a human society. This is equiva¬
lent to the view that if no sanctions occur, then there is
no genuine legal order. Hagerstrom's theory then commits
him to Hobbes' view after all. There is a logical connection
between the concept of law and coercive reaction.
According to Hagerstrom's formal theory there are in¬
dependently existing objective moral properties revealed by
reason which determines the regulation of the use of legal
terms. This formal theory is clearly in conflict with Hager¬
strom's theory of moral nihilism which states that there are
no such objective properties. So it is the legislator who
must be the master of using words to mean what he chooses
them to mean. Hagerstrom's theory of the legislator is then
equivalent to Hobbes' Sovereign. Sovereigns "make the things
they command just, by commanding them, and those which they
147)
forbid unjust, by forbidding them".
This is, in the end, also Hagerstrom's view. Thus, he
ends up with a will-theory of law. This has been overlooked.
The question is the authority behind the words. Hagerstrom's
147) Hobbes, Man & Ciuizen (De Cive XII, 1) p. 244-245.
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objection to the will-theory is that the authority behind
the words is personal power. By contrast for Hagerstrom the
authority rests upon the fact that "the power is of an im¬
personal kind, at any rate in constitutional regimes^
But then Hagerstrom lapses into the will-theory by saying
that "in interpreting the letter of the law it is necessary
in doubtful cases to pay regard to what is called the inten¬
tion of the legislator". This is by no means necessary. It
is only necessary if you hold a will-theory of law.
Thus, Hagerstrom ends up with propounding a will-theory
claiming obedience to a genuine legal order of independent
commands, where "the community is organized on the basis of
149)
rules of law into superiors and inferiors". This is Ha¬
gerstrom's design of the legal order as a machine, where
the inferiors are cogs, and the superiors the philosophers
who provide the "intelligent guidance as to whither we are
travelling" to use Lundstedt's apt expression. ^ This "in¬
telligent guidance" is Hagerstrom's philosophy which stands
151)
out as "one source of information".
Thus, Hagerstrom's epistemology is crucially important.
It is presented as a case of thinking devoid of valuation.
On this basis Hagerstrom denies that individuals have any
personal rights independent of the legal order. He denies
that individuals have any right to govern themselves. He de¬
nies that there can be criticism of the existing legal order.
He affirms that there is a duty to obey the law. He affirms
that a person who disobeys legal rules is irrational. The
person is not a human agent but rather an object posing the
problem of intellectual management, treatment and control.
Hagerstrom claims that this is based upon thinking.
Here is the cognitive Sovereign. If my criticism is right
this is not the case. It is based upon the will to power.
This is expressed in Hagerstrom's theory of law in its psy¬
chological version. This is, then,a version of a will-theory
148) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 311, p. 312 for the following quotation (my
italics).
149) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 15.
150) Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised, p. 9.
151) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 313.
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where Hagerstrom is the commanding Sovereign. This has been
overlooked, since Hagerstrom claims that the legal order is
prior to the sovereign. There are, Hagerstrom says,
"three conditions which are always necessary for the main¬
tenance of a legal order, viz. social instinct, a positive
moral disposition, and fear of external coercion. But of
these three the social instinct is presupposed by the other
two. Without it morality would not lead to such actions
which are free from legal coercive reaction."152)
Thus, Hagerstrom's thesis is that if there is no social
instinct then there is no legal order, which is equivalent
to making the social instinct a necessary cause of any legal
order, since the thesis is equivalent to: if there is a le¬
gal order then there is a social instinct. This is Hager¬
strom's formal theory which leads him into a theory of na¬
tural law. This theory of natural law is not a theory con¬
cerning the rights of individuals. It is a theory which
elevates the rights of society. Society depends upon the
proper social instinct towards sociableness and away from
selfishness. The end is that the genuine legal order func¬
tions as a machine. As a machine it must have technical per¬
fection. Every person must fulfil his proper function. It
must also have human perfection. Every person must seek tech¬
nical perfection as an outward expression of their moral
perfection, their willingness to submit their passions to
rational control. "'No one', Luther writes, 'is without some
commission and calling' - a set of tasks it is his responsi-
1 5I)
bility to perform".
Hagerstrom has a mission in life: his vocation is to
establish a genuine legal order, and a society which values,
above all else, unity, harmony, stability. This is presented
as a necessity of thought which cannot be otherwise. This
is where we are travelling to, if we follow Hagerstrom and
his pupils. It may preserve an outward appearance of order
152) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 352 (my italics). It may also be that the in¬
stinct is rather a product of education, the effect rather than
the cause of the legal order. The dispute may be called Hagerstrom
versus Marx. Hagerstrom presents no empirical evidence for his
thesis, cf. for a discussion Popper, The Open Society and its
Enemies, vol. II, p. 89 ff.
153) Quoted from Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man, p. 13.
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only at the cost of suppressing human freedom and creative
experiment. Hagerstrom's Sweden is, indeed, a case in point.
8. Scandinavian Legal Realism
Hagerstrom's philosophy is the foundation for the school of
law known as Scandinavian Legal Realism. To mention one or
two examples, Lundstedt acknowledges his debt to Hagerstrom
writing: "Under the impact of Hagerstrom's writings, my
154)
views on legal matters underwent a rational change".
Lundstedt's numerous writings are built "on a forty-year-old
foundation, laid by one of the greatest thinkers of our time,
may be of all time". Lundstedt, besides being a professor of
law in Uppsala, was an active politician, member of the Swe¬
dish Riksdag representing Socialdemokratiet, turning Hager¬
strom's ideas into practical application for social life in
Sweden. - Olivecrona also pays homage to Hagerstrom in the
preface to his book "Law as Fact". Olivecrona's "endeavour
to treat law as fact could not have been made without the
155)
basis supplied by his (i.e. Hagerstrom's) work". - Final¬
ly, there is also the Danish approach to law made by Alf Ross,
whose thinking is "directed toward a realistic interpreta¬
tion of law, that is, an interpretation in accordance with
the principles of an empirical philosophy". Ross mentions
Hagerstrom's work in this connection which is "dissociated
from the natural-law doctrines and other ramifications of
the idealistic philosophy of law prevalent on the Continent"
Thus, it is quite clear that Hagerstrom is considered to be
a great philosopher who has provided the only proper founda¬
tion for legal studies.
The common factors among the Scandinavian Realists men¬
tioned are that they are anti-metaphysical and realistic,
or so they claim. They want a realistic jurisprudence. The
154) Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised, p. 6, for the next quotation
Lundstedt, The Responsibility of Legal Science for the Fate of
Man and Nations, in New York University Law Review, vol. X, 1932-
33, p. 326 at p. 340.
155) Olivecrona, Law as Fact, 1st ed., preface, where also a debt to
Lundstedt is acknowledged.
156) Ross, On Law and Justice, London 1974, Preface, p. IX.
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objection is that every legal philosopher wants a realistic
jurisprudence. To quote Neil MacCormick,
"nobody has ever announced an intention to indulge in un¬
realistic jurisprudence. ... The problem we all face is not
whether to be realistic, but how, not whether to portray
law as fact rather than fiction, but what counts as a fact,
and what, therefore, as a factual portrayal of it."157)
On the question how to be realistic, I shall claim that
the Scandinavians disagree. They also disagree about what counts
as a fact, and therefore what the object and task of legal
science is. One dividing line among the Scandinavians is the
epistemology, on which they base their jurisprudential writ¬
ings. The Swedes adhere to Hagerstrom's epistemology, Alf
Ross, by contrast, adheres to logical positivism. Logical
positivism is banned by Hagerstrom as metaphysics. Hager¬
strom does not endorse Ross' principles of an empirical phi¬
losophy. On the contrary, Hagerstrom is a rationalist, a
follower of Hegel's view:
"This is the quintessence of shallow thinking to base phi¬
losophical science not on the development of thought and
the concept, but on immediate sense-perception and the play
of fancy".158)
So how to be realistic is for the Swedes to base in¬
vestigation upon thinking, for Ross it is experience. This,
in turn, has consequences for what is banned as metaphysics.
For the Swedes the criterion is the law of contradiction.
By contrast, Ross adopts the principle of verifiability (or
verification] of logical positivism. For Ross it is the ques¬
tion whether the statement is testable by experience which
is the decisive question. If the statement is not testable,
then the statement is meaningless. This gives Ross a problem
concerning the logical status of his own statements put for¬
ward in his book "On Law and Justice".
Are these statements analytical statements or empirical
statements? If neither they are meaningless. I only wish
to raise the problem, not engage to solve it for Ross. Ross
limits jurisprudence to be concerned with a conceptual ana-
157) Neil MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact, The Law Quarterly Re¬
view, vol. 90, 1974, p. 102 ff. at p. 103.
158) Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Preface, p. 6, cf. above Ch. IV, Sec.8.
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lysis of concepts which are used in legal science. He is
not interested in providing a definition of law, since law
cannot be defined but only pointed out. The argument offered
is that the word "law" is a proper name. This seems to me
to be mistaken, since Ross confuses a class-word like "law"
with a proper name like John Smith. And even the explana-
159)tion of proper names is a definition, pace Mill. The
question of definition leads to another important difference
among the Scandinavians. Hagerstrom and Olivecrona think that
the customary meanings of words suggest important truths,
which we overlook if we stipulate new meanings, as Kelsen,
for example, is said to be doing. This is to turn our backs
on reality. The origin of words is for Hagerstrom and Olive¬
crona an important study. This is based upon the assumption
that words are natural signs, where there is a necessary or
natural connection between a word and a thing, which gives
the word a real meaning. Words with real meaning are names
of genuine concepts. If we wish to understand the real mean¬
ing of words we must look for the origin of words. It is
necessary then to examine ordinary use or the definitions
presented by writers in order to determine whether they are
the correct definitions of basic concepts.
By contrast, the approach of Ross, and to a certain ex¬
tent also Lundstedt, is rather characterized by stipulating
new meanings for words, which leads them to the improvement
of concepts or the creation of new concepts as a key to a
successful legal science. With respect to legal science this
is for Ross an inquiry directed at making predictions of
judicial decisions on the basis of a hypothesis of a norma¬
tive ideology of a known content.
By contrast, the Swedes deny that prediction is the
essential element. This reflects, no doubt, Hagerstrom's
attitude to predictions. Hagerstrom does not care for pre¬
dictions, since what matters is that jurisprudence is a
normative discipline aimed at offering guidance for the ci¬
vil authorities. In this respect they part company with
159) See Robinson, Definition, p. 23 f.
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Kelsen's view of legal science which is rejected as sterile
formalism.
Kelsen's view is that legal science is a normative
science. It is the business of the legal scientist to de¬
scribe the norms, but it is by no means within his province
to prescribe what ought to be done. In this respect Kelsen
sides with Hobbes1 view: "when the question is of the Mean¬
ing of written Lawes, he is not the Interpreter of them,
that writeth a commentary upon them".
Ross shares Kelsen's view that legal science is a nor¬
mative science. He is in agreement with Kelsen that a legal
science cannot prescribe. This is based upon Ross' adherence
to the ethical theory put forward by Charles Stevenson. What
the legal scientist does, then, according to Ross, is to
describe the normative ideology assumed to be present in
the minds of judges.
Hagerstrom parts company with Hobbes, Kelsen, and Ross.
For Hagerstrom legal science is a normative science both in
the sense that it describes legal prescripts and in the
sense that it offers guidance for maintaining the legal
order. Hagerstrom's objection to Kelsen's conception of le¬
gal science is that Kelsen is "led back to the view of pri¬
mitive positivism and the so-called grammatical method of
, „ 161)jurisprudence .
This approach is clearly not suitable for Hagerstrom's
aim: to provide peace with society using legal science as a
means. Hagerstrom's argument is therefore: jurisprudence is
a normative science with a definite practical aim, viz. to
keep carrying out the existing law by using "ought in its
16 2)
usual sense". Hagerstrom holds it against other writers
that they fail to see clearly what the object of jurispru¬
dence is. This objection can also be raised against Hager¬
strom.
Kelsen's theory concerning the task of legal science
is rejected as primitive positivism because only positive
160) Hobbes, Leviathan, Part II, Ch. 26, p. 325, cf. p. 322.
161) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 274.
162) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 53.
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law is valid. By contrast, Hagerstrom's theory commits him
to a natural law theory revealing "rational law" according
16 3)
to "sound reason". This raises the question concerning
the status of "principles for ascertaining the positive law".
On the one hand Hagerstrom holds that these principles "are
regarded as "positive law" just as much as the statutes".^
So they belong to positive law. Hagerstrom's objection to
Kelsen is that Kelsen holds that these principles are mere¬
ly ethico-political postulates. In the case of Hart versus
Dworkin, Hagerstrom in 19 2 5 is then on the side of Dworkin. ^
On the other hand Hagerstrom stresses in 1917 that
"in point of fact the ordinary expositions of the correct
principle for interpreting and supplementing legal enact¬
ments are by no means juridical in the proper sense of the
word. They belong to practical philosophy or sociology."166)
So Hagerstrom is also on the side of Hart and Kelsen versus
Dworkin.
Hagerstrom's position may be explained on the basis of
his two theories of law, the formal theory and the psycholo¬
gical theory. The formal theory is held against Kelsen. When
attacked as a natural lawyer, Hagerstrom takes refuge in the
psychological theory. But, whatever the theory adopted, Hagerstrcm
stresses that it is guidance, not prediction, which matters.
This is so, since it is vital to inculcate the proper moral
disposition "because the social instinct does not infallibly
act on its own account, but may be overcome by interests or
16 7)
passions which lead to antisocial action".
This is the difference between Kelsen and the Swedes.
16 8)
It is, I think, the answer to the query raised by Hart.
It is the difference between Swedish Legal Realism and Ame¬
rican Legal Realism and Ross. Ross is much closer to Ameri¬
can Realism. Ross is opposed to Lundstedt's method of social
welfare, which, whatever Lundstedt says, is a crude form of
163) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 278 and p. 298.
164) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 292, cp. p. 244 and p. 95 f.
165) For an overview of this debate see Neil MacCormick, Legal Reason¬
ing and Legal Theory, Oxford 1978, Ch. IX.
166) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 104 (his italics).
167) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 352.
168) H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961, p. 233 note at p. 10.
*
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utilitarianism. Lundstedt has been criticized by Ross for
confusing description with prescription, or else ending up
as a plain metaphysician. Lundstedt, by contrast, castigates
Ross in his usual way of answering critics. This debate is
not worth rehearsing. Olivecrona has been neutral in this
debate. He is only concerned with giving a description of
magical ideas in the minds of people, or else engaged in hi¬
storical studies. The former is a rather dubious affair. If
Hagerstrom's materialism is taken into account, then psycho¬
logical phenomena are bodily activities. So Olivecrona lapses
into idealism. But Olivecrona tells us that he is a realist
fighting against idealism. Surely something has gone wrong.
Olivecrona's historical investigations are interesting and
well worth reading.
The difference between Olivecrona and Lundstedt can
perhaps be traced back to the fact (and this is a fact)that
the master never propounds a coherent theory concerning the
object of legal science. Lundstedt and Olivecrona think,
however, that Hagerstrom's theory provides such an exhaustive
and definite formulation of the essence of law - all the rest
is just exegesis. Left to themselves to provide the exegesis
they develop different theories, precisely because Hagerstrom
does not provide a coherent set of concepts.
Ross parts company with the Swedes and joins the logical posi-
vists instead. But they all learnt the gospel of the psycho¬
logical importance of using words to direct and control men's
instincts in the struggle for existence. This is, I think,
the lesson to be learnt from the Realists.
It never occurred to them that this method can be used
as well as misused. Criticism of legal rules in moral terms
is ruled out by the Scandinavian Realists. This is, I think,
disastrously wrong.
Hagerstrom probably got the idea of using words as a
169)
persuasive means from Berkeley. One end of language is
the communication of knowledge. But there are other ends
"as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring
169) Berkeley, Introduction to the Principles § 2Q, Selections p. 26 f.
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from an action, the putting the mind in some particular dis¬
position", as Berkeley says. His example is
"For example, when a schoolman tells me 'Aristotle hath said
it', all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to em¬
brace his opinion with the deference and submission which
custom has annexed to that name. And this effect is often
so instantly produced in the minds of those who are accus¬
tomed to resign their judgment to authority of that philo¬
sopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his person,
writings, or reputation should go before. So close and imme¬
diate a connexion may custom establish betwixt the very word
Aristotle and the motions of assent and reverence in the
minds of some men. Innumerable examples of this kind may be
given, but why should I insist on those things which every
one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest
unto him?"170)
To give an example of this kind. If you replace "Ari¬
stotle" with "Hagerstrom", then you get a very apt descrip¬
tion of jurists in Sweden who have had and still have great
influence on legal science and social policy.
As a school of legal thinking, Scandinavian Realism
has not produced any comprehensive research programme. The
recent death of Olivecrona signals the end of Scandinavian
Legal Realism in jurisprudence. It does not follow, however,
that his death is also the end of jurisprudence in Scandi¬
navia .




"But thought's the slave of life, and
life time's fool;
And time, that takes survey of all the world
must have a stop."
W. Shakespeare*
1. Looking Back
In the preceding chapters I have taken a survey of Hager¬
strom's writings. My thesis is that Hagerstrom's theory of
knowledge and reality is of crucial importance for his in¬
quiries into morality and law. I have tried to argue for
that thesis, starting with a brief account of Hagerstrom's
life in Chapter I. I have then tried to relate this account
to his philosophical writings in Chapter II. Hagerstrom's
numerous writings - and perhaps even more his oral teaching -
have been extremely influential in Sweden. And there is "a
single coherent thought to be found in the conglomerate of
writings" presented by Hagerstrom."^'
This thought is the priority of reason to will and feel¬
ing on the one hand, and to sense-experience on the other
hand. Hagerstrom's philosophy is the line of rationalist phi¬
losophers, going back to Parmenides. Hagerstrom's thesis is
that reason provides knowledge that is necessary and univer¬
sal. Genuine knowledge is knowledge of causes and effects
and the necessity in causal relations is objective based upon
rational intuition.
Hagerstrom's rationalist philosophy must be seen as pro¬
viding an answer to the problem situation of his day. The
world is in a state of flux. Hagerstrom's philosophy, his
Copernican Revolution, is meant to put an end to this state
* William Shakespeare, King Henry the Fourth, Part One, Act V, IV
per Hotspur.
1) The quoted phrase is Hagerstrom's, referring to the Bible, where
no such thought can be found according to Hagerstrom, INLM p. 102.
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of affairs. I have tried to present this in Chapter III.
From the very beginning of his career as a philosopher
Hagerstrom believed he had a mission in life. This mis¬
sion is to remove the veil of deception of the prevailing
philosophies of idealism and realism as metaphysical specula¬
tion devoid of meaning, and to demonstrate that knowledge
of the world of things in space and time existing indepen¬
dently of man's consciousness is possible, provided the
proper foundation is established. Hagerstrom's philosophy
is meant to establish this foundation.
Hagerstrom's invective against metaphysics is meant to
express the essence of his own philosophy: the unconditioned
character of the sovereignty of reason as the only light to
make objects in the world visible. Reason shows that nature
operates everywhere and always by causal laws. This is the
truth about the way objects, including living objects, are.
Nature is stable and uniform. Scientists and ordinary people
are, by contrast, confused and changeable. The remedy is the
philosopher's knowledge. I have considered the merits and
demerits of Hagerstrom's revolution in Chapter III, section 5,
especially p. 163 ff.
I have then accompanied Hagerstrom on his way of truth,
i.e. the theory which holds that whatever is inquired into
must exist as an external object in space and time in Chap¬
ter IV. Hagerstrom's way of truth winds uphill to the Abso¬
lute, i.e. Hagerstrom's thesis that reality must be defined
as knowledge itself. This thesis is, in turn, based upon
Hagerstrom's claim that the word "reality" means nothing but
"the logical feeling of certainty". To have this feeling is
a necessary condition for understanding the meaning of Ha¬
gerstrom's sentences. This makes it, of course, difficult
to understand what Hagerstrom is saying. I have tried never¬
theless, and also tried to present his views fairly and aright
in order to consider whether to endorse them or not.
As for Hagerstrom's thesis, mentioned above, it involves
him in a vicious - because both vacuous and interminable -
regress. Hagerstrom's definition of knowledge is "what Ha¬
gerstrom has a logical feeling of certainty about is know-
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ledge". In order to understand this definition Hagerstrom
must already understand the concept of knowledge in some
other way. If this is not the case, he is involved in writ¬
ing out his definition as "what Hagerstrom has a logical
feeling of certainty about is "what Hagerstrom has a logical
feeling of certainty about is "what Hagerstrom has a logical
feeling of certainty about is Hagerstrom does not
bring this conceptual point out. If it is brought out to him
his answer is, I think, that knowledge is self-justifying.
The first step is the decisive step, and this step con¬
cerns the way of the right method to obtain knowledge. Hager¬
strom's step is to pursue along the way of truth, as opposed
to the way of illusion, exemplified by idealism or the scien¬
tific consciousness, and as opposed to the way of opinion,
exemplified by realism or the ordinary consciousness. The
way of truth is exemplified by the philosophical conscious¬
ness and this leads in the end to knowledge, which is equi¬
valent to the logical feeling of certainty. When Hagerstrom
sincerely claims that he has a logical feeling of certainty,
it is idle for others to dispute this. What can be denied
is, however, Hagerstrom's point that this logical feeling of
certainty guarantees the existence of external objects exist¬
ing in space and time. Even Hagerstrom must admit that I can
have a logical feeling of certainty that there are horses.
But it does not follow that there actually are horses in the
world to be seen or touched. Hagerstrom simply begs the ques¬
tion concerning the existence of external objects.
Hagerstrom's theory of knowledge and reality is put for¬
ward as the firm foundation for rational discussion within
philosophy, science, and law. The aim is to bring men back
to their senses and stop them talking nonsense. The sur¬
prising result of Hagerstrom's own theory of knowledge is
that this is beyond the domain of rational discussion. Hager¬
strom's appeal is in the end to the Absolute, i.e. his ra¬
tional intuition or logical feeling of certainty. Hagerstrom
is then forced to abandon any critical discussion of the
foundation of his own philosophy.
About the concept of the Absolute in itself, no further
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questions can be asked. If we do ask questions about the
Absolute, it would cease to be the Absolute. The consequence
is that what is supposed to make the world intelligible must
itself be unintelligible and beyond rational discussion.
This is very odd, indeed. It makes a nonsense of Hagerstrom's
own philosophy if we follow his principle of causation which
says that like causes produce like effects.
But it is, nevertheless, the basis for Hagerstrom's
existence as a cognitive sovereign claiming obedience to his
teaching and inculcating the feeling of certainty in his pu¬
pils in order to make himself understood. The motto is:
crede ut intelligas, cf. above Chapter III, p. 140 and 173.
Hagerstrom's theory of knowledge and reality is import¬
ant in two respects. First it provides the foundation for
his inquiries into morality and law. These inquiries are
then based upon reason and bound to result in knowledge.
Secondly, it provides the foundation for his protection from
potential critics. Hagerstrom's inquiries are based upon
sound reason, and sound reason is infallible knowledge. Ha-
gerstrom's mistake is to confuse
a) when he knows that the horse is running then it
it is true that the horse is running, i.e. Hager¬
strom's judgement is true, with
b) when he knows that the horse is running then he
is stating a necessary truth, i.e. Hagerstrom's
judgement is a necessary truth.
If Hagerstrom knows that p, then necessarily p. But this
formula is ambiguous between (a) p is true and (b) p is ne¬
cessarily true. Hagerstrom exploits this ambiguity. The
judgements of other people can be classified as belonging
to (a). Hagerstrom's judgements, by contrast, always belong
to (b) .
In the area of morality, Hagerstrom's theory of know¬
ledge and reality leads to his thesis, as against Hume, that
man's passions are, and ought only to be, the slave of rea¬
son and can never pretend to any other office than to serve
and obey reason.^
2) Compare Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Sec.
Ill, p. 415.
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Hagerstrom's moral theory is presented in Chapter V,
Hagerstrom is generally known as being a non-cognitivist or
moral nihilist, i.e. his holding the thesis of moral nihi¬
lism which states that there can be no knowledge of values.
Since Hagerstrom's theory of knowledge equates knowledge
and reality, it follows that it is an ontological impossibi¬
lity that there are values in the world. There are then,
properly speaking, no genuine value-judgements, but only
words expressing feelings. It follows that values do serve
and obey reason, since Hagerstrom holds, on the basis of a
logical feeling of certainty, that values do not exist. Hence,
there can be no genuine problems of values and no genuine
solutions to these problems either. If values, including re¬
ligious values, are essentially a non-cognitive activity of
expressions of feelings, then they cannot possibly conflict
with the cognitive activity of reason. So the important con¬
sequence is on the one hand that religion is saved from the in¬
road of science, on the other hand theology is dismissed as not
a genuine scientific activity. Concerning feelings noboby
can be in the superior position of a teacher, and nobody in
the inferior position of a pupil.
Hagerstrom's moral skepticism commits him to the posi¬
tion of ethical individualism, i.e. the source of values is
only the individual's feelings. Based upon his theory of
knowledge and reality Hagerstrom transforms the conceptual
and normative questions concerning values into causal in¬
quiries where reason rather than experience operates. To
be sure, Hagerstrom appeals to experience. He claims that
values (i.e. feelings) are conditioned by the individual's
upbringing and his natural and social environment. This
causes the individual to believe in the objectivity of va¬
lues, but this is a case of illusion and superstition.
Nevertheless, Hagerstrom is involved in conceptual dif¬
ficulties, if he adheres to his own definition of the nature
of feelings and volitions. Here there is no process of ob-
jectification as is the case with thinking. In the case of
feeling and will there is no distinction between the state
of consciousness and the object, existing independently of
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the state of consciousness. In the case of feelings and vo¬
litions there are nothing but states of consciousness, using
empty words for expressing feelings and volitions. How can
empty words produce effects? This is, indeed, a mysterious
and incomprehensible operation according to Hagerstrom's
ontology. Hagerstrom's solution of this problem is not based
upon experience. He does not offer an empirical hypothesis
that empty words may, after all, cause feelings in a hearer
of those words. He does not set out to do some field-work.
He remains in his study, looking into himself, considering
his own state of consciousness when subjected to words ex¬
pressing feelings. Hagerstrom's assumption is that human na¬
ture is constant and uniform in all times and places. On this
basis Hagerstrom lays down that his experience of words ex¬
pressing values is tantamount to the experience of all people.
Hagerstrom's feeling, however, enjoys a privileged sta¬
tus, just as his feeling of logical evidence enjoys a privi¬
leged status. Hagerstrom's value-feeling is not to be tested
by reports made by anthropologists. On the contrary, these
reports are to be tested against Hagerstrom's feeling. Hager¬
strom's feeling has then a regulative status. This implies
that if Hagerstrom hears the military march then he, and
3)
everybody else, has a warlike feeling. If so, reason comes
into operation, since reason implies order, in nature as
well as in society. Reason is knowledge of causes which ope¬
rate necessarily. That is to say, in the absence of the cause,
the effect will never occur.
To secure peace within society, it is then necessary to
remove the causes of war. It is quite simple then. You stop
playing the military march, and the effect of a warlike feel¬
ing does not occur.
The idea that people have natural rights is also a dan¬
gerous idea. The idea of natural rights functions as a cause
to produce effects within society. Again the solution is
quite simple, viz. to eliminate the cause. If people have
no idea of natural rights, then the effects of "brawls" con-
3) Hclgerstrom, PR p. 71.
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cerning "meum and tuum, just and unjust, profitable and un-
4)
profitable", to use Hobbes' phrase, cannot occur.
Hagerstrom shares Hobbes' idea of peace as all-import¬
ant. Hobbes retains the idea of natural rights and intro¬
duces a powerful sovereign to make some common rules backed
up by the sword, in order to secure peace. Hagerstrom aban¬
dons the idea of natural rights and claims that the sovereign
has no creative will. He is bound by law as well. This takes
Hagerstrom into a discussion of the nature of law, which I
have considered in Chapter VI.
If my understanding of Hagerstrom is correct, then he
has two theories of law, which I have called the formal
theory of law and the psychological theory of law. The for¬
mal theory holds, briefly, that legal rules are categorical
imperatives which determine the necessary actions for the
survival of a peaceful life within society. The psychologi¬
cal theory holds, briefly, that legal rules are expression
of interests and the maintenance of legal rules depends upon
the pressure of using words to influence people to share the
interest in upholding the law. The formal theory enables
Hagerstrom to reject the voluntaristic theory of law which
holds that legal rules are made by a sovereign will, which im¬
poses names upon human conduct and thereby makes it right or
wrong conduct.
Hagerstrom's inquiry into law is a sustained attack
on voluntarist theories of law. His argument is that the
existence of a sovereign will presupposes the existence of
an independent legal order which sets limits to what the
sovereign may legitimately do. It is not open to the sove¬
reign will to choose what names to impose on conduct. Hager--
strom's assumption is that choosing is arbitrary depending
upon will, whereas finding is determined. What is created
is arbitrary, what is given or found is fixed by laws, which
operate independently of man's faculties of reason, will and
feeling. It seems to me that this assumption is false. What
is created is not necessarily arbitrary.
4) Hobbes, Man and Citizen (De Cive VI, 9), p. 178.
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Hagerstrom's assumption leads him to the thesis that
law is found rather than made. It is the distinction between
order and anarchy, between a genuine legal order and despot¬
ism. This thesis implies that the sovereign, no less than
his subjects, is bound by law. The legislator is determined
by the natural and social environment in which he lives,
and cannot arbitrarily impose his will upon men living to¬
gether in society.
It seems to me that Hagerstrom conflates laws in a de¬
scriptive sense and laws in a prescriptive sense. The latter,
but not the former, are not fixed in the sense that they
cannot be changed. Hagerstrom is, however, opposed to change,
which leads him to the view that we are "the slaves" of the law.-^
Law is not only the cohesive force of the State, it is also
above the sovereign. This is the foundation for Hagerstrom's
rejection of Hobbes' theory of law and John Austin's theory
of law. Indeed, any voluntaristic theory of law is rejected
as a piece of metaphysics, because it is rooted in the con¬
cept of an active will. This also leads Hagerstrom to re¬
ject Kelsen's theory of law as a piece of metaphysics, since
Kelsen's theory is based upon a construction of thought. A
proper theory of law must be based upon what is given to
reason. If we think realistically, Hagerstrom claims, then
we must realize that we move within a sphere of fixed con¬
cepts, the selection of which is not open to us. What is
open to us is to discover the real meaning of the fixed con¬
cepts by tracing their origins.
Hagerstrom's mistake is, it seems to me, to underrate
the value of concepts, created by philosophers or scientists,
for rendering law intelligible. For Hagerstrom this is tant¬
amount to empty fantasy as distinct from philosophical
truths. Hagerstrom claims to possess the truth.
Another consequence of Hagerstrom's formal theory is
his rejection of individuals having natural rights. All
rights, in the proper sense, depend for their existence upon
the law. All the benefits of civilization, all cultural va-
5) Cf. Hagerstrom, Ratten och Staten, p. 253.
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lues, appear as gifts from the law, which barbarians tend
to destroy by anti-social behaviour rooted in the idea of
having natural rights to freedom. In this sense Hagerstrom
is strongly opposed to natural rights theories, and rather
an ardent legal positivist.
Hagerstrom's rejection of natural rights implies dismissal
of the idea that the legitimacy of the law depends upon the
individual's consent. This is also why institutions of par¬
liamentary democracy can find no proper place in Hagerstrom's
formal theory of law. He believes rather in education of in¬
dividuals into a state governed by impersonal reason as ex¬
pressed in legal rules. Hagerstrom regards any exercise of
will upon the law as perversive of its nature. His answer to
the key question of the legitimacy of the legal order is that
the actual existing legal order is the legitimate legal order.
What is, is legitimate. This is to reduce norms to facts,
which is quite consistent within Hagerstrom's theory of know¬
ledge and reality.
As a consequence of this theory Hagerstrom holds, in
his formal theory of law, that the individual is bound to
obey the law just as the legislator is bound to obey the law.
In this sense Hagerstrom holds a natural law theory accord¬
ing to his own definition. Again the objection is that Hager¬
strom conflates law in a descriptive sense with law in a
prescriptive sense.
As for the content of legal rules and for the criteria
governing the use of legal language Hagerstrom's position
is ambiguous. On the one hand he holds that they are not
open to choice but given in the nature of things. On the
other hand they are open to the legislator's choice provided
he is directed by a proper understanding of the requirements
of society based upon reason.
Hagerstrom holds that the concepts of right and duty are
correlative concepts. These concepts are not meaningless
simplicities. There is room for a genuine concept of duty
as well for a genuine concept of right, when these concepts
have been purified from the confused mixture of logically
unrelated ideas such as the individual's active will. Proper-
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ly understood the concept of duty is equivalent to right
conduct. And right conduct is determined in legal rules.
The content of these rules is, in turn, determined by men's
social interest in common welfare as distinct from men's
self-interest in selfish behaviour. For Hagerstrom there is
natural selection by and for group survival based upon the
social instinct as opposed to selection by and for indivi¬
dual survival based upon the selfish instinct. Behaviour
that helps the group rather than the individual within so¬
ciety is rewarded by natural selection, which determines
the course of evolution. Men's social interest in common wel¬
fare calls for security, discipline, and the upholding of a
stable social order. This social order is by nature hierarchical.
The autonomous morality of each individual, which is
stressed by Hagerstrom, is very much in line with Bradley's
thought that the individual apart from the society is not
anything real, and the individual becomes real only by ful¬
filling his station and his duties as a member within an
organized society. In a genuine legal order, the individual's
duty and right are united in one and the same relation de¬
fined by impersonal laws.
It follows that Hagerstrom's thesis of moral nihilism,
mentioned above, is restricted to religious values. They de¬
pend solely upon feelings, and are beyond the reach of science.
As for other values, Hagerstrom's formal theory supplies the
answer which commits him to a cognitivist position. Right
conduct is either found or established by reason.
Hence the importance of the psychological theory, which
is connected with Hagerstrom's conception of natural selec¬
tion. Again it must be noticed that this is not an empirical
theory. The theory holds that law is an expression of inter¬
ests, viz. the interest in obeying the law. Since interests
are, for Hagerstrom, expressions of will, the surprising re¬
sult is that Hagerstrom holds a will-theory of law, which
does not fit with his general attack upon voluntarist theo¬
ries. Hagerstrom's psychological theory is designed, however,
to inculcate the basic principles of social co-operation,
to make the system of welfare services provided by law
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effective. The duty to obey the law is then of crucial im¬
portance. The duty to obey the law is natural in the sense
that it depends upon man's social instinct. Hagerstrom can¬
not fail to observe that this social instinct does not act
infallibly on its own account. It is Hagerstrom's objective
to see to that it does act infallibly by counteracting man's
anti-social instinct to evade the law, when he can get away
with it. This instinct, which is rooted in man's idea of
having an active will, leads to anarchy. This presents clear¬
ly a danger for peace within society.
The curious thing is that Hagerstrom claims to have
solved this problem by his thesis that there is no such thing
as an active will. The fact that he introduces his psycholo¬
gical theory shows clearly that his thesis must be rejected
or at least modified, since the psychological theory holds
that law is an expression of will. Another problem for Hager¬
strom is that his psychological theory implies that it is
possible to interfere with nature's universally binding laws.
This again is inconsistent with his determinism.
Hagerstrom's way out of these difficulties is, I think,
that he tries to prove his own thesis that there is no such
thing as an active will by using the words "right" and "duty"
as means to destroy the anti-social instinct and firmly in¬
culcate the social instinct to adhere to legal rules.
Thus legal science has supreme importance for life in
society. Legal science is social inculcation of right
conduct. The function of legal science is not to predict be¬
haviour but to enthuse citizens to act according to the law.
The aim is that they may receive the content of law into
their consciousness and thereby make society cohere. Since
legal science is based upon reason it is neutral in the
sense that it involves no value-judgements as expressions
of feelings. The legal scientist functions rather like a
doctor, where the patients are the citizens.
The formal theory enables the legal scientist to know
and demonstrate the sovereignty of law over men's passions.
The psychological theory is used to take care that the sove¬
reignty of the law is maintained in order to secure the
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overriding aim of social harmony and stability between peopl
living together in society. If the formal theory of law and
the psychological theory are combined, or even reduced to
one theory of law which Hagerstrom's theory of knowledge and
reality implies, then reason governs the passions. The le¬
gal order will function as a machine, where men, like cogs,
mechanically and automatically act according to laws.
I dissent from the implications of his philosophy for
life in society. The implications that there can be no mo¬
ral criticism of the existing legal order, that men are re¬
duced to powerless and mindless creatures in a total order
united by a single-minded feeling of harmony based upon the
single thought that there is but one Kingdom, and Paradise
is, after all, realized on Earth.
On the basis of HagerstrSm's cognitive sovereignty his
thesis is the sovereignty of law. The thesis is stated as a
demand of reason which must be obeyed as a precondition of
genuine knowledge and as a precondition of genuine order
within society. Hagerstrom's conception of reason can only
command and dominate man's passions and his life in society.
His sovereign reason turns out to be a coercive sovereign,
whose authority cannot be questioned.
I have, nevertheless, challenged Hagerstrom's authority
My objection is that Hagerstrom's conception of reason over¬
looks that reason may also function to inform and guide man'
passions rather than to destroy them as Hagerstrom implies.
If Hagerstrom's philosophy works, then this leads in
the end to moral as well as intellectual apathy. To be sure,
Hagerstrom has then achieved his aim. His basic value, "we
wish first and foremost to live an unobstructed life", has
6)
been implemented. ' Peace has been brought about by reason,
but at a very high price, viz. the destruction of man's
freedom and creativity. I am not quite sure whether Hager¬
strom has designed his theories of law to achieve this ef¬
fect. If I am right that the destruction of man's freedom
is the effect, then can Hagerstrom's philosophy be dismissed
on that account alone?
6) Hagerstrom, PR p. 213.
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I am not quite sure whether this is a proper basis for
dismissal of Hagerstrom's theory, bearing Hume's remark in
mind, that is "when any opinion leads us into absurdities,
'tis certainly false; but 'tis not certain an opinion is
7)
false, because 'tis of dangerous consequence".
Then, perhaps, there is more force in the objection to
Hagerstrom's theory that it leads us into absurdities. The
absurdity is Hagerstrom's theory of knowledge and reality,
which is the foundation for his legal theories. HSgerstrom's
theory of knowledge leads him to reject whatever does not
fit into his system as a piece of metaphysics. As an illu¬
stration there is his rejection of the atomic theory "which
is metaphysical and meaningless, leads to speculations which
8)
are ultimately meaningless - a weaving of words". HSger-
strom did not live long enough to see that "a weaving of
words" was capable of producing the atomic bomb.
Hagerstrom's great mistake is, it seems to me, to claim
that when he declares that something exists, then it does as
a matter of fact exist. An example is Hagerstrom's idea of
the course of evolution, which commits him to the Phoenix
myth, the myth of a fresh start provided by Hagerstrom's phi-
9)
losophy. This will carry men to a condition of happiness.
And when Hagerstrom declares that something is non-existent
then it is non-existent as a matter of fact. So he is high¬
ly surprised and puzzled when reality turns out otherwise.
This leads him to claim that the facts so presented are,
really, mystical forces. On both accounts, the result is a
falsification of the way things are.
2. Looking Ahead
I have questioned HSgerstrom's cognitive sovereignty, and
perhaps some of Hagerstrom's disciples may reject my studies
in the philosophy of Axel Hagerstrom as being rather studies
7) Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Sec. II, p. 409.
8) Hagerstrom, PR p. 311.
9) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 95.
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against the philosophy of Axel Hagerstrom''" ^ . To these cri¬
tics my reply is that my studies are in as well as against
the philosophy of Axel HSgerstrom. They are in HSgerstrom's
philosophy in the sense that I have tried to understand the
meaning of HagerStrom's sentences in order to examine whet-
er these sentences express true or false judgements. My
studies are against Hagerstrom's philosophy in the sense
that I claim that Hagerstrom's philosophy rests upon un-
truisms. Nevertheless, Hagerstrom's philosophy must be taken
seriously as an attempt to ground law and legal science upon
epistemology.^' This seems to me to be the lasting value of
Hagerstrom's philosophy. Unfortunately, Hagerstrom is high¬
ly, but wrongly, suspicious of the essentially constructive
nature of thought which leads to the introduction of new
concepts to make reality, including law, intelligible. Con¬
sequently Hagerstrom condemns theory on precisely those
points, where its constructive character comes to light, as
for example in Kelsen's theory of law.
Hagerstrom's mistake is to lay down, once and for all,
the limits of intelligible discourse, in such a way, as to
exclude the introduction of new concepts.
To mention an example of what I have in mind about the
constructive nature of thought within law. Hagerstrdm's con¬
ception of law is in terms of a command, albeit an indepen¬
dent command. But it may be illuminating to discard the no¬
10) Cf. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, p. 19, and see above
Ch. I, Sec. 9, especially p. 31.
11) It is curious to notice that Hagerstrom's philosophy is not taken
seriously in Sweden. To mention but two examples. Alexander Pecze-
nik describes in his book Juridikens Metodproblem (Methodological
Problem of Legal Science), Stockholm 1974, p. 15, Hagerstrom as
a great philosopher, his works are mentioned too, but why Hager-
strom is a great philosopher Peczenik does not tell his reader.
In another book by Dag Victor, Rattssystemer och Vetenskap (Legal
Systems and Knowledge), Uppsala 1977, Hagerstrom's philosophy is
simply ignored, Victor is concerned with Aristotle's philosophy
and its importance for the methodology of legal science, where
Victor deals with Lundstedt's view. This seems to me to be remark¬
able. Since Hagerstrom is influenced by Aristotle, and Lundstedt
is influenced by Hagerstrom, I should think that Victor is mistaken
when he ignores Hagerstrom's philosophy. Even more so, since Hager¬
strom's philosophy has been so influential in Sweden.
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tion of command and its implication of some superior autho¬
rity on the part of the commander. It is more illuminating
to see law in terms of rules, as H.L.A. Hart does.
The constructive aspect is quite important, since to
have the power to legislate is to have the power to form a
whole group's way of life. This is, to be sure, realized by
Hagerstrom. What he fails to realize is that we are not ne¬
cessarily slaves of the law. It is, after all, possible for
the slaves to rebel against the tyranny of law. HSgerstrGm
also realizes, quite correctly in my opinion, the importance
of legal science and its reciprocal relationship to episte-
mology. Epistemology and legal science are dependent on each
other.
For Hagerstrom this relationship is a necessary one.
That is to say, Hagerstrom's theory of law stands and falls
together with his theory of knowledge and reality. If the
latter is dismissed, so is the legal theory. I am not sure
whether this is the right conclusion to draw. Certainly,
Hagerstrom is right to insist that science without episte¬
mology is muddled.
He is wrong, when he insists that important questions
such as whether, and to what extent, individuals have rights,
and whether the existing legal order is just or unjust can¬
not be legitimately raised and properly answered.
What we need, then, is not to reject Hagerstrom's phi¬
losophy and start afresh. What we need is to take Hagerstrom's
philosophy seriously as a basis for a better epistemology as a
basis for better legal theories. We are not, then, slaves of
our own theories, as Hagerstrom claims. On the contrary, it
is possible to create new theories, which render the law
more intelligible. This is to continue in the spirit of Ha¬
gerstrom, to continue to work as he did, but with the dif¬
ferent aim of providing room for reason as well as for pas¬
sions .
To conclude with a remark made by Mr. Justice Holmes,
jr. :
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""The work is done". But just as one says that, the answer
comes: "The race is over, but the work never is done while
the power to work remains"." -^)
My thesis is, finally, at journey's end. But then there
is a new vista ahead, as I have just suggested, I also hope
to have the power to work on that. As Holmes says:
"The canter that brings you to a standstill need not be
only coming to rest. It cannot be, while you still live.
For to live is to function. That is all there is in living."
12) Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Occasional Speeches (edt. M. De Wolfe
Howe), Cambridge, Mass. 1962, p. 178, also here the next quotation.
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